

COURT FILE NUMBER 2001-05630

COURT COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH OF ALBERTA IN BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY

JUDICIAL CENTRE CALGARY

APPLICANTS **IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED**

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF DOMINION DIAMOND MINES ULC, DOMINION DIAMOND DELAWARE COMPANY LLC, DOMINION DIAMOND CANADA ULC, WASHINGTON DIAMOND INVESTMENTS, LLC, DOMINION DIAMOND HOLDINGS, LLC, DOMINION FINCO INC., AND DOMINION DIAMOND MARKETING CORPORATION

DOCUMENT **BENCH BRIEF OF THE APPLICANTS**
(APPROVAL AND VESTING ORDER AND STAY EXTENSION)

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PART I - INTRODUCTION

1. This bench brief is submitted in support of an application by the debtors (“**Dominion**” or the “**Applicants**”) in these *Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act* (the “**CCAA**”) proceedings for orders (a) approving the Asset Purchase Agreement (the “**Purchase Agreement**”) dated as of December 6, 2020, by and among the Applicants, as vendors (the “**Dominion Vendors**”), and DDJ Capital Management, LLC and Brigade Capital Management, LP (the “**Contracting Purchasers**”); and (b) extending the Stay Period (as defined in the second amended and restated order granted by this Court on June 19, 2020 (the “**SARIO**”)) until and including March 1, 2021.
2. The transaction (the “**Transaction**”) contemplated by the Purchase Agreement before this Court, which is the culmination of nearly nine months of restructuring efforts, meets Dominion’s primary restructuring objective in commencing these CCAA proceedings by providing for a going concern outcome for the Ekati Mine.
3. The going concern nature of the Transaction also furthers the objective of the CCAA by saving the Ekati Mine and its attendant jobs, contracts, impact benefit agreements, tax revenue, and environmental reclamation commitments, thereby helping to avoid the devastating social and economic effects of the potential bankruptcy or creditor-initiated termination of Dominion’s business.
4. The Transaction is supported by the First Lien Lenders (who have advanced to Dominion US\$150 million under a revolving facility in the form of draws totalling approximately US\$70 million in cash with a further approximate CDN\$110,000,000 having been utilized for the purpose of obtaining letters of credit) and the Ad Hoc Group (members of which hold in excess of 50% of the US\$550 million face value of Dominion’s second lien notes). The Monitor is also supportive of the approval of the Transaction.
5. After three prior strategic review processes undertaken in the past five years, and a thorough exploration and canvassing of the market over the course of more than five months through a sales process approved by this Court, the Transaction contemplated by the Purchase Agreement is the best executable alternative for the Applicants at this time and in the circumstances.
6. The alternative to the approval of the Transaction is the real possibility that Dominion will not be able to avoid liquidation. The devastating social and economic effects of such an outcome

would be inconsistent with the purpose of the CCAA and be contrary to the interests of the Applicants' stakeholders generally.

7. The Purchase Agreement requires, among other things, that the Approval and Vesting Order sought by Dominion on this application be issued on or prior to December 11, 2020 and that operations at the Ekati Mine be re-started by no later than January 29, 2021. There is accordingly significant urgency to the relief sought by the Applicants.

8. The Applicants' proposed stay extension up to and including March 1, 2021, which date roughly coincides with the February 1, 2021 Outside Date for the closing of the Transaction as may potentially be extended under the Purchase Agreement, is required to permit a closing of the Transaction.

9. The Applicants submit that the approval of the Purchase Agreement and the granting of the requested extension to the Stay Period is in the best interests of Dominion's stakeholders generally, including but not limited to the interests of Northern communities, Northern Indigenous groups, employees and contractors (and Northern-based employees and contractors in particular), the environment, and creditors, and should therefore be approved by this Court.

PART II – FACTS

A. BACKGROUND

10. Background facts relating to the commencement of these CCAA proceedings are set out in the affidavit of Kristal Kaye, sworn April 21, 2020.

11. Background facts with respect to the sale investment solicitation process (the "**SISP**") approved by this Court on June 19, 2020 are set out in the affidavits of John Startin, sworn May 21, 2020 (the "**May Startin Affidavit**"), June 12, 2020, and October 5, 2020 ("**October Startin Affidavit**"), and the affidavits of Brendan Bell, sworn May 21, 2020, June 12, 2020, and October 4, 2020 (the "**October 4 Bell Affidavit**").

12. The circumstances leading up to the unavailability of the stalking horse bid (the "**Stalking Horse Bid**") approved by this Court as part of the SISP, and the Applicants' subsequent efforts to pursue alternate restructuring options, which culminated in the execution of the Purchase Agreement before this Court, are discussed in the affidavit of Brendan Bell, sworn October 23,

2020 and the Ninth and Tenth Reports of the Monitor dated November 15, 2020 and December 1, 2020, respectively.

13. The facts relating to the Transaction that is the subject of this application are described in the affidavit of Brendan Bell, sworn December 7, 2020 (the “**December Bell Affidavit**”).

14. The background facts relevant to the present application are summarized below.¹

B. DOMINION’S PURSUIT OF A GOING CONCERN RESTRUCTURING

15. Prior to these CCAA proceedings, Dominion conducted three unsuccessful strategic review processes to, among other things, solicit the sale of Dominion’s assets to a third-party. The first two of these strategic processes were undertaken with the assistance of a bank-owned financial advisor in each of 2015 and 2016 and did not produce a buyer. The third strategic process was undertaken in 2017 and resulted in one formal offer to acquire the company, being the offer that led to the acquisition of Dominion by The Washington Companies (“**Washington**”).²

16. After the company’s acquisition by Washington, Dominion faced several financial challenges that culminated in the company’s need to seek protection under the CCAA.

17. As noted at the June 19, 2020 hearing before this Court and set out in the consolidated statement of loss found at Exhibit D to Ms. Kaye’s April 21, 2020 affidavit, Dominion lost a combined US\$332 million in 2018 and 2019. Additionally, again as outlined by Ms. Kaye in her affidavit, the ability of Dominion to conduct business and generate revenue and liquidity prior to the commencement of these CCAA proceedings had been constrained by the company’s highly leveraged capital structure (which includes the US\$150 First Lien Lenders’ facility and the US\$550 million in second lien notes). These financial woes were exacerbated and materially impacted in the first quarter of 2020 by COVID-19, cash calls by Dominion’s joint venture partner at the Diavik Mine, increasing trade debt owing to suppliers, and finally an impending US\$20 million interest payment due May 1, 2020 to the holders of the second lien notes (which interest payments are due semi-annually and a further US\$20 million would have had to be paid November 1, 2020 but for these CCAA proceedings).³

¹ Capitalized terms not otherwise defined in this bench brief have the meanings ascribed to them in the December Bell Affidavit and Purchase Agreement, as applicable.

² December Bell Affidavit at para. 7

³ December Bell Affidavit at para. 9

18. These circumstances and constraints led Dominion to apply for and obtain from this Court on April 22, 2020 protection from the company's creditors pursuant to an initial CCAA order.

19. On April 22, 2020, upon the granting of the initial CCAA order, Dominion issued a press release advising the public and interested parties of the commencement of these CCAA proceedings. In its press release, Dominion disclosed that it intended to use these CCAA proceedings to engage in discussions with its lenders, creditors, equity sponsor, and other stakeholders, and to solicit and evaluate strategic alternatives to restructure financially and operationally.⁴

20. Dominion's April 22, 2020 press release also noted that Dominion had received and was considering a proposal from an affiliate of Washington (the "**Stalking Horse Bidder**") for debtor-in-possession financing, which was conditional upon Dominion agreeing to: (a) a memorandum of understanding regarding a possible sale of Dominion's assets to the Stalking Horse Bidder; and (b) bidding procedures for the solicitation of competing offers to such sale.⁵

21. With the assistance of Evercore, a leading independent investment banking advisory and investment management firm engaged as the company's financial advisor, Dominion's negotiations with the Stalking Horse Bidder and their First Lien Lenders culminated in a letter of intent delivered to Dominion by the Stalking Horse Bidder on May 21, 2020. The letter of intent set out an integrated, comprehensive restructuring proposal that included a Stalking Horse Bid and a SISP that provided for a process to identify potentially higher and better offers than provided for by the Stalking Horse Bid.⁶

C. COURT APPROVAL OF A SALES PROCESS

(1) **Court Approval of the Stalking Horse Bid and SISP**

22. On May 21, 2020, the Applicants filed an application for a second amended and restated initial order (or the SARIO, as defined above), approving the SISP, the Stalking Horse Bid, and a related Interim Financing Term Sheet (among other things) with a hearing set for May 29, 2020.⁷

23. Dominion's application for approval of the SISP and Stalking Horse Bid was heard on May 29, 2020 and continued to June 19, 2020. Prior to and during the hearing of the application

⁴ December Bell Affidavit at para. 12

⁵ December Bell Affidavit at para. 12

⁶ May Startin Affidavit at para. 9

⁷ May Startin Affidavit at para. 3

Dominion's stakeholders provided input on the SISP timelines and procedures and several changes were made to address such stakeholder input.

24. The Monitor supported the approval of the SISP and Stalking Horse Bid by this Court, noting (among other things) that "the SISP is a fair and transparent marketing process designed to identify the highest and best offers for the Dominion Vendors' assets and to maximize recoveries, by seeking offers superior to the Stalking Horse Bid."⁸

25. On June 19, 2020, after considering the submissions of various stakeholders, this Court approved the Applicants' application for the SARIO, thereby approving the SISP and Stalking Horse Bid.

(2) Evercore's Implementation of the SISP

26. The SISP approved by this Court was structured as a two-phase process to be implemented by Evercore and Dominion with the oversight of the Monitor.

27. Pursuant to the SISP, interested parties could submit offers for:

- (a) the purchase of (i) all or substantially all of the assets, property, and undertakings of the Applicants and certain of their subsidiaries; (ii) the Diavik Interest; and (iii) the Non-Diavik Assets; or (iv) some other portion of the assets, property, and undertakings of the Applicants; or
- (b) an investment in, restructuring, recapitalization, refinancing, or other form of reorganization of Dominion or its business.

28. That is, the SISP allowed any potentially interested party to submit a broad range of restructuring proposals, not just a bid for a sale of assets.

29. The SISP provided for two phases. Phase 1 required interested parties to submit a non-binding letter of intent containing critical information about the proposed bid. If no Phase 1 bids were received, the SISP provided that the Dominion Vendors would seek court approval of the Stalking Horse Bid. Parties that submitted Phase 1 bids that satisfied certain enumerated criteria

⁸ Fourth Report of the Monitor dated May 26, 2020 at para. 32(i).

(more particularly set out in the SISP) would have the opportunity to submit a binding offer in Phase 2 of the SISP.⁹

30. While Phase 1 of the SISP formally commenced upon the granting of the SARIO on June 19, 2020, Evercore took steps to advance the process contemplated by the SISP prior to this date to ensure that the SISP was implemented in a timely and effective manner.¹⁰

31. In particular, Evercore began contacting potential bidders on April 27, 2020, nearly two months before the formal approval of the SISP.¹¹ As a result of Evercore's outreach program, the marketing process for the Dominion Vendors' assets had been underway for nearly two months prior to the formal commencement of the SISP on June 19, 2020, with thirty-eight potential bidders including Washington having been contacted by Evercore as of June 11, 2019.¹²

32. The formal SISP process, which commenced on June 19, 2020, ended upon the expiry of the Second Extended Phase 2 Deadline under the SISP on September 15, 2020.

33. The SISP did not result in a qualified bid other than that of the Stalking Horse Bidder. Nor did any third-parties come forward with their own stalking horse offer in the approximately two months between the commencement of these CCAA proceedings in April and the formal start of the SISP process in June notwithstanding the limited pool of potential purchasers and the public nature of these CCAA proceedings.¹³

34. On September 15, 2020 (i.e., the Second Extended Phase 2 Deadline), counsel to the Ad Hoc Group wrote to counsel to Dominion requesting that Dominion not proceed with the Stalking Horse Bid (notwithstanding that no other qualified bids were received in the SISP) and instead engage in discussions with the Ad Hoc Group on an alternate transaction path. Prior to sending this letter, the Ad Hoc Group had participated in the SISP including by submitting a Phase 1 bid.¹⁴

35. After consideration of, among other things, the appropriateness of implementing the SISP, the value of the Stalking Horse Bid, and the granting of extensions to the SISP timelines in the form of the First and Second Extended Phase 2 Bid Deadlines, the Applicants' Independent

⁹ October Startin Affidavit at para. 13

¹⁰ October Startin Affidavit at para. 19

¹¹ October Startin Affidavit at para. 24

¹² October Startin Affidavit at para. 25

¹³ December Bell Affidavit at para. 15

¹⁴ December Bell Affidavit at para. 16

Director determined that it was in the best interest of Dominion and its stakeholders generally that Dominion continue to move forward with the transaction contemplated by the Stalking Horse Bid.¹⁵

(3) Unavailability of the Stalking Horse Bid and Pursuit of an Alternate Transaction

36. The transaction contemplated by the Stalking Horse Bid was the culmination of a multi-month effort by Dominion, with the support of the First Lien Lenders and other key stakeholders, to find a going concern solution to Dominion's financial challenges that would save the Ekati Mine and its attendant jobs, contracts, impact benefit agreements, tax revenue, and satisfy the company's environmental reclamation obligations, all to the benefit of Dominion's stakeholders generally.¹⁶

37. However, five days after the Applicants' Independent Director swore an affidavit supporting the approval of the transaction contemplated by the Stalking Horse Bid, Dominion issued a press release announcing that its court application for approval of such transaction would not be proceeding due to the inability of the Stalking Horse Bidder and Dominion's Surety Bond Issuers to reach an agreement relating to a material closing condition.¹⁷

38. The break-down in negotiations between the Stalking Horse Bidder and the Surety Bond Issuers had an obvious and significant impact on these CCAA proceedings.

39. With the transaction contemplated by the Stalking Horse Bid no longer an option, Dominion commenced working diligently with the assistance of its legal counsel and Evercore, and in consultation with the Monitor, to assess all its available options. These efforts involved discussions with numerous stakeholders including the First Lien Lenders, the Ad Hoc Group, the Surety Bond Issuers, and others.¹⁸

40. Since this Court granted Dominion's request for an extension of the Stay Period to December 15, 2020, Dominion has continued consultation with its stakeholders regarding available restructuring objectives, including by continuing to facilitate discussions among the First

¹⁵ October 4 Bell Affidavit at para. 78; December Bell Affidavit at para. 17

¹⁶ December Bell Affidavit at para. 18

¹⁷ December Bell Affidavit at para. 19

¹⁸ December Bell Affidavit at para. 21

Lien Lenders, the Ad Hoc Group, and other stakeholders as well as their respective legal and financial advisors.¹⁹

41. As of November 13, 2020, as a result of the efforts noted above, the First Lien Lenders and the Ad Hoc Group had agreed in principle, subject to agreement on binding terms, to a restructuring transaction involving Dominion's business that would see Dominion recapitalized and able to continue to operate as a going concern with a planned restart of mining operations in early 2021.²⁰

42. Based on this development, on November 13, 2020, Dominion issued a press release advising that, in anticipation of the First Lien Lenders and the Ad Hoc Group reaching an agreement, Dominion had determined to recall sixty furloughed employees effective early December 2020.²¹

D. OVERVIEW OF THE AD HOC GROUP TRANSACTION

43. On December 6, 2020, the First Lien Lenders and the Ad Hoc Group entered into a Mutual Support Agreement (the "**Support Agreement**") regarding the Transaction to be implemented within the context of these CCAA proceedings.²²

44. The Purchase Agreement, a copy of which is attached as Schedule "A" to the Approval and Vesting Order being sought by the Applicants, includes among others the following terms (with capitalized terms utilized in the table below that are not otherwise defined herein having the meanings ascribed to them in the Purchase Agreement):²³

Term	Details
Restart of Operations (s. 7.1(a)(i) of the Purchase Agreement)	Dominion shall take all actions reasonably necessary or appropriate in furtherance of re-starting operations and shall in any case ensure that such operations are re-started by no later than January 29, 2021.
Purchase Price (s. 4.1 of the Purchase Agreement)	The Purchase Price for the Acquired Assets to be paid and satisfied by the Purchaser is the aggregate of:

¹⁹ December Bell Affidavit at para. 22

²⁰ Ninth Report of the Monitor dated November 15, 2020 at para. 13

²¹ December Bell Affidavit at para. 24

²² December Bell Affidavit at para. 25

²³ December Bell Affidavit at para. 26

Term	Details
	<p>(a) the value of the Pre-filing Indebtedness Assumption, being the assumption by the Purchaser on Closing (or the repayment on Closing if such repayment is in accordance with the Support Agreement) of US \$70,000,000 of outstanding Indebtedness under the Pre-filing Credit Agreement, on and subject to the terms and conditions set out in the Support Agreement and the definitive documents to be delivered pursuant thereto);</p> <p>(b) the value of the Indemnity Assumption, being the assumption by Purchaser on Closing of indemnity and related obligations in respect of certain surety bonds in the face amount of CDN \$278,970,785 issued by the Surety Bond Issuers for the benefit of the Dominion Vendors, on and subject to the terms and conditions set out in the Sureties Support Confirmations and the definitive documents to be delivered pursuant thereto; and</p> <p>(c) the value of the Assumed Liabilities.</p>
<p>Additional Consideration/Capitalization (s. 4.3 of the Purchase Agreement)</p>	<p>Concurrently with Closing, the Contracting Purchasers shall provide to Purchaser new financing of US \$70,000,000 to fund Purchaser's post-Closing satisfaction of Assumed Liabilities, which amount includes payment of the Cure Amount, operations at the Ekati Mine, and general working capital, all on and subject to the terms and conditions set out in the Support Agreement and the definitive documents to be delivered pursuant thereto.</p>
<p>Acquired and Excluded Assets (ss. 3.1 and 3.2 of the Purchase Agreement)</p>	<p>The Purchaser will acquire substantially all the assets used in connection with the Dominion Vendors' business as well as all of the Dominion Vendors' rights and interests in relation to the receipt of realizations and recoveries from or in respect of the Diavik Joint Venture Interest, which shall be assigned to Purchaser subject only to the continuing liens and charges of the First Lien Lenders pursuant to the Pre-filing Credit Agreement until such time as all letters of credit issued by the First Lien Lenders in respect of the Diavik Mine have been cash collateralized or cancelled and all related fees have been paid.</p> <p>The Purchaser will not acquire Excluded Assets which include (a) the Diavik Joint Venture Agreement; (b) Excluded Contracts; (c) shares of certain subsidiaries; and (d) assets that are removed from the Acquired Assets.</p>

Term	Details
<p>Assumption of Liabilities (ss. 3.3 & 3.6 of the Purchase Agreement)</p>	<p>The Purchaser will assume substantially all go forward operating liabilities of the Dominion Vendors, including all obligations of the Dominion Vendors under their operational contracts to employees and unions, First Nations and aboriginal groups, and the GNWT, in each case on the terms set out in the Purchase Agreement.</p> <p>The Purchaser is entitled to make additions, deletions or modifications to the contracts being assigned after the date of the granting of the Approval and Vesting Order.</p> <p>The Purchaser and the Dominion Vendors will consider whether there are any contractual obligations in connection with the operations of the Ekati Mine that should not be assigned to the Purchaser.</p>
<p>GNWT Royalties (s. 7.15 of the Purchase Agreement)</p>	<p>Prior to or concurrent with the Closing, the Dominion Vendors will pay and/or otherwise obtain releases in full in a form satisfactory to the Contracting Purchasers of all obligations in respect of any period that are due and payable prior to Closing in respect of royalties or similar payment obligations to the GNWT, which shall include all royalty and similar payments obligations to GNWT in respect of fiscal year 2019. Payment of such amounts to the GNWT was also a requirement under the Stalking Horse Bid.</p>
<p>Wind-Down Account and Diavik Realization Account (7.1)</p>	<p>In order to facilitate the orderly wind down of the Dominion entities, at Closing, the Company will fund segregated bank accounts from cash on hand with US\$250,000 for wind down costs and US\$1,000,000 for costs relating to the administration of the Diavik Interest.</p>
<p>Employees (s. 8.1 of the Purchase Agreement)</p>	<p>Subject to certain terms specified in the Purchase Agreement, the Purchaser shall offer employment to substantially all employees of the Dominion Vendors and assume all employee benefit plans, pension plans, union and collective bargaining arrangements, and other employee arrangements on their existing terms.</p>
<p>Conditions (Articles 9 & 10 of the Purchase Agreement)</p>	<p>Closing of the Transaction contemplated by the Purchase Agreement is subject to customary and various conditions, including (a) approval by this Court of the Purchase Agreement; (b) regulatory approvals having been obtained; (c) an Assignment Order having been granted if necessary; and (d) the</p>

Term	Details
	First Lien Lenders and the Purchasers having executed and delivered the definitive documentation contemplated in the Support Agreement. There is no financing condition.
Closing and Outside Date (s. 12(b)(i) of the Purchase Agreement)	The parties will seek to close as soon as reasonably possible following court approval and the target date for closing is February 1, 2020 which coincides with the Outside Date for closing (subject to no more than four (4) seven (7) day extensions).

45. On December 4, 2020, Dominion's Surety Bond Issuers provided to the Contracting Purchasers the Sureties Support Confirmations contemplated by the Purchase Agreement confirming that upon the completion of the Transaction, the Surety Bond Issuers will issue the necessary documentation to replace Dominion's existing surety bond coverage with the same coverage for the Purchaser and subject to the applicable terms.²⁴

46. The Purchase Agreement (s. 12.4) also provides that, in consideration of the Contracting Purchasers having expended considerable time and expense in connection with the Purchase Agreement and the negotiation thereof, and the identification and quantification of assets to be included in the Acquired Assets, if: (a) the Purchase Agreement is terminated or the Transaction is not completed for any reason other than the Contracting Purchasers' non-compliance with their obligations under the Purchase Agreement; and (b) an alternative transaction is consummated within nine months of the date of the Purchase Agreement for the sale or restructuring of the Dominion Vendors or any material portion of their assets and pursuant to which Indebtedness under the Pre-filing Credit Agreement is repaid in full in cash ("**Alternate Transaction**"), then in such event (and in addition to such other expense reimbursement amounts to which the Contracting Purchasers may be entitled pursuant to the Purchase Agreement), the Dominion Vendors will pay to the Contracting Purchasers immediately following the closing of such Alternate Transaction an amount equal to US\$2,522,140 (the "**Break-Up Fee**") as consideration for the disposition of the Contracting Purchasers' rights under the Purchase Agreement.²⁵ The Break-Up Fee is approximately the same amount as the break-up fee in favour of the Stalking Horse Bidder approved by the SARIO.

²⁴ December Bell Affidavit at para. 27

²⁵ December Bell Affidavit at para. 28

47. The Dominion Vendors' obligation to pay the Break-Up Fee survives termination of the Purchase Agreement and is to be secured by a charge against all of the Dominion Vendors' properties and assets, which charge will rank subsequent to: (a) other priority charges ordered by this Court in the CCAA proceedings prior to the date of the Purchase Agreement; and (b) charges in respect of Indebtedness under the First Lien Lenders' Pre-filing Credit Agreement (as defined in the Purchase Agreement).²⁶

48. If the Purchase Agreement is terminated solely as a result of a material breach by any Contracting Purchaser, the Dominion Vendors, as their sole remedy, shall be entitled to liquidated damages in the amount of US\$7,000,000.²⁷

PART III – ISSUES

49. The sole issues to be considered on this application are whether this Court should:

- (a) approve the Transaction contemplated by the Purchase Agreement; and
- (b) approve the extension of the Stay Period.

PART IV – LAW & ANALYSIS

A. APPLICABLE LEGAL PRINCIPLES

(1) CCAA Sale Approvals

50. Restructuring proceedings under the CCAA are intended to provide a means whereby the devastating social and economic effects of bankruptcy or creditor-initiated termination of ongoing business operations can be avoided.²⁸ In furtherance of this purpose, Canadian courts have regularly approved sales of distressed businesses, recognizing that such sales are consistent with the remedial nature of the CCAA.²⁹

²⁶ December Bell Affidavit at para. 29

²⁷ December Bell Affidavit at para. 30

²⁸ *Ted Leroy Trucking [Century Services] Ltd. Re*, 2010 SCC 60 at para. 59 [TAB 2]. See also the comments of Justice Morawetz in *Nortel Networks Corp. (Re)* 2009, 55 C.B.R. (5th) 229 (Ont. S.C.J.) [Nortel] at para. 34 [TAB 3], where the Court stated that the CCAA should be given a "broad and liberal interpretation to facilitate its underlying purpose" and that "for as long as the business continues as a going concern, the primary goal of the CCAA will be met."

²⁹ *Nortel* at paras. 47-48 [TAB 3]

51. Section 36 of the CCAA expressly authorizes this Court to approve going concern sales of a debtor's assets outside of the ordinary course of business.

52. In deciding whether to approve a sale pursuant to section 36, this Court is required to consider the non-exhaustive factors set out in subsection 36(3), including:

- (a) whether the process leading up to the proposed sale or disposition was reasonable in the circumstances;
- (b) whether the monitor approved the process leading up to the proposed sale or disposition;
- (c) whether the monitor filed with a court a report stating that in their opinion the sale or disposition would be more beneficial to the creditors than a sale or disposition under a bankruptcy;
- (d) the extent to which creditors were consulted;
- (e) the effects of the proposed sale or disposition on the creditors and other interested parties; and
- (f) whether the consideration to be received for the assets is fair, taking into account their market value.³⁰

53. The list of factors set out in section 36(3) largely overlaps with the criteria set out in *Royal Bank of Canada v. Soundair Corp.*, which summarized the factors courts considered when assessing sale approval applications before the enactment of section 36 of the CCAA:

- (a) whether sufficient effort has been made to obtain the best price and that the debtor has not acted improvidently;
- (b) the interests of all parties;
- (c) the efficacy and integrity of the process by which offers have been obtained; and

³⁰ CCAA, s. 36 [TAB 1]; *Nelson Education Ltd (Re)*, 2015 ONSC 5557 [*Nelson Education*] at para. 38 [TAB 4]

(d) whether there has been any unfairness in the working out of the process.³¹

54. In terms of assessing the appropriateness of a debtor's decision to sell assets or complete a particular transaction, "a court will not lightly interfere with the exercise of the commercial and business judgment of the debtor company and the monitor in the context of an asset sale where the marketing and sale process was fair, reasonable, transparent and efficient."³² The Monitor's recommendation has been held to be particularly important and to carry "great weight" with the Court in any approval process.³³

(2) Approval of the Transaction Would Further the Objectives of the CCAA

55. The Transaction contemplates that the Purchaser (being one or more entities designated by the Contracting Purchasers in accordance with the Purchase Agreement) will assume substantially all of the go-forward operating liabilities of the Applicants (but not the Diavik Interest), including substantially all obligations (a) of the Applicants under Dominion's go-forward operational contracts and joint venture agreements; (b) to employees and unions (including obligations under Dominion's collective bargaining agreements and pension plan); (c) to Indigenous groups; and (d) to the Government of the Northwest Territories (the "GNWT").

56. The going concern sale of Dominion will also preserve a strategic resource for the Northwest Territories. As a material taxpayer and the second largest non-governmental employer in the Northwest Territories (with over 40% of employees being Northern residents), the continuation of the Ekati Mine as a going concern is critical to, among others, the Northwest Territories, Dominion's Northern-based employees and contractors, and Northern communities generally.³⁴ The importance of Dominion's business for these stakeholders cannot be overstated, and one of Dominion's primary objectives has been to identify a restructuring path for Dominion that provides the best opportunity for the Ekati Mine to restart operations and continue as a going concern.³⁵

³¹ *Re Canwest Publishing Inc.*, 2010 ONSC 2870 at para. 13 [TAB 5]; *Eddie Bauer of Canada Inc. (Re)*, [2009] O.J. No. 3784 at para. 21 [TAB 6]; *Royal Bank v. Soundair Corp.* (1991), 4 O.R. (3d) (Ont. C.A.) 1 [Soundair] at para. 16 [TAB 7]. These factors continue to be applied by this Court in considering whether to approve a sale pursuant to section 36 of the CCAA. See for example *Sanjel (Re)*, 2016 ABQB 257 [Sanjel] at para. 56 [TAB 8]; *Bellatrix Exploration Ltd. (Re)*, 2020 ABQB 332 at para. 29 [TAB 9]

³² *Aveos Fleet Performance Inc.*, 2012 QCCS 4074 [Aveos] at para. 50 [TAB 10]; *Sanjel* at para. 57 [TAB 8] citing *AbitibiBowater Inc. (Re)*, 2010 QCCS 1742 [Abitibi] at paras. 70-72 [TAB 11].

³³ *Aveos* at para. 50 [TAB 10]; *Sanjel* at para. 57 [TAB 8] citing *Abitibi* at paras. 70-72 [TAB 11].

³⁴ December Bell Affidavit at para. 32

³⁵ October 4 Bell Affidavit at paras. 15-16; December Bell Affidavit at paras. 32-33

57. In other words, the relief sought by the Applicants will further the objectives of the CCAA by preserving an important regional business and thereby avoid the devastating social and economic effects of a potential liquidation of Dominion's business. This outcome is a significant benefit to those who depend on Dominion's business operations for their livelihoods and economic well being.

58. In contrast, a liquidation of Dominion's business could result in the loss of hundreds of jobs and supply contracts and, in general, would be a devastating result for the North. This is clearly a result that is contrary to the objectives of the CCAA.

(3) The Transaction Meets the Section 36 Factors

59. In addition to furthering the objectives of the CCAA, the Transaction contemplated by the Purchase Agreement satisfies the statutory requirements of section 36 of the CCAA.

i. The process leading to the proposed sale of the Applicants' assets was reasonable in the circumstances

60. The commencement of these CCAA proceedings was preceded by three strategic sale processes for Dominion's assets in 2015, 2016, and 2017 that did not result in any offers to purchase Dominion's assets other than that of Washington.

61. To ensure that the SISP, which represented the fourth strategic process for the sale of Dominion's business in five years, was transparent, fair, and professionally conducted, Dominion engaged Evercore to conduct such process, with the oversight of the Monitor, in accordance with procedures approved by this Court after input from Dominion's stakeholders.

62. The SISP was designed to provide potentially interested parties with diverse options, including the ability to submit proposals for the purchase of all or substantially all of Dominion's assets, or alternatively some portion thereof, or to instead propose an investment in, restructuring, recapitalization, refinancing, or other form of reorganization of Dominion or its business. The Stalking Horse Bid approved by this Court as part of the SISP set price expectations for bidders, which further assisted with the efficiency of the SISP.

63. The SISP was implemented by Evercore, with the oversight of the Monitor, over a five month period, from the commencement of these CCAA proceedings on April 22, 2020, to the formal commencement of the SISP upon its approval by this Court on June 19, 2020, through to

the announcement of the Stalking Horse Bid as the successful bid upon the expiry of the Second Extended Phase 2 Deadline under the SISP on September 15, 2020.

64. The Monitor has advised this Court that the SISP represented a fair and transparent marketing process designed to identify the highest and best offers for the Dominion Vendors' assets and to maximize recoveries by seeking offers superior to the Stalking Horse Bid.

65. Upon the unavailability of the Stalking Horse Bid (which was the only qualified bid in the SISP), Dominion immediately undertook a thorough consultation process aimed at considering available restructuring alternatives and next steps. This process included:

- (a) Dominion, and its advisors, being in regular contact with the First Lien Lenders and their advisors. These contacts involved numerous discussions with and among the financial and legal advisors to Dominion and the First Lien Lenders, the Monitor, and direct discussions with representatives of Dominion's management and the advisors to the First Lien Lenders. Both Evercore and Dominion shared information, documentation and various financial analyses and models with the First Lien Lenders and their advisors to assist the First Lien Lenders in assessing and considering Dominion's situation and the available options;
- (b) Dominion and its advisors actively engaging in discussions with the Ad Hoc Group and its advisors, which involved numerous discussions with and among the financial and legal advisors to Dominion and the Ad Hoc Group, the Monitor, and representatives of Dominion's management and members of the Ad Hoc Group directly. In addition, Dominion, with the assistance of Evercore, shared confidential information and documentation and prepared financial analyses and modelling for the Ad Hoc Group. During these discussions, the Ad Hoc Group advised that it was working towards a going concern solution and a restructuring transaction to effect that outcome;
- (c) Dominion briefing the GNWT regarding alternative restructuring paths and available options;
- (d) Dominion engaging with representatives of a federal financial Crown corporation regarding available options for support for Dominion. Dominion had not previously engaged with such corporation in respect of such matters due to the Stalking Horse Bid and the pursuit of a going concern transaction with the Stalking Horse Bidder;

- (e) Dominion's advisors engaging directly with the advisors to the Surety Bond Issuers to discuss a going concern transaction and the interests of the Surety Bond Issuers in such a going concern outcome; and
- (f) Dominion continuing its ongoing consultation with the company's stakeholders regarding the status of these CCAA proceedings, including ongoing discussions with Dominion's trades, the union representing Dominion's unionized employees, and other stakeholders such as the beneficiaries under the Socio-Economic Agreement with the GNWT and Impact Benefit Agreements with Indigenous groups.

66. Dominion's discussions and consultations with its stakeholders noted above were focused on finding a restructuring option that would be in the best interests of Dominion and its stakeholders generally.

67. The Monitor's view is that the Applicants, in conjunction with Evercore, have marketed their business and assets in a fair and transparent manner and that all participants were treated consistently and with equal access to information and in a manner that managed against potential conflicts of interest among related parties.³⁶

ii. The Monitor approved the process leading to the proposed sale

68. The Monitor has submitted reports to this Court confirming that its view is that the SISF terms and timeframe were reasonable in the circumstances and afforded the Applicants with an opportunity to achieve a successful restructuring transaction.

69. The Monitor supports approval of the Transaction before this Court.

iii. Dominion's stakeholders were consulted throughout these CCAA proceedings

70. Dominion's stakeholders had the opportunity to provide input on the SISF prior to its implementation at two hearings before this Court. The input of stakeholders led to changes in the SISF process including the adjustment of SISF timelines. After a full hearing of all affected parties' submissions and concerns, this Court approved the SISF as being reasonable in the circumstances.

³⁶ Eleventh Report of the Monitor, at para. 29(a).

71. As noted above, when the transaction contemplated by the Stalking Horse Bid was no longer an option, Dominion commenced working diligently with the assistance of its legal counsel and Evercore, and in consultation with the Monitor, to assess all its available options. These efforts included extensive discussions with numerous stakeholders including the First Lien Lenders, the Ad Hoc Group, the Surety Bond Issuers, and others.

72. The Applicants' consultation process with its stakeholders throughout these CCAA proceedings has been extensive and integral to the development of the Transaction before this Court.

iv. The Transaction is more beneficial to Dominion's creditors and other interested parties than a sale or disposition under bankruptcy

73. The Transaction that is the subject of the Purchase Agreement is supported by the First Lien Lenders (who have advanced to Dominion US\$150 million under a revolving facility in the form of draws totalling approximately US\$70 million in cash with a further approximate CDN\$110,000,000 having been utilized for the purpose of obtaining letters of credit) and the Ad Hoc Group (members of which hold in excess of 50% of the US\$550 million face value of Dominion's second lien notes).

74. The Surety Bond Issuers have also provided to the Contracting Purchasers the Sureties Support Confirmations contemplated by the Purchase Agreement confirming that upon the completion of the Transaction, the Surety Bond Issuers will issue the necessary documentation to replace Dominion's existing surety bond coverage.

75. With respect to go-forward contracts, Dominion has worked diligently with many of its trade creditors and suppliers as well as with the Purchaser to identify those parties who are critical to Dominion's restructuring. Dominion has engaged in confidential settlement discussions with many such parties and has reached agreements with various trade creditors and suppliers (many of whom have filed miner's lien claims) to restructure their debt, including in many cases by way of reduced total payment, partial payment upon or soon after closing of the Transaction, and/or payments over defined periods of time.

76. Approval of the Transaction, which will result in the assumption by the Purchaser of substantially all the go-forward operating liabilities of the Applicants (but not the Diavik Interest), is also a crucial benefit to those who depend on Dominion's business operations for their livelihoods and economic wellbeing.

77. In particular, the continuation of the Ekati Mine as a going concern is critical to, among others, the Northwest Territories, Dominion's Northern-based employees and contractors, and Northern communities generally. Approval of the going-concern Transaction before this Court would preserve an important regional business for these stakeholders and avoid the devastating social and economic effects of a potential liquidation of Dominion's business.

78. The Monitor's view is that (a) the Transaction will result in a significantly higher recovery to creditors than would likely be achieved in a liquidation of the Acquired Assets;³⁷ (b) the Transaction will provide for substantial recoveries to Dominion vendors under operational contracts and joint venture agreements as well as on amounts due to employees, unions, First Nations, aboriginal groups and GNWT;³⁸ (c) the Transaction and new money commitment allow for a near-term restart of the Ekati Mine which is of strategic importance to numerous stakeholders including Northern-based employees, contractors, suppliers and the Northern communities in general;³⁹ (d) concluding the Transaction in a timely manner will allow the Applicants to mitigate the substantial ongoing cost of care and maintenance operations and the professional fee costs of the CCAA Proceedings;⁴⁰ and, overall, (e) the Transaction is in the best interests of the Dominion's creditors.⁴¹

v. The Ad Hoc Group Transaction is the best executable alternative at this time and the consideration provided is fair in the circumstances

79. The objective of the SISP was to test the market value of Dominion's assets by canvassing the market to determine whether bids superior to the Stalking Horse Bid were available to the Applicants. As noted above, the SISP was the fourth strategic process for the sale of Dominion's assets and was preceded by three strategic sale processes in 2015, 2016, and 2017 that did not result in any offers to purchase Dominion's assets other than that of Washington.

80. Notwithstanding the public nature of these CCAA proceedings, and the limited pool of potential purchasers with sufficient resources and expertise to acquire and operate a diamond mine in the Northwest Territories, no third parties came forward with their own competing offer to be a stalking horse bidder in the SISP process. Nor did the SISP result in a Qualified Bid other than that of the Stalking Horse Bidder.

³⁷ Eleventh Report of the Monitor, at para. 29(c).

³⁸ Eleventh Report of the Monitor, at para. 29(e).

³⁹ Eleventh Report of the Monitor, at para. 29(f).

⁴⁰ Eleventh Report of the Monitor, at para. 29 (i).

⁴¹ Eleventh Report of the Monitor, at para. 29(j).

81. As discussed above, it is evident that approval of the Transaction will benefit the Applicants' stakeholders generally notwithstanding that the Transaction will not give rise to sale "proceeds" from which secured and other claims can be satisfied.

82. In *Bellatrix Exploration Ltd. (Re)*,⁴² this Court has recently approved a transaction that provided no recovery for approximately \$290 million of secured debt obligations but nevertheless resulted in the payment or assumption of substantial unsecured obligations relating to assumed contracts, cure costs, and environmental and reclamation obligations. As noted by Hollins J., the transaction at issue in *Bellatrix*:

[...] would produce sufficient funds to pay the CCAA priority charges and a substantial portion of the first lienholder notes, as well as providing for the assumption of other contractual and statutory obligations. It would not be sufficient to pay the entire first lienholder debt and would leave nothing for the second or third lien note holders.⁴³ [Emphasis added]

83. Consistent with the purpose of the CCAA and the factors set out in section 36 of the CCAA, this Court in *Bellatrix* focused its analysis on the effects of the proposed sale or disposition on the creditors and other interested parties. Specifically, while recognizing that creditor interests are important considerations when approving a sale, this Court approved the transaction before it notwithstanding that such approval would provide benefits to unsecured creditors, employees, and other stakeholders in circumstances where certain of the debtor's secured lenders would not receive any recovery:

The Spartan Bid will see the first lien noteholders paid a portion of their outstanding debt but not all. The second and third lien noteholders will receive nothing [...]

The Spartan Asset Purchase Agreement obligates Spartan to assume the obligations and liabilities, except relating to excluded assets. This will include environmental liabilities, as well as employment, regulatory and contractual obligations. The parties represented at the approval hearing included various contracting parties and regulators, all of whom supported the Spartan Bid. While they cannot be assumed to be overly concerned about which of Bellatrix's creditors receive payment, it is important to remember that these other stakeholders do represent the beneficiaries of a sale of the company as a going concern. From an overarching economic view, keeping contracts intact and people employed is a significant and positive factor.

It is axiomatic that considering someone's interests is not the same thing as satisfying those interests. I accept the submissions of Bellatrix, the Monitor, BMO and the other

⁴² *Bellatrix* [TAB 9]

⁴³ *Bellatrix* at paras. 59-62 [TAB 9]

parties supporting the Spartan bid that the interests of all parties and particularly the creditors were considered. [Emphasis added]

84. This Court's decision in *Bellatrix* is by no means novel. In *Re Nelson Education Limited*,⁴⁴ the Ontario court approved a credit bid transaction by the first lien lenders that provided no recovery for approximately \$200 million owing to second lien lenders. The transaction provided for "the assumption by the purchaser of substantially all of Nelson's trade payables, contractual obligations and employment obligations incurred in the ordinary course and as reflected in its balance sheet [...]."⁴⁵ In approving the relevant transaction, the court noted:

The positive effect is that all ordinary course creditors, employees, suppliers, and customers will be protected. The effect on the second lien lenders is to wipe out their security and any chance of their loans being repaid. However, apart from their being deemed to have consented to the sale, it is clear the second lien lenders have no economic interest in the Nelson assets except as might be the case some years away if Nelson were able to improve its profitability to the point that the second lien lenders could be paid something towards the debt owed to them. RBC puts this time as perhaps five years and it is clearly conjecture. The first lien lenders however are not obliged to wait in the hopes of some future result.⁴⁶

85. Ultimately, affording a measure of discretion to a purchaser to assume some liabilities and not others allows a purchaser to address the needs of employees, suppliers, pensioners and social stakeholders that are important, in its judgment, to the ongoing function of the business. If it could not do so, unless and until it paid all prior ranking creditors, the purchaser would be placed in a judicial straight jacket where it is proscribed from taking the steps necessary to secure needed ongoing services and supplies.

86. The Purchase Agreement includes a Break-Up Fee in favour of the Purchaser that is approximately the same amount as the break-up fee this Court approved in favour of the Stalking Horse Bidder. This Court considered the legal principles and case law applicable to the approval of such fees in insolvency proceeding in granting the SARIO. The Applicants' submissions in support of the approval of the break-up fee contained in the SARIO are accordingly not repeated here.⁴⁷ The Monitor's view is that the Break-Up Fee, which has been agreed amongst stakeholders, is commercially reasonable in the circumstances and that, given that that the Break-

⁴⁴ *Nelson Education* [TAB 4]

⁴⁵ *Nelson Education* at para. 21(b) [TAB 4]

⁴⁶ *Nelson Education* at para. 38(e) [TAB 4]

⁴⁷ Bench Brief of the Applicants dated May 27, 2020 at paras. 99 – 102

Up Fee will only become payable if the Applicants are proceeding with an Alternative Transaction, the securing of this obligation via the Break-Up Fee Charge is appropriate in the circumstances.⁴⁸

87. In summary, after the detailed canvassing of the market through the SISP, and with the Stalking Horse Bid no longer available, the Applicants submit that the Purchase Agreement is the best executable alternative for Dominion at this time in the circumstances and is in the best interest of Dominion and its stakeholders.

88. The Monitor's view is that the price and terms of the Purchase Agreement represent the highest and best offer in respect of the Acquired Assets and are fair and reasonable in the circumstances.⁴⁹

B. AN EXTENSION TO THE STAY PERIOD IS NECESSARY

89. The Stay Period with respect to the Applicants is scheduled to expire on December 15, 2020. An extension of the Stay Period is necessary to allow for the closing of the Transaction contemplated by the Purchase Agreement.

90. Section 11.02 of the CCAA provides this Court with broad jurisdiction to extend a stay of proceedings.⁵⁰ Pursuant to section 11.02(3) of the CCAA, to exercise its discretion to extend the Stay Period, the Court must be satisfied that: (i) circumstances exist that make the order appropriate; and (ii) the Applicants have acted, and are acting, in good faith and with due diligence during the CCAA proceedings.⁵¹ The good faith and due diligence requirements provided for by subsection 11.02(3) includes observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealings in the proceedings, the absence of an intent to defraud, and a duty of honesty to the court and to the stakeholders directly affected by the CCAA process.⁵²

91. The requirement to consider expenditures of time and resources in connection with stay extensions has been noted as being of significance not only for the CCAA debtor but for its stakeholders generally. The costs of stay extension applications "redound to the prejudice of the overall stakeholder group given the significant costs that are involved."⁵³

⁴⁸ Eleventh Report of the Monitor, at para. 29(h).

⁴⁹ Eleventh Report of the Monitor, at para. 29(b).

⁵⁰ CCAA, s 11.02(2)

⁵¹ CCAA, s 11.02(3)

⁵² *North American Tungsten Corporation Ltd. (Re)*, 2015 BCSC 1376 at para. 29 [TAB 12]

⁵³ *Sunrise/Saskatoon Apartments Limited Partnership (re)*, 2017 BCSC 808 [Sunrise] at para. 23 [TAB 13]

92. The Applicants' proposed stay extension up to and including March 1, 2021, which date roughly coincides with the Outside Date for the closing of the Transaction as may potentially be extended under the Purchase Agreement, is required to permit a closing of the Transaction, provide the necessary breathing room for the Applicants as they continue to work towards their restructuring objectives, and permit the Applicants to attend to the various other CCAA matters that will arise, all for the benefit of their stakeholders.

93. Since the date of the Initial Order, the Applicants have acted, and continue to act, in good faith and with due diligence in implementing the SISF and subsequently continuing to pursue a going concern transaction for the benefit of Dominion and its stakeholders, including creditors, employees, suppliers, and the Government of the Northwest Territories. The Monitor has advised and is of the view that the Applicants have been acting in good faith and with due diligence throughout these CCAA proceedings.⁵⁴

PART V – CONCLUSION

94. For all the reasons set out above, the Applicants respectfully submit that this Court approve the Transaction contemplated by the Purchase Agreement and grant the requested extension to the Stay Period.

ALL OF WHICH IS RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 9th day of December 2020.



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Counsel to the Applicants

⁵⁴ See First Report of the Monitor dated April 29, 2020 at para. 14(d); Fourth Report of the Monitor dated May 26, 2020 at para. 51(d); Fifth Report of the Monitor dated June 18, 2020 at para. 49(d); Sixth Report of the Monitor dated September 22, 2020 at para. 40(d); Ninth Report of the Monitor dated November 15, 2020 at para. 15; Tenth Report of the Monitor dated December 1, 2020 at para. 14; Eleventh Report of the Monitor, at para. 29.

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Tab	Description
1	<i>Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act</i> , R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as amended
2	<i>Ted Leroy Trucking [Century Services] Ltd. Re</i> , 2010 SCC 60
3	<i>Nortel Networks Corp. (Re)</i> 2009, 55 C.B.R. (5th) 229 (Ont. S.C.J.)
4	<i>Nelson Education Ltd (Re)</i> , 2015 ONSC 5557
5	<i>Re Canwest Publishing Inc.</i> , 2010 ONSC 2870
6	<i>Eddie Bauer of Canada Inc. (Re)</i> , [2009] O.J. No. 3784
7	<i>Royal Bank v. Soundair Corp.</i> (1991), 4 O.R. (3d) (Ont. C.A.) 1
8	<i>Sanjel (Re)</i> , 2016 ABQB 257
9	<i>Bellatrix Exploration Ltd. (Re)</i> , 2020 ABQB 332
10	<i>Aveos Fleet Performance Inc.</i> , 2012 QCCS 4074
11	<i>AbitibiBowater Inc. (Re)</i> , 2010 QCCS 1742
12	<i>North American Tungsten Corporation Ltd. (Re)</i> , 2015 BCSC 1376
13	<i>Sunrise/Saskatoon Apartments Limited Partnership (re)</i> , 2017 BCSC 808

TAB 1

Canada Federal Statutes
Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act
Part II — Jurisdiction of Courts (ss. 9-18.5)

R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, s. 11.02

S 11.02

Currency

11.02

11.02(1) Stays, etc. — initial application

A court may, on an initial application in respect of a debtor company, make an order on any terms that it may impose, effective for the period that the court considers necessary, which period may not be more than 10 days,

- (a) staying, until otherwise ordered by the court, all proceedings taken or that might be taken in respect of the company under the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* or the *Winding-up and Restructuring Act*;
- (b) restraining, until otherwise ordered by the court, further proceedings in any action, suit or proceeding against the company; and
- (c) prohibiting, until otherwise ordered by the court, the commencement of any action, suit or proceeding against the company.

11.02(2) Stays, etc. — other than initial application

A court may, on an application in respect of a debtor company other than an initial application, make an order, on any terms that it may impose,

- (a) staying, until otherwise ordered by the court, for any period that the court considers necessary, all proceedings taken or that might be taken in respect of the company under an Act referred to in paragraph (1)(a);
- (b) restraining, until otherwise ordered by the court, further proceedings in any action, suit or proceeding against the company; and
- (c) prohibiting, until otherwise ordered by the court, the commencement of any action, suit or proceeding against the company.

11.02(3) Burden of proof on application

The court shall not make the order unless

- (a) the applicant satisfies the court that circumstances exist that make the order appropriate; and
- (b) in the case of an order under subsection (2), the applicant also satisfies the court that the applicant has acted, and is acting, in good faith and with due diligence.

11.02(4) Restriction

Orders doing anything referred to in subsection (1) or (2) may only be made under this section.

Amendment History

2005, c. 47, s. 128; 2019, c. 29, s. 137

Currency

Federal English Statutes reflect amendments current to November 19, 2020

Federal English Regulations are current to Gazette Vol. 154:21 (October 14, 2020)

End of Document

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Canada Federal Statutes

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act

Part III — General (ss. 18.6-43) [Heading added 2005, c. 47, s. 131.]

Obligations and Prohibitions [Heading added 2005, c. 47, s. 131.]

R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, s. 36

s 36.

Currency

36.

36(1) Restriction on disposition of business assets

A debtor company in respect of which an order has been made under this Act may not sell or otherwise dispose of assets outside the ordinary course of business unless authorized to do so by a court. Despite any requirement for shareholder approval, including one under federal or provincial law, the court may authorize the sale or disposition even if shareholder approval was not obtained.

36(2) Notice to creditors

A company that applies to the court for an authorization is to give notice of the application to the secured creditors who are likely to be affected by the proposed sale or disposition.

36(3) Factors to be considered

In deciding whether to grant the authorization, the court is to consider, among other things,

- (a) whether the process leading to the proposed sale or disposition was reasonable in the circumstances;
- (b) whether the monitor approved the process leading to the proposed sale or disposition;
- (c) whether the monitor filed with the court a report stating that in their opinion the sale or disposition would be more beneficial to the creditors than a sale or disposition under a bankruptcy;
- (d) the extent to which the creditors were consulted;
- (e) the effects of the proposed sale or disposition on the creditors and other interested parties; and
- (f) whether the consideration to be received for the assets is reasonable and fair, taking into account their market value.

36(4) Additional factors — related persons

If the proposed sale or disposition is to a person who is related to the company, the court may, after considering the factors referred to in subsection (3), grant the authorization only if it is satisfied that

- (a) good faith efforts were made to sell or otherwise dispose of the assets to persons who are not related to the company; and
- (b) the consideration to be received is superior to the consideration that would be received under any other offer made in accordance with the process leading to the proposed sale or disposition.

36(5) Related persons

For the purpose of subsection (4), a person who is related to the company includes

- (a) a director or officer of the company;
- (b) a person who has or has had, directly or indirectly, control in fact of the company; and
- (c) a person who is related to a person described in paragraph (a) or (b).

36(6) Assets may be disposed of free and clear

The court may authorize a sale or disposition free and clear of any security, charge or other restriction and, if it does, it shall also order that other assets of the company or the proceeds of the sale or disposition be subject to a security, charge or other restriction in favour of the creditor whose security, charge or other restriction is to be affected by the order.

36(7) Restriction — employers

The court may grant the authorization only if the court is satisfied that the company can and will make the payments that would have been required under paragraphs 6(5)(a) and 6(6)(a) if the court had sanctioned the compromise or arrangement.

36(8) Restriction — intellectual property

If, on the day on which an order is made under this Act in respect of the company, the company is a party to an agreement that grants to another party a right to use intellectual property that is included in a sale or disposition authorized under subsection (6), that sale or disposition does not affect that other party's right to use the intellectual property — including the other party's right to enforce an exclusive use — during the term of the agreement, including any period for which the other party extends the agreement as of right, as long as the other party continues to perform its obligations under the agreement in relation to the use of the intellectual property.

Amendment History

2005, c. 47, s. 131; 2007, c. 36, s. 78; 2017, c. 26, s. 14; 2018, c. 27, s. 269

Currency

Federal English Statutes reflect amendments current to September 2, 2020

Federal English Regulations are current to Gazette Vol. 154:17 (August 19, 2020)

TAB 2

2010 SCC 60
Supreme Court of Canada

Ted Leroy Trucking [Century Services] Ltd., Re

2010 CarswellBC 3419, 2010 CarswellBC 3420, 2010 SCC 60, [2010] 3 S.C.R. 379, [2010] G.S.T.C. 186, [2010] S.C.J. No. 60, [2011] 2 W.W.R. 383, [2011] B.C.W.L.D. 533, [2011] B.C.W.L.D. 534, 12 B.C.L.R. (5th) 1, 196 A.C.W.S. (3d) 27, 2011 D.T.C. 5006 (Eng.), 2011 G.T.C. 2006 (Eng.), 296 B.C.A.C. 1, 326 D.L.R. (4th) 577, 409 N.R. 201, 503 W.A.C. 1, 72 C.B.R. (5th) 170, J.E. 2011-5

Century Services Inc. (Appellant) and Attorney General of Canada on behalf of Her Majesty The Queen in Right of Canada (Respondent)

Deschamps J., McLachlin C.J.C., Binnie, LeBel, Fish, Abella, Charron, Rothstein, Cromwell JJ.

Heard: May 11, 2010
Judgment: December 16, 2010
Docket: 33239

Proceedings: reversing *Ted Leroy Trucking Ltd., Re* (2009), 2009 CarswellBC 1195, 2009 G.T.C. 2020 (Eng.), 2009 BCCA 205, 270 B.C.A.C. 167, 454 W.A.C. 167, [2009] 12 W.W.R. 684, 98 B.C.L.R. (4th) 242, [2009] G.S.T.C. 79 (B.C. C.A.); reversing *Ted Leroy Trucking Ltd., Re* (2008), 2008 CarswellBC 2895, 2008 BCSC 1805, [2008] G.S.T.C. 221, 2009 G.T.C. 2011 (Eng.) (B.C. S.C. [In Chambers])

Counsel: Mary I.A. Buttery, Owen J. James, Matthew J.G. Curtis for Appellant
Gordon Bourgard, David Jacyk, Michael J. Lema for Respondent

Subject: Estates and Trusts; Goods and Services Tax (GST); Tax — Miscellaneous; Insolvency

Related Abridgment Classifications

Tax

I General principles

I.5 Priority of tax claims in bankruptcy proceedings

Tax

III Goods and Services Tax

III.14 Collection and remittance

III.14.b GST held in trust

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s. 67(3) — referred to

s. 81.1 [en. 1992, c. 27, s. 38(1)] — considered

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s. 73 — referred to

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Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36

Generally — referred to

s. 11 — considered

s. 11(1) — considered

s. 11(3) — referred to

s. 11(4) — referred to

s. 11(6) — referred to

s. 11.02 [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] — referred to

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s. 11.4 [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] — referred to

s. 18.3 [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 125] — considered

s. 18.3(1) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 125] — considered

s. 18.3(2) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 125] — considered

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s. 18.4(3) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 125] — considered

s. 20 — considered

s. 21 — considered

s. 37 — considered

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s. 86(2) — referred to

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Generally — referred to

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s. 69 — referred to

s. 128 — referred to

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s. 67(3) — considered

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Generally — referred to

s. 23 — considered

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Generally — referred to

s. 11 — considered

s. 18.3(1) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 125] — considered

s. 18.3(2) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 125] — considered

s. 37(1) — considered

Employment Insurance Act, S.C. 1996, c. 23

Generally — referred to

s. 86(2) — referred to

s. 86(2.1) [en. 1998, c. 19, s. 266(1)] — referred to

Excise Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. E-15

Generally — referred to

s. 222 [en. 1990, c. 45, s. 12(1)] — considered

s. 222(1) [en. 1990, c. 45, s. 12(1)] — considered

s. 222(3) [en. 1990, c. 45, s. 12(1)] — considered

s. 222(3)(a) [en. 1990, c. 45, s. 12(1)] — considered

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s. 227(4) — considered

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s. 227(4.1)(a) [en. 1998, c. 19, s. 226(1)] — considered

Statutes considered *Abella J. (dissenting)*:

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Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36

Generally — referred to

s. 11 — considered

s. 11(1) — considered

s. 11(3) — considered

s. 18.3(1) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 125] — considered

s. 37(1) — considered

Excise Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. E-15

Generally — referred to

s. 222 [en. 1990, c. 45, s. 12(1)] — considered

s. 222(3) [en. 1990, c. 45, s. 12(1)] — considered

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s. 2(1)"enactment" — considered

s. 44(f) — considered

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Generally — referred to

APPEAL by creditor from judgment reported at [2009 CarswellBC 1195](#), [2009 BCCA 205](#), [\[2009\] G.S.T.C. 79](#), [98 B.C.L.R. \(4th\) 242](#), [\[2009\] 12 W.W.R. 684](#), [270 B.C.A.C. 167](#), [454 W.A.C. 167](#), [2009 G.T.C. 2020 \(Eng.\)](#) (B.C. C.A.), allowing Crown's appeal from dismissal of application for immediate payment of tax debt.

Deschamps J.:

1 For the first time this Court is called upon to directly interpret the provisions of the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 ("*CCAA*"). In that respect, two questions are raised. The first requires reconciliation of provisions of the *CCAA* and the *Excise Tax Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. E-15 ("*ETA*"), which lower courts have held to be in conflict with one another. The second concerns the scope of a court's discretion when supervising reorganization. The relevant statutory provisions are reproduced in the Appendix. On the first question, having considered the evolution of Crown priorities in the context of insolvency and the wording of the various statutes creating Crown priorities, I conclude that it is the *CCAA* and not the *ETA* that provides the rule. On the second question, I conclude that the broad discretionary jurisdiction conferred on the supervising judge must be interpreted having regard to the remedial nature of the *CCAA* and insolvency legislation generally. Consequently, the

court had the discretion to partially lift a stay of proceedings to allow the debtor to make an assignment under the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3 ("*BIA*"). I would allow the appeal.

1. Facts and Decisions of the Courts Below

2 Ted LeRoy Trucking Ltd. ("LeRoy Trucking") commenced proceedings under the *CCAA* in the Supreme Court of British Columbia on December 13, 2007, obtaining a stay of proceedings with a view to reorganizing its financial affairs. LeRoy Trucking sold certain redundant assets as authorized by the order.

3 Amongst the debts owed by LeRoy Trucking was an amount for Goods and Services Tax ("GST") collected but unremitted to the Crown. The *ETA* creates a deemed trust in favour of the Crown for amounts collected in respect of GST. The deemed trust extends to any property or proceeds held by the person collecting GST and any property of that person held by a secured creditor, requiring that property to be paid to the Crown in priority to all security interests. The *ETA* provides that the deemed trust operates despite any other enactment of Canada except the *BIA*. However, the *CCAA* also provides that subject to certain exceptions, none of which mentions GST, deemed trusts in favour of the Crown do not operate under the *CCAA*. Accordingly, under the *CCAA* the Crown ranks as an unsecured creditor in respect of GST. Nonetheless, at the time LeRoy Trucking commenced *CCAA* proceedings the leading line of jurisprudence held that the *ETA* took precedence over the *CCAA* such that the Crown enjoyed priority for GST claims under the *CCAA*, even though it would have lost that same priority under the *BIA*. The *CCAA* underwent substantial amendments in 2005 in which some of the provisions at issue in this appeal were renumbered and reformulated (S.C. 2005, c. 47). However, these amendments only came into force on September 18, 2009. I will refer to the amended provisions only where relevant.

4 On April 29, 2008, Brenner C.J.S.C., in the context of the *CCAA* proceedings, approved a payment not exceeding \$5 million, the proceeds of redundant asset sales, to Century Services, the debtor's major secured creditor. LeRoy Trucking proposed to hold back an amount equal to the GST monies collected but unremitted to the Crown and place it in the Monitor's trust account until the outcome of the reorganization was known. In order to maintain the *status quo* while the success of the reorganization was uncertain, Brenner C.J.S.C. agreed to the proposal and ordered that an amount of \$305,202.30 be held by the Monitor in its trust account.

5 On September 3, 2008, having concluded that reorganization was not possible, LeRoy Trucking sought leave to make an assignment in bankruptcy under the *BIA*. The Crown sought an order that the GST monies held by the Monitor be paid to the Receiver General of Canada. Brenner C.J.S.C. dismissed the latter application. Reasoning that the purpose of segregating the funds with the Monitor was "to facilitate an ultimate payment of the GST monies which were owed pre-filing, but only if a viable plan emerged", the failure of such a reorganization, followed by an assignment in bankruptcy, meant the Crown would lose priority under the *BIA* (2008 BCSC 1805, [2008] G.S.T.C. 221 (B.C. S.C. [In Chambers])).

6 The Crown's appeal was allowed by the British Columbia Court of Appeal (2009 BCCA 205, [2009] G.S.T.C. 79, 270 B.C.A.C. 167 (B.C. C.A.)). Tysoe J.A. for a unanimous court found two independent bases for allowing the Crown's appeal.

7 First, the court's authority under s. 11 of the *CCAA* was held not to extend to staying the Crown's application for immediate payment of the GST funds subject to the deemed trust after it was clear that reorganization efforts had failed and that bankruptcy was inevitable. As restructuring was no longer a possibility, staying the Crown's claim to the GST funds no longer served a purpose under the *CCAA* and the court was bound under the priority scheme provided by the *ETA* to allow payment to the Crown. In so holding, Tysoe J.A. adopted the reasoning in *Ottawa Senators Hockey Club Corp. (Re)*, [2005] G.S.T.C. 1, 73 O.R. (3d) 737 (Ont. C.A.), which found that the *ETA* deemed trust for GST established Crown priority over secured creditors under the *CCAA*.

8 Second, Tysoe J.A. concluded that by ordering the GST funds segregated in the Monitor's trust account on April 29, 2008, the judge had created an express trust in favour of the Crown from which the monies in question could not be diverted for any other purposes. The Court of Appeal therefore ordered that the money held by the Monitor in trust be paid to the Receiver General.

2. Issues

9 This appeal raises three broad issues which are addressed in turn:

(1) Did s. 222(3) of the *ETA* displace s. 18.3(1) of the *CCAA* and give priority to the Crown's *ETA* deemed trust during *CCAA* proceedings as held in *Ottawa Senators*?

(2) Did the court exceed its *CCAA* authority by lifting the stay to allow the debtor to make an assignment in bankruptcy?

(3) Did the court's order of April 29, 2008 requiring segregation of the Crown's GST claim in the Monitor's trust account create an express trust in favour of the Crown in respect of those funds?

3. Analysis

10 The first issue concerns Crown priorities in the context of insolvency. As will be seen, the *ETA* provides for a deemed trust in favour of the Crown in respect of GST owed by a debtor "[d]espite ... any other enactment of Canada (except the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*)" (s. 222(3)), while the *CCAA* stated at the relevant time that "notwithstanding any provision in federal or provincial legislation that has the effect of deeming property to be held in trust for Her Majesty, property of a debtor company shall not be [so] regarded" (s. 18.3(1)). It is difficult to imagine two statutory provisions more apparently in conflict. However, as is often the case, the apparent conflict can be resolved through interpretation.

11 In order to properly interpret the provisions, it is necessary to examine the history of the *CCAA*, its function amidst the body of insolvency legislation enacted by Parliament, and the principles that have been recognized in the jurisprudence. It will be seen that Crown priorities in the insolvency context have been significantly pared down. The resolution of the second issue is also rooted in the context of the *CCAA*, but its purpose and the manner in which it has been interpreted in the case law are also key. After examining the first two issues in this case, I will address Tysoe J.A.'s conclusion that an express trust in favour of the Crown was created by the court's order of April 29, 2008.

3.1 Purpose and Scope of Insolvency Law

12 Insolvency is the factual situation that arises when a debtor is unable to pay creditors (see generally, R. J. Wood, *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Law* (2009), at p. 16). Certain legal proceedings become available upon insolvency, which typically allow a debtor to obtain a court order staying its creditors' enforcement actions and attempt to obtain a binding compromise with creditors to adjust the payment conditions to something more realistic. Alternatively, the debtor's assets may be liquidated and debts paid from the proceeds according to statutory priority rules. The former is usually referred to as reorganization or restructuring while the latter is termed liquidation.

13 Canadian commercial insolvency law is not codified in one exhaustive statute. Instead, Parliament has enacted multiple insolvency statutes, the main one being the *BIA*. The *BIA* offers a self-contained legal regime providing for both reorganization and liquidation. Although bankruptcy legislation has a long history, the *BIA* itself is a fairly recent statute — it was enacted in 1992. It is characterized by a rules-based approach to proceedings. The *BIA* is available to insolvent debtors owing \$1000 or more, regardless of whether they are natural or legal persons. It contains mechanisms for debtors to make proposals to their creditors for the adjustment of debts. If a proposal fails, the *BIA* contains a bridge to bankruptcy whereby the debtor's assets are liquidated and the proceeds paid to creditors in accordance with the statutory scheme of distribution.

14 Access to the *CCAA* is more restrictive. A debtor must be a company with liabilities in excess of \$5 million. Unlike the *BIA*, the *CCAA* contains no provisions for liquidation of a debtor's assets if reorganization fails. There are three ways of exiting *CCAA* proceedings. The best outcome is achieved when the stay of proceedings provides the debtor with some breathing space during which solvency is restored and the *CCAA* process terminates without reorganization being needed. The second most desirable outcome occurs when the debtor's compromise or arrangement is accepted by its creditors and the reorganized company emerges from the *CCAA* proceedings as a going concern. Lastly, if the compromise or arrangement fails, either the company or its creditors usually seek to have the debtor's assets liquidated under the applicable provisions of the *BIA* or to place the debtor into receivership. As discussed in greater detail below, the key difference between the reorganization regimes

under the *BIA* and the *CCAA* is that the latter offers a more flexible mechanism with greater judicial discretion, making it more responsive to complex reorganizations.

15 As I will discuss at greater length below, the purpose of the *CCAA* — Canada's first reorganization statute — is to permit the debtor to continue to carry on business and, where possible, avoid the social and economic costs of liquidating its assets. Proposals to creditors under the *BIA* serve the same remedial purpose, though this is achieved through a rules-based mechanism that offers less flexibility. Where reorganization is impossible, the *BIA* may be employed to provide an orderly mechanism for the distribution of a debtor's assets to satisfy creditor claims according to predetermined priority rules.

16 Prior to the enactment of the *CCAA* in 1933 (S.C. 1932-33, c. 36), practice under existing commercial insolvency legislation tended heavily towards the liquidation of a debtor company (J. Sarra, *Creditor Rights and the Public Interest: Restructuring Insolvent Corporations* (2003), at p. 12). The battering visited upon Canadian businesses by the Great Depression and the absence of an effective mechanism for reaching a compromise between debtors and creditors to avoid liquidation required a legislative response. The *CCAA* was innovative as it allowed the insolvent debtor to attempt reorganization under judicial supervision outside the existing insolvency legislation which, once engaged, almost invariably resulted in liquidation (*Reference re Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (Canada)*, [1934] S.C.R. 659 (S.C.C.), at pp. 660-61; Sarra, *Creditor Rights*, at pp. 12-13).

17 Parliament understood when adopting the *CCAA* that liquidation of an insolvent company was harmful for most of those it affected — notably creditors and employees — and that a workout which allowed the company to survive was optimal (Sarra, *Creditor Rights*, at pp. 13-15).

18 Early commentary and jurisprudence also endorsed the *CCAA's* remedial objectives. It recognized that companies retain more value as going concerns while underscoring that intangible losses, such as the evaporation of the companies' goodwill, result from liquidation (S. E. Edwards, "Reorganizations Under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act" (1947), 25 *Can. Bar Rev.* 587, at p. 592). Reorganization serves the public interest by facilitating the survival of companies supplying goods or services crucial to the health of the economy or saving large numbers of jobs (*ibid.*, at p. 593). Insolvency could be so widely felt as to impact stakeholders other than creditors and employees. Variants of these views resonate today, with reorganization justified in terms of rehabilitating companies that are key elements in a complex web of interdependent economic relationships in order to avoid the negative consequences of liquidation.

19 The *CCAA* fell into disuse during the next several decades, likely because amendments to the Act in 1953 restricted its use to companies issuing bonds (S.C. 1952-53, c. 3). During the economic downturn of the early 1980s, insolvency lawyers and courts adapting to the resulting wave of insolvencies resurrected the statute and deployed it in response to new economic challenges. Participants in insolvency proceedings grew to recognize and appreciate the statute's distinguishing feature: a grant of broad and flexible authority to the supervising court to make the orders necessary to facilitate the reorganization of the debtor and achieve the *CCAA's* objectives. The manner in which courts have used *CCAA* jurisdiction in increasingly creative and flexible ways is explored in greater detail below.

20 Efforts to evolve insolvency law were not restricted to the courts during this period. In 1970, a government-commissioned panel produced an extensive study recommending sweeping reform but Parliament failed to act (see *Bankruptcy and Insolvency: Report of the Study Committee on Bankruptcy and Insolvency Legislation* (1970)). Another panel of experts produced more limited recommendations in 1986 which eventually resulted in enactment of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* of 1992 (S.C. 1992, c. 27) (see *Proposed Bankruptcy Act Amendments: Report of the Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy and Insolvency* (1986)). Broader provisions for reorganizing insolvent debtors were then included in Canada's bankruptcy statute. Although the 1970 and 1986 reports made no specific recommendations with respect to the *CCAA*, the House of Commons committee studying the *BIA's* predecessor bill, C-22, seemed to accept expert testimony that the *BIA's* new reorganization scheme would shortly supplant the *CCAA*, which could then be repealed, with commercial insolvency and bankruptcy being governed by a single statute (*Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Standing Committee on Consumer and Corporate Affairs and Government Operations*, Issue No. 15, October 3, 1991, at pp. 15:15-15:16).

21 In retrospect, this conclusion by the House of Commons committee was out of step with reality. It overlooked the renewed vitality the *CCAA* enjoyed in contemporary practice and the advantage that a flexible judicially supervised reorganization process presented in the face of increasingly complex reorganizations, when compared to the stricter rules-based scheme contained in the *BIA*. The "flexibility of the *CCAA* [was seen as] a great benefit, allowing for creative and effective decisions" (Industry Canada, Marketplace Framework Policy Branch, *Report on the Operation and Administration of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* (2002), at p. 41). Over the past three decades, resurrection of the *CCAA* has thus been the mainspring of a process through which, one author concludes, "the legal setting for Canadian insolvency restructuring has evolved from a rather blunt instrument to one of the most sophisticated systems in the developed world" (R. B. Jones, "The Evolution of Canadian Restructuring: Challenges for the Rule of Law", in J. P. Sarra, ed., *Annual Review of Insolvency Law 2005* (2006), 481, at p. 481).

22 While insolvency proceedings may be governed by different statutory schemes, they share some commonalities. The most prominent of these is the single proceeding model. The nature and purpose of the single proceeding model are described by Professor Wood in *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Law*:

They all provide a collective proceeding that supersedes the usual civil process available to creditors to enforce their claims. The creditors' remedies are collectivized in order to prevent the free-for-all that would otherwise prevail if creditors were permitted to exercise their remedies. In the absence of a collective process, each creditor is armed with the knowledge that if they do not strike hard and swift to seize the debtor's assets, they will be beat out by other creditors. [pp. 2-3]

The single proceeding model avoids the inefficiency and chaos that would attend insolvency if each creditor initiated proceedings to recover its debt. Grouping all possible actions against the debtor into a single proceeding controlled in a single forum facilitates negotiation with creditors because it places them all on an equal footing, rather than exposing them to the risk that a more aggressive creditor will realize its claims against the debtor's limited assets while the other creditors attempt a compromise. With a view to achieving that purpose, both the *CCAA* and the *BIA* allow a court to order all actions against a debtor to be stayed while a compromise is sought.

23 Another point of convergence of the *CCAA* and the *BIA* relates to priorities. Because the *CCAA* is silent about what happens if reorganization fails, the *BIA* scheme of liquidation and distribution necessarily supplies the backdrop for what will happen if a *CCAA* reorganization is ultimately unsuccessful. In addition, one of the important features of legislative reform of both statutes since the enactment of the *BIA* in 1992 has been a cutback in Crown priorities (S.C. 1992, c. 27, s. 39; S.C. 1997, c. 12, ss. 73 and 125; S.C. 2000, c. 30, s. 148; S.C. 2005, c. 47, ss. 69 and 131; S.C. 2009, c. 33, ss. 25 and 29; see also *Alternative granite & marbre inc., Re*, 2009 SCC 49, [2009] 3 S.C.R. 286, [2009] G.S.T.C. 154 (S.C.C.); *Quebec (Deputy Minister of Revenue) c. Rainville* (1979), [1980] 1 S.C.R. 35 (S.C.C.); *Proposed Bankruptcy Act Amendments: Report of the Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy and Insolvency* (1986)).

24 With parallel *CCAA* and *BIA* restructuring schemes now an accepted feature of the insolvency law landscape, the contemporary thrust of legislative reform has been towards harmonizing aspects of insolvency law common to the two statutory schemes to the extent possible and encouraging reorganization over liquidation (see *An Act to establish the Wage Earner Protection Program Act, to amend the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act and to make consequential amendments to other Acts*, S.C. 2005, c. 47; *Gauntlet Energy Corp., Re*, 2003 ABQB 894, [2003] G.S.T.C. 193, 30 Alta. L.R. (4th) 192 (Alta. Q.B.), at para. 19).

25 Mindful of the historical background of the *CCAA* and *BIA*, I now turn to the first question at issue.

3.2 GST Deemed Trust Under the CCAA

26 The Court of Appeal proceeded on the basis that the *ETA* precluded the court from staying the Crown's enforcement of the GST deemed trust when partially lifting the stay to allow the debtor to enter bankruptcy. In so doing, it adopted the reasoning in a line of cases culminating in *Ottawa Senators*, which held that an *ETA* deemed trust remains enforceable during *CCAA* reorganization despite language in the *CCAA* that suggests otherwise.

27 The Crown relies heavily on the decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal in *Ottawa Senators* and argues that the later in time provision of the *ETA* creating the GST deemed trust trumps the provision of the *CCAA* purporting to nullify most statutory deemed trusts. The Court of Appeal in this case accepted this reasoning but not all provincial courts follow it (see, e.g., *Komunik Corp., Re*, 2009 QCCS 6332 (C.S. Que.), leave to appeal granted, 2010 QCCA 183 (C.A. Que.)). Century Services relied, in its written submissions to this Court, on the argument that the court had authority under the *CCAA* to continue the stay against the Crown's claim for unremitted GST. In oral argument, the question of whether *Ottawa Senators* was correctly decided nonetheless arose. After the hearing, the parties were asked to make further written submissions on this point. As appears evident from the reasons of my colleague Abella J., this issue has become prominent before this Court. In those circumstances, this Court needs to determine the correctness of the reasoning in *Ottawa Senators*.

28 The policy backdrop to this question involves the Crown's priority as a creditor in insolvency situations which, as I mentioned above, has evolved considerably. Prior to the 1990s, Crown claims largely enjoyed priority in insolvency. This was widely seen as unsatisfactory as shown by both the 1970 and 1986 insolvency reform proposals, which recommended that Crown claims receive no preferential treatment. A closely related matter was whether the *CCAA* was binding at all upon the Crown. Amendments to the *CCAA* in 1997 confirmed that it did indeed bind the Crown (see *CCAA*, s. 21, as am. by S.C. 1997, c. 12, s. 126).

29 Claims of priority by the state in insolvency situations receive different treatment across jurisdictions worldwide. For example, in Germany and Australia, the state is given no priority at all, while the state enjoys wide priority in the United States and France (see B. K. Morgan, "Should the Sovereign be Paid First? A Comparative International Analysis of the Priority for Tax Claims in Bankruptcy" (2000), 74 *Am. Bank. L.J.* 461, at p. 500). Canada adopted a middle course through legislative reform of Crown priority initiated in 1992. The Crown retained priority for source deductions of income tax, Employment Insurance ("EI") and Canada Pension Plan ("CPP") premiums, but ranks as an ordinary unsecured creditor for most other claims.

30 Parliament has frequently enacted statutory mechanisms to secure Crown claims and permit their enforcement. The two most common are statutory deemed trusts and powers to garnish funds third parties owe the debtor (see F. L. Lamer, *Priority of Crown Claims in Insolvency* (loose-leaf), at § 2).

31 With respect to GST collected, Parliament has enacted a deemed trust. The *ETA* states that every person who collects an amount on account of GST is deemed to hold that amount in trust for the Crown (s. 222(1)). The deemed trust extends to other property of the person collecting the tax equal in value to the amount deemed to be in trust if that amount has not been remitted in accordance with the *ETA*. The deemed trust also extends to property held by a secured creditor that, but for the security interest, would be property of the person collecting the tax (s. 222(3)).

32 Parliament has created similar deemed trusts using almost identical language in respect of source deductions of income tax, EI premiums and CPP premiums (see s. 227(4) of the *Income Tax Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.) ("*ITA*"), ss. 86(2) and (2.1) of the *Employment Insurance Act*, S.C. 1996, c. 23, and ss. 23(3) and (4) of the *Canada Pension Plan*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-8). I will refer to income tax, EI and CPP deductions as "source deductions".

33 In *Royal Bank v. Sparrow Electric Corp.*, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 411 (S.C.C.), this Court addressed a priority dispute between a deemed trust for source deductions under the *ITA* and security interests taken under both the *Bank Act*, S.C. 1991, c. 46, and the *Alberta Personal Property Security Act*, S.A. 1988, c. P-4.05 ("*PPSA*"). As then worded, an *ITA* deemed trust over the debtor's property equivalent to the amount owing in respect of income tax became effective at the time of liquidation, receivership, or assignment in bankruptcy. *Sparrow Electric* held that the *ITA* deemed trust could not prevail over the security interests because, being fixed charges, the latter attached as soon as the debtor acquired rights in the property such that the *ITA* deemed trust had no property on which to attach when it subsequently arose. Later, in *First Vancouver Finance v. Minister of National Revenue*, 2002 SCC 49, [2002] G.S.T.C. 23, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 720 (S.C.C.), this Court observed that Parliament had legislated to strengthen the statutory deemed trust in the *ITA* by deeming it to operate from the moment the deductions were not paid to the Crown as required by the *ITA*, and by granting the Crown priority over all security interests (paras. 27-29) (the "*Sparrow Electric* amendment").

34 The amended text of s. 227(4.1) of the *ITA* and concordant source deductions deemed trusts in the *Canada Pension Plan* and the *Employment Insurance Act* state that the deemed trust operates notwithstanding any other enactment of Canada, except ss. 81.1 and 81.2 of the *BIA*. The *ETA* deemed trust at issue in this case is similarly worded, but it excepts the *BIA* in its entirety. The provision reads as follows:

222. (3) Despite any other provision of this Act (except subsection (4)), any other enactment of Canada (except the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*), any enactment of a province or any other law, if at any time an amount deemed by subsection (1) to be held by a person in trust for Her Majesty is not remitted to the Receiver General or withdrawn in the manner and at the time provided under this Part, property of the person and property held by any secured creditor of the person that, but for a security interest, would be property of the person, equal in value to the amount so deemed to be held in trust, is deemed

35 The Crown submits that the *Sparrow Electric* amendment, added by Parliament to the *ETA* in 2000, was intended to preserve the Crown's priority over collected GST under the *CCAA* while subordinating the Crown to the status of an unsecured creditor in respect of GST only under the *BIA*. This is because the *ETA* provides that the GST deemed trust is effective "despite" any other enactment except the *BIA*.

36 The language used in the *ETA* for the GST deemed trust creates an apparent conflict with the *CCAA*, which provides that subject to certain exceptions, property deemed by statute to be held in trust for the Crown shall not be so regarded.

37 Through a 1997 amendment to the *CCAA* (S.C. 1997, c. 12, s. 125), Parliament appears to have, subject to specific exceptions, nullified deemed trusts in favour of the Crown once reorganization proceedings are commenced under the Act. The relevant provision reads:

18.3 (1) Subject to subsection (2), notwithstanding any provision in federal or provincial legislation that has the effect of deeming property to be held in trust for Her Majesty, property of a debtor company shall not be regarded as held in trust for Her Majesty unless it would be so regarded in the absence of that statutory provision.

This nullification of deemed trusts was continued in further amendments to the *CCAA* (S.C. 2005, c. 47), where s. 18.3(1) was renumbered and reformulated as s. 37(1):

37. (1) Subject to subsection (2), despite any provision in federal or provincial legislation that has the effect of deeming property to be held in trust for Her Majesty, property of a debtor company shall not be regarded as being held in trust for Her Majesty unless it would be so regarded in the absence of that statutory provision.

38 An analogous provision exists in the *BIA*, which, subject to the same specific exceptions, nullifies statutory deemed trusts and makes property of the bankrupt that would otherwise be subject to a deemed trust part of the debtor's estate and available to creditors (S.C. 1992, c. 27, s. 39; S.C. 1997, c. 12, s. 73; *BIA*, s. 67(2)). It is noteworthy that in both the *CCAA* and the *BIA*, the exceptions concern source deductions (*CCAA*, s. 18.3(2); *BIA*, s. 67(3)). The relevant provision of the *CCAA* reads:

18.3 (2) Subsection (1) does not apply in respect of amounts deemed to be held in trust under subsection 227(4) or (4.1) of the *Income Tax Act*, subsection 23(3) or (4) of the *Canada Pension Plan* or subsection 86(2) or (2.1) of the *Employment Insurance Act*....

Thus, the Crown's deemed trust and corresponding priority in source deductions remain effective both in reorganization and in bankruptcy.

39 Meanwhile, in both s. 18.4(1) of the *CCAA* and s. 86(1) of the *BIA*, other Crown claims are treated as unsecured. These provisions, establishing the Crown's status as an unsecured creditor, explicitly exempt statutory deemed trusts in source deductions (*CCAA*, s. 18.4(3); *BIA*, s. 86(3)). The *CCAA* provision reads as follows:

18.4 (3) Subsection (1) [Crown ranking as unsecured creditor] does not affect the operation of

(a) subsections 224(1.2) and (1.3) of the *Income Tax Act*,

(b) any provision of the *Canada Pension Plan* or of the *Employment Insurance Act* that refers to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act* and provides for the collection of a contribution

Therefore, not only does the *CCAA* provide that Crown claims do not enjoy priority over the claims of other creditors (s. 18.3(1)), but the exceptions to this rule (i.e., that Crown priority is maintained for source deductions) are repeatedly stated in the statute.

40 The apparent conflict in this case is whether the rule in the *CCAA* first enacted as s. 18.3 in 1997, which provides that subject to certain explicit exceptions, statutory deemed trusts are ineffective under the *CCAA*, is overridden by the one in the *ETA* enacted in 2000 stating that GST deemed trusts operate despite any enactment of Canada except the *BIA*. With respect for my colleague Fish J., I do not think the apparent conflict can be resolved by denying it and creating a rule requiring both a statutory provision enacting the deemed trust, and a second statutory provision confirming it. Such a rule is unknown to the law. Courts must recognize conflicts, apparent or real, and resolve them when possible.

41 A line of jurisprudence across Canada has resolved the apparent conflict in favour of the *ETA*, thereby maintaining GST deemed trusts under the *CCAA*. *Ottawa Senators*, the leading case, decided the matter by invoking the doctrine of implied repeal to hold that the later in time provision of the *ETA* should take precedence over the *CCAA* (see also *Solid Resources Ltd., Re* (2002), 40 C.B.R. (4th) 219, [2003] G.S.T.C. 21 (Alta. Q.B.); *Gauntlet*

42 The Ontario Court of Appeal in *Ottawa Senators* rested its conclusion on two considerations. First, it was persuaded that by explicitly mentioning the *BIA* in *ETA* s. 222(3), but not the *CCAA*, Parliament made a deliberate choice. In the words of MacPherson J.A.:

The *BIA* and the *CCAA* are closely related federal statutes. I cannot conceive that Parliament would specifically identify the *BIA* as an exception, but accidentally fail to consider the *CCAA* as a possible second exception. In my view, the omission of the *CCAA* from s. 222(3) of the *ETA* was almost certainly a considered omission. [para. 43]

43 Second, the Ontario Court of Appeal compared the conflict between the *ETA* and the *CCAA* to that before this Court in *Doré c. Verdun (Municipalité)*, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 862 (S.C.C.), and found them to be "identical" (para. 46). It therefore considered *Doré* binding (para. 49). In *Doré*, a limitations provision in the more general and recently enacted *Civil Code of Québec*, S.Q. 1991, c. 64 ("C.C.Q."), was held to have repealed a more specific provision of the earlier Quebec *Cities and Towns Act*, R.S.Q., c. C-19, with which it conflicted. By analogy, the Ontario Court of Appeal held that the later in time and more general provision, s. 222(3) of the *ETA*, impliedly repealed the more specific and earlier in time provision, s. 18.3(1) of the *CCAA* (paras. 47-49).

44 Viewing this issue in its entire context, several considerations lead me to conclude that neither the reasoning nor the result in *Ottawa Senators* can stand. While a conflict may exist at the level of the statutes' wording, a purposive and contextual analysis to determine Parliament's true intent yields the conclusion that Parliament could not have intended to restore the Crown's deemed trust priority in GST claims under the *CCAA* when it amended the *ETA* in 2000 with the *Sparrow Electric* amendment.

45 I begin by recalling that Parliament has shown its willingness to move away from asserting priority for Crown claims in insolvency law. Section 18.3(1) of the *CCAA* (subject to the s. 18.3(2) exceptions) provides that the Crown's deemed trusts have no effect under the *CCAA*. Where Parliament has sought to protect certain Crown claims through statutory deemed trusts and intended that these deemed trusts continue in insolvency, it has legislated so explicitly and elaborately. For example, s. 18.3(2) of the *CCAA* and s. 67(3) of the *BIA* expressly provide that deemed trusts for source deductions remain effective in insolvency. Parliament has, therefore, clearly carved out exceptions from the general rule that deemed trusts are ineffective in insolvency. The *CCAA* and *BIA* are in harmony, preserving deemed trusts and asserting Crown priority only in respect of source deductions. Meanwhile, there is no express statutory basis for concluding that GST claims enjoy a preferred treatment under the *CCAA* or the *BIA*. Unlike source deductions, which are clearly and expressly dealt with under both these insolvency statutes, no such clear and express language exists in those Acts carving out an exception for GST claims.

46 The internal logic of the *CCAA* also militates against upholding the *ETA* deemed trust for GST. The *CCAA* imposes limits on a suspension by the court of the Crown's rights in respect of source deductions but does not mention the *ETA* (s. 11.4). Since source deductions deemed trusts are granted explicit protection under the *CCAA*, it would be inconsistent to afford a better protection to the *ETA* deemed trust absent explicit language in the *CCAA*. Thus, the logic of the *CCAA* appears to subject the *ETA* deemed trust to the waiver by Parliament of its priority (s. 18.4).

47 Moreover, a strange asymmetry would arise if the interpretation giving the *ETA* priority over the *CCAA* urged by the Crown is adopted here: the Crown would retain priority over GST claims during *CCAA* proceedings but not in bankruptcy. As courts have reflected, this can only encourage statute shopping by secured creditors in cases such as this one where the debtor's assets cannot satisfy both the secured creditors' and the Crown's claims (*Gauntlet*, at para. 21). If creditors' claims were better protected by liquidation under the *BIA*, creditors' incentives would lie overwhelmingly with avoiding proceedings under the *CCAA* and not risking a failed reorganization. Giving a key player in any insolvency such skewed incentives against reorganizing under the *CCAA* can only undermine that statute's remedial objectives and risk inviting the very social ills that it was enacted to avert.

48 Arguably, the effect of *Ottawa Senators* is mitigated if restructuring is attempted under the *BIA* instead of the *CCAA*, but it is not cured. If *Ottawa Senators* were to be followed, Crown priority over GST would differ depending on whether restructuring took place under the *CCAA* or the *BIA*. The anomaly of this result is made manifest by the fact that it would deprive companies of the option to restructure under the more flexible and responsive *CCAA* regime, which has been the statute of choice for complex reorganizations.

49 Evidence that Parliament intended different treatments for GST claims in reorganization and bankruptcy is scant, if it exists at all. Section 222(3) of the *ETA* was enacted as part of a wide-ranging budget implementation bill in 2000. The summary accompanying that bill does not indicate that Parliament intended to elevate Crown priority over GST claims under the *CCAA* to the same or a higher level than source deductions claims. Indeed, the summary for deemed trusts states only that amendments to existing provisions are aimed at "ensuring that employment insurance premiums and Canada Pension Plan contributions that are required to be remitted by an employer are fully recoverable by the Crown in the case of the bankruptcy of the employer" (Summary to S.C. 2000, c. 30, at p. 4a). The wording of GST deemed trusts resembles that of statutory deemed trusts for source deductions and incorporates the same overriding language and reference to the *BIA*. However, as noted above, Parliament's express intent is that only source deductions deemed trusts remain operative. An exception for the *BIA* in the statutory language establishing the source deductions deemed trusts accomplishes very little, because the explicit language of the *BIA* itself (and the *CCAA*) carves out these source deductions deemed trusts and maintains their effect. It is however noteworthy that no equivalent language maintaining GST deemed trusts exists under either the *BIA* or the *CCAA*.

50 It seems more likely that by adopting the same language for creating GST deemed trusts in the *ETA* as it did for deemed trusts for source deductions, and by overlooking the inclusion of an exception for the *CCAA* alongside the *BIA* in s. 222(3) of the *ETA*, Parliament may have inadvertently succumbed to a drafting anomaly. Because of a statutory lacuna in the *ETA*, the GST deemed trust could be seen as remaining effective in the *CCAA*, while ceasing to have any effect under the *BIA*, thus creating an apparent conflict with the wording of the *CCAA*. However, it should be seen for what it is: a facial conflict only, capable of resolution by looking at the broader approach taken to Crown priorities and by giving precedence to the statutory language of s. 18.3 of the *CCAA* in a manner that does not produce an anomalous outcome.

51 Section 222(3) of the *ETA* evinces no explicit intention of Parliament to repeal *CCAA* s. 18.3. It merely creates an apparent conflict that must be resolved by statutory interpretation. Parliament's intent when it enacted *ETA* s. 222(3) was therefore far from unambiguous. Had it sought to give the Crown a priority for GST claims, it could have done so explicitly as it did for source deductions. Instead, one is left to infer from the language of *ETA* s. 222(3) that the GST deemed trust was intended to be effective under the *CCAA*.

52 I am not persuaded that the reasoning in *Doré* requires the application of the doctrine of implied repeal in the circumstances of this case. The main issue in *Doré* concerned the impact of the adoption of the *C.C.Q.* on the administrative law rules with respect to municipalities. While Gonthier J. concluded in that case that the limitation provision in art. 2930 *C.C.Q.* had repealed

by implication a limitation provision in the *Cities and Towns Act*, he did so on the basis of more than a textual analysis. The conclusion in *Doré* was reached after thorough contextual analysis of both pieces of legislation, including an extensive review of the relevant legislative history (paras. 31-41). Consequently, the circumstances before this Court in *Doré* are far from "identical" to those in the present case, in terms of text, context and legislative history. Accordingly, *Doré* cannot be said to require the automatic application of the rule of repeal by implication.

53 A noteworthy indicator of Parliament's overall intent is the fact that in subsequent amendments it has not displaced the rule set out in the *CCAA*. Indeed, as indicated above, the recent amendments to the *CCAA* in 2005 resulted in the rule previously found in s. 18.3 being renumbered and reformulated as s. 37. Thus, to the extent the interpretation allowing the GST deemed trust to remain effective under the *CCAA* depends on *ETA* s. 222(3) having impliedly repealed *CCAA* s. 18.3(1) because it is later in time, we have come full circle. Parliament has renumbered and reformulated the provision of the *CCAA* stating that, subject to exceptions for source deductions, deemed trusts do not survive the *CCAA* proceedings and thus the *CCAA* is now the later in time statute. This confirms that Parliament's intent with respect to GST deemed trusts is to be found in the *CCAA*.

54 I do not agree with my colleague Abella J. that s. 44(f) of the *Interpretation Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-21, can be used to interpret the 2005 amendments as having no effect. The new statute can hardly be said to be a mere re-enactment of the former statute. Indeed, the *CCAA* underwent a substantial review in 2005. Notably, acting consistently with its goal of treating both the *BIA* and the *CCAA* as sharing the same approach to insolvency, Parliament made parallel amendments to both statutes with respect to corporate proposals. In addition, new provisions were introduced regarding the treatment of contracts, collective agreements, interim financing and governance agreements. The appointment and role of the Monitor was also clarified. Noteworthy are the limits imposed by *CCAA* s. 11.09 on the court's discretion to make an order staying the Crown's source deductions deemed trusts, which were formerly found in s. 11.4. No mention whatsoever is made of GST deemed trusts (see Summary to S.C. 2005, c. 47). The review went as far as looking at the very expression used to describe the statutory override of deemed trusts. The comments cited by my colleague only emphasize the clear intent of Parliament to maintain its policy that only source deductions deemed trusts survive in *CCAA* proceedings.

55 In the case at bar, the legislative context informs the determination of Parliament's legislative intent and supports the conclusion that *ETA* s. 222(3) was not intended to narrow the scope of the *CCAA*'s override provision. Viewed in its entire context, the conflict between the *ETA* and the *CCAA* is more apparent than real. I would therefore not follow the reasoning in *Ottawa Senators* and affirm that *CCAA* s. 18.3 remained effective.

56 My conclusion is reinforced by the purpose of the *CCAA* as part of Canadian remedial insolvency legislation. As this aspect is particularly relevant to the second issue, I will now discuss how courts have interpreted the scope of their discretionary powers in supervising a *CCAA* reorganization and how Parliament has largely endorsed this interpretation. Indeed, the interpretation courts have given to the *CCAA* helps in understanding how the *CCAA* grew to occupy such a prominent role in Canadian insolvency law.

3.3 Discretionary Power of a Court Supervising a CCAA Reorganization

57 Courts frequently observe that "[t]he *CCAA* is skeletal in nature" and does not "contain a comprehensive code that lays out all that is permitted or barred" (*ATB Financial v. Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp.*, 2008 ONCA 587, 92 O.R. (3d) 513 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 44, *per* Blair J.A.). Accordingly, "[t]he history of *CCAA* law has been an evolution of judicial interpretation" (*Dylex Ltd., Re* (1995), 31 C.B.R. (3d) 106 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List])), at para. 10, *per* Farley J.).

58 *CCAA* decisions are often based on discretionary grants of jurisdiction. The incremental exercise of judicial discretion in commercial courts under conditions one practitioner aptly describes as "the hothouse of real-time litigation" has been the primary method by which the *CCAA* has been adapted and has evolved to meet contemporary business and social needs (see Jones, at p. 484).

59 Judicial discretion must of course be exercised in furtherance of the *CCAA*'s purposes. The remedial purpose I referred to in the historical overview of the Act is recognized over and over again in the jurisprudence. To cite one early example:

The legislation is remedial in the purest sense in that it provides a means whereby the devastating social and economic effects of bankruptcy or creditor initiated termination of ongoing business operations can be avoided while a court-supervised attempt to reorganize the financial affairs of the debtor company is made.

(*Nova Metal Products Inc. v. Comiskey (Trustee of)* (1990), 41 O.A.C. 282 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 57, per Doherty J.A., dissenting)

60 Judicial decision making under the *CCAA* takes many forms. A court must first of all provide the conditions under which the debtor can attempt to reorganize. This can be achieved by staying enforcement actions by creditors to allow the debtor's business to continue, preserving the *status quo* while the debtor plans the compromise or arrangement to be presented to creditors, and supervising the process and advancing it to the point where it can be determined whether it will succeed (see, e.g., *Hongkong Bank of Canada v. Chef Ready Foods Ltd.* (1990), 51 B.C.L.R. (2d) 84 (B.C. C.A.), at pp. 88-89; *Pacific National Lease Holding Corp., Re* (1992), 19 B.C.A.C. 134 (B.C. C.A. [In Chambers]), at para. 27). In doing so, the court must often be cognizant of the various interests at stake in the reorganization, which can extend beyond those of the debtor and creditors to include employees, directors, shareholders, and even other parties doing business with the insolvent company (see, e.g., *Canadian Airlines Corp., Re*, 2000 ABQB 442, 84 Alta. L.R. (3d) 9 (Alta. Q.B.), at para. 144, per Paperny J. (as she then was); *Air Canada, Re* (2003), 42 C.B.R. (4th) 173 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]), at para. 3; *Air Canada, Re* [2003 CarswellOnt 4967 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]), 2003 CanLII 49366, at para. 13, per Farley J.; Sarra, *Creditor Rights*, at pp. 181-92 and 217-26). In addition, courts must recognize that on occasion the broader public interest will be engaged by aspects of the reorganization and may be a factor against which the decision of whether to allow a particular action will be weighed (see, e.g., *Canadian Red Cross Society / Société Canadienne de la Croix Rouge, Re* (2000), 19 C.B.R. (4th) 158 (Ont. S.C.J.), at para. 2, per Blair J. (as he then was); Sarra, *Creditor Rights*, at pp. 195-214).

61 When large companies encounter difficulty, reorganizations become increasingly complex. *CCAA* courts have been called upon to innovate accordingly in exercising their jurisdiction beyond merely staying proceedings against the debtor to allow breathing room for reorganization. They have been asked to sanction measures for which there is no explicit authority in the *CCAA*. Without exhaustively cataloguing the various measures taken under the authority of the *CCAA*, it is useful to refer briefly to a few examples to illustrate the flexibility the statute affords supervising courts.

62 Perhaps the most creative use of *CCAA* authority has been the increasing willingness of courts to authorize post-filing security for debtor in possession financing or super-priority charges on the debtor's assets when necessary for the continuation of the debtor's business during the reorganization (see, e.g., *Skydome Corp., Re* (1998), 16 C.B.R. (4th) 118 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]); *United Used Auto & Truck Parts Ltd., Re*, 2000 BCCA 146, 135 B.C.A.C. 96 (B.C. C.A.), aff'g (1999), 12 C.B.R. (4th) 144 (B.C. S.C. [In Chambers]); and generally, J. P. Sarra, *Rescue! The Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* (2007), at pp. 93-115). The *CCAA* has also been used to release claims against third parties as part of approving a comprehensive plan of arrangement and compromise, even over the objections of some dissenting creditors (see *Metcalf & Mansfield*). As well, the appointment of a Monitor to oversee the reorganization was originally a measure taken pursuant to the *CCAA*'s supervisory authority; Parliament responded, making the mechanism mandatory by legislative amendment.

63 Judicial innovation during *CCAA* proceedings has not been without controversy. At least two questions it raises are directly relevant to the case at bar: (1) what are the sources of a court's authority during *CCAA* proceedings? (2) what are the limits of this authority?

64 The first question concerns the boundary between a court's statutory authority under the *CCAA* and a court's residual authority under its inherent and equitable jurisdiction when supervising a reorganization. In authorizing measures during *CCAA* proceedings, courts have on occasion purported to rely upon their equitable jurisdiction to advance the purposes of the Act or their inherent jurisdiction to fill gaps in the statute. Recent appellate decisions have counselled against purporting to rely on inherent jurisdiction, holding that the better view is that courts are in most cases simply construing the authority supplied by the *CCAA* itself (see, e.g., *Skeena Cellulose Inc., Re*, 2003 BCCA 344, 13 B.C.L.R. (4th) 236 (B.C. C.A.), at paras. 45-47, per Newbury J.A.; *Stelco Inc. (Re)* (2005), 75 O.R. (3d) 5 (Ont. C.A.), paras. 31-33, per Blair J.A.).

65 I agree with Justice Georgina R. Jackson and Professor Janis Sarra that the most appropriate approach is a hierarchical one in which courts rely first on an interpretation of the provisions of the *CCAA* text before turning to inherent or equitable jurisdiction to anchor measures taken in a *CCAA* proceeding (see G. R. Jackson and J. Sarra, "Selecting the Judicial Tool to get the Job Done: An Examination of Statutory Interpretation, Discretionary Power and Inherent Jurisdiction in Insolvency Matters", in J. P. Sarra, ed., *Annual Review of Insolvency Law 2007* (2008), 41, at p. 42). The authors conclude that when given an appropriately purposive and liberal interpretation, the *CCAA* will be sufficient in most instances to ground measures necessary to achieve its objectives (p. 94).

66 Having examined the pertinent parts of the *CCAA* and the recent history of the legislation, I accept that in most instances the issuance of an order during *CCAA* proceedings should be considered an exercise in statutory interpretation. Particularly noteworthy in this regard is the expansive interpretation the language of the statute at issue is capable of supporting.

67 The initial grant of authority under the *CCAA* empowered a court "where an application is made under this Act in respect of a company ... on the application of any person interested in the matter ..., subject to this Act, [to] make an order under this section" (*CCAA*, s. 11(1)). The plain language of the statute was very broad.

68 In this regard, though not strictly applicable to the case at bar, I note that Parliament has in recent amendments changed the wording contained in s. 11(1), making explicit the discretionary authority of the court under the *CCAA*. Thus in s. 11 of the *CCAA* as currently enacted, a court may, "subject to the restrictions set out in this Act, ... make any order that it considers appropriate in the circumstances" (S.C. 2005, c. 47, s. 128). Parliament appears to have endorsed the broad reading of *CCAA* authority developed by the jurisprudence.

69 The *CCAA* also explicitly provides for certain orders. Both an order made on an initial application and an order on subsequent applications may stay, restrain, or prohibit existing or new proceedings against the debtor. The burden is on the applicant to satisfy the court that the order is appropriate in the circumstances and that the applicant has been acting in good faith and with due diligence (*CCAA*, ss. 11(3), (4) and (6)).

70 The general language of the *CCAA* should not be read as being restricted by the availability of more specific orders. However, the requirements of appropriateness, good faith, and due diligence are baseline considerations that a court should always bear in mind when exercising *CCAA* authority. Appropriateness under the *CCAA* is assessed by inquiring whether the order sought advances the policy objectives underlying the *CCAA*. The question is whether the order will usefully further efforts to achieve the remedial purpose of the *CCAA* — avoiding the social and economic losses resulting from liquidation of an insolvent company. I would add that appropriateness extends not only to the purpose of the order, but also to the means it employs. Courts should be mindful that chances for successful reorganizations are enhanced where participants achieve common ground and all stakeholders are treated as advantageously and fairly as the circumstances permit.

71 It is well-established that efforts to reorganize under the *CCAA* can be terminated and the stay of proceedings against the debtor lifted if the reorganization is "doomed to failure" (see *Chef Ready*, at p. 88; *Philip's Manufacturing Ltd., Re* (1992), 9 C.B.R. (3d) 25 (B.C. C.A.), at paras. 6-7). However, when an order is sought that does realistically advance the *CCAA*'s purposes, the ability to make it is within the discretion of a *CCAA* court.

72 The preceding discussion assists in determining whether the court had authority under the *CCAA* to continue the stay of proceedings against the Crown once it was apparent that reorganization would fail and bankruptcy was the inevitable next step.

73 In the Court of Appeal, Tysoe J.A. held that no authority existed under the *CCAA* to continue staying the Crown's enforcement of the GST deemed trust once efforts at reorganization had come to an end. The appellant submits that in so holding, Tysoe J.A. failed to consider the underlying purpose of the *CCAA* and give the statute an appropriately purposive and liberal interpretation under which the order was permissible. The Crown submits that Tysoe J.A. correctly held that the mandatory language of the *ETA* gave the court no option but to permit enforcement of the GST deemed trust when lifting the *CCAA* stay to permit the debtor to make an assignment under the *BIA*. Whether the *ETA* has a mandatory effect in the context of a *CCAA* proceeding has already been discussed. I will now address the question of whether the order was authorized by the *CCAA*.

74 It is beyond dispute that the *CCAA* imposes no explicit temporal limitations upon proceedings commenced under the Act that would prohibit ordering a continuation of the stay of the Crown's GST claims while lifting the general stay of proceedings temporarily to allow the debtor to make an assignment in bankruptcy.

75 The question remains whether the order advanced the underlying purpose of the *CCAA*. The Court of Appeal held that it did not because the reorganization efforts had come to an end and the *CCAA* was accordingly spent. I disagree.

76 There is no doubt that had reorganization been commenced under the *BIA* instead of the *CCAA*, the Crown's deemed trust priority for the GST funds would have been lost. Similarly, the Crown does not dispute that under the scheme of distribution in bankruptcy under the *BIA*, the deemed trust for GST ceases to have effect. Thus, after reorganization under the *CCAA* failed, creditors would have had a strong incentive to seek immediate bankruptcy and distribution of the debtor's assets under the *BIA*. In order to conclude that the discretion does not extend to partially lifting the stay in order to allow for an assignment in bankruptcy, one would have to assume a gap between the *CCAA* and the *BIA* proceedings. Brenner C.J.S.C.'s order staying Crown enforcement of the GST claim ensured that creditors would not be disadvantaged by the attempted reorganization under the *CCAA*. The effect of his order was to blunt any impulse of creditors to interfere in an orderly liquidation. His order was thus in furtherance of the *CCAA*'s objectives to the extent that it allowed a bridge between the *CCAA* and *BIA* proceedings. This interpretation of the tribunal's discretionary power is buttressed by s. 20 of the *CCAA*. That section provides that the *CCAA* "may be applied together with the provisions of any Act of Parliament... that authorizes or makes provision for the sanction of compromises or arrangements between a company and its shareholders or any class of them", such as the *BIA*. Section 20 clearly indicates the intention of Parliament for the *CCAA* to operate *in tandem* with other insolvency legislation, such as the *BIA*.

77 The *CCAA* creates conditions for preserving the *status quo* while attempts are made to find common ground amongst stakeholders for a reorganization that is fair to all. Because the alternative to reorganization is often bankruptcy, participants will measure the impact of a reorganization against the position they would enjoy in liquidation. In the case at bar, the order fostered a harmonious transition between reorganization and liquidation while meeting the objective of a single collective proceeding that is common to both statutes.

78 Tysoe J.A. therefore erred in my view by treating the *CCAA* and the *BIA* as distinct regimes subject to a temporal gap between the two, rather than as forming part of an integrated body of insolvency law. Parliament's decision to maintain two statutory schemes for reorganization, the *BIA* and the *CCAA*, reflects the reality that reorganizations of differing complexity require different legal mechanisms. By contrast, only one statutory scheme has been found to be needed to liquidate a bankrupt debtor's estate. The transition from the *CCAA* to the *BIA* may require the partial lifting of a stay of proceedings under the *CCAA* to allow commencement of the *BIA* proceedings. However, as Laskin J.A. for the Ontario Court of Appeal noted in a similar competition between secured creditors and the Ontario Superintendent of Financial Services seeking to enforce a deemed trust, "[t]he two statutes are related" and no "gap" exists between the two statutes which would allow the enforcement of property interests at the conclusion of *CCAA* proceedings that would be lost in bankruptcy *Ivaco Inc. (Re)* (2006), 83 O.R. (3d) 108 (Ont. C.A.), at paras. 62-63).

79 The Crown's priority in claims pursuant to source deductions deemed trusts does not undermine this conclusion. Source deductions deemed trusts survive under both the *CCAA* and the *BIA*. Accordingly, creditors' incentives to prefer one Act over another will not be affected. While a court has a broad discretion to stay source deductions deemed trusts in the *CCAA* context, this discretion is nevertheless subject to specific limitations applicable only to source deductions deemed trusts (*CCAA*, s. 11.4). Thus, if *CCAA* reorganization fails (e.g., either the creditors or the court refuse a proposed reorganization), the Crown can immediately assert its claim in unremitted source deductions. But this should not be understood to affect a seamless transition into bankruptcy or create any "gap" between the *CCAA* and the *BIA* for the simple reason that, regardless of what statute the reorganization had been commenced under, creditors' claims in both instances would have been subject to the priority of the Crown's source deductions deemed trust.

80 Source deductions deemed trusts aside, the comprehensive and exhaustive mechanism under the *BIA* must control the distribution of the debtor's assets once liquidation is inevitable. Indeed, an orderly transition to liquidation is mandatory under

the *BIA* where a proposal is rejected by creditors. The *CCAA* is silent on the transition into liquidation but the breadth of the court's discretion under the Act is sufficient to construct a bridge to liquidation under the *BIA*. The court must do so in a manner that does not subvert the scheme of distribution under the *BIA*. Transition to liquidation requires partially lifting the *CCAA* stay to commence proceedings under the *BIA*. This necessary partial lifting of the stay should not trigger a race to the courthouse in an effort to obtain priority unavailable under the *BIA*.

81 I therefore conclude that Brenner C.J.S.C. had the authority under the *CCAA* to lift the stay to allow entry into liquidation.

3.4 Express Trust

82 The last issue in this case is whether Brenner C.J.S.C. created an express trust in favour of the Crown when he ordered on April 29, 2008, that proceeds from the sale of LeRoy Trucking's assets equal to the amount of unremitted GST be held back in the Monitor's trust account until the results of the reorganization were known. Tysoe J.A. in the Court of Appeal concluded as an alternative ground for allowing the Crown's appeal that it was the beneficiary of an express trust. I disagree.

83 Creation of an express trust requires the presence of three certainties: intention, subject matter, and object. Express or "true trusts" arise from the acts and intentions of the settlor and are distinguishable from other trusts arising by operation of law (see D. W. M. Waters, M. R. Gillen and L. D. Smith, eds., *Waters' Law of Trusts in Canada* (3rd ed. 2005), at pp. 28-29 especially fn. 42).

84 Here, there is no certainty to the object (i.e. the beneficiary) inferable from the court's order of April 29, 2008, sufficient to support an express trust.

85 At the time of the order, there was a dispute between Century Services and the Crown over part of the proceeds from the sale of the debtor's assets. The court's solution was to accept LeRoy Trucking's proposal to segregate those monies until that dispute could be resolved. Thus there was no certainty that the Crown would actually be the beneficiary, or object, of the trust.

86 The fact that the location chosen to segregate those monies was the Monitor's trust account has no independent effect such that it would overcome the lack of a clear beneficiary. In any event, under the interpretation of *CCAA* s. 18.3(1) established above, no such priority dispute would even arise because the Crown's deemed trust priority over GST claims would be lost under the *CCAA* and the Crown would rank as an unsecured creditor for this amount. However, Brenner C.J.S.C. may well have been proceeding on the basis that, in accordance with *Ottawa Senators*, the Crown's GST claim would remain effective if reorganization was successful, which would not be the case if transition to the liquidation process of the *BIA* was allowed. An amount equivalent to that claim would accordingly be set aside pending the outcome of reorganization.

87 Thus, uncertainty surrounding the outcome of the *CCAA* restructuring eliminates the existence of any certainty to permanently vest in the Crown a beneficial interest in the funds. That much is clear from the oral reasons of Brenner C.J.S.C. on April 29, 2008, when he said: "Given the fact that [*CCAA* proceedings] are known to fail and filings in bankruptcy result, it seems to me that maintaining the status quo in the case at bar supports the proposal to have the monitor hold these funds in trust." Exactly who might take the money in the final result was therefore evidently in doubt. Brenner C.J.S.C.'s subsequent order of September 3, 2008, denying the Crown's application to enforce the trust once it was clear that bankruptcy was inevitable, confirms the absence of a clear beneficiary required to ground an express trust.

4. Conclusion

88 I conclude that Brenner C.J.S.C. had the discretion under the *CCAA* to continue the stay of the Crown's claim for enforcement of the GST deemed trust while otherwise lifting it to permit LeRoy Trucking to make an assignment in bankruptcy. My conclusion that s. 18.3(1) of the *CCAA* nullified the GST deemed trust while proceedings under that Act were pending confirms that the discretionary jurisdiction under s. 11 utilized by the court was not limited by the Crown's asserted GST priority, because there is no such priority under the *CCAA*.

89 For these reasons, I would allow the appeal and declare that the \$305,202.30 collected by LeRoy Trucking in respect of GST but not yet remitted to the Receiver General of Canada is not subject to deemed trust or priority in favour of the Crown. Nor is this amount subject to an express trust. Costs are awarded for this appeal and the appeal in the court below.

Fish J. (concurring):

I

90 I am in general agreement with the reasons of Justice Deschamps and would dispose of the appeal as she suggests.

91 More particularly, I share my colleague's interpretation of the scope of the judge's discretion under s. 11 of the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 ("*CCAA*"). And I share my colleague's conclusion that Brenner C.J.S.C. did not create an express trust in favour of the Crown when he segregated GST funds into the Monitor's trust account (2008 BCSC 1805, [2008] G.S.T.C. 221 (B.C. S.C. [In Chambers])).

92 I nonetheless feel bound to add brief reasons of my own regarding the interaction between the *CCAA* and the *Excise Tax Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. E-15 ("*ETA*").

93 In upholding deemed trusts created by the *ETA* notwithstanding insolvency proceedings, *Ottawa Senators Hockey Club Corp. (Re)* (2005), 73 O.R. (3d) 737, [2005] G.S.T.C. 1 (Ont. C.A.), and its progeny have been unduly protective of Crown interests which Parliament itself has chosen to subordinate to competing prioritized claims. In my respectful view, a clearly marked departure from that jurisprudential approach is warranted in this case.

94 Justice Deschamps develops important historical and policy reasons in support of this position and I have nothing to add in that regard. I do wish, however, to explain why a comparative analysis of related statutory provisions adds support to our shared conclusion.

95 Parliament has in recent years given detailed consideration to the Canadian insolvency scheme. It has declined to amend the provisions at issue in this case. Ours is not to wonder why, but rather to treat Parliament's preservation of the relevant provisions as a deliberate exercise of the legislative discretion that is Parliament's alone. With respect, I reject any suggestion that we should instead characterize the apparent conflict between s. 18.3(1) (now s. 37(1)) of the *CCAA* and s. 222 of the *ETA* as a drafting anomaly or statutory lacuna properly subject to judicial correction or repair.

II

96 In the context of the Canadian insolvency regime, a deemed trust will be found to exist only where two complementary elements co-exist: first, a statutory provision *creating* the trust; and second, a *CCAA* or *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3 ("*BIA*") provision *confirming* — or explicitly preserving — its effective operation.

97 This interpretation is reflected in three federal statutes. Each contains a deemed trust provision framed in terms strikingly similar to the wording of s. 222 of the *ETA*.

98 The first is the *Income Tax Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.) ("*ITA*") where s. 227(4) *creates* a deemed trust:

227 (4) Trust for moneys deducted — Every person who deducts or withholds an amount under this Act is deemed, notwithstanding any security interest (as defined in subsection 224(1.3)) in the amount so deducted or withheld, to hold the amount separate and apart from the property of the person and from property held by any secured creditor (as defined in subsection 224(1.3)) of that person that but for the security interest would be property of the person, in trust for Her Majesty and for payment to Her Majesty in the manner and at the time provided under this Act. [Here and below, the emphasis is of course my own.]

99 In the next subsection, Parliament has taken care to make clear that this trust is unaffected by federal or provincial legislation to the contrary:

(4.1) Extension of trust — Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* (except sections 81.1 and 81.2 of that Act), any other enactment of Canada, any enactment of a province or any other law, where at any time an amount deemed by subsection 227(4) to be held by a person in trust for Her Majesty is not paid to Her Majesty in the manner and at the time provided under this Act, property of the person ... equal in value to the amount so deemed to be held in trust is deemed

(a) to be held, from the time the amount was deducted or withheld by the person, separate and apart from the property of the person, in trust for Her Majesty whether or not the property is subject to such a security interest, ...

...

... and the proceeds of such property shall be paid to the Receiver General in priority to all such security interests.

100 The continued operation of this deemed trust is expressly *confirmed* in s. 18.3 of the *CCAA*:

18.3 (1) Subject to subsection (2), notwithstanding any provision in federal or provincial legislation that has the effect of deeming property to be held in trust for Her Majesty, property of a debtor company shall not be regarded as being held in trust for Her Majesty unless it would be so regarded in the absence of that statutory provision.

(2) Subsection (1) does not apply in respect of amounts deemed to be held in trust under subsection 227(4) or (4.1) of the *Income Tax Act*, subsection 23(3) or (4) of the *Canada Pension Plan* or subsection 86(2) or (2.1) of the *Employment Insurance Act*...

101 The operation of the *ITA* deemed trust is also confirmed in s. 67 of the *BIA*:

67 (2) Subject to subsection (3), notwithstanding any provision in federal or provincial legislation that has the effect of deeming property to be held in trust for Her Majesty, property of a bankrupt shall not be regarded as held in trust for Her Majesty for the purpose of paragraph (1)(a) unless it would be so regarded in the absence of that statutory provision.

(3) Subsection (2) does not apply in respect of amounts deemed to be held in trust under subsection 227(4) or (4.1) of the *Income Tax Act*, subsection 23(3) or (4) of the *Canada Pension Plan* or subsection 86(2) or (2.1) of the *Employment Insurance Act*...

102 Thus, Parliament has first *created* and then *confirmed the continued operation of* the Crown's *ITA* deemed trust under *both* the *CCAA* and the *BIA* regimes.

103 The second federal statute for which this scheme holds true is the *Canada Pension Plan*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-8 ("*CPP*"). At s. 23, Parliament creates a deemed trust in favour of the Crown and specifies that it exists despite all contrary provisions in any other Canadian statute. Finally, and in almost identical terms, the *Employment Insurance Act*, S.C. 1996, c. 23 ("*EIA*"), creates a deemed trust in favour of the Crown: see ss. 86(2) and (2.1).

104 As we have seen, the survival of the deemed trusts created under these provisions of the *ITA*, the *CPP* and the *EIA* is confirmed in s. 18.3(2) the *CCAA* and in s. 67(3) the *BIA*. In all three cases, Parliament's intent to enforce the Crown's deemed trust through insolvency proceedings is expressed in clear and unmistakable terms.

105 The same is not true with regard to the deemed trust created under the *ETA*. Although Parliament creates a deemed trust in favour of the Crown to hold unremitted GST monies, and although it purports to maintain this trust notwithstanding any contrary federal or provincial legislation, it does not *confirm* the trust — or expressly provide for its continued operation — in

either the *BIA* or the *CCAA*. The second of the two mandatory elements I have mentioned is thus absent reflecting Parliament's intention to allow the deemed trust to lapse with the commencement of insolvency proceedings.

106 The language of the relevant *ETA* provisions is identical in substance to that of the *ITA*, *CPP*, and *EIA* provisions:

222. (1) [Deemed] Trust for amounts collected— Subject to subsection (1.1), every person who collects an amount as or on account of tax under Division II is deemed, for all purposes and despite any security interest in the amount, to hold the amount in trust for Her Majesty in right of Canada, separate and apart from the property of the person and from property held by any secured creditor of the person that, but for a security interest, would be property of the person, until the amount is remitted to the Receiver General or withdrawn under subsection (2).

...

(3) Extension of trust— Despite any other provision of this Act (except subsection (4)), any other enactment of Canada (except the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act), any enactment of a province or any other law, if at any time an amount deemed by subsection (1) to be held by a person in trust for Her Majesty is not remitted to the Receiver General or withdrawn in the manner and at the time provided under this Part, property of the person and property held by any secured creditor of the person that, but for a security interest, would be property of the person, equal in value to the amount so deemed to be held in trust, is deemed

(a) to be held, from the time the amount was collected by the person, in trust for Her Majesty, separate and apart from the property of the person, whether or not the property is subject to a security interest, ...

...

... and the proceeds of the property shall be paid to the Receiver General in priority to all security interests.

107 Yet no provision of the *CCAA* provides for the continuation of this deemed trust after the *CCAA* is brought into play.

108 In short, Parliament has imposed *two* explicit conditions, or "building blocks", for survival under the *CCAA* of deemed trusts created by the *ITA*, *CPP*, and *EIA*. Had Parliament intended to likewise preserve under the *CCAA* deemed trusts created by the *ETA*, it would have included in the *CCAA* the sort of confirmatory provision that explicitly preserves other deemed trusts.

109 With respect, unlike Tysoe J.A., I do not find it "inconceivable that Parliament would specifically identify the *BIA* as an exception when enacting the current version of s. 222(3) of the *ETA* without considering the *CCAA* as a possible second exception" (2009 BCCA 205, 98 B.C.L.R. (4th) 242, [2009] G.S.T.C. 79 (B.C. C.A.), at para. 37). *All* of the deemed trust provisions excerpted above make explicit reference to the *BIA*. Section 222 of the *ETA* does not break the pattern. Given the near-identical wording of the four deemed trust provisions, it would have been surprising indeed had Parliament not addressed the *BIA* at all in the *ETA*.

110 Parliament's evident intent was to render GST deemed trusts inoperative upon the institution of insolvency proceedings. Accordingly, s. 222 mentions the *BIA* so as to *exclude* it from its ambit — rather than to *include* it, as do the *ITA*, the *CPP*, and the *EIA*.

111 Conversely, I note that *none* of these statutes mentions the *CCAA* expressly. Their specific reference to the *BIA* has no bearing on their interaction with the *CCAA*. Again, it is the confirmatory provisions *in the insolvency statutes* that determine whether a given deemed trust will subsist during insolvency proceedings.

112 Finally, I believe that chambers judges should not segregate GST monies into the Monitor's trust account during *CCAA* proceedings, as was done in this case. The result of Justice Deschamps's reasoning is that GST claims become unsecured under the *CCAA*. Parliament has deliberately chosen to nullify certain Crown super-priorities during insolvency; this is one such instance.

III

113 For these reasons, like Justice Deschamps, I would allow the appeal with costs in this Court and in the courts below and order that the \$305,202.30 collected by LeRoy Trucking in respect of GST but not yet remitted to the Receiver General of Canada be subject to no deemed trust or priority in favour of the Crown.

Abella J. (dissenting):

114 The central issue in this appeal is whether s. 222 of the *Excise Tax Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. E-15 ("ETA"), and specifically s. 222(3), gives priority during *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 ("CCA"), proceedings to the Crown's deemed trust in unremitted GST. I agree with Tysoe J.A. that it does. It follows, in my respectful view, that a court's discretion under s. 11 of the *CCA* is circumscribed accordingly.

115 Section 11¹ of the *CCA* stated:

11. (1) Notwithstanding anything in the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* or the *Winding-up Act*, where an application is made under this Act in respect of a company, the court, on the application of any person interested in the matter, may, subject to this Act, on notice to any other person or without notice as it may see fit, make an order under this section.

To decide the scope of the court's discretion under s. 11, it is necessary to first determine the priority issue. Section 222(3), the provision of the *ETA* at issue in this case, states:

222 (3) Extension of trust — Despite any other provision of this Act (except subsection (4)), any other enactment of Canada (except the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*), any enactment of a province or any other law, if at any time an amount deemed by subsection (1) to be held by a person in trust for Her Majesty is not remitted to the Receiver General or withdrawn in the manner and at the time provided under this Part, property of the person and property held by any secured creditor of the person that, but for a security interest, would be property of the person, equal in value to the amount so deemed to be held in trust, is deemed

(a) to be held, from the time the amount was collected by the person, in trust for Her Majesty, separate and apart from the property of the person, whether or not the property is subject to a security interest, and

(b) to form no part of the estate or property of the person from the time the amount was collected, whether or not the property has in fact been kept separate and apart from the estate or property of the person and whether or not the property is subject to a security interest

and is property beneficially owned by Her Majesty in right of Canada despite any security interest in the property or in the proceeds thereof and the proceeds of the property shall be paid to the Receiver General in priority to all security interests.

116 Century Services argued that the *CCA*'s general override provision, s. 18.3(1), prevailed, and that the deeming provisions in s. 222 of the *ETA* were, accordingly, inapplicable during *CCA* proceedings. Section 18.3(1) states:

18.3 (1) ... [N]otwithstanding any provision in federal or provincial legislation that has the effect of deeming property to be held in trust for Her Majesty, property of a debtor company shall not be regarded as held in trust for Her Majesty unless it would be so regarded in the absence of that statutory provision.

117 As MacPherson J.A. correctly observed in *Ottawa Senators Hockey Club Corp. (Re)* (2005), 73 O.R. (3d) 737, [2005] G.S.T.C. 1 (Ont. C.A.), s. 222(3) of the *ETA* is in "clear conflict" with s. 18.3(1) of the *CCA* (para. 31). Resolving the conflict between the two provisions is, essentially, what seems to me to be a relatively uncomplicated exercise in statutory interpretation: does the language reflect a clear legislative intention? In my view it does. The deemed trust provision, s. 222(3) of the *ETA*, has unambiguous language stating that it operates notwithstanding any law except the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3 ("*BIA*").

118 By expressly excluding only one statute from its legislative grasp, and by unequivocally stating that it applies despite any other law anywhere in Canada *except* the *BIA*, s. 222(3) has defined its boundaries in the clearest possible terms. I am in complete agreement with the following comments of MacPherson J.A. in *Ottawa Senators*:

The legislative intent of s. 222(3) of the *ETA* is clear. If there is a conflict with "any other enactment of Canada (except the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*", s. 222(3) prevails. In these words Parliament did two things: it decided that s. 222(3) should trump all other federal laws and, importantly, it addressed the topic of exceptions to its trumping decision and identified a single exception, the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* The *BIA* and the *CCAA* are closely related federal statutes. I cannot conceive that Parliament would specifically identify the *BIA* as an exception, but accidentally fail to consider the *CCAA* as a possible second exception. In my view, the omission of the *CCAA* from s. 222(3) of the *ETA* was almost certainly a considered omission. [para. 43]

119 MacPherson J.A.'s view that the failure to exempt the *CCAA* from the operation of the *ETA* is a reflection of a clear legislative intention, is borne out by how the *CCAA* was subsequently changed after s. 18.3(1) was enacted in 1997. In 2000, when s. 222(3) of the *ETA* came into force, amendments were also introduced to the *CCAA*. Section 18.3(1) was not amended.

120 The failure to amend s. 18.3(1) is notable because its effect was to protect the legislative *status quo*, notwithstanding repeated requests from various constituencies that s. 18.3(1) be amended to make the priorities in the *CCAA* consistent with those in the *BIA*. In 2002, for example, when Industry Canada conducted a review of the *BIA* and the *CCAA*, the Insolvency Institute of Canada and the Canadian Association of Insolvency and Restructuring Professionals recommended that the priority regime under the *BIA* be extended to the *CCAA* (Joint Task Force on Business Insolvency Law Reform, *Report* (March 15, 2002), Sch. B, proposal 71, at pp. 37-38). The same recommendations were made by the Standing Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce in its 2003 report, *Debtors and Creditors Sharing the Burden: A Review of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*; by the Legislative Review Task Force (Commercial) of the Insolvency Institute of Canada and the Canadian Association of Insolvency and Restructuring Professionals in its 2005 *Report on the Commercial Provisions of Bill C-55*; and in 2007 by the Insolvency Institute of Canada in a submission to the Standing Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce commenting on reforms then under consideration.

121 Yet the *BIA* remains the only exempted statute under s. 222(3) of the *ETA*. Even after the 2005 decision in *Ottawa Senators* which confirmed that the *ETA* took precedence over the *CCAA*, there was no responsive legislative revision. I see this lack of response as relevant in this case, as it was in *R. v. Tele-Mobile Co.*, 2008 SCC 12, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 305 (S.C.C.), where this Court stated:

While it cannot be said that legislative silence is necessarily determinative of legislative intention, in this case the silence is Parliament's answer to the consistent urging of Telus and other affected businesses and organizations that there be express language in the legislation to ensure that businesses can be reimbursed for the reasonable costs of complying with evidence-gathering orders. I see the legislative history as reflecting Parliament's intention that compensation not be paid for compliance with production orders. [para. 42]

122 All this leads to a clear inference of a deliberate legislative choice to protect the deemed trust in s. 222(3) from the reach of s. 18.3(1) of the *CCAA*.

123 Nor do I see any "policy" justification for interfering, through interpretation, with this clarity of legislative intention. I can do no better by way of explaining why I think the policy argument cannot succeed in this case, than to repeat the words of Tysse J.A. who said:

I do not dispute that there are valid policy reasons for encouraging insolvent companies to attempt to restructure their affairs so that their business can continue with as little disruption to employees and other stakeholders as possible. It is appropriate for the courts to take such policy considerations into account, but only if it is in connection with a matter that has not been considered by Parliament. Here, Parliament must be taken to have weighed policy considerations when it enacted the amendments to the *CCAA* and *ETA* described above. As Mr. Justice MacPherson observed at para. 43 of *Ottawa Senators*,

it is inconceivable that Parliament would specifically identify the *BIA* as an exception when enacting the current version of s. 222(3) of the *ETA* without considering the *CCAA* as a possible second exception. I also make the observation that the 1992 set of amendments to the *BIA* enabled proposals to be binding on secured creditors and, while there is more flexibility under the *CCAA*, it is possible for an insolvent company to attempt to restructure under the auspices of the *BIA*. [para. 37]

124 Despite my view that the clarity of the language in s. 222(3) is dispositive, it is also my view that even the application of other principles of interpretation reinforces this conclusion. In their submissions, the parties raised the following as being particularly relevant: the Crown relied on the principle that the statute which is "later in time" prevails; and Century Services based its argument on the principle that the general provision gives way to the specific (*generalia specialibus non derogant*).

125 The "later in time" principle gives priority to a more recent statute, based on the theory that the legislature is presumed to be aware of the content of existing legislation. If a new enactment is inconsistent with a prior one, therefore, the legislature is presumed to have intended to derogate from the earlier provisions (Ruth Sullivan, *Sullivan on the Construction of Statutes* (5th ed. 2008), at pp. 346-47; Pierre-André Côté, *The Interpretation of Legislation in Canada* (3rd ed. 2000), at p. 358).

126 The exception to this presumptive displacement of pre-existing inconsistent legislation, is the *generalia specialibus non derogant* principle that "[a] more recent, general provision will not be construed as affecting an earlier, special provision" (Côté, at p. 359). Like a Russian Doll, there is also an exception within this exception, namely, that an earlier, specific provision may in fact be "overruled" by a subsequent general statute if the legislature indicates, through its language, an intention that the general provision prevails (*Doré c. Verdun (Municipalité)*, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 862 (S.C.C.)).

127 The primary purpose of these interpretive principles is to assist in the performance of the task of determining the intention of the legislature. This was confirmed by MacPherson J.A. in *Ottawa Senators*, at para. 42:

[T]he overarching rule of statutory interpretation is that statutory provisions should be interpreted to give effect to the intention of the legislature in enacting the law. This primary rule takes precedence over all maxims or canons or aids relating to statutory interpretation, including the maxim that the specific prevails over the general (*generalia specialibus non derogant*). As expressed by Hudson J. in *Canada v. Williams*, [1944] S.C.R. 226, ... at p. 239 ...:

The maxim *generalia specialibus non derogant* is relied on as a rule which should dispose of the question, but the maxim is not a rule of law but a rule of construction and bows to the intention of the legislature, if such intention can reasonably be gathered from all of the relevant legislation.

(See also Côté, at p. 358, and Pierre-André Côté, with the collaboration of S. Beaulac and M. Devinat, *Interprétation des lois* (4th ed. 2009), at para. 1335.)

128 I accept the Crown's argument that the "later in time" principle is conclusive in this case. Since s. 222(3) of the *ETA* was enacted in 2000 and s. 18.3(1) of the *CCAA* was introduced in 1997, s. 222(3) is, on its face, the later provision. This chronological victory can be displaced, as Century Services argues, if it is shown that the more recent provision, s. 222(3) of the *ETA*, is a general one, in which case the earlier, specific provision, s. 18.3(1), prevails (*generalia specialibus non derogant*). But, as previously explained, the prior specific provision does not take precedence if the subsequent general provision appears to "overrule" it. This, it seems to me, is precisely what s. 222(3) achieves through the use of language stating that it prevails despite any law of Canada, of a province, or "any other law" other than the *BIA*. Section 18.3(1) of the *CCAA*, is thereby rendered inoperative for purposes of s. 222(3).

129 It is true that when the *CCAA* was amended in 2005,² s. 18.3(1) was re-enacted as s. 37(1) (S.C. 2005, c. 47, s. 131). Deschamps J. suggests that this makes s. 37(1) the new, "later in time" provision. With respect, her observation is refuted by the operation of s. 44(f) of the *Interpretation Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-21, which expressly deals with the (non) effect of re-enacting, without significant substantive changes, a repealed provision (see *Canada (Attorney General) v. Canada (Public Service Staff Relations Board)*, [1977] 2 F.C. 663 (Fed. C.A.), dealing with the predecessor provision to s. 44(f)). It directs that new enactments not be construed as "new law" unless they differ in substance from the repealed provision:

44. Where an enactment, in this section called the "former enactment", is repealed and another enactment, in this section called the "new enactment", is substituted therefor,

...

(f) except to the extent that the provisions of the new enactment are not in substance the same as those of the former enactment, the new enactment shall not be held to operate as new law, but shall be construed and have effect as a consolidation and as declaratory of the law as contained in the former enactment;

Section 2 of the *Interpretation Act* defines an enactment as "an Act or regulation or *any portion of an Act or regulation*".

130 Section 37(1) of the current *CCAA* is almost identical to s. 18.3(1). These provisions are set out for ease of comparison, with the differences between them underlined:

37.(1) Subject to subsection (2), despite any provision in federal or provincial legislation that has the effect of deeming property to be held in trust for Her Majesty, property of a debtor company shall not be regarded as being held in trust for Her Majesty unless it would be so regarded in the absence of that statutory provision.

18.3 (1) Subject to subsection (2), notwithstanding any provision in federal or provincial legislation that has the effect of deeming property to be held in trust for Her Majesty, property of a debtor company shall not be regarded as held in trust for Her Majesty unless it would be so regarded in the absence of that statutory provision.

131 The application of s. 44(f) of the *Interpretation Act* simply confirms the government's clearly expressed intent, found in Industry Canada's clause-by-clause review of Bill C-55, where s. 37(1) was identified as "a technical amendment to reorder the provisions of this Act". During second reading, the Hon. Bill Rompkey, then the Deputy Leader of the Government in the Senate, confirmed that s. 37(1) represented only a technical change:

On a technical note relating to the treatment of deemed trusts for taxes, the bill [*sic*] makes no changes to the underlying policy intent, despite the fact that in the case of a restructuring under the *CCAA*, sections of the act [*sic*] were repealed and substituted with renumbered versions due to the extensive reworking of the *CCAA*.

(*Debates of the Senate*, vol. 142, 1st Sess., 38th Parl., November 23, 2005, at p. 2147)

132 Had the substance of s. 18.3(1) altered in any material way when it was replaced by s. 37(1), I would share Deschamps J.'s view that it should be considered a new provision. But since s. 18.3(1) and s. 37(1) are the same in substance, the transformation of s. 18.3(1) into s. 37(1) has no effect on the interpretive queue, and s. 222(3) of the *ETA* remains the "later in time" provision (Sullivan, at p. 347).

133 This means that the deemed trust provision in s. 222(3) of the *ETA* takes precedence over s. 18.3(1) during *CCAA* proceedings. The question then is how that priority affects the discretion of a court under s. 11 of the *CCAA*.

134 While s. 11 gives a court discretion to make orders notwithstanding the *BIA* and the *Winding-up Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. W-11, that discretion is not liberated from the operation of any other federal statute. Any exercise of discretion is therefore circumscribed by whatever limits are imposed by statutes *other* than the *BIA* and the *Winding-up Act*. That includes the *ETA*. The chambers judge in this case was, therefore, required to respect the priority regime set out in s. 222(3) of the *ETA*. Neither s. 18.3(1) nor s. 11 of the *CCAA* gave him the authority to ignore it. He could not, as a result, deny the Crown's request for payment of the GST funds during the *CCAA* proceedings.

135 Given this conclusion, it is unnecessary to consider whether there was an express trust.

136 I would dismiss the appeal.

Appeal allowed.

Pourvoi accueilli.

Appendix

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 (as at December 13, 2007)

11. (1) Powers of court — Notwithstanding anything in the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* or the *Winding-up Act*, where an application is made under this Act in respect of a company, the court, on the application of any person interested in the matter, may, subject to this Act, on notice to any other person or without notice as it may see fit, make an order under this section.

...

(3) Initial application court orders — A court may, on an initial application in respect of a company, make an order on such terms as it may impose, effective for such period as the court deems necessary not exceeding thirty days,

(a) staying, until otherwise ordered by the court, all proceedings taken or that might be taken in respect of the company under an Act referred to in subsection (1);

(b) restraining, until otherwise ordered by the court, further proceedings in any action, suit or proceeding against the company; and

(c) prohibiting, until otherwise ordered by the court, the commencement of or proceeding with any other action, suit or proceeding against the company.

(4) Other than initial application court orders — A court may, on an application in respect of a company other than an initial application, make an order on such terms as it may impose,

(a) staying, until otherwise ordered by the court, for such period as the court deems necessary, all proceedings taken or that might be taken in respect of the company under an Act referred to in subsection (1);

(b) restraining, until otherwise ordered by the court, further proceedings in any action, suit or proceeding against the company; and

(c) prohibiting, until otherwise ordered by the court, the commencement of or proceeding with any other action, suit or proceeding against the company.

...

(6) Burden of proof on application — The court shall not make an order under subsection (3) or (4) unless

(a) the applicant satisfies the court that circumstances exist that make such an order appropriate; and

(b) in the case of an order under subsection (4), the applicant also satisfies the court that the applicant has acted, and is acting, in good faith and with due diligence.

11.4 (1) Her Majesty affected — An order made under section 11 may provide that

(a) Her Majesty in right of Canada may not exercise rights under subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act* or any provision of the *Canada Pension Plan* or of the *Employment Insurance Act* that refers to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act* and provides for the collection of a contribution, as defined in the *Canada Pension Plan*, or an employee's premium, or employer's premium, as defined in the *Employment Insurance Act*, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, in respect of the company if the company is a tax debtor under that subsection or provision, for such period as the court considers appropriate but ending not later than

- (i) the expiration of the order,
- (ii) the refusal of a proposed compromise by the creditors or the court,
- (iii) six months following the court sanction of a compromise or arrangement,
- (iv) the default by the company on any term of a compromise or arrangement, or
- (v) the performance of a compromise or arrangement in respect of the company; and\

(b) Her Majesty in right of a province may not exercise rights under any provision of provincial legislation in respect of the company where the company is a debtor under that legislation and the provision has a similar purpose to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act*, or refers to that subsection, to the extent that it provides for the collection of a sum, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, where the sum

- (i) has been withheld or deducted by a person from a payment to another person and is in respect of a tax similar in nature to the income tax imposed on individuals under the *Income Tax Act*, or
- (ii) is of the same nature as a contribution under the *Canada Pension Plan* if the province is a "province providing a comprehensive pension plan" as defined in subsection 3(1) of the *Canada Pension Plan* and the provincial legislation establishes a "provincial pension plan" as defined in that subsection,

for such period as the court considers appropriate but ending not later than the occurrence or time referred to in whichever of subparagraphs (a)(i) to (v) may apply.

(2) When order ceases to be in effect — An order referred to in subsection (1) ceases to be in effect if

(a) the company defaults on payment of any amount that becomes due to Her Majesty after the order is made and could be subject to a demand under

- (i) subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act*,
- (ii) any provision of the *Canada Pension Plan* or of the *Employment Insurance Act* that refers to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act* and provides for the collection of a contribution, as defined in the *Canada Pension Plan*, or an employee's premium, or employer's premium, as defined in the *Employment Insurance Act*, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, or
- (iii) under any provision of provincial legislation that has a similar purpose to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act*, or that refers to that subsection, to the extent that it provides for the collection of a sum, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, where the sum

(A) has been withheld or deducted by a person from a payment to another person and is in respect of a tax similar in nature to the income tax imposed on individuals under the *Income Tax Act*, or

(B) is of the same nature as a contribution under the *Canada Pension Plan* if the province is a "province providing a comprehensive pension plan" as defined in subsection 3(1) of the *Canada Pension Plan* and the provincial legislation establishes a "provincial pension plan" as defined in that subsection; or

(b) any other creditor is or becomes entitled to realize a security on any property that could be claimed by Her Majesty in exercising rights under

- (i) subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act*,

(ii) any provision of the *Canada Pension Plan* or of the *Employment Insurance Act* that refers to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act* and provides for the collection of a contribution, as defined in the *Canada Pension Plan*, or an employee's premium, or employer's premium, as defined in the *Employment Insurance Act*, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, or

(iii) any provision of provincial legislation that has a similar purpose to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act*, or that refers to that subsection, to the extent that it provides for the collection of a sum, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, where the sum

(A) has been withheld or deducted by a person from a payment to another person and is in respect of a tax similar in nature to the income tax imposed on individuals under the *Income Tax Act*, or

(B) is of the same nature as a contribution under the *Canada Pension Plan* if the province is a "province providing a comprehensive pension plan" as defined in subsection 3(1) of the *Canada Pension Plan* and the provincial legislation establishes a "provincial pension plan" as defined in that subsection.

(3) Operation of similar legislation — An order made under section 11, other than an order referred to in subsection (1) of this section, does not affect the operation of

(a) subsections 224(1.2) and (1.3) of the *Income Tax Act*,

(b) any provision of the *Canada Pension Plan* or of the *Employment Insurance Act* that refers to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act* and provides for the collection of a contribution, as defined in the *Canada Pension Plan*, or an employee's premium, or employer's premium, as defined in the *Employment Insurance Act*, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, or

(c) any provision of provincial legislation that has a similar purpose to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act*, or that refers to that subsection, to the extent that it provides for the collection of a sum, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, where the sum

(i) has been withheld or deducted by a person from a payment to another person and is in respect of a tax similar in nature to the income tax imposed on individuals under the *Income Tax Act*, or

(ii) is of the same nature as a contribution under the *Canada Pension Plan* if the province is a "province providing a comprehensive pension plan" as defined in subsection 3(1) of the *Canada Pension Plan* and the provincial legislation establishes a "provincial pension plan" as defined in that subsection,

and for the purpose of paragraph (c), the provision of provincial legislation is, despite any Act of Canada or of a province or any other law, deemed to have the same effect and scope against any creditor, however secured, as subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act* in respect of a sum referred to in subparagraph (c)(i), or as subsection 23(2) of the *Canada Pension Plan* in respect of a sum referred to in subparagraph (c)(ii), and in respect of any related interest, penalties or other amounts.

18.3 (1) Deemed trusts — Subject to subsection (2), notwithstanding any provision in federal or provincial legislation that has the effect of deeming property to be held in trust for Her Majesty, property of a debtor company shall not be regarded as held in trust for Her Majesty unless it would be so regarded in the absence of that statutory provision.

(2) Exceptions — Subsection (1) does not apply in respect of amounts deemed to be held in trust under subsection 227(4) or (4.1) of the *Income Tax Act*, subsection 23(3) or (4) of the *Canada Pension Plan* or subsection 86(2) or (2.1) of the *Employment Insurance Act* (each of which is in this subsection referred to as a "federal provision") nor in respect of amounts deemed to be held in trust under any law of a province that creates a deemed trust the sole purpose of which is to ensure remittance to Her Majesty in right of the province of amounts deducted or withheld under a law of the province where

(a) that law of the province imposes a tax similar in nature to the tax imposed under the *Income Tax Act* and the amounts deducted or withheld under that law of the province are of the same nature as the amounts referred to in subsection 227(4) or (4.1) of the *Income Tax Act*, or

(b) the province is a "province providing a comprehensive pension plan" as defined in subsection 3(1) of the *Canada Pension Plan*, that law of the province establishes a "provincial pension plan" as defined in that subsection and the amounts deducted or withheld under that law of the province are of the same nature as amounts referred to in subsection 23(3) or (4) of the *Canada Pension Plan*,

and for the purpose of this subsection, any provision of a law of a province that creates a deemed trust is, notwithstanding any Act of Canada or of a province or any other law, deemed to have the same effect and scope against any creditor, however secured, as the corresponding federal provision.

18.4 (1) Status of Crown claims — In relation to a proceeding under this Act, all claims, including secured claims, of Her Majesty in right of Canada or a province or any body under an enactment respecting workers' compensation, in this section and in section 18.5 called a "workers' compensation body", rank as unsecured claims.

...

(3) Operation of similar legislation — Subsection (1) does not affect the operation of

(a) subsections 224(1.2) and (1.3) of the *Income Tax Act*,

(b) any provision of the *Canada Pension Plan* or of the *Employment Insurance Act* that refers to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act* and provides for the collection of a contribution, as defined in the *Canada Pension Plan*, or an employee's premium, or employer's premium, as defined in the *Employment Insurance Act*, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, or

(c) any provision of provincial legislation that has a similar purpose to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act*, or that refers to that subsection, to the extent that it provides for the collection of a sum, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, where the sum

(i) has been withheld or deducted by a person from a payment to another person and is in respect of a tax similar in nature to the income tax imposed on individuals under the *Income Tax Act*, or

(ii) is of the same nature as a contribution under the *Canada Pension Plan* if the province is a "province providing a comprehensive pension plan" as defined in subsection 3(1) of the *Canada Pension Plan* and the provincial legislation establishes a "provincial pension plan" as defined in that subsection,

and for the purpose of paragraph (c), the provision of provincial legislation is, despite any Act of Canada or of a province or any other law, deemed to have the same effect and scope against any creditor, however secured, as subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act* in respect of a sum referred to in subparagraph (c)(i), or as subsection 23(2) of the *Canada Pension Plan* in respect of a sum referred to in subparagraph (c)(ii), and in respect of any related interest, penalties or other amounts.

...

20. [Act to be applied jointly with other Acts] — The provisions of this Act may be applied together with the provisions of any Act of Parliament or of the legislature of any province, that authorizes or makes provision for the sanction of compromises or arrangements between a company and its shareholders or any class of them.

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 (as at September 18, 2009)

11. General power of court — Despite anything in the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* or the *Winding-up and Restructuring Act*, if an application is made under this Act in respect of a debtor company, the court, on the application of any person

interested in the matter, may, subject to the restrictions set out in this Act, on notice to any other person or without notice as it may see fit, make any order that it considers appropriate in the circumstances.

...

11.02 (1) Stays, etc. — initial application — A court may, on an initial application in respect of a debtor company, make an order on any terms that it may impose, effective for the period that the court considers necessary, which period may not be more than 30 days,

(a) staying, until otherwise ordered by the court, all proceedings taken or that might be taken in respect of the company under the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* or the *Winding-up and Restructuring Act*;

(b) restraining, until otherwise ordered by the court, further proceedings in any action, suit or proceeding against the company; and

(c) prohibiting, until otherwise ordered by the court, the commencement of any action, suit or proceeding against the company.

(2) Stays, etc. — other than initial application — A court may, on an application in respect of a debtor company other than an initial application, make an order, on any terms that it may impose,

(a) staying, until otherwise ordered by the court, for any period that the court considers necessary, all proceedings taken or that might be taken in respect of the company under an Act referred to in paragraph (1)(a);

(b) restraining, until otherwise ordered by the court, further proceedings in any action, suit or proceeding against the company; and

(c) prohibiting, until otherwise ordered by the court, the commencement of any action, suit or proceeding against the company.

(3) Burden of proof on application — The court shall not make the order unless

(a) the applicant satisfies the court that circumstances exist that make the order appropriate; and

(b) in the case of an order under subsection (2), the applicant also satisfies the court that the applicant has acted, and is acting, in good faith and with due diligence.

...

11.09 (1) Stay — Her Majesty — An order made under section 11.02 may provide that

(a) Her Majesty in right of Canada may not exercise rights under subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act* or any provision of the *Canada Pension Plan* or of the *Employment Insurance Act* that refers to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act* and provides for the collection of a contribution, as defined in the *Canada Pension Plan*, or an employee's premium, or employer's premium, as defined in the *Employment Insurance Act*, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, in respect of the company if the company is a tax debtor under that subsection or provision, for the period that the court considers appropriate but ending not later than

(i) the expiry of the order,

(ii) the refusal of a proposed compromise by the creditors or the court,

(iii) six months following the court sanction of a compromise or an arrangement,

(iv) the default by the company on any term of a compromise or an arrangement, or

(v) the performance of a compromise or an arrangement in respect of the company; and

(b) Her Majesty in right of a province may not exercise rights under any provision of provincial legislation in respect of the company if the company is a debtor under that legislation and the provision has a purpose similar to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act*, or refers to that subsection, to the extent that it provides for the collection of a sum, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, and the sum

(i) has been withheld or deducted by a person from a payment to another person and is in respect of a tax similar in nature to the income tax imposed on individuals under the *Income Tax Act*, or

(ii) is of the same nature as a contribution under the *Canada Pension Plan* if the province is a "province providing a comprehensive pension plan" as defined in subsection 3(1) of the *Canada Pension Plan* and the provincial legislation establishes a "provincial pension plan" as defined in that subsection,

for the period that the court considers appropriate but ending not later than the occurrence or time referred to in whichever of subparagraphs (a)(i) to (v) that may apply.

(2) When order ceases to be in effect — The portions of an order made under section 11.02 that affect the exercise of rights of Her Majesty referred to in paragraph (1)(a) or (b) cease to be in effect if

(a) the company defaults on the payment of any amount that becomes due to Her Majesty after the order is made and could be subject to a demand under

(i) subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act*,

(ii) any provision of the *Canada Pension Plan* or of the *Employment Insurance Act* that refers to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act* and provides for the collection of a contribution, as defined in the *Canada Pension Plan*, or an employee's premium, or employer's premium, as defined in the *Employment Insurance Act*, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, or

(iii) any provision of provincial legislation that has a purpose similar to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act*, or that refers to that subsection, to the extent that it provides for the collection of a sum, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, and the sum

(A) has been withheld or deducted by a person from a payment to another person and is in respect of a tax similar in nature to the income tax imposed on individuals under the *Income Tax Act*, or

(B) is of the same nature as a contribution under the *Canada Pension Plan* if the province is a "province providing a comprehensive pension plan" as defined in subsection 3(1) of the *Canada Pension Plan* and the provincial legislation establishes a "provincial pension plan" as defined in that subsection; or

(b) any other creditor is or becomes entitled to realize a security on any property that could be claimed by Her Majesty in exercising rights under

(i) subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act*,

(ii) any provision of the *Canada Pension Plan* or of the *Employment Insurance Act* that refers to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act* and provides for the collection of a contribution, as defined in the *Canada Pension Plan*, or an employee's premium, or employer's premium, as defined in the *Employment Insurance Act*, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, or

(iii) any provision of provincial legislation that has a purpose similar to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act*, or that refers to that subsection, to the extent that it provides for the collection of a sum, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, and the sum

(A) has been withheld or deducted by a person from a payment to another person and is in respect of a tax similar in nature to the income tax imposed on individuals under the *Income Tax Act*, or

(B) is of the same nature as a contribution under the *Canada Pension Plan* if the province is a "province providing a comprehensive pension plan" as defined in subsection 3(1) of the *Canada Pension Plan* and the provincial legislation establishes a "provincial pension plan" as defined in that subsection.

(3) Operation of similar legislation — An order made under section 11.02, other than the portions of that order that affect the exercise of rights of Her Majesty referred to in paragraph (1)(a) or (b), does not affect the operation of

(a) subsections 224(1.2) and (1.3) of the *Income Tax Act*,

(b) any provision of the *Canada Pension Plan* or of the *Employment Insurance Act* that refers to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act* and provides for the collection of a contribution, as defined in the *Canada Pension Plan*, or an employee's premium, or employer's premium, as defined in the *Employment Insurance Act*, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, or

(c) any provision of provincial legislation that has a purpose similar to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act*, or that refers to that subsection, to the extent that it provides for the collection of a sum, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, and the sum

(i) has been withheld or deducted by a person from a payment to another person and is in respect of a tax similar in nature to the income tax imposed on individuals under the *Income Tax Act*, or

(ii) is of the same nature as a contribution under the *Canada Pension Plan* if the province is a "province providing a comprehensive pension plan" as defined in subsection 3(1) of the *Canada Pension Plan* and the provincial legislation establishes a "provincial pension plan" as defined in that subsection,

and for the purpose of paragraph (c), the provision of provincial legislation is, despite any Act of Canada or of a province or any other law, deemed to have the same effect and scope against any creditor, however secured, as subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act* in respect of a sum referred to in subparagraph (c)(i), or as subsection 23(2) of the *Canada Pension Plan* in respect of a sum referred to in subparagraph (c)(ii), and in respect of any related interest, penalties or other amounts.

37. (1) Deemed trusts — Subject to subsection (2), despite any provision in federal or provincial legislation that has the effect of deeming property to be held in trust for Her Majesty, property of a debtor company shall not be regarded as being held in trust for Her Majesty unless it would be so regarded in the absence of that statutory provision.

(2) Exceptions — Subsection (1) does not apply in respect of amounts deemed to be held in trust under subsection 227(4) or (4.1) of the *Income Tax Act*, subsection 23(3) or (4) of the *Canada Pension Plan* or subsection 86(2) or (2.1) of the *Employment Insurance Act* (each of which is in this subsection referred to as a "federal provision"), nor does it apply in respect of amounts deemed to be held in trust under any law of a province that creates a deemed trust the sole purpose of which is to ensure remittance to Her Majesty in right of the province of amounts deducted or withheld under a law of the province if

(a) that law of the province imposes a tax similar in nature to the tax imposed under the *Income Tax Act* and the amounts deducted or withheld under that law of the province are of the same nature as the amounts referred to in subsection 227(4) or (4.1) of the *Income Tax Act*, or

(b) the province is a "province providing a comprehensive pension plan" as defined in subsection 3(1) of the *Canada Pension Plan*, that law of the province establishes a "provincial pension plan" as defined in that subsection and the amounts deducted or withheld under that law of the province are of the same nature as amounts referred to in subsection 23(3) or (4) of the *Canada Pension Plan*,

and for the purpose of this subsection, any provision of a law of a province that creates a deemed trust is, despite any Act of Canada or of a province or any other law, deemed to have the same effect and scope against any creditor, however secured, as the corresponding federal provision.

Excise Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. E-15 (as at December 13, 2007)

222. (1) [Deemed] Trust for amounts collected — Subject to subsection (1.1), every person who collects an amount as or on account of tax under Division II is deemed, for all purposes and despite any security interest in the amount, to hold the amount in trust for Her Majesty in right of Canada, separate and apart from the property of the person and from property held by any secured creditor of the person that, but for a security interest, would be property of the person, until the amount is remitted to the Receiver General or withdrawn under subsection (2).

(1.1) Amounts collected before bankruptcy — Subsection (1) does not apply, at or after the time a person becomes a bankrupt (within the meaning of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*), to any amounts that, before that time, were collected or became collectible by the person as or on account of tax under Division II.

...

(3) Extension of trust — Despite any other provision of this Act (except subsection (4)), any other enactment of Canada (except the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*), any enactment of a province or any other law, if at any time an amount deemed by subsection (1) to be held by a person in trust for Her Majesty is not remitted to the Receiver General or withdrawn in the manner and at the time provided under this Part, property of the person and property held by any secured creditor of the person that, but for a security interest, would be property of the person, equal in value to the amount so deemed to be held in trust, is deemed

(a) to be held, from the time the amount was collected by the person, in trust for Her Majesty, separate and apart from the property of the person, whether or not the property is subject to a security interest, and

(b) to form no part of the estate or property of the person from the time the amount was collected, whether or not the property has in fact been kept separate and apart from the estate or property of the person and whether or not the property is subject to a security interest

and is property beneficially owned by Her Majesty in right of Canada despite any security interest in the property or in the proceeds thereof and the proceeds of the property shall be paid to the Receiver General in priority to all security interests.

Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3 (as at December 13, 2007)

67. (1) Property of bankrupt — The property of a bankrupt divisible among his creditors shall not comprise

(a) property held by the bankrupt in trust for any other person,

(b) any property that as against the bankrupt is exempt from execution or seizure under any laws applicable in the province within which the property is situated and within which the bankrupt resides, or

(b.1) such goods and services tax credit payments and prescribed payments relating to the essential needs of an individual as are made in prescribed circumstances and are not property referred to in paragraph (a) or (b),

but it shall comprise

(c) all property wherever situated of the bankrupt at the date of his bankruptcy or that may be acquired by or devolve on him before his discharge, and

(d) such powers in or over or in respect of the property as might have been exercised by the bankrupt for his own benefit.

(2) Deemed trusts — Subject to subsection (3), notwithstanding any provision in federal or provincial legislation that has the effect of deeming property to be held in trust for Her Majesty, property of a bankrupt shall not be regarded as held in trust for Her Majesty for the purpose of paragraph (1)(a) unless it would be so regarded in the absence of that statutory provision.

(3) Exceptions — Subsection (2) does not apply in respect of amounts deemed to be held in trust under subsection 227(4) or (4.1) of the *Income Tax Act*, subsection 23(3) or (4) of the *Canada Pension Plan* or subsection 86(2) or (2.1) of the *Employment Insurance Act* (each of which is in this subsection referred to as a "federal provision") nor in respect of amounts deemed to be held in trust under any law of a province that creates a deemed trust the sole purpose of which is to ensure remittance to Her Majesty in right of the province of amounts deducted or withheld under a law of the province where

(a) that law of the province imposes a tax similar in nature to the tax imposed under the *Income Tax Act* and the amounts deducted or withheld under that law of the province are of the same nature as the amounts referred to in subsection 227(4) or (4.1) of the *Income Tax Act*, or

(b) the province is a "province providing a comprehensive pension plan" as defined in subsection 3(1) of the *Canada Pension Plan*, that law of the province establishes a "provincial pension plan" as defined in that subsection and the amounts deducted or withheld under that law of the province are of the same nature as amounts referred to in subsection 23(3) or (4) of the *Canada Pension Plan*,

and for the purpose of this subsection, any provision of a law of a province that creates a deemed trust is, notwithstanding any Act of Canada or of a province or any other law, deemed to have the same effect and scope against any creditor, however secured, as the corresponding federal provision.

86. (1) Status of Crown claims — In relation to a bankruptcy or proposal, all provable claims, including secured claims, of Her Majesty in right of Canada or a province or of any body under an Act respecting workers' compensation, in this section and in section 87 called a "workers' compensation body", rank as unsecured claims.

...

(3) Exceptions — Subsection (1) does not affect the operation of

(a) subsections 224(1.2) and (1.3) of the *Income Tax Act*;

(b) any provision of the *Canada Pension Plan* or of the *Employment Insurance Act* that refers to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act* and provides for the collection of a contribution, as defined in the *Canada Pension Plan*, or an employee's premium, or employer's premium, as defined in the *Employment Insurance Act*, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts; or

(c) any provision of provincial legislation that has a similar purpose to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act*, or that refers to that subsection, to the extent that it provides for the collection of a sum, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, where the sum

(i) has been withheld or deducted by a person from a payment to another person and is in respect of a tax similar in nature to the income tax imposed on individuals under the *Income Tax Act*, or

(ii) is of the same nature as a contribution under the *Canada Pension Plan* if the province is a "province providing a comprehensive pension plan" as defined in subsection 3(1) of the *Canada Pension Plan* and the provincial legislation establishes a "provincial pension plan" as defined in that subsection,

and for the purpose of paragraph (c), the provision of provincial legislation is, despite any Act of Canada or of a province or any other law, deemed to have the same effect and scope against any creditor, however secured, as subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act* in respect of a sum referred to in subparagraph (c)(i), or as subsection 23(2) of the *Canada Pension Plan* in respect of a sum referred to in subparagraph (c)(ii), and in respect of any related interest, penalties or other amounts.

Footnotes

- 1 Section 11 was amended, effective September 18, 2009, and now states:
11. Despite anything in the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* or the *Winding-up and Restructuring Act*, if an application is made under this Act in respect of a debtor company, the court, on the application of any person interested in the matter, may, subject to the restrictions set out in this Act, on notice to any other person or without notice as it may see fit, make any order that it considers appropriate in the circumstances.
- 2 The amendments did not come into force until September 18, 2009.

TAB 3

2009 CarswellOnt 4467
Ontario Superior Court of Justice [Commercial List]

Nortel Networks Corp., Re

2009 CarswellOnt 4467, [2009] O.J. No. 3169, 179 A.C.W.S. (3d) 265, 55 C.B.R. (5th) 229

**IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS
ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED**

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF
NORTEL NETWORKS CORPORATION, NORTEL NETWORKS LIMITED, NORTEL
NETWORKS GLOBAL CORPORATION, NORTEL NETWORKS INTERNATIONAL
CORPORATION AND NORTEL NETWORKS TECHNOLOGY CORPORATION (Applicants)

APPLICATION UNDER THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS
ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

Morawetz J.

Heard: June 29, 2009

Written reasons: July 23, 2009

Docket: 09-CL-7950

Counsel: Derrick Tay, Jennifer Stam for Nortel Networks Corporation, et al

Lyndon Barnes, Adam Hirsh for Board of Directors of Nortel Networks Corporation, Nortel Networks Limited

J. Carfagnini, J. Pasquariello for Monitor, Ernst & Young Inc.

M. Starnino for Superintendent of Financial Services, Administrator of PBGF

S. Philpott for Former Employees

K. Zych for Noteholders

Pamela Huff, Craig Thorburn for MatlinPatterson Global Advisors LLC, MatlinPatterson Global Opportunities Partners III L.P.,

Matlin Patterson Opportunities Partners (Cayman) III L.P.

David Ward for UK Pension Protection Fund

Leanne Williams for Flextronics Inc.

Alex MacFarlane for Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors

Arthur O. Jacques, Tom McRae for Felske & Sylvain (de facto Continuing Employees' Committee)

Robin B. Schwill, Matthew P. Gottlieb for Nortel Networks UK Limited

A. Kauffman for Export Development Canada

D. Ullman for Verizon Communications Inc.

G. Benchetrit for IBM

Subject: Insolvency; Estates and Trusts

Related Abridgment Classifications

Bankruptcy and insolvency

[XIV](#) Administration of estate

[XIV.6](#) Sale of assets

[XIV.6.f](#) Jurisdiction of court to approve sale

Bankruptcy and insolvency

[XIX](#) Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act

[XIX.1](#) General principles

XIX.1.e Jurisdiction

XIX.1.e.i Court

Table of Authorities**Cases considered by *Morawetz J.*:**

Asset Engineering LP v. Forest & Marine Financial Ltd. Partnership (2009), 2009 BCCA 319, 2009 CarswellBC 1738 (B.C. C.A.) — followed

ATB Financial v. Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp. (2008), 2008 ONCA 587, 2008 CarswellOnt 4811, (sub nom. *Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp., Re*) 240 O.A.C. 245, (sub nom. *Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp., Re*) 296 D.L.R. (4th) 135, (sub nom. *Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp., Re*) 92 O.R. (3d) 513, 45 C.B.R. (5th) 163, 47 B.L.R. (4th) 123 (Ont. C.A.) — considered

ATB Financial v. Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp. (2008), 2008 CarswellOnt 5432, 2008 CarswellOnt 5433 (S.C.C.) — referred to

Boutiques San Francisco Inc., Re (2004), 2004 CarswellQue 10918, 7 C.B.R. (5th) 189 (C.S. Que.) — referred to
Calpine Canada Energy Ltd., Re (2007), 2007 CarswellAlta 1050, 2007 ABQB 504, 35 C.B.R. (5th) 1, 415 A.R. 196, 33 B.L.R. (4th) 68 (Alta. Q.B.) — referred to

Canadian Red Cross Society / Société Canadienne de la Croix-Rouge, Re (1998), 1998 CarswellOnt 3346, 5 C.B.R. (4th) 299, 72 O.T.C. 99 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — considered

Caterpillar Financial Services Ltd. v. Hard-Rock Paving Co. (2008), 2008 CarswellOnt 4046, 45 C.B.R. (5th) 87 (Ont. S.C.J.) — referred to

Cliffs Over Maple Bay Investments Ltd. v. Fisgard Capital Corp. (2008), 2008 BCCA 327, 2008 CarswellBC 1758, 83 B.C.L.R. (4th) 214, 296 D.L.R. (4th) 577, 434 W.A.C. 187, 258 B.C.A.C. 187, 46 C.B.R. (5th) 7, [2008] 10 W.W.R. 575 (B.C. C.A.) — distinguished

Consumers Packaging Inc., Re (2001), 150 O.A.C. 384, 27 C.B.R. (4th) 197, 2001 CarswellOnt 3482, 12 C.P.C. (5th) 208 (Ont. C.A.) — considered

Lehndorff General Partner Ltd., Re (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 24, 9 B.L.R. (2d) 275, 1993 CarswellOnt 183 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — referred to

PSINET Ltd., Re (2001), 28 C.B.R. (4th) 95, 2001 CarswellOnt 3405 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — considered
Residential Warranty Co. of Canada Inc., Re (2006), 2006 ABQB 236, 2006 CarswellAlta 383, (sub nom. *Residential Warranty Co. of Canada Inc. (Bankrupt), Re*) 393 A.R. 340, 62 Alta. L.R. (4th) 168, 21 C.B.R. (5th) 57 (Alta. Q.B.) — referred to

Royal Bank v. Soundair Corp. (1991), 7 C.B.R. (3d) 1, 83 D.L.R. (4th) 76, 46 O.A.C. 321, 4 O.R. (3d) 1, 1991 CarswellOnt 205 (Ont. C.A.) — considered

Stelco Inc., Re (2004), 2004 CarswellOnt 4084, 6 C.B.R. (5th) 316 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Tiger Brand Knitting Co., Re (2005), 2005 CarswellOnt 1240, 9 C.B.R. (5th) 315 (Ont. S.C.J.) — referred to

Winnipeg Motor Express Inc., Re (2008), 2008 CarswellMan 560, 2008 MBQB 297, 49 C.B.R. (5th) 302 (Man. Q.B.) — referred to

Statutes considered:

Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C.

s. 363 — referred to

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36

Generally — referred to

s. 11 — referred to

s. 11(4) — considered

MOTION by company for approval of bidding procedures for sale of business and asset sale agreement.

Morawetz J.*:*Introduction**

1 On June 29, 2009, I granted the motion of the Applicants and approved the bidding procedures (the "Bidding Procedures") described in the affidavit of Mr. Riedel sworn June 23, 2009 (the "Riedel Affidavit") and the Fourteenth Report of Ernst & Young, Inc., in its capacity as Monitor (the "Monitor") (the "Fourteenth Report"). The order was granted immediately after His Honour Judge Gross of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware (the "U.S. Court") approved the Bidding Procedures in the Chapter 11 proceedings.

2 I also approved the Asset Sale Agreement dated as of June 19, 2009 (the "Sale Agreement") among Nokia Siemens Networks B.V. ("Nokia Siemens Networks" or the "Purchaser"), as buyer, and Nortel Networks Corporation ("NNC"), Nortel Networks Limited ("NNL"), Nortel Networks, Inc. ("NNI") and certain of their affiliates, as vendors (collectively the "Sellers") in the form attached as Appendix "A" to the Fourteenth Report and I also approved and accepted the Sale Agreement for the purposes of conducting the "stalking horse" bidding process in accordance with the Bidding Procedures including, the Break-Up Fee and the Expense Reimbursement (as both terms are defined in the Sale Agreement).

3 An order was also granted sealing confidential Appendix "B" to the Fourteenth Report containing the schedules and exhibits to the Sale Agreement pending further order of this court.

4 The following are my reasons for granting these orders.

5 The hearing on June 29, 2009 (the "Joint Hearing") was conducted by way of video conference with a similar motion being heard by the U.S. Court. His Honor Judge Gross presided over the hearing in the U.S. Court. The Joint Hearing was conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Cross-Border Protocol, which had previously been approved by both the U.S. Court and this court.

6 The Sale Agreement relates to the Code Division Multiple Access ("CDMA") business Long-Term Evolution ("LTE") Access assets.

7 The Sale Agreement is not insignificant. The Monitor reports that revenues from CDMA comprised over 21% of Nortel's 2008 revenue. The CDMA business employs approximately 3,100 people (approximately 500 in Canada) and the LTE business employs approximately 1,000 people (approximately 500 in Canada). The purchase price under the Sale Agreement is \$650 million.

Background

8 The Applicants were granted CCAA protection on January 14, 2009. Insolvency proceedings have also been commenced in the United States, the United Kingdom, Israel and France.

9 At the time the proceedings were commenced, Nortel's business operated through 143 subsidiaries, with approximately 30,000 employees globally. As of January 2009, Nortel employed approximately 6,000 people in Canada alone.

10 The stated purpose of Nortel's filing under the CCAA was to stabilize the Nortel business to maximize the chances of preserving all or a portion of the enterprise. The Monitor reported that a thorough strategic review of the company's assets and operations would have to be undertaken in consultation with various stakeholder groups.

11 In April 2009, the Monitor updated the court and noted that various restructuring alternatives were being considered.

12 On June 19, 2009, Nortel announced that it had entered into the Sale Agreement with respect to its assets in its CDMA business and LTE Access assets (collectively, the "Business") and that it was pursuing the sale of its other business units. Mr. Riedel in his affidavit states that Nortel has spent many months considering various restructuring alternatives before determining in its business judgment to pursue "going concern" sales for Nortel's various business units.

13 In deciding to pursue specific sales processes, Mr. Riedel also stated that Nortel's management considered:

- (a) the impact of the filings on Nortel's various businesses, including deterioration in sales; and
- (b) the best way to maximize the value of its operations, to preserve jobs and to continue businesses in Canada and the U.S.

14 Mr. Riedel notes that while the Business possesses significant value, Nortel was faced with the reality that:

- (a) the Business operates in a highly competitive environment;
- (b) full value cannot be realized by continuing to operate the Business through a restructuring; and
- (c) in the absence of continued investment, the long-term viability of the Business would be put into jeopardy.

15 Mr. Riedel concluded that the proposed process for the sale of the Business pursuant to an auction process provided the best way to preserve the Business as a going concern and to maximize value and preserve the jobs of Nortel employees.

16 In addition to the assets covered by the Sale Agreement, certain liabilities are to be assumed by the Purchaser. This issue is covered in a comprehensive manner at paragraph 34 of the Fourteenth Report. Certain liabilities to employees are included on this list. The assumption of these liabilities is consistent with the provisions of the Sale Agreement that requires the Purchaser to extend written offers of employment to at least 2,500 employees in the Business.

17 The Monitor also reports that given that certain of the U.S. Debtors are parties to the Sale Agreement and given the desire to maximize value for the benefit of stakeholders, Nortel determined and it has agreed with the Purchaser that the Sale Agreement is subject to higher or better offers being obtained pursuant to a sale process under s. 363 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code and that the Sale Agreement shall serve as a "stalking horse" bid pursuant to that process.

18 The Bidding Procedures provide that all bids must be received by the Seller by no later than July 21, 2009 and that the Sellers will conduct an auction of the purchased assets on July 24, 2009. It is anticipated that Nortel will ultimately seek a final sales order from the U.S. Court on or about July 28, 2009 and an approval and vesting order from this court in respect of the Sale Agreement and purchased assets on or about July 30, 2009.

19 The Monitor recognizes the expeditious nature of the sale process but the Monitor has been advised that given the nature of the Business and the consolidation occurring in the global market, there are likely to be a limited number of parties interested in acquiring the Business.

20 The Monitor also reports that Nortel has consulted with, among others, the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (the "UCC") and the bondholder group regarding the Bidding Procedures and is of the view that both are supportive of the timing of this sale process. (It is noted that the UCC did file a limited objection to the motion relating to certain aspects of the Bidding Procedures.)

21 Given the sale efforts made to date by Nortel, the Monitor supports the sale process outlined in the Fourteenth Report and more particularly described in the Bidding Procedures.

22 Objections to the motion were filed in the U.S. Court and this court by MatlinPatterson Global Advisors LLC, MatlinPatterson Global Opportunities Partners III L.P. and Matlin Patterson Opportunities Partners (Cayman) III L.P. (collectively, "MatlinPatterson") as well the UCC.

23 The objections were considered in the hearing before Judge Gross and, with certain limited exceptions, the objections were overruled.

Issues and Discussion

24 The threshold issue being raised on this motion by the Applicants is whether the CCAA affords this court the jurisdiction to approve a sales process in the absence of a formal plan of compromise or arrangement and a creditor vote. If the question is answered in the affirmative, the secondary issue is whether this sale should authorize the Applicants to sell the Business.

25 The Applicants submit that it is well established in the jurisprudence that this court has the jurisdiction under the CCAA to approve the sales process and that the requested order should be granted in these circumstances.

26 Counsel to the Applicants submitted a detailed factum which covered both issues.

27 Counsel to the Applicants submits that one of the purposes of the CCAA is to preserve the going concern value of debtors companies and that the court's jurisdiction extends to authorizing sale of the debtor's business, even in the absence of a plan or creditor vote.

28 The CCAA is a flexible statute and it is particularly useful in complex insolvency cases in which the court is required to balance numerous constituents and a myriad of interests.

29 The CCAA has been described as "skeletal in nature". It has also been described as a "sketch, an outline, a supporting framework for the resolution of corporate insolvencies in the public interest". *ATB Financial v. Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp.* (2008), 45 C.B.R. (5th) 163 (Ont. C.A.) at paras. 44, 61, leave to appeal refused [2008] S.C.C.A. No. 337 (S.C.C.). ("ATB Financial").

30 The jurisprudence has identified as sources of the court's discretionary jurisdiction, *inter alia*:

(a) the power of the court to impose terms and conditions on the granting of a stay under s. 11(4) of the CCAA;

(b) the specific provision of s. 11(4) of the CCAA which provides that the court may make an order "on such terms as it may impose"; and

(c) the inherent jurisdiction of the court to "fill in the gaps" of the CCAA in order to give effect to its objects. *Canadian Red Cross Society / Société Canadienne de la Croix-Rouge, Re* (1998), 5 C.B.R. (4th) 299 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) at para. 43; *PSINET Ltd., Re* (2001), 28 C.B.R. (4th) 95 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) at para. 5, *ATB Financial, supra*, at paras. 43-52.

31 However, counsel to the Applicants acknowledges that the discretionary authority of the court under s. 11 must be informed by the purpose of the CCAA.

Its exercise must be guided by the scheme and object of the Act and by the legal principles that govern corporate law issues. *Re Stelco Inc.* (2005), 9 C.B.R. (5th) 135 (Ont. C.A.) at para. 44.

32 In support of the court's jurisdiction to grant the order sought in this case, counsel to the Applicants submits that Nortel seeks to invoke the "overarching policy" of the CCAA, namely, to preserve the going concern. *Residential Warranty Co. of Canada Inc., Re* (2006), 21 C.B.R. (5th) 57 (Alta. Q.B.) at para. 78.

33 Counsel to the Applicants further submits that CCAA courts have repeatedly noted that the purpose of the CCAA is to preserve the benefit of a going concern business for all stakeholders, or "the whole economic community":

The purpose of the CCAA is to facilitate arrangements that might avoid liquidation of the company and allow it to continue in business to the benefit of the whole economic community, including the shareholders, the creditors (both secured and unsecured) and the employees. *Citibank Canada v. Chase Manhattan Bank of Canada* (1991), 5 C.B.R. (3rd) 167 (Ont. Gen. Div.) at para. 29. *Re Consumers Packaging Inc.* (2001) 27 C.B.R. (4th) 197 (Ont. C.A.) at para. 5.

34 Counsel to the Applicants further submits that the CCAA should be given a broad and liberal interpretation to facilitate its underlying purpose, including the preservation of the going concern for the benefit of all stakeholders and further that it should not matter whether the business continues as a going concern under the debtor's stewardship or under new ownership, for as long as the business continues as a going concern, a primary goal of the CCAA will be met.

35 Counsel to the Applicants makes reference to a number of cases where courts in Ontario, in appropriate cases, have exercised their jurisdiction to approve a sale of assets, even in the absence of a plan of arrangement being tendered to stakeholders for a vote. In doing so, counsel to the Applicants submits that the courts have repeatedly recognized that they have jurisdiction under the CCAA to approve asset sales in the absence of a plan of arrangement, where such sale is in the best interests of stakeholders generally. *Canadian Red Cross Society / Société Canadienne de la Croix-Rouge, Re, supra, Re PSINet, supra, Consumers Packaging Inc., Re* [2001 CarswellOnt 3482 (Ont. C.A.)], *supra, Stelco Inc., Re* (2004), 6 C.B.R. (5th) 316 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) at para. 1, *Tiger Brand Knitting Co., Re* (2005), 9 C.B.R. (5th) 315 (Ont. S.C.J.), *Caterpillar Financial Services Ltd. v. Hard-Rock Paving Co.* (2008), 45 C.B.R. (5th) 87 (Ont. S.C.J.) and *Lehndorff General Partner Ltd., Re* (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 24 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]).

36 In *Re Consumers Packaging, supra*, the Court of Appeal for Ontario specifically held that a sale of a business as a going concern during a CCAA proceeding is consistent with the purposes of the CCAA:

The sale of Consumers' Canadian glass operations as a going concern pursuant to the Owens-Illinois bid allows the preservation of Consumers' business (albeit under new ownership), and is therefore consistent with the purposes of the CCAA.

...we cannot refrain from commenting that Farley J.'s decision to approve the Owens-Illinois bid is consistent with previous decisions in Ontario and elsewhere that have emphasized the broad remedial purpose of flexibility of the CCAA and have approved the sale and disposition of assets during CCAA proceedings prior to a formal plan being tendered. *Re Consumers Packaging, supra, at paras. 5, 9.*

37 Similarly, in *Canadian Red Cross Society / Société Canadienne de la Croix-Rouge, Re, supra*, Blair J. (as he then was) expressly affirmed the court's jurisdiction to approve a sale of assets in the course of a CCAA proceeding before a plan of arrangement had been approved by creditors. *Canadian Red Cross Society / Société Canadienne de la Croix-Rouge, Re, supra*, at paras. 43, 45.

38 Similarly, in *PSINet Limited, supra*, the court approved a going concern sale in a CCAA proceeding where no plan was presented to creditors and a substantial portion of the debtor's Canadian assets were to be sold. Farley J. noted as follows:

[If the sale was not approved,] there would be a liquidation scenario ensuing which would realize far less than this going concern sale (which appears to me to have involved a transparent process with appropriate exposure designed to maximize the proceeds), thus impacting upon the rest of the creditors, especially as to the unsecured, together with the material enlarging of the unsecured claims by the disruption claims of approximately 8,600 customers (who will be materially disadvantaged by an interrupted transition) plus the job losses for approximately 200 employees. *Re PSINet Limited, supra*, at para. 3.

39 In *Re Stelco Inc., supra*, in 2004, Farley J. again addressed the issue of the feasibility of selling the operations as a going concern:

I would observe that usually it is the creditor side which wishes to terminate CCAA proceedings and that when the creditors threaten to take action, there is a realization that a liquidation scenario will not only have a negative effect upon a CCAA applicant, but also upon its workforce. Hence, the CCAA may be employed to provide stability during a period of necessary financial and operational restructuring - and if a restructuring of the "old company" is not feasible, then there is the exploration of the feasibility of the sale of the operations/enterprise as a going concern (with continued employment) in whole or in part. *Re Stelco Inc, supra*, at para. 1.

40 I accept these submissions as being general statements of the law in Ontario. The value of equity in an insolvent debtor is dubious, at best, and, in my view, it follows that the determining factor should not be whether the business continues under the debtor's stewardship or under a structure that recognizes a new equity structure. An equally important factor to consider is whether the case can be made to continue the business as a going concern.

41 Counsel to the Applicants also referred to decisions from the courts in Quebec, Manitoba and Alberta which have similarly recognized the court's jurisdiction to approve a sale of assets during the course of a CCAA proceeding. *Boutiques San Francisco Inc., Re* (2004), 7 C.B.R. (5th) 189 (C.S. Que.), *Winnipeg Motor Express Inc., Re* (2008), 49 C.B.R. (5th) 302 (Man. Q.B.) at paras. 41, 44, and *Calpine Canada Energy Ltd., Re* (2007), 35 C.B.R. (5th) 1 (Alta. Q.B.) at para. 75.

42 Counsel to the Applicants also directed the court's attention to a recent decision of the British Columbia Court of Appeal which questioned whether the court should authorize the sale of substantially all of the debtor's assets where the debtor's plan "will simply propose that the net proceeds from the sale...be distributed to its creditors". In *Cliffs Over Maple Bay Investments Ltd. v. Fisgard Capital Corp.* (2008), 46 C.B.R. (5th) 7 (B.C. C.A.) ("*Cliffs Over Maple Bay*"), the court was faced with a debtor who had no active business but who nonetheless sought to stave off its secured creditor indefinitely. The case did not involve any type of sale transaction but the Court of Appeal questioned whether a court should authorize the sale under the CCAA without requiring the matter to be voted upon by creditors.

43 In addressing this matter, it appears to me that the British Columbia Court of Appeal focussed on whether the court should grant the requested relief and not on the question of whether a CCAA court has the jurisdiction to grant the requested relief.

44 I do not disagree with the decision in *Cliffs Over Maple Bay*. However, it involved a situation where the debtor had no active business and did not have the support of its stakeholders. That is not the case with these Applicants.

45 The *Cliffs Over Maple Bay* decision has recently been the subject of further comment by the British Columbia Court of Appeal in *Asset Engineering LP v. Forest & Marine Financial Ltd. Partnership*, 2009 BCCA 319 (B.C. C.A.).

46 At paragraphs 24 - 26 of the *Forest and Marine* decision, Newbury J.A. stated:

24. In *Cliffs Over Maple Bay*, the debtor company was a real estate developer whose one project had failed. The company had been dormant for some time. It applied for CCAA protection but described its proposal for restructuring in vague terms that amounted essentially to a plan to "secure sufficient funds" to complete the stalled project (Para. 34). This court, per Tysoe J.A., ruled that although the Act can apply to single-project companies, its purposes are unlikely to be engaged in such instances, since mortgage priorities are fully straight forward and there will be little incentive for senior secured creditors to compromise their interests (Para. 36). Further, the Court stated, the granting of a stay under s. 11 is "not a free standing remedy that the court may grant whenever an insolvent company wishes to undertake a "restructuring"...Rather, s. 11 is ancillary to the fundamental purpose of the CCAA, and a stay of proceedings freezing the rights of creditors should only be granted in furtherance of the CCAA's fundamental purpose". That purpose has been described in *Meridian Developments Inc. v. Toronto Dominion Bank* (1984) 11 D.L.R. (4th) 576 (Alta. Q.B.):

The legislation is intended to have wide scope and allow a judge to make orders which will effectively maintain the status quo for a period while the insolvent company attempts to gain the approval of its creditors for a proposed arrangement which will enable the company to remain in operation for what is, hopefully, the future benefit of both the company and its creditors. [at 580]

25. The Court was not satisfied in *Cliffs Over Maple Bay* that the "restructuring" contemplated by the debtor would do anything other than distribute the net proceeds from the sale, winding up or liquidation of its business. The debtor had no intention of proposing a plan of arrangement, and its business would not continue following the execution of its proposal - thus it could not be said the purposes of the statute would be engaged...

26. In my view, however, the case at bar is quite different from *Cliffs Over Maple Bay*. Here, the main debtor, the Partnership, is at the centre of a complicated corporate group and carries on an active financing business that it hopes to save notwithstanding the current economic cycle. (The business itself which fills a "niche" in the market, has been carried on in one form or another since 1983.) The CCAA is appropriate for situations such as this where it is unknown whether the "restructuring" will ultimately take the form of a refinancing or will involve a reorganization of the corporate entity or entities and a true compromise of the rights of one or more parties. The "fundamental purpose" of the Act - to preserve the *status quo* while the debtor prepares a plan that will enable it to remain in business to the benefit of all concerned - will be furthered by granting a stay so that the means contemplated by the Act - a compromise or arrangement - can be developed, negotiated and voted on if necessary...

47 It seems to me that the foregoing views expressed in *Forest and Marine* are not inconsistent with the views previously expressed by the courts in Ontario. The CCAA is intended to be flexible and must be given a broad and liberal interpretation to achieve its objectives and a sale by the debtor which preserves its business as a going concern is, in my view, consistent with those objectives.

48 I therefore conclude that the court does have the jurisdiction to authorize a sale under the CCAA in the absence of a plan.

49 I now turn to a consideration of whether it is appropriate, in this case, to approve this sales process. Counsel to the Applicants submits that the court should consider the following factors in determining whether to authorize a sale under the CCAA in the absence of a plan:

- (a) is a sale transaction warranted at this time?
- (b) will the sale benefit the whole "economic community"?
- (c) do any of the debtors' creditors have a *bona fide* reason to object to a sale of the business?
- (d) is there a better viable alternative?

I accept this submission.

50 It is the position of the Applicants that Nortel's proposed sale of the Business should be approved as this decision is to the benefit of stakeholders and no creditor is prejudiced. Further, counsel submits that in the absence of a sale, the prospects for the Business are a loss of competitiveness, a loss of value and a loss of jobs.

51 Counsel to the Applicants summarized the facts in support of the argument that the Sale Transaction should be approved, namely:

- (a) Nortel has been working diligently for many months on a plan to reorganize its business;
- (b) in the exercise of its business judgment, Nortel has concluded that it cannot continue to operate the Business successfully within the CCAA framework;
- (c) unless a sale is undertaken at this time, the long-term viability of the Business will be in jeopardy;
- (d) the Sale Agreement continues the Business as a going concern, will save at least 2,500 jobs and constitutes the best and most valuable proposal for the Business;
- (e) the auction process will serve to ensure Nortel receives the highest possible value for the Business;
- (f) the sale of the Business at this time is in the best interests of Nortel and its stakeholders; and
- (g) the value of the Business is likely to decline over time.

52 The objections of MatlinPatterson and the UCC have been considered. I am satisfied that the issues raised in these objections have been addressed in a satisfactory manner by the ruling of Judge Gross and no useful purpose would be served by adding additional comment.

53 Counsel to the Applicants also emphasize that Nortel will return to court to seek approval of the most favourable transaction to emerge from the auction process and will aim to satisfy the elements established by the court for approval as set out in *Royal Bank v. Soundair Corp.* (1991), 7 C.B.R. (3d) 1 (Ont. C.A.) at para. 16.

Disposition

54 The Applicants are part of a complicated corporate group. They carry on an active international business. I have accepted that an important factor to consider in a CCAA process is whether the case can be made to continue the business as a going concern. I am satisfied having considered the factors referenced at [49], as well as the facts summarized at [51], that the Applicants have met this test. I am therefore satisfied that this motion should be granted.

55 Accordingly, I approve the Bidding Procedures as described in the Riedel Affidavit and the Fourteenth Report of the Monitor, which procedures have been approved by the U.S. Court.

56 I am also satisfied that the Sale Agreement should be approved and further that the Sale Agreement be approved and accepted for the purposes of conducting the "stalking horse" bidding process in accordance with the Bidding Procedures including, without limitation the Break-Up Fee and the Expense Reimbursement (as both terms are defined in the Sale Agreement).

57 Further, I have also been satisfied that Appendix B to the Fourteenth Report contains information which is commercially sensitive, the dissemination of which could be detrimental to the stakeholders and, accordingly, I order that this document be sealed, pending further order of the court.

58 In approving the Bidding Procedures, I have also taken into account that the auction will be conducted prior to the sale approval motion. This process is consistent with the practice of this court.

59 Finally, it is the expectation of this court that the Monitor will continue to review ongoing issues in respect of the Bidding Procedures. The Bidding Procedures permit the Applicants to waive certain components of qualified bids without the consent of the UCC, the bondholder group and the Monitor. However, it is the expectation of this court that, if this situation arises, the Applicants will provide advance notice to the Monitor of its intention to do so.

Motion granted.

TAB 4

2015 ONSC 5557
Ontario Superior Court of Justice [Commercial List]

Nelson Education Ltd., Re

2015 CarswellOnt 13576, 2015 ONSC 5557, 258 A.C.W.S. (3d) 465, 29 C.B.R. (6th) 140

**In the Matter of the Companies' Lenders
Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as Amended**

In the Matter of a Plan of Compromise or Arrangement of Nelson
Education Ltd. and Nelson Education Holdings Ltd., Applicants

Newbould J.

Heard: August 13, 27, 2015
Judgment: September 8, 2015
Docket: CV15-10961-00CL

Counsel: Benjamin Zarnett, Jessica Kimmel, Caroline Descours for Applicants
Robert W. Staley, Kevin J. Zych, Sean Zweig for First Lien Agent and the First Lien Steering Committee
John L. Finnigan, D.J. Miller, Kyla E.M. Mahar for Royal Bank of Canada
Orestes Pasparaskis for Monitor

Subject: Insolvency

Related Abridgment Classifications

Bankruptcy and insolvency

[XIX Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act](#)

[XIX.5 Miscellaneous](#)

Headnote

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Miscellaneous

Education publishing company obtained protection under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act ("CCAA") — Bank was one of 22 first lien lenders, second lien lender and agent for second lien lenders — Credit bid for sale of substantially all assets to newly incorporated entity owned by first ranked secured lenders, if approved, would result in second lien lenders receiving nothing on outstanding loans — Company brought motion for approval of sale; bank brought motion for order that amounts owing to it and portion of consent fee be paid by company prior to sale — Company's motion granted; bank's motion dismissed — Normally, sale process is undertaken after court approves proposed sale methodology with monitor participating in process and reporting to court — While none of this occurred, sale or investment sales process ("SISP") and credit bid sale transaction met requirements of CCAA — SISP was typical and consistent with processes that had been approved by court in many CCAA proceedings — Results of SISP showed that no interested parties could offer price sufficient to repay amounts owing to first lien lenders — Intercreditor agreement governed, and led to conclusion that order in favour of bank as second lien agent was not appropriate as payment would reduce collateral subject to rights of first lien lenders in that collateral.

Table of Authorities

Cases considered by *Newbould J.*:

ATB Financial v. Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp. (2008), 2008 ONCA 587, 2008 CarswellOnt 4811, 45 C.B.R. (5th) 163, 47 B.L.R. (4th) 123, (sub nom. *Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp., Re*) 296 D.L.R. (4th) 135, (sub nom. *Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp., Re*) 240 O.A.C. 245, (sub nom. *Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp., Re*) 92 O.R. (3d) 513 (Ont. C.A.) — followed
Brainhunter Inc., Re (2009), 2009 CarswellOnt 7627 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to
Cruden v. Bank of New York (1992), 957 F.2d 961 (U.S. C.A. 2nd Cir.) — referred to

Nortel Networks Corp., Re (2009), 2009 CarswellOnt 4467, 55 C.B.R. (5th) 229 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — considered

Nortel Networks Corp., Re (2014), 2014 ONSC 6973, 2014 CarswellOnt 17291, 20 C.B.R. (6th) 171, 17 C.C.P.B. (2nd) 10 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Rainbow v. Swisher (1988), 72 N.Y.2d 106, 531 N.Y.S. 775, 527 N.E.2d 258 (U.S. N.Y. Ct. App.) — referred to

Royal Bank v. Soundair Corp. (1991), 7 C.B.R. (3d) 1, 83 D.L.R. (4th) 76, 46 O.A.C. 321, 4 O.R. (3d) 1, 1991 CarswellOnt 205 (Ont. C.A.) — followed

Statutes considered:

Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C.

Generally — referred to

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36

Generally — referred to

s. 11 — considered

s. 36(3) — considered

MOTION by company for approval of sale; MOTION by bank for order that amounts owing to it and portion of consent fee be paid by company prior to sale.

Newbould J.:

1 The applicants Nelson Education Ltd. ("Nelson") and Nelson Education Holdings Ltd. sought and obtained protection under the CCAA on May 12, 2015. They now apply for approval of the sale of substantially all of the assets and business of Nelson to a newly incorporated entity to be owned indirectly by Nelson's first ranked secured lenders (the "first lien lenders") pursuant to a credit bid made by the first lien agent. Nelson also seeks ancillary orders relating to the sale. The effect of the credit bid, if approved, is that the second lien lenders will receive nothing for their outstanding loans.

2 RBC is one of 22 first lien lenders, a second lien lender and agent for the second lien lenders. At the time of its motion to replace the Monitor, RBC did not accept that the proposed sale should be approved. RBC now takes no position on the sale approval motion other than to oppose certain ancillary relief sought by the applicants. RBC also has moved for an order that certain amounts said to be owing to it and their portion of a consent fee should be paid by Nelson prior to the completion of the sale. The applicants and the first lien lenders oppose the relief sought by RBC.

Nelson business

3 Nelson is a Canadian education publishing company, providing learning solutions to universities, colleges, students, teachers, professors, libraries, government agencies, schools, professionals and corporations across the country.

4 The business and assets of Nelson were acquired by an OMERS entity and certain other funds from the Thomson Corporation in 2007 together with U.S. assets of Thomson for U.S. \$7.75 billion, of which US\$550 million was attributed to the Canadian business. The purchase was financed with first lien debt of approximately US\$311.5 million and second lien debt of approximately US\$171.3 million.

5 The maturity date under the first lien credit agreement was July 3, 2014 and the maturity date under the second lien credit agreement was July 3, 2015. Nelson has not paid the principal balances owing under either loan. It paid interest on the first lien credit up to the filing of this CCAA application. It has paid no interest on the second lien credit since April 2014. As of the filing date, Nelson was indebted in the aggregate principal amounts of approximately US\$269 million, plus accrued interest, costs and fees, under the first lien credit agreement and approximately US\$153 million, plus accrued interest, costs and fees, under the second lien credit agreement.

6 Because these loans are denominated in U.S. dollars, the recent decline in the Canadian dollar against the United States dollar has significantly increased the Canadian dollar balance of the loans. Nelson generates substantially all of its revenue in Canadian dollars and is not hedged against currency fluctuations. Based on an exchange rate of CAD/USD of 1.313, as of August 10, 2015, the Canadian dollar principal balances of the first and second lien loans are \$352,873,910 and \$201,176,237.

7 According to Mr. Greg Nordal, the CEO of Nelson, the business of Nelson has been affected by a general decline in the education markets over the past few years. Notwithstanding the industry decline over the past few years, Nelson has maintained strong EBITDA over each of the last several years.

Discussions leading to the sale to the first lien lenders

8 In March 2013, Nelson engaged Alvarez & Marsal Canada Securities ULC ("A&M"), the Canadian corporate finance arm of Alvarez & Marsal to assist it in reviewing and considering potential strategic alternatives. RBC, the second lien agent also engaged a financial advisor in March 2013 and the first lien steering committee engaged a financial advisor in June 2013. RBC held approximately 85% of the second lien debt.

9 Commencing in April 2013, Nelson and its advisors entered into discussions with stakeholders including the RBC as second lien agent, the first lien steering committee and their advisors. Nelson sought to achieve as its primary objective a consensual transaction that would be supported by all of the first lien lenders and second lien lenders. These discussions took place until September 2014. No agreement with the first lien lenders and second lien lenders was reached.

10 In April 2014, Nelson and the second lien lenders agreed to two extensions of the cure period under the second lien credit agreement in respect of the second lien interest payment due on March 31, 2014, to May 30, 2014. In connection with these extensions, Nelson made a partial payment of US\$350,000 in respect of the March interest payment and paid certain professional fees of the second lien lenders. Nelson requested a further extension of the second lien cure period beyond May 30, 2014, but the second lien lenders did not agree. Thereafter, Nelson defaulted under the second lien credit agreement and failed to make further interest payments to the second lien lenders.

11 The first lien credit agreement matured on July 3, 2014. On July 7, 2014, Nelson proposed an amendment and extension of that agreement and solicited consent from its first lien lenders. RBC, as one of the first lien lenders was prepared to consent to the Nelson proposal, being a consent and support agreement, but no agreement was reached with the other first lien lenders and it did not proceed.

12 In September, 2014, Nelson proposed in a term sheet to the first lien lenders a transaction framework for a sale or restructuring of the business on the terms set out in a term sheet dated September 10, 2014 and sought their support. In connection with the first lien term sheet, Nelson entered into a first lien support agreement with first lien lenders representing approximately 88% of the principal amounts outstanding under the first lien credit agreement. The consenting first lien lenders comprised 21 of the 22 first lien lenders, the only first lien lender not consenting being RBC. Consent fees of approximately US\$12 million have been paid to the consenting first lien lenders.

13 The first lien term sheet provided that Nelson would conduct a comprehensive and open sale or investment sales process (SISP) to attempt to identify one or more potential purchasers of, or investors in, the Nelson business on terms that would provide for net sale or investment proceeds sufficient to pay in full all obligations under the first lien credit agreement or that was otherwise acceptable to first lien lenders holding at least 66 2/3% of the outstanding obligations under the first lien credit agreement. If such a superior offer was not identified pursuant to the SISP, the first lien lenders would become the purchaser and purchase substantially all of the assets of Nelson in exchange for the conversion by all of the first lien lenders of all of the debt owing to them under the first lien credit agreement into a new first lien term facility and for common shares of the purchaser.

14 In September 2014, the company engaged A&M to assist with the SISP. By that time, A&M had been advising the Company for over 17 months and had gained an understanding of the Nelson Business and the educational publishing industry. The SISP was structured as a two-phase process.

15 Phase 1 involved (i) contacting 168 potential purchasers, including both financial and strategic parties located in Canada, the United States and Europe, and 11 potential lenders to ascertain their potential interest in a transaction, (ii) initial due diligence and (iii) receipt by Nelson of non-binding letters of interest ("LOIs"). The SISP provided that interested parties could propose a purchase of the whole or parts of the business or an investment in Nelson.

16 Seven potential purchasers submitted LOIs under phase 1, six of which were offers to purchase substantially all of the Nelson business and one of which was an offer to acquire only the K-12 business. Nelson reviewed the LOIs with the assistance of its advisors, and following consultation with the first lien steering committee and its advisors, invited five of the parties that submitted LOIs to phase 2 of the SISP. Phase 2 of the SISP involved additional due diligence, data room access and management presentations aimed at completion of binding documentation for a superior offer.

17 Three participants submitted non-binding offers by the deadline of December 19, 2014, two of which were for the purchase of substantially all of the Nelson business and one of which was for the acquisition of the K-12 business. All three offers remained subject to further due diligence and reflected values that were significantly below the value of the obligations under the first lien credit agreement.

18 On December 19, 2014, one of the participants advised A&M that it required additional time to complete and submit its offer, which additional time was granted. An offer was subsequently submitted but not ultimately advanced by the bidder.

19 Nelson, with the assistance of its advisors, maintained communications throughout its restructuring efforts with Cengage Learnings, the company that has the U.S. business that was sold by Thomson and which is a key business partner of Nelson. Cengage submitted an expression of interest for the higher education business that, even in combination with the offer received for the K-12 business, was substantially lower than the amount of the first lien debt. In February 2015, Cengage and Nelson terminated discussions about a potential sale transaction.

20 Ultimately, phase 2 of the SISP did not result in a transaction that would generate proceeds sufficient to repay the obligations under the first lien credit agreement in full or would otherwise be supported by the first lien lenders. Accordingly, with the assistance of A&M and its legal advisors, and in consultation with the first lien steering committee, Nelson determined that it should proceed with the sale transaction pursuant to the first lien support agreement.

Sale transaction

21 The sale transaction is an asset purchase. It will enable the Nelson business to continue as a going concern. It includes:

(a) the transfer of substantially all of Nelson's assets to a newly incorporated entity to be owned indirectly by the first lien lenders;

(b) the assumption by the purchaser of substantially all of Nelson's trade payables, contractual obligations and employment obligations incurred in the ordinary course and as reflected in its balance sheet, excluding some obligations including the obligations under the second lien credit agreement and an intercompany promissory note of approximately \$102.3 million owing by Nelson to Nelson Education Holdings Ltd.;

(c) an offer of employment by the purchaser to all of Nelson's employees; and

(d) a release by the first lien lenders of all of the indebtedness owing under the first lien credit agreement in exchange for: (i) 100% of the common shares of a newly incorporated entity that will own 100% of the common shares of the purchaser, and (ii) the obligations under a new US\$200 million first lien term facility to be entered into by the Purchaser.

22 The relief sought by the applicants apart from the approval of the sale transaction involves ancillary relief, including authorizing the distribution from Nelson's cash on hand to the first lien lenders of outstanding fees and interest, effecting mutual

releases of parties associated with the sale transaction, and deeming a shareholders' rights agreement to bind all shareholders of the purchaser. This ancillary relief is opposed by RBC.

Analysis

(i) Sale approval

23 RBC says it takes no position on the sale, although it opposes some of the terms and seeks an order paying the second lien lenders their pre-filing interest and expense claims. Whether RBC is entitled to raise the issues that it has requires a consideration of the intercreditor agreement of July 5, 2007 made between the agents for the first lien lenders and the second lien lenders.

24 Section 6.1(a) of the intercreditor agreement provides that the second lien lenders shall not object to or oppose a sale and of the collateral and shall be deemed to have consented to it if the first lien claimholders have consented to it. It provides:

The Second Lien Collateral Agent on behalf of the Second Lien Claimholders agrees that it will raise no objection or oppose a sale or other disposition of any Collateral free and clear of its Liens and other claims under Section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code (or any similar provision of any other Bankruptcy Law or any order of a court of competent jurisdiction) if the First Lien Claimholders have consented to such sale or disposition of such assets and the Second Lien Collateral Agent and each other Second Lien Claimholder will be deemed to have consented under Section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code (or any similar provision of any other Bankruptcy Law or any order of a court of competent jurisdiction) to any sale supported by the First Lien Claimholders and to have released their Liens in such assets.

(underlining added)

25 Section 6.11 of the intercreditor agreement contained a similar provision. RBC raises the point that for these two sections to be applicable, the first lien claimholders must have consented to the sale, and that the definition of first lien claimholders means that all of the first lien lenders must have consented to the sale. In this case, only 88% of the first lien lenders consented to the sale, the lone holdout being RBC. The definition in the intercreditor agreement of first lien claimholder is as follows:

"First Lien Claimholders" means, at any relevant time, the holders of First Lien Obligations at that time, including the First Lien Collateral Agent, the First Lien Lenders, any other "Secured Party" (as defined in the First Lien Credit Agreement) and the agents under the First Lien Loan Documents.

26 The intercreditor agreement is governed by the New York law and is to be construed and enforced in accordance with that law. The first lien agent filed an opinion of Allan L. Gropper, a former bankruptcy judge in the Southern District of New York and undoubtedly highly qualified to express proper expert opinions regarding the matters in issue. Mr. Gropper did not, however, discuss the principles of interpretation of a commercial contract under New York law, and in the absence of such evidence, I am to take the law of New York so far as contract interpretation is concerned as the same as our law. In any event, New York law regarding the interpretation of a contract would appear to be the same as our law. See *Cruden v. Bank of New York*, 957 F.2d 961 (U.S. C.A. 2nd Cir. 1992) and *Rainbow v. Swisher*, 72 N.Y.2d 106, 531 N.Y.S. 775, 527 N.E.2d 258 (U.S. N.Y. Ct. App. 1988). Mr. Gropper did opine that the sections in question are valid and enforceable in accordance with their terms.¹

27 The intercreditor agreement, like a lot of complex commercial contracts, appears to have a hodgepodge of terms piled on, or added to, one another, with many definitions and exceptions to exceptions. That is what too often appears to happen when too many lawyers are involved in stirring the broth. It is clear that there are many definitions, including a reference to First Lien Lenders, which is defined to be the Lenders as defined in the First Lien Loan Documents, which is itself a defined term, meaning the First Lien Credit Agreement and the Loan Documents. The provisions of the first lien credit agreement make clear that the Lenders include all those who have lent under that agreement, including obviously RBC.

28 Under section 8.02(d) of the first lien credit agreement, more than 50% of the first lien lenders (the "Required Lenders") may direct the first lien agent to exercise on behalf of the first lien lenders all rights and remedies available to. In this case 88%

of the first lien lenders, being all except RBC, directed the first lien agent to credit bid all of the first lien debt. This credit bid was thus made on behalf of all of the first lien lenders, including RBC.

29 While the definition of First Lien Claimholders is expansive and refers to both the First Lien Collateral Agent (the first lien agent) and the First Lien Lenders, suggesting a distinction between the two, once the Required Lenders have caused a credit bid to be made by the First Lien Collateral Agent, RBC in my view is taken to have supported the sale that is contemplated by the credit bid.

30 It follows that RBC is deemed under section 6.11 of the intercreditor agreement to have consented to the sale supported by the first lien claimholders. It is nevertheless required that I determine whether the sale and its terms should be approved. It is also important to note that no sale agreement has been signed and it awaits an order approving the form of Asset Purchase Agreement submitted by Nelson in its motion materials.

31 This is an unusual CCAA case. It involves the acquisition of the Nelson business by its senior secured creditors under a credit bid made after a SISP conducted before any CCAA process and without any prior court approval of the SISP terms. The result of the credit bid in this case will be the continuation of the Nelson business in the hands of the first lien lenders, a business that is generating a substantial EBITDA each year and which has been paying its unsecured creditors in the normal course, but with the extinguishment of the US \$153 million plus interest owed to the second lien lenders.

32 Liquidating CCAA proceedings without a plan of arrangement are now a part of the insolvency landscape in Canada, but it is usual that the sale process be undertaken after a court has blessed the proposed sale methodology with a monitor fully participating in the sale process and reporting to the court with its views on the process that was carried out². None of this has occurred in this case. One issue therefore is whether the SISP carried out before credit bid sale that has occurred involving an out of court process can be said to meet the *Soundair*³ principles and that the credit bid sale meets the requirements of section 36(3) of the CCAA.

33 I have concluded that the SISP and the credit bid sale transaction in this case does meet those requirements, for the reasons that follow.

34 Alvarez & Marsal Canada Inc. was named the Monitor in the Initial Order over the objections of RBC, but shortly afterwards on the come-back motion by RBC, was replaced as Monitor by FTI Consulting Inc. The reasons for this change are contained in my endorsement of June 2, 2015. There was no suggestion of a lack of integrity or competence on the part of A&M or Alvarez & Marsal Canada Inc. In brief, the reason was that A&M had been retained by Nelson in 2013 as a financial advisor in connection with its debt situation, and in September 2014 had been retained to undertake the SISP process that has led to the sale transaction to the first lien lenders. I did not consider it right to put Alvarez & Marsal Canada Inc. in the position of providing independent advice to the Court on the SISP process that its affiliate had conducted, and that it would be fairer to all concerned that a different Monitor be appointed in light of the fact that the validity of the SISP process was going to be front and centre in the application of Nelson to have the sale agreement to the first lien lenders approved. Accordingly FTI was appointed to be the Monitor.

35 FTI did a thorough review of all relevant facts, including interviewing a large number of people involved. In its report to the Court the Monitor expressed the following views:

- (a) The design of the SISP was typical of such marketing processes and was consistent with processes that have been approved by the courts in many CCAA proceedings;
- (b) The SISP allowed interested parties adequate opportunity to conduct due diligence, both A&M and management appear to have been responsive to all requests from potentially interested parties and the timelines provided for in the SISP were reasonable in the circumstances;

- (c) The activities undertaken by A&M were consistent with the activities that any investment banker or sale advisor engaged to assist in the sale of a business would be expected to undertake;
- (d) The selection of A&M as investment banker would not have had a detrimental effect on the SISP or the value of offers;
- (e) Both key senior management and A&M were incentivised to achieve the best value available and there was no impediment to doing so;
- (f) The SISP was undertaken in a thorough and professional manner;
- (g) The results of the SISP clearly demonstrate that none of the interested parties would, or would be likely to, offer a price for the Nelson business that would be sufficient to repay the amounts owing to the first lien lenders under the first lien credit agreement
- (h) The SISP was a thorough market test and can be relied on to establish that there is no value beyond the first lien debt.

36 The Monitor expressed the further view that:

- (a) There is no realistic prospect that Nelson could obtain a new source of financing sufficient to repay the first lien debt;
- (b) An alternative debt restructuring that might create value for the second lien lenders is not a viable alternative at this time;
- (c) There is no reasonable prospect of a new sale process generating a transaction at a value in excess of the first lien debt;
- (d) It does not appear that there are significant operational improvements reasonably available that would materially improve profitability in the short-term such that the value of the Nelson business would increase to the extent necessary to repay the first lien debt and, accordingly, there is no apparent benefit from delaying the sale of the business.

37 *Soundair* established factors to be considered in an application to approve a sale in a receivership. These factors have widely been considered in such applications in a CCAA proceeding. They are:

- (a) whether sufficient effort has been made to obtain the best price and that the receiver or debtor (as applicable) has not acted improvidently;
- (b) whether the interests of all parties have been considered;
- (c) the efficacy and integrity of the process by which offers have been obtained; and
- (d) whether there has been unfairness in the working out of the process.

38 These factors are now largely mirrored in section 36(3) of the CCAA that requires a court to consider a number of factors, among other things, in deciding to authorize a sale of a debtor's assets. It is necessary to deal briefly with them.

- (a) Whether the process leading to the proposed sale or disposition was reasonable in the circumstances. In this case, despite the fact that there was no prior court approval to the SISP, I accept the Monitor's view that the process was reasonable.

(b) Whether the monitor approved the process leading to the proposed sale or disposition. In this case there was no monitor at the time of the SISP. This factor is thus not strictly applicable as it assumes a sale process undertaken in a CCAA proceeding. However, the report of FTI blessing the SISP that took place is an important factor to consider.

(c) Whether the monitor filed with the court a report stating that in its opinion the sale or disposition would be more beneficial to the creditors than a sale or disposition under a bankruptcy. The Monitor did not make such a statement in its report. However, there is no reason to think that a sale or disposition under a bankruptcy would be more beneficial to the creditors. The creditors negatively affected could not expect to fare better in a bankruptcy.

(d) The extent to which the creditors were consulted. The first lien steering committee was obviously consulted. Before the SISP, RBC, the second lien lenders' agent, was consulted and actively participated in the reconstruction discussions. I take it from the evidence that RBC did not actively participate in the SISP, a decision of its choosing, but was provided some updates.

(e) The effects of the proposed sale or disposition on the creditors and other interested parties. The positive effect is that all ordinary course creditors, employees, suppliers and customers will be protected. The effect on the second lien lenders is to wipe out their security and any chance of their loans being repaid. However, apart from their being deemed to have consented to the sale, it is clear that the second lien lenders have no economic interest in the Nelson assets except as might be the case some years away if Nelson were able to improve its profitability to the point that the second lien lenders could be paid something towards the debt owed to them. RBC puts this time line as perhaps five years and it is clearly conjecture. The first lien lenders however are not obliged to wait in the hopes of some future result. As the senior secured creditor, they have priority over the interests of the second lien lenders.

There are some excluded liabilities and a small amount owing to former terminated employees that will not be paid. As to these the Monitor points out that there is no reasonable prospect of any alternative solution that would provide a recovery for those creditors, all of whom rank subordinate to the first lien lenders.

(f) Whether the consideration to be received for the assets is reasonable and fair, taking into account their market value. The Monitor is of the view that the results of the SISP indicate that the consideration is fair and reasonable in the circumstances and that the SISP can, and should, be relied on for the purposes of such a determination. There is no evidence to the contrary and I accept the view of the Monitor.

39 In the circumstances, taking into account the *Soundair* factors and the matters to be considered in section 36(3) of the CCAA, I am satisfied that the sale transaction should be approved. Whether the ancillary relief should be granted is a separate issue, to which I now turn.

(ii) Ancillary claimed relief

(a) Vesting order

40 The applicants seek a vesting order vesting all of Nelson's right, title and interest in and to the purchased assets in the purchaser, free and clear of all interests, liens, charges and encumbrances, other than the permitted encumbrances and assumed liabilities contemplated in the Asset Purchase Agreement. It is normal relief given in an asset sale under the CCAA and it is appropriate in this case.

(b) Payment of amounts to first lien lenders

41 As a condition to the completion of the transaction, Nelson is to pay all accrued and unpaid interest owing to the first lien lenders and all unpaid professional fees of the first lien agent and the first lien lenders outstanding under the first lien credit agreement. RBC does not oppose this relief.

42 If the cash is not paid out before the closing, it will be an asset of the purchaser as all cash on hand is being acquired by the purchaser. Thus the first lien lenders will have the cash. However, because the applicant is requesting a court ordered release by the first lien lenders of all obligations under the first lien credit agreement, the unpaid professional fees of the first lien agent and the first lien lenders that are outstanding under the first lien credit agreement would no longer be payable after the closing of the transaction. Presumably this is the reason for the payment of these prior to the closing.

43 These amounts are owed under the provisions of the first lien credit agreement and have priority over the interests of the second lien lenders under the intercreditor agreement. However, on June 2, 2015 it was ordered that pending further order, Nelson was prevented from paying any interest or other expenses to the first lien lenders unless the same payments owing to the second lien lenders. Nelson then chose not to make any payments to the first lien lenders. It is in effect now asking for an order nunc pro tunc permitting the payments to be made. I have some reluctance to make such an order, but in light of no opposition to it and that fact that it is clear from the report of the Monitor that there is no value in the collateral for the second lien lenders, the payment is approved.

(c) Releases

44 The applicants request an order that would include a broad release of the parties to the Asset Purchase Agreement as well as well as other persons including the first lien lenders.

45 The Asset Purchase Agreement has not been executed. In accordance with the draft approval and vesting order sought by the applicants, it is to be entered into upon the entry of the approval and vesting order. The release contained in the draft Asset Purchase Agreement in section 5.12 provides that the parties release each other from claims in connection with Nelson, the Nelson business, the Asset Purchase Agreement, the transaction, these proceedings, the first lien support agreement, the supplemental support agreement, the payment and settlement agreement, the first lien credit agreement and the other loan documents or the transactions contemplated by them. Released parties are not released from their other obligations or from claims of fraud. The release also does not deal with the second lien credit agreement or the second lien lenders.

46 The first lien term sheet made a part of the support agreement contained terms and conditions, but it stated that they would not be effective until definitive agreements were made by the applicable parties and until they became effective. One of the terms was that there would be a release "usual and customary for transactions of this nature", including a release by the first lien lenders in connection with "all matters related to the Existing First Lien Credit Agreement, the other Loan Documents and the transactions contemplated herein". RBC was not a party to the support agreement or the first lien term sheet.

47 The release in the Asset Purchase Agreement at section 5.12 provides that "each of the Parties on behalf of itself and its Affiliates does hereby forever release...". "Affiliates" is defined to include "any other Person that directly or indirectly...controls...such Person". The party that is the purchaser is a New Brunswick numbered company that will be owned indirectly by the first lien lenders. What instructions will or have been given by the first lien lenders to the numbered company to sign the Asset Purchase Agreement are not in the record, but I will assume that the First Lien Agent has or will authorize it and that RBC as a first lien lenders has not and will not authorize it.

48 Releases are a feature of approved plans of compromise and arrangement under the CCAA. The conditions for such a release have been laid down in *ATB Financial v. Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp.*, 2008 ONCA 587 (Ont. C.A.) at paras. 43 and 70. Third party releases are authorized under the CCAA if there is a reasonable connection between the third party claim being compromised in the plan and the restructuring achieved by the plan. In *Metcalfe*, Blair J.A. found compelling that the claims to be released were rationally related to the purpose of the plan and necessary for it and that the parties who were to have claims against them released were contributing in a tangible and realistic way to the plan⁴.

49 While there is no CCAA plan in this case, I see no reason not to consider the principles established in *Metcalfe* when considering a sale such as this under the CCAA, with any necessary modifications due to the fact that it is not a sale pursuant

to a plan. The application of those principles dictates in my view that the requested release by the first lien lenders should not be ordered.

50 The beneficiaries of the release by the first lien lenders are providing nothing to the first lien lenders in return for the release. The substance of the support agreement was that Nelson agreed to try to fetch as much as it could through a SISP but that if it could not get enough to satisfy the first lien lenders, it agreed to a credit bid by the first lien lenders. Neither Nelson nor the first lien agent or supplemental first lien agent or any other party gave up anything in return for a release from the first lien lenders. So far as RBC releasing a claim that it may have as a first lien lender against the other first lien lenders, nothing has been provided to RBC by the other first lien lenders in return for such a release. RBC as a first lien lender would be required to give up any claim it might have against the other parties to the release for any matters arising prior to or after the support agreement while receiving nothing in return for its release.

In the circumstances, I decline to approve the release by the first lien lenders requested by the applicants to be included in the approval and vesting order.

(d) Stockholders and Registration Rights Agreement

51 The applicants seek to have a Stockholders and Registration Rights Agreement declared effective and binding on all persons entitled to receive common shares of Purchaser Holdco in connection with the transaction as though such persons were signatories to the Stockholders and Registration Rights Agreement.

52 The Stockholders and Registration Rights Agreement is a contract among the purchaser's parent company, Purchaser Holdco, and the holders of Purchaser Holdco's common shares. After implementation of the transaction, the first lien lenders will be the holders of 100% of the shares of Purchaser Holdco. The Stockholders and Registration Rights Agreement was negotiated and agreed to by Purchaser Holdco and the First Lien Steering Committee (all first lien lenders except RBC). The First Lien Steering Committee would like RBC to be bound by the agreement. The evidence of this is in the affidavit of Mr. Nordal, the President and CEO of Nelson, who says that based on discussions with Mr. Chadwick, the First Lien Steering Committee requires that all of the first lien lenders to be bound to the terms of the Stockholders and Registration Rights Agreement. This is of course double hearsay as Mr. Chadwick acts for Nelson and not the First Lien Steering Committee.

The effect of what is being requested is that RBC as a shareholder of Purchaser Holdco would be bound to some shareholder agreement amongst the shareholders of Purchaser Holdco. While the remaining 88% of the shareholders of Purchaser Holdco might want to bind RBC, I see nothing in the record that would justify such a confiscation of such shareholder rights. I agree with RBC that extending the Court's jurisdiction in these CCAA proceedings and exercising it to assist the purchaser's parent company with its corporate governance is not appropriate. The purchaser and its parent company either have the contractual right to bind all first lien lenders to terms as future shareholders, or they do not.

RBC Motion

(a) Second lenders' pre-filing interest and second lien agent's fees

53 RBC seeks an order that directing Nelson to pay to RBC in its capacity as the second lien agent the second lien interest outstanding at the filing date of CDN\$1,316,181.73 and the second lien fees incurred prior to the filing date of US \$15,365,998.83.

54 Mr. Zarnett in argument conceded that these amounts are owed under the second lien credit agreement. There are further issues, however, being (i) whether they continue to be owed due to the intercreditor agreement (ii) whether RBC is entitled under the intercreditor agreement to request the payment and (iii) whether RBC is entitled to be paid these under the intercreditor agreement before the first lien lenders are paid in full.

55 There is a distinction between a lien subordination agreement and a payment subordination agreement. Lien subordination is limited to dealings with the collateral over which both groups of lenders hold security. It gives the senior lender a head start with respect to any enforcement actions in respect of the collateral and ensures a priority waterfall from the proceeds of enforcement over collateral. It entitles second lien lenders to receive and retain payments of interest, principal and other amounts in respect of a second lien obligation unless the receipt results from an enforcement step in respect of the collateral. By contrast, payment subordination means that subordinate lenders have also subordinated in favour of the senior lender their right to payment and have agreed to turn over all money received, whether or not derived from the proceeds of the common collateral⁵. The intercreditor agreement is a lien subordination agreement, as stated in section 8.2.

56 Nelson and the first lien agent say that RBC has no right to ask the Court to order any payments to it from the cash on hand prior to the closing of the transaction. They rely on the language of section 3.1(a)(1) that provides that until the discharge of the first lien obligations, the second lien collateral agent will not exercise any rights or remedies with respect to any collateral, institute any action or proceeding with respect to such remedies including any enforcement step under the second lien documents. RBC says it is not asking to enforce its security rights but merely asking that it be paid what it is owed and is permitted to receive under the intercreditor agreement, which does not subordinate payments but only liens. It points to section 3.1(c) that provides that:

(c) Notwithstanding the foregoing (i.e. section 3.1(a)(1)) the Second Lien Collateral Agent and any Second Lien Claimholder may (1)... and may take such other action as it deems in good faith to be necessary to protect its rights in an insolvency proceeding" and (4) may file any... motions... which assert rights... available to unsecured creditors... arising under any insolvency... proceeding.

57 My view of the intercreditor agreement language and what has occurred is that RBC has not taken enforcement steps with respect to collateral. It has asked that payments owing to it under the second lien credit agreement up to the date of filing be paid.

58 Payment of what the second lien lenders are entitled to under the second lien credit agreement is protected under the intercreditor agreement unless it is as the result of action taken by the second lien lenders to enforce their security. Section 3.1(f) of the intercreditor agreement provides as follows:

(f) Except as set forth in section 3.1(a) and section 4 to the extent applicable, nothing in this Agreement shall prohibit the receipt by the Second Lien Collateral Agent or any Second Lien Claimholders of the required payments of interest, principal and other amounts owed in respect of the Second Lien Obligations or receipt of payments permitted under the First Lien Loan Documents, including without limitation, under section 7.09(a) of the First Lien Credit Agreement, so long as such receipt is not the direct or indirect result of the exercise by the Second Lien Collateral Agent or any Second Lien Claimholders of rights or remedies as a secured creditor (including set off) or enforcement in contravention of this Agreement. ... (underlining added).

59 Section 3.1(a) prohibits the second lien lenders from exercising any rights or remedies with respect to the collateral before the first liens have been discharged. Section 4 requires any collateral or proceeds thereof received by the first lien collateral agent from a sale of collateral to be first applied to the first lien obligations and requires any payments received by the second lien lenders from collateral in connection with the exercise of any right or remedy in contravention of the agreement must be paid over to the first lien collateral agent.

60 It do not agree with the first lien collateral agent that payment to RBC before the sale closes of amounts owing pre-filing under the second lien credit agreement would be in contravention of section 4.1. That section deals with cash from collateral being received by the first lien collateral agent in connection with a sale of collateral, and provides that it shall be applied to the first lien obligations until those obligations have been discharged. In this case, the cash on hand before any closing will not be received by the first lien collateral agent at all. It will be received after the closing by the purchaser.

61 The first lien collateral agent has made a credit bid on behalf of the first lien lenders. Pursuant to section 3.1(b), that credit bid is deemed to be an exercise of remedies with respect to the collateral held by the first lien lenders. Under the last paragraph of section 3.1(c), until the discharge of the first lien obligations has occurred, the sole right of the second lien collateral agent and the second lien claimholders with respect to the collateral is to hold a lien on the collateral pursuant to the second lien collateral documents and to receive a share of the proceeds thereof, if any, after the discharge of the first lien obligations has occurred. That provision is as follows:

Without limiting the generality of the foregoing, unless and until the discharge of the First Lien Obligations has occurred, except as expressly provided in Sections 3.1(a), 6.3(b) and this Section 3.1(c), the sole right of the Second Lien Collateral Agent and the Second Lien Claimholders with respect to the Collateral is to hold a Lien of the Collateral pursuant to the Second Lien Collateral Documents for the period and to the extent granted therein and to receive a share of the proceeds thereof, if any, after the Discharge of First Lien Obligations has occurred.

62 RBC points out that its rights under section 3.1(f) to receive payment of amounts owing to the second lien lenders is not subject to section 3.1(c) at all. It is not suggested by the first lien collateral agent that this is a drafting error, but it strikes me that it may be. The provision at the end of section 3.1(c) is inconsistent with section 3.1(f) as section 3.1(c) is not an exception to section 3.1(f).

63 Both the liens of the first lien lenders and the second lien lenders are over all of the assets of Nelson. Cash is one of those assets. Therefore if payment were now made to RBC from that cash, the cash would be paid to RBC from the collateral for amounts owing under the second lien credit agreement before the obligations to the first lien lenders were discharged. The obligations to the first lien lenders will be discharged when the sale to the purchaser takes place and the first lien obligations are cancelled.

64 There is yet another provision of the intercreditor agreement that must be considered. It appears to say that if a judgment is obtained in favour of a second lien lender after exercising rights as an unsecured creditor, the judgment is to be considered a judgment lien subject to the intercreditor agreement for all purposes. Section 3.1(e) provides:

(e) Except as otherwise specifically set forth in Sections 3.1(a) and (d), the Second Lien Collateral Agent and the Second Lien Claimholders may exercise rights and remedies as unsecured creditors against the Company or any other Grantor that has guaranteed or granted Liens to secure the Second Lien Obligations in accordance with the terms of the Second Lien Loan Documents and applicable law; provided that in the event that any Second Lien Claimholder becomes a judgment creditor in respect of Collateral as a result of its enforcement of its rights as an unsecured creditor with respect to the Second Lien Obligations, **such judgment Lien** shall be subject to the terms of this Agreement for all purposes (including in relation to the First Lien Obligations) as the other Liens securing the Second Lien Obligations are subject to this Agreement. (Emphasis added).

65 What exactly is meant by a "judgment Lien" is not stated in the intercreditor agreement and is not a defined term. If an order is made in this CCAA proceeding that the pre-filing obligations to the second lien collateral agent are to be paid from the cash on hand that Nelson holds, is that a "judgment Lien" meaning that it cannot be exercised before the first lien obligations are discharged? In this case, as the first lien obligations will be discharged as part of the closing of the transaction, does that mean that once the order is made approving the sale and the transaction closes, the cash on hand will go to the purchaser and the judgment Lien will not be paid? It is not entirely clear. But the section gives some indication that a judgment held as a result of the second lien agent exercising rights as an unsecured creditor cannot be used to attach collateral contrary to the agreement if the first lien obligations have not been discharged.

66 I have been referred to a number of cases in which statements have been made as to the need for the priority of secured creditors to be recognized in CCAA proceedings, particularly when distributions have been ordered. While in this case we are not dealing with a distribution generally to creditors, the principles are well known and undisputed. However, in considering

the priorities between the first and second lien holders in this case, the intercreditor agreement is what must govern, even with all of its warts.

67 In this case, the cash on hand held by Nelson is collateral, and subject to the rights of the first lien lenders in that collateral. An order made in favour of RBC as second lien agent would reduce that collateral. The overall tenor of the intercreditor agreement, including section 3.1(e), leads me to the conclusion that such an order in favour of RBC should not be made. I do say, however, that the issue is not at all free from doubt and that no credit should be given to those who drafted and settled the intercreditor agreement as it is far from a model of clarity. I decline to make the order sought by RBC.

68 I should note that RBC has made a claim that that Nelson and the first lien lenders who signed the First Lien Support Agreement acted in bad faith and disregarded the interests of the second lien lenders under the intercreditor agreement. RBC claims that the first lien lenders induced Nelson to breach the second lien credit agreement and that this breach resulted in damages to the second lien agent in the amounts of US\$15,365,998.83 on account of interest and CDN\$1,316,181.73 on account of fees. RBC says that these wrongs should be taken into account in considering whether the credit bid should be accepted and that the powers under section 11 of the CCAA should be exercised to order these amounts to be paid to RBC as second lien agent.

69 I decline to do so. No decision on this record could be possibly be made as to whether these wrongs took place. The claim for inducing breach of contract surfaced in the RBC factum filed just two days before the hearing and it would be unfair to Nelson or the first lien lenders to have to respond without the chance to fully contest these issues. Moreover, even the release sought by the applicants would not prevent RBC or any second lien lender from bringing an action for wrongs committed. RBC is able to pursue relief for these alleged wrongs in a separate action.

(b) Consent fee

70 The first lien lenders who signed the First Lien Support Agreement were paid a consent fee. That agreement, and particularly the term sheet made a part of it, provided that those first lien lenders who signed the agreement would be paid a consent fee.

71 RBC contends that because the consent fee was calculated for each first lien lender that signed the First Lien Support Agreement on the amount of the loans that any consenting first lien lenders held under the first lien credit agreement, the consent fee was paid on account of the loans and thus because all first lien lenders were to be paid equally on their loans on a pro rata basis, RBC is entitled to be paid its share of the consent fees.

72 Section 2.14 of the first lien credit agreement provides in part, as follows:

If, other than as expressly provided elsewhere herein, **any Lender shall obtain on account of the Loans made by it**, or the participations in L/C Obligations and Swing Line Loans held by it, **any payment** (whether voluntary, involuntary, through the exercise of any right of setoff, or otherwise) **in excess of its ratable share** (or other share contemplated hereunder) thereof, such Lender shall immediately (a) notify the Administrative Agent of such fact, and (b) purchase from the other Lenders such participations in the Loans made by them and/or such subparticipations in the participations in L/C Obligations or Swing Line Loans held by them, as the case may be, as shall be necessary to cause such purchasing Lender to share the excess payment in respect of such Loans or such participations, as the case may be, pro rata with each of them ... [emphasis added].

73 RBC says that while the section refers to a first lien lender obtaining a payment "on account" of its loan, U.S. authorities under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code have held that the words "on account of" do not mean "in exchange for" but rather mean "because of." As the consent payments are calculated on the amount of the loan of any first lien lender who signed the term sheet, RBC says that they were made because of their loan and thus RBC is entitled to its share of the consent fees that were paid by virtue of section 2.14 of the first lien credit agreement.

74 I do not accept that argument. The consent fees were paid because the consenting first lien lenders signed the First Lien Support Agreement. The fact that their calculation depended on the amount of the loan made by each consenting first

lien lender does not mean they were made because of the loan. RBC declined to sign the First Lien Support Agreement and is not entitled to a consent fee.

Conclusion

75 An order is to go in accordance with these reasons. As there has been mixed success, there shall be no order as to costs.
Company's motion granted; bank's motion dismissed.

Footnotes

- 1 I do not think that Mr. Gropper's views on what particular sections of the agreement meant is the proper subject of expert opinion on foreign law. Such an expert should confine his evidence to a statement of what the law is and how it applies generally and not express his opinion on the very facts in issue before the court. See my comments in *Nortel Networks Corp., Re* (2014), 20 C.B.R. (6th) 171 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) para. 103.
- 2 See *Nortel Networks Corp., Re* (2009), 55 C.B.R. (5th) 229 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) at paras. 35-40 and *Brainhunter Inc., Re*, [2009] O.J. No. 5207 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) at paras. 12-13.
- 3 *Royal Bank v. Soundair Corp.* (1991), 7 C.B.R. (3d) 1 (Ont. C.A.).
- 4 This case does not involve a plan under the CCAA. One of the reasons for this may be that pursuant to section 6.9(b) of the intercreditor agreement, in the event the applicants commence any restructuring proceeding in Canada and put forward a plan, the applicants, the first lien lenders and the second lien lenders agreed that the first lien lenders and the second lien lenders should be classified together in one class. The second lien lenders agreed that they would only vote in favour of a plan if it satisfied one of two conditions, there was no contractual restriction on their ability to vote against a plan.
- 5 See 65 A.B.A. Bus Law. 809-883 (May 2010).

TAB 5

2010 ONSC 2870

Ontario Superior Court of Justice [Commercial List]

Canwest Publishing Inc./Publications Canwest Inc., Re

2010 CarswellOnt 3509, 2010 ONSC 2870, 189 A.C.W.S. (3d) 598, 68 C.B.R. (5th) 233

**IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS
ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED**

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF CANWEST PUBLISHING
INC./PUBLICATIONS CANWEST INC., CANWEST BOOKS INC., AND CANWEST (CANADA) INC. (Applicants)

Pepall J.

Judgment: May 21, 2010

Docket: CV-10-8533-00CL

Counsel: Lyndon Barnes, Alex Cobb, Betsy Putnam for Applicant, LP Entities
Mario Forte for Special Committee of the Board of Directors
David Byers, Maria Konyukhova for Monitor, FTI Consulting Canada Inc.
Andrew Kent, Hilary Clarke for Administrative Agent of the Senior Secured Lenders Syndicate
M.P. Gottlieb, J.A. Swartz for Ad Hoc Committee of 9.25% Senior Subordinated Noteholders
Robert Chadwick, Logan Willis for 7535538 Canada Inc.
Deborah McPhail for Superintendent of Financial Services (FSCO)
Thomas McRae for Certain Canwest Employees

Subject: Insolvency; Estates and Trusts

Related Abridgment Classifications

Bankruptcy and insolvency

[XIV Administration of estate](#)

[XIV.6 Sale of assets](#)

[XIV.6.b Sale by tender](#)

[XIV.6.b.ii Miscellaneous](#)

Bankruptcy and insolvency

[XIX Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act](#)

[XIX.3 Arrangements](#)

[XIX.3.b Approval by court](#)

[XIX.3.b.i "Fair and reasonable"](#)

Bankruptcy and insolvency

[XIX Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act](#)

[XIX.5 Miscellaneous](#)

Headnote

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Administration of estate — Sale of assets — Sale by tender — Miscellaneous
Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Sale and investor solicitation process — In earlier order, court approved support
agreement between LP entities and senior lenders (support transaction) and commencement of sale and investor solicitation
process (SISP) — AHC bid was only superior offer as defined in SISP — AHC bid would allow for full payout of debt owed to
secured lenders and provide additional value to be available for unsecured creditors — AHC transaction would be implemented
pursuant to plan of compromise or arrangement — LP entities brought application for order authorizing them to enter into asset
purchase agreement based on AHC bid and conditionally sanctioning support transaction, among other relief — Application

granted — AHC transaction was approved — Proposed disposition of assets met criteria in s. 36 of Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act and common law — Process was reasonable — Sufficient efforts were made to attract best possible bid — AHC bid was better than support transaction — Effect of proposed sale on interested parties was positive.

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Miscellaneous

Procedure — Court approved commencement of sale and investor solicitation process (SISP) in earlier order — AHC bid was only superior offer as defined in SISP — AHC bid would allow for full payout of debt owed to secured lenders and provide additional value to be available for unsecured creditors — LP entities brought application for order approving amended claims procedure, authorizing them to call meeting of unsecured creditors to vote on AHC plan, and amending SISP procedures so LP entities could advance AHC transaction, among other relief — Application granted — Requested claims procedure order was approved — Because AHC plan was approved, scope of process had to be expanded to ensure as many creditors as possible could participate in meeting to consider AHC plan — Meeting order to convene meeting of unsecured creditors to vote on AHC plan was granted — On consent, SISP was amended to extend date for closing of AHC transaction and to permit proposed dual track procedure — Amendments were warranted as practical matter and to procure best available going concern outcome for stakeholders and LP entities.

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Arrangements — Approval by court — "Fair and reasonable"

In earlier order, court approved support agreement between LP entities and senior lenders (support transaction) and commencement of sale and investor solicitation process (SISP) — AHC bid was only superior offer as defined in SISP — AHC bid would allow for full payout of debt owed to secured lenders and provide additional value to be available for unsecured creditors — AHC transaction would be implemented pursuant to plan of compromise or arrangement — LP entities brought application for order authorizing them to enter into asset purchase agreement based on AHC bid and conditionally sanctioning support transaction, among other relief — Application granted — It was prudent for LP entities to simultaneously advance AHC transaction and support transaction — Support transaction was conditionally sanctioned — Excess of required majorities of senior lenders voted in favour of support transaction — Absent closing of AHC transaction, support transaction was fair and reasonable as between LP entities and creditors — There were no available commercial going concern alternatives to support transaction — There had been strict compliance with statutory requirements.

Table of Authorities

Cases considered by *Pepall J.*:

Canadian Airlines Corp., Re (2000), [2000] 10 W.W.R. 269, 20 C.B.R. (4th) 1, 84 Alta. L.R. (3d) 9, 9 B.L.R. (3d) 41, 2000 CarswellAlta 662, 2000 ABQB 442, 265 A.R. 201 (Alta. Q.B.) — followed

Canadian Airlines Corp., Re (2000), 2000 CarswellAlta 919, [2000] 10 W.W.R. 314, 20 C.B.R. (4th) 46, 84 Alta. L.R. (3d) 52, 9 B.L.R. (3d) 86, 2000 ABCA 238, 266 A.R. 131, 228 W.A.C. 131 (Alta. C.A. [In Chambers]) — referred to

Canadian Airlines Corp., Re (2000), 88 Alta. L.R. (3d) 8, 2001 ABCA 9, 2000 CarswellAlta 1556, [2001] 4 W.W.R. 1, 277 A.R. 179, 242 W.A.C. 179 (Alta. C.A.) — referred to

Canadian Airlines Corp., Re (2001), 2001 CarswellAlta 888, 2001 CarswellAlta 889, 275 N.R. 386 (note), 293 A.R. 351 (note), 257 W.A.C. 351 (note) (S.C.C.) — referred to

Royal Bank v. Soundair Corp. (1991), 7 C.B.R. (3d) 1, 83 D.L.R. (4th) 76, 46 O.A.C. 321, 4 O.R. (3d) 1, 1991 CarswellOnt 205 (Ont. C.A.) — followed

Statutes considered:

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36

Generally — referred to

s. 6 — referred to

s. 6(3) — referred to

s. 6(5) — referred to

s. 6(6) — referred to

s. 11 — referred to

s. 36 — considered

APPLICATION by LP entities for various relief relating to *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* proceedings.

Pepall J.:

Endorsement

Relief Requested

1 The LP Entities seek an order: (1) authorizing them to enter into an Asset Purchase Agreement based on a bid from the Ad Hoc Committee of 9.25% Senior Subordinated Noteholders ("the AHC Bid"); (2) approving an amended claims procedure; (3) authorizing the LP Entities to resume the claims process; and (4) amending the SISP procedures so that the LP Entities can advance the Ad Hoc Committee transaction (the AHC Transaction") and the Support Transaction concurrently. They also seek an order authorizing them to call a meeting of unsecured creditors to vote on the Ad Hoc Committee Plan on June 10, 2010. Lastly, they seek an order conditionally sanctioning the Senior Lenders' CCAA Plan.

AHC Bid

2 Dealing firstly with approval of the AHC Bid, in my Initial Order of January 8, 2010, I approved the Support Agreement between the LP Entities and the Administrative Agent for the Senior Lenders and authorized the LP Entities to file a Senior Lenders' Plan and to commence a sale and investor solicitation process (the SISP). The objective of the SISP was to test the market and obtain an offer that was superior to the terms of the Support Transaction.

3 On January 11, 2010, the Financial Advisor, RBC Capital Markets, commenced the SISP. Qualified Bids (as that term was defined in the SISP) were received and the Monitor, in consultation with the Financial Advisor and the LP CRA, determined that the AHC Bid was a Superior Cash Offer and that none of the other bids was a Superior Offer as those terms were defined in the SISP.

4 The Monitor recommended that the LP Entities pursue the AHC Transaction and the Special Committee of the Board of Directors accepted that recommendation.

5 The AHC Transaction contemplates that 7535538 Canada Inc. ("Holdco") will effect a transaction through a new limited partnership (Opco LP) in which it will acquire substantially all of the financial and operating assets of the LP Entities and the shares of National Post Inc. and assume certain liabilities including substantially all of the operating liabilities for a purchase price of \$1.1 billion. At closing, Opco LP will offer employment to substantially all of the employees of the LP Entities and will assume all of the pension liabilities and other benefits for employees of the LP Entities who will be employed by Opco LP, as well as for retirees currently covered by registered pension plans or other benefit plans. The materials submitted with the AHC Bid indicated that Opco LP will continue to operate all of the businesses of the LP Entities in substantially the same manner as they are currently operated, with no immediate plans to discontinue operations, sell material assets or make significant changes to current management. The AHC Bid will also allow for a full payout of the debt owed by the LP Entities to the LP Secured Lenders under the LP credit agreement and the Hedging Creditors and provides an additional \$150 million in value which will be available for the unsecured creditors of the LP Entities.

6 The purchase price will consist of an amount in cash that is equal to the sum of the Senior Secured Claims Amount (as defined in the AHC Asset Purchase Agreement), a promissory note of \$150 million (to be exchanged for up to 45% of the common shares of Holdco) and the assumption of certain liabilities of the LP Entities.

7 The Ad Hoc Committee has indicated that Holdco has received commitments for \$950 million of funded debt and equity financing to finance the AHC Bid. This includes \$700 million of new senior funded debt to be raised by Opco LP and \$250 million of mezzanine debt and equity to be raised including from the current members of the Ad Hoc Committee.

8 Certain liabilities are excluded including pre-filing liabilities and restructuring period claims, certain employee related liabilities and intercompany liabilities between and among the LP Entities and the CMI Entities. Effective as of the closing date, Opco LP will offer employment to all full-time and part-time employees of the LP Entities on substantially similar terms as their then existing employment (or the terms set out in their collective agreement, as applicable), subject to the option, exercisable on or before May 30, 2010, to not offer employment to up to 10% of the non-unionized part-time or temporary employees employed by the LP Entities.

9 The AHC Bid contemplates that the transaction will be implemented pursuant to a plan of compromise or arrangement between the LP Entities and certain unsecured creditors (the "AHC Plan"). In brief, the AHC Plan would provide that Opco LP would acquire substantially all of the assets of the LP Entities. The Senior Lenders would be unaffected creditors and would be paid in full. Unsecured creditors with proven claims of \$1,000 or less would receive cash. The balance of the consideration would be satisfied by an unsecured demand note of \$150 million less the amounts paid to the \$1,000 unsecured creditors. Ultimately, affected unsecured creditors with proven claims would receive shares in Holdco and Holdco would apply for the listing of its common shares on the Toronto Stock Exchange.

10 The Monitor recommended that the AHC Asset Purchase Agreement based on the AHC Bid be authorized. Certain factors were particularly relevant to the Monitor in making its recommendation:

- the Senior Lenders will received 100 cents on the dollar;
- the AHC Transaction will preserve substantially all of the business of the LP Entities to the benefit of the LP Entities' suppliers and the millions of people who rely on the LP Entities' publications each day;
- the AHC Transaction preserves the employment of substantially all of the current employees and largely protects the interests of former employees and retirees;
- the AHC Bid contemplates that the transaction will be implemented through a Plan under which \$150 million in cash or shares will be available for distribution to unsecured creditors;
- unlike the Support Transaction, there is no option *not* to assume certain pension or employee benefits obligations.

11 The Monitor, the LP CRA and the Financial Advisor considered closing risks associated with the AHC Bid and concluded that the Bid was credible, reasonably certain and financially viable. The LP Entities agreed with that assessment. All appearing either supported the AHC Transaction or were unopposed.

12 Clearly the SISP was successful and in my view, the LP Entities should be authorized to enter the Ad Hoc Committee Asset Purchase Agreement as requested.

13 The proposed disposition of assets meets the section 36 CCAA criteria and those set forth in the *Royal Bank v. Soundair Corp.*¹ decision. Indeed, to a large degree, the criteria overlap. The process was reasonable and the Monitor was content with it. Sufficient efforts were made to attract the best possible bid; the SISP was widely publicized; ample time was given to prepare offers; and there was integrity and no unfairness in the process. The Monitor was intimately involved in supervising the SISP and also made the Superior Cash Offer recommendation. The Monitor had previously advised the Court that in its opinion, the Support Transaction was preferable to a bankruptcy. The logical extension of that conclusion is that the AHC Transaction is as well. The LP Entities' Senior Lenders were either consulted and/or had the right to approve the various steps in the SISP. The effect of the proposed sale on other interested parties is very positive. Amongst other things, it provides for a going concern outcome and significant recoveries for both the secured and unsecured creditors. The consideration to be received is reasonable and fair. The Financial Advisor and the Monitor were both of the opinion that the SISP was a thorough canvassing of the market. The AHC Transaction was the highest offer received and delivers considerably more value than the Support Transaction which was in essence a "stalking horse" offer made by the single largest creditor constituency. The remaining subsequent provisions

of section 36 of the CCAA are either inapplicable or have been complied with. In conclusion the AHC Transaction ought to be and is approved.

Claims Procedure Order and Meeting Order

14 Turning to the Claims Procedure Order, as a result of the foregoing, the scope of the claims process needs to be expanded. Claims that have been filed will move to adjudication and resolution and in addition, the scope of the process needs to be expanded so as to ensure that as many creditors as possible have an opportunity to participate in the meeting to consider the Ad Hoc Committee Plan and to participate in distributions. Dates and timing also have to be adjusted. In these circumstances the requested Claims Procedure Order should be approved. Additionally, the Meeting Order required to convene a meeting of unsecured creditors on June 10, 2010 to vote on the Ad Hoc Committee Plan is granted.

SISP Amendment

15 It is proposed that the LP Entities will work diligently to implement the AHC Transaction while concurrently pursuing such steps as are required to effect the Support Transaction. The SISP procedures must be amended. The AHC Transaction which is to be effected through the Ad Hoc Committee Plan cannot be completed within the sixty days contemplated by the SISP. On consent of the Monitor, the LP Administrative Agent, the Ad Hoc Committee and the LP Entities, the SISP is amended to extend the date for closing of the AHC Transaction and to permit the proposed dual track procedure. The proposed amendments to the SISP are clearly warranted as a practical matter and so as to procure the best available going concern outcome for the LP Entities and their stakeholders. Paragraph 102 of the Initial Order contains a comeback clause which provides that interested parties may move to amend the Initial Order on notice. This would include a motion to amend the SISP which is effectively incorporated into the Initial Order by reference. The Applicants submit that I have broad general jurisdiction under section 11 of the CCAA to make such amendments. In my view, it is unnecessary to decide that issue as the affected parties are consenting to the proposed amendments.

Dual Track and Sanction of Senior Lenders' CCAA Plan

16 In my view, it is prudent for the LP Entities to simultaneously advance the AHC Transaction and the Support Transaction. To that end, the LP Entities seek approval of a conditional sanction order. They ask for conditional authorization to enter into the Acquisition and Assumption Agreement pursuant to a Credit Acquisition Sanction, Approval and Vesting Order.

17 The Senior Lenders' meeting was held January 27, 2010 and 97.5% in number and 88.7% in value of the Senior Lenders holding Proven Principal Claims who were present and voting voted in favour of the Senior Lenders' Plan. This was well in excess of the required majorities.

18 The LP Entities are seeking the sanction of the Senior Lenders' CCAA Plan on the basis that its implementation is conditional on the delivery of a Monitor's Certificate. The certificate will not be delivered if the AHC Bid closes. Satisfactory arrangements have been made to address closing timelines as well as access to advisor and management time. Absent the closing of the AHC Transaction, the Senior Lenders' CCAA Plan is fair and reasonable as between the LP Entities and its creditors. If the AHC Transaction is unable to close, I conclude that there are no available commercial going concern alternatives to the Senior Lenders' CCAA Plan. The market was fully canvassed during the SISP; there was ample time to conduct such a canvass; it was professionally supervised; and the AHC Bid was the only Superior Offer as that term was defined in the SISP. For these reasons, I am prepared to find that the Senior Lenders' CCAA Plan is fair and reasonable and may be conditionally sanctioned. I also note that there has been strict compliance with statutory requirements and nothing has been done or purported to have been done which was not authorized by the CCAA. As such, the three part test set forth in the *Canadian Airlines Corp., Re*² has been met. Additionally, there has been compliance with section 6 of the CCAA. The Crown, employee and pension claims described in section 6 (3),(5), and (6) have been addressed in the Senior Lenders' Plan at sections 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4.

Conclusion

19 In conclusion, it is evident to me that the parties who have been engaged in this CCAA proceeding have worked diligently and cooperatively, rigorously protecting their own interests but at the same time achieving a positive outcome for the LP Entities' stakeholders as a whole. As I indicated in Court, for this they and their professional advisors should be commended. The business of the LP Entities affects many people - creditors, employees, retirees, suppliers, community members and the millions who rely on their publications for their news. This is a good chapter in the LP Entities' CCAA story. Hopefully, it will have a happy ending.

Application granted.

Footnotes

- 1 [1991] O.J. No. 1137 (Ont. C.A.).
- 2 2000 ABQB 442 (Alta. Q.B.), leave to appeal refused 2000 ABCA 238 (Alta. C.A. [In Chambers]), affirmed 2001 ABCA 9 (Alta. C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused July 12, 2001 [2001 CarswellAlta 888 (S.C.C.)].

TAB 6

2009 CarswellOnt 5450
Ontario Superior Court of Justice [Commercial List]

Eddie Bauer of Canada Inc., Re

2009 CarswellOnt 5450, [2009] O.J. No. 3784, 57 C.B.R. (5th) 241

**IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT
ACT, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED AND IN THE MATTER OF A
PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF EDDIE BAUER OF
CANADA, INC. AND EDDIE BAUER CUSTOMER SERVICES INC. (Applicants)**

C. Campbell J.

Heard: July 22, 2009
Judgment: July 30, 2009
Docket: CV-09-8240-00CL

Counsel: Fred Myers, L. Joseph Latham, Christopher G. Armstrong for Applicants
Jay Swartz for RSM Richter
Linda Galessiere for Landlords
Maria Konyukhova for Everest Holdings
Alexander Cobb for Bank of America

Subject: Insolvency

Related Abridgment Classifications

Bankruptcy and insolvency

[XIX Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act](#)

[XIX.3 Arrangements](#)

[XIX.3.e Miscellaneous](#)

Table of Authorities

Cases considered by C. Campbell J.:

Bakemates International Inc., Re (2004), 2004 CarswellOnt 2339 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to

Crown Trust Co. v. Rosenberg (1986), 60 O.R. (2d) 87, 1986 CarswellOnt 235, 22 C.P.C. (2d) 131, 39 D.L.R. (4th) 526, 67 C.B.R. (N.S.) 320 (note) (Ont. H.C.) — considered

Eddie Bauer of Canada Inc., Re (2009), 2009 CarswellOnt 3657, 55 C.B.R. (5th) 33 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Ivaco Inc., Re (2004), 2004 CarswellOnt 3563 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Royal Bank v. Soundair Corp. (1991), 7 C.B.R. (3d) 1, 83 D.L.R. (4th) 76, 46 O.A.C. 321, 4 O.R. (3d) 1, 1991 CarswellOnt 205 (Ont. C.A.) — considered

Tiger Brand Knitting Co., Re (2005), 2005 CarswellOnt 1240, 9 C.B.R. (5th) 315 (Ont. S.C.J.) — considered

Statutes considered:

Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C.

Chapter 11 — referred to

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36

Generally — referred to

APPLICATION for approval of sale and vesting order.

C. Campbell J.:

1 A joint hearing between this Court and the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware was held on July 22, 2009 for Sale Approval and a Vesting Order in respect of an Asset Purchase Agreement dated as of July 17, 2009 among Everest Holdings LLC as buyer and Eddie Bauer Holdings Inc. ("EB Holdings") and each of its subsidiaries.

2 These are the reasons for approval of the Order granted.

3 On June 17, 2009, Eddie Bauer Canada Inc. and Eddie Bauer Customer Services Inc. (together, "EB Canada"), two of the EB Holdings subsidiaries, were granted protection under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-36, as amended ("CCAA") in an Initial Order of this Court, with RSM Richter Inc. appointed as Monitor.

4 On the same day, EB Holdings commenced reorganization under Chapter 11 of the United States Code in bankruptcy. A cross-border protocol was approved by this Court [2009 CarswellOnt 3657 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List])] and the U.S. Court on June 25, 2009.

5 The purpose of what is described in the Orders as "Restructuring Proceedings" was a process to enable the Eddie Bauer Group to have an opportunity to maximize the value of its business and assets in a unified, Court-approved sale process.

6 EB Holdings is a publicly traded company with shares trade on the NASDAQ Global Market. Eddie Bauer branded products are sold at over 300 retail outlets in the United States and 36 retail stores and one warehouse store throughout Canada, together with online and catalogue sales employing 933 individuals in Canada.

7 The joint hearing conducted on June 29, 2009 before the U.S. Court and this Court approved a Stalking Horse process and certain prescribed bidding procedures. Rainer Holdings LLC, an affiliate of CCMP Capital Advisors and indirectly of the buyer, became the Stalking Horse bidder.

8 The Stalking Horse offer of US\$202.3 million was for substantially all of the assets, property and undertaking of the Eddie Bauer Group.

9 The Bidding Procedure Order provided that the Stalking Horse offeror would be entitled to a break fee and to have its expenses of approximately \$250,000 reimbursed and would offer employment to substantially all of the Company's employees, assume at least 250 U.S. retail locations and all Canadian locations and pay all of the Group's post-filing supplier claims.

10 The bidding was completed in the early hours of July 17, 2009. The three stage basis of the auction process included (1) the best inventory offer from Inventory Bidders; (2) the best intellectual property offer of the IP bidders; and (3) the best going-concern offer from Going-Concern Bidders. The best inventory and intellectual offers were to be compared against the best going-concern offer.

11 The US\$286 million bid by Everest (a company unrelated to Rainer) was deemed the best offer, yielding the highest net recovery for creditors (including creditors in consultation.) A US\$250 million back-up bid was also identified.

12 The Canadian real property leases are to be assigned, assuming consent of landlords, and offers of employment to all Canadian employees to be made and ordinary course liabilities assumed.

13 The value allocated to the Canadian Purchased Assets of US\$11 million exceeds in the analysis and opinion of the Monitor the net value on a liquidation basis, particularly as the only two material assets are inventory and equity (if any) in realty leases.

14 All parties represented at the joint hearing, including counsel for the landlords, either supported or did not oppose the Order sought.

15 The process that has been undertaken in a very short time is an example of a concerted and dedicated effort of a variety of stakeholders to achieve a restructuring without impairing the going-concern nature of the Eddie Bauer business.

16 The sale and purchase of assets assures a compromise of debt accepted by those debtholders (with a process of certain leases not taken up in the US), which to the extent possible preserves the value of the name and reputation of the business as a going concern.

17 Had it not been for the cooperative effort of counsel for the parties on both sides of the border and a joint hearing process to approve on an efficient and timely basis, the restructuring regime would undoubtedly have been more time-consuming and more costly.

18 I am satisfied that the statement of law that set out the duties of a Court in reviewing the propriety of the actions of a Court officer (Monitor) are applicable and have been met here.

19 The duties were set out by Anderson J. in *Crown Trust Co. v. Rosenberg* (1986), 60 O.R. (2d) 87 (Ont. H.C.) at pp 92-94 and are as follows:

1. It should consider the interests of all parties.
2. It should consider the efficacy and integrity of the process by which offers are obtained.
3. It should consider whether there has been unfairness in the working out of the process.

20 Galligan J.A. for the majority in the Court of Appeal in Ontario in *Royal Bank v. Soundair Corp.* (1991), 4 O.R. (3d) 1 (Ont. C.A.) at p. 8 further accepted and adopted the further statement of Anderson J. in *Crown Trust* at p. 551 that "its decision was made as a matter of business judgement on the elements then available to it. It is the very essence of a receiver's function to make such judgments and in the making of them, to act seriously and responsibly, so as to be prepared to stand behind them."

21 What have come to be known as the *Soundair* principles have been accepted in a number of Ontario cases, including *Bakemates International Inc., Re* [2004 CarswellOnt 2339 (Ont. C.A.)], 2004 CanLII 59994. The same principles have been accepted to approval of Asset Purchase Agreements and Vesting Orders. See *Ivaco Inc., Re* [2004 CarswellOnt 3563 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List])] 2004 CanLII 21547. In *Tiger Brand Knitting Co., Re* [2005 CarswellOnt 1240 (Ont. S.C.J.)] 2005 CanLII 9680, I declined to extend the time for a bid and directed the Monitor not to accept a bid it had received and to negotiate with another party.

22 The concern in *Tiger Brand*, as in this case, is that once a sales process is put forward, the Court should to the extent possible uphold the business judgment of the Court officer and the parties supporting it. Absent a violation of the *Soundair* principles, the result of that process should as well be upheld.

23 A Stalking Horse bid has become an important feature of the CCAA process. In this case, the fact that the Stalking Horse bidder promoted other bids and put in the highest bid satisfies me that the process was fair and reasonable and produced a fair and reasonable result.

24 One can readily understand that the goodwill attached to a recognized name such as Eddie Bauer will likely only retain its value if there is a seamless and orderly transfer.

25 For the foregoing reasons the draft Orders of Approval and Vesting will issue as approved and signed.

Application granted.

TAB 7

1991 CarswellOnt 205
Ontario Court of Appeal

Royal Bank v. Soundair Corp.

1991 CarswellOnt 205, [1991] O.J. No. 1137, 27 A.C.W.S. (3d) 1178,
46 O.A.C. 321, 4 O.R. (3d) 1, 7 C.B.R. (3d) 1, 83 D.L.R. (4th) 76

**ROYAL BANK OF CANADA (plaintiff/respondent) v. SOUNDAIR CORPORATION
(respondent), CANADIAN PENSION CAPITAL LIMITED (appellant)
and CANADIAN INSURERS' CAPITAL CORPORATION (appellant)**

Goodman, McKinlay and Galligan JJ.A.

Heard: June 11, 12, 13 and 14, 1991

Judgment: July 3, 1991

Docket: Doc. CA 318/91

Counsel: *J. B. Berkow* and *S. H. Goldman* , for appellants Canadian Pension Capital Limited and Canadian Insurers' Capital Corporation.

J. T. Morin, Q.C. , for Air Canada.

L.A.J. Barnes and *L.E. Ritchie* , for plaintiff/respondent Royal Bank of Canada.

S.F. Dunphy and *G.K. Ketcheson* , for Ernst & Young Inc., receiver of respondent Soundair Corporation.

W.G. Horton , for Ontario Express Limited.

N.J. Spies , for Frontier Air Limited.

Subject: Corporate and Commercial; Insolvency

Related Abridgment Classifications

Debtors and creditors

VII Receivers

VII.6 Conduct and liability of receiver

VII.6.a General conduct of receiver

Table of Authorities

Cases considered:

Beauty Counsellors of Canada Ltd., Re (1986), 58 C.B.R. (N.S.) 237 (Ont. S.C.) — referred to

British Columbia Development Corp. v. Spun Cast Industries Ltd. (1977), 26 C.B.R. (N.S.) 28, 5 B.C.L.R. 94 (S.C.) — referred to

Cameron v. Bank of Nova Scotia (1981), 38 C.B.R. (N.S.) 1, 45 N.S.R. (2d) 303, 86 A.P.R. 303 (C.A.) — referred to

Crown Trust Co. v. Rosenburg (1986), 67 C.B.R. (N.S.) 320n, 60 O.R. (2d) 87, 22 C.P.C. (2d) 131, 39 D.L.R. (4th) 526 (H.C.) — applied

Salima Investments Ltd. v. Bank of Montreal (1985), 59 C.B.R. (N.S.) 242, 41 Alta. L.R. (2d) 58, 65 A.R. 372 , 21 D.L.R. (4th) (C.A.) — referred to

Selkirk, Re (1986), 58 C.B.R. (N.S.) 245 (Ont. S.C.) — referred to

Selkirk, Re (1987), 64 C.B.R. (N.S.) 140 (Ont. S.C.) — referred to

Statutes considered:

Employment Standards Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 137.

Environmental Protection Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 141.

Appeal from order approving sale of assets by receiver.

Galligan J.A. :

1 This is an appeal from the order of Rosenberg J. made on May 1, 1991. By that order, he approved the sale of Air Toronto to Ontario Express Limited and Frontier Air Limited, and he dismissed a motion to approve an offer to purchase Air Toronto by 922246 Ontario Limited.

2 It is necessary at the outset to give some background to the dispute. Soundair Corporation ("Soundair") is a corporation engaged in the air transport business. It has three divisions. One of them is Air Toronto. Air Toronto operates a scheduled airline from Toronto to a number of mid-sized cities in the United States of America. Its routes serve as feeders to several of Air Canada's routes. Pursuant to a connector agreement, Air Canada provides some services to Air Toronto and benefits from the feeder traffic provided by it. The operational relationship between Air Canada and Air Toronto is a close one.

3 In the latter part of 1989 and the early part of 1990, Soundair was in financial difficulty. Soundair has two secured creditors who have an interest in the assets of Air Toronto. The Royal Bank of Canada (the "Royal Bank") is owed at least \$65 million dollars. The appellants Canadian Pension Capital Limited and Canadian Insurers' Capital Corporation (collectively called "CCFL") are owed approximately \$9,500,000. Those creditors will have a deficiency expected to be in excess of \$50 million on the winding up of Soundair.

4 On April 26, 1990, upon the motion of the Royal Bank, O'Brien J. appointed Ernst & Young Inc. (the "receiver") as receiver of all of the assets, property and undertakings of Soundair. The order required the receiver to operate Air Toronto and sell it as a going concern. Because of the close relationship between Air Toronto and Air Canada, it was contemplated that the receiver would obtain the assistance of Air Canada to operate Air Toronto. The order authorized the receiver:

(b) to enter into contractual arrangements with Air Canada to retain a manager or operator, including Air Canada, to manage and operate Air Toronto under the supervision of Ernst & Young Inc. until the completion of the sale of Air Toronto to Air Canada or other person.

Also because of the close relationship, it was expected that Air Canada would purchase Air Toronto. To that end, the order of O'Brien J. authorized the Receiver:

(c) to negotiate and do all things necessary or desirable to complete a sale of Air Toronto to Air Canada and, if a sale to Air Canada cannot be completed, to negotiate and sell Air Toronto to another person, subject to terms and conditions approved by this Court.

5 Over a period of several weeks following that order, negotiations directed towards the sale of Air Toronto took place between the receiver and Air Canada. Air Canada had an agreement with the receiver that it would have exclusive negotiating rights during that period. I do not think it is necessary to review those negotiations, but I note that Air Canada had complete access to all of the operations of Air Toronto and conducted due diligence examinations. It became thoroughly acquainted with every aspect of Air Toronto's operations.

6 Those negotiations came to an end when an offer made by Air Canada on June 19, 1990, was considered unsatisfactory by the receiver. The offer was not accepted and lapsed. Having regard to the tenor of Air Canada's negotiating stance and a letter sent by its solicitors on July 20, 1990, I think that the receiver was eminently reasonable when it decided that there was no realistic possibility of selling Air Toronto to Air Canada.

7 The receiver then looked elsewhere. Air Toronto's feeder business is very attractive, but it only has value to a national airline. The receiver concluded reasonably, therefore, that it was commercially necessary for one of Canada's two national airlines to be involved in any sale of Air Toronto. Realistically, there were only two possible purchasers, whether direct or indirect. They were Air Canada and Canadian Airlines International.

8 It was well known in the air transport industry that Air Toronto was for sale. During the months following the collapse of the negotiations with Air Canada, the receiver tried unsuccessfully to find viable purchasers. In late 1990, the receiver turned

to Canadian Airlines International, the only realistic alternative. Negotiations began between them. Those negotiations led to a letter of intent dated February 11, 1990. On March 6, 1991, the receiver received an offer from Ontario Express Limited and Frontier Airlines Limited, who are subsidiaries of Canadian Airlines International. This offer is called the OEL offer.

9 In the meantime, Air Canada and CCFL were having discussions about making an offer for the purchase of Air Toronto. They formed 922246 Ontario Limited ("922") for the purpose of purchasing Air Toronto. On March 1, 1991, CCFL wrote to the receiver saying that it proposed to make an offer. On March 7, 1991, Air Canada and CCFL presented an offer to the receiver in the name of 922. For convenience, its offers are called the "922 offers."

10 The first 922 offer contained a condition which was unacceptable to the receiver. I will refer to that condition in more detail later. The receiver declined the 922 offer and on March 8, 1991, accepted the OEL offer. Subsequently, 922 obtained an order allowing it to make a second offer. It then submitted an offer which was virtually identical to that of March 7, 1991, except that the unacceptable condition had been removed.

11 The proceedings before Rosenberg J. then followed. He approved the sale to OEL and dismissed a motion for the acceptance of the 922 offer. Before Rosenberg J., and in this court, both CCFL and the Royal Bank supported the acceptance of the second 922 offer.

12 There are only two issues which must be resolved in this appeal. They are:

- (1) Did the receiver act properly when it entered into an agreement to sell Air Toronto to OEL?
- (2) What effect does the support of the 922 offer by the secured creditors have on the result?

13 I will deal with the two issues separately.

1. Did the Receiver Act Properly in Agreeing to Sell to OEL?

14 Before dealing with that issue, there are three general observations which I think I should make. The first is that the sale of an airline as a going concern is a very complex process. The best method of selling an airline at the best price is something far removed from the expertise of a court. When a court appoints a receiver to use its commercial expertise to sell an airline, it is inescapable that it intends to rely upon the receiver's expertise and not upon its own. Therefore, the court must place a great deal of confidence in the actions taken and in the opinions formed by the receiver. It should also assume that the receiver is acting properly unless the contrary is clearly shown. The second observation is that the court should be reluctant to second-guess, with the benefit of hindsight, the considered business decisions made by its receiver. The third observation which I wish to make is that the conduct of the receiver should be reviewed in the light of the specific mandate given to him by the court.

15 The order of O'Brien J. provided that if the receiver could not complete the sale to Air Canada that it was "to negotiate and sell Air Toronto to another person." The court did not say how the receiver was to negotiate the sale. It did not say it was to call for bids or conduct an auction. It told the receiver to negotiate and sell. It obviously intended, because of the unusual nature of the asset being sold, to leave the method of sale substantially in the discretion of the receiver. I think, therefore, that the court should not review minutely the process of the sale when, broadly speaking, it appears to the court to be a just process.

16 As did Rosenberg J., I adopt as correct the statement made by Anderson J. in *Crown Trust Co. v. Rosenberg* (1986), 60 O.R. (2d) 87, 67 C.B.R. (N.S.) 320n, 22 C.P.C. (2d) 131, 39 D.L.R. (4th) 526 (H.C.), at pp. 92-94 [O.R.], of the duties which a court must perform when deciding whether a receiver who has sold a property acted properly. When he set out the court's duties, he did not put them in any order of priority, nor do I. I summarize those duties as follows:

1. It should consider whether the receiver has made a sufficient effort to get the best price and has not acted improvidently.
2. It should consider the interests of all parties.
3. It should consider the efficacy and integrity of the process by which offers are obtained.

4. It should consider whether there has been unfairness in the working out of the process.

17 I intend to discuss the performance of those duties separately.

1. Did the Receiver make a sufficient effort to get the best price and did it act providently?

18 Having regard to the fact that it was highly unlikely that a commercially viable sale could be made to anyone but the two national airlines, or to someone supported by either of them, it is my view that the receiver acted wisely and reasonably when it negotiated only with Air Canada and Canadian Airlines International. Furthermore, when Air Canada said that it would submit no further offers and gave the impression that it would not participate further in the receiver's efforts to sell, the only course reasonably open to the receiver was to negotiate with Canadian Airlines International. Realistically, there was nowhere else to go but to Canadian Airlines International. In doing so, it is my opinion that the receiver made sufficient efforts to sell the airline.

19 When the receiver got the OEL offer on March 6, 1991, it was over 10 months since it had been charged with the responsibility of selling Air Toronto. Until then, the receiver had not received one offer which it thought was acceptable. After substantial efforts to sell the airline over that period, I find it difficult to think that the receiver acted improvidently in accepting the only acceptable offer which it had.

20 On March 8, 1991, the date when the receiver accepted the OEL offer, it had only two offers, the OEL offer, which was acceptable, and the 922 offer, which contained an unacceptable condition. I cannot see how the receiver, assuming for the moment that the price was reasonable, could have done anything but accept the OEL offer.

21 When deciding whether a receiver had acted providently, the court should examine the conduct of the receiver in light of the information the receiver had when it agreed to accept an offer. In this case, the court should look at the receiver's conduct in the light of the information it had when it made its decision on March 8, 1991. The court should be very cautious before deciding that the receiver's conduct was improvident based upon information which has come to light after it made its decision. To do so, in my view, would derogate from the mandate to sell given to the receiver by the order of O'Brien J. I agree with and adopt what was said by Anderson J. in *Crown Trust Co. v. Rosenberg*, supra, at p. 112 [O.R.]:

Its decision was made as a matter of business judgment *on the elements then available to it*. It is of the very essence of a receiver's function to make such judgments and in the making of them to act seriously and responsibly so as to be prepared to stand behind them.

If the court were to reject the recommendation of the Receiver in any but the most exceptional circumstances, it would materially diminish and weaken the role and function of the Receiver both in the perception of receivers and in the perception of any others who might have occasion to deal with them. It would lead to the conclusion that the decision of the Receiver was of little weight and that the real decision was always made upon the motion for approval. That would be a consequence susceptible of immensely damaging results to the disposition of assets by court-appointed receivers.

[Emphasis added.]

22 I also agree with and adopt what was said by Macdonald J.A. in *Cameron v. Bank of Nova Scotia* (1981), 38 C.B.R. (N.S.) 1, 45 N.S.R. (2d) 303, 86 A.P.R. 303 (C.A.), at p. 11 [C.B.R.]:

In my opinion if the decision of the receiver to enter into an agreement of sale, subject to court approval, with respect to certain assets is reasonable and sound under the circumstances *at the time existing* it should not be set aside simply because a later and higher bid is made. To do so would literally create chaos in the commercial world and receivers and purchasers would never be sure they had a binding agreement.

[Emphasis added.]

23 On March 8, 1991, the receiver had two offers. One was the OEL offer, which it considered satisfactory but which could be withdrawn by OEL at any time before it was accepted. The receiver also had the 922 offer, which contained a condition that was totally unacceptable. It had no other offers. It was faced with the dilemma of whether it should decline to accept the OEL offer and run the risk of it being withdrawn, in the hope that an acceptable offer would be forthcoming from 922. An affidavit filed by the president of the receiver describes the dilemma which the receiver faced, and the judgment made in the light of that dilemma:

24. An asset purchase agreement was received by Ernst & Young on March 7, 1991 which was dated March 6, 1991. This agreement was received from CCFL in respect of their offer to purchase the assets and undertaking of Air Toronto. Apart from financial considerations, which will be considered in a subsequent affidavit, the *Receiver determined that it would not be prudent to delay acceptance of the OEL agreement to negotiate a highly uncertain arrangement with Air Canada and CCFL*. Air Canada had the benefit of an 'exclusive' in negotiations for Air Toronto and had clearly indicated its intention take itself out of the running while ensuring that no other party could seek to purchase Air Toronto and maintain the Air Canada connector arrangement vital to its survival. The CCFL offer represented a radical reversal of this position by Air Canada at the eleventh hour. However, it contained a significant number of conditions to closing which were entirely beyond the control of the Receiver. As well, the CCFL offer came less than 24 hours before signing of the agreement with OEL which had been negotiated over a period of months, at great time and expense.

[Emphasis added.] I am convinced that the decision made was a sound one in the circumstances faced by the receiver on March 8, 1991.

24 I now turn to consider whether the price contained in the OEL offer was one which it was provident to accept. At the outset, I think that the fact that the OEL offer was the only acceptable one available to the receiver on March 8, 1991, after 10 months of trying to sell the airline, is strong evidence that the price in it was reasonable. In a deteriorating economy, I doubt that it would have been wise to wait any longer.

25 I mentioned earlier that, pursuant to an order, 922 was permitted to present a second offer. During the hearing of the appeal, counsel compared at great length the price contained in the second 922 offer with the price contained in the OEL offer. Counsel put forth various hypotheses supporting their contentions that one offer was better than the other.

26 It is my opinion that the price contained in the 922 offer is relevant only if it shows that the price obtained by the receiver in the OEL offer was not a reasonable one. In *Crown Trust Co. v. Rosenberg*, supra, Anderson J., at p. 113 [O.R.], discussed the comparison of offers in the following way:

No doubt, as the cases have indicated, situations might arise where the disparity was so great as to call in question the adequacy of the mechanism which had produced the offers. It is not so here, and in my view that is substantially an end of the matter.

27 In two judgments, Saunders J. considered the circumstances in which an offer submitted after the receiver had agreed to a sale should be considered by the court. The first is *Re Selkirk* (1986), 58 C.B.R. (N.S.) 245 (Ont. S.C.), at p. 247:

If, for example, in this case there had been a second offer of a substantially higher amount, then the court would have to take that offer into consideration in assessing whether the receiver had properly carried out his function of endeavouring to obtain the best price for the property.

28 The second is *Re Beauty Counsellors of Canada Ltd.* (1986), 58 C.B.R. (N.S.) 237 (Ont. S.C.), at p. 243:

If a substantially higher bid turns up at the approval stage, the court should consider it. Such a bid may indicate, for example, that the trustee has not properly carried out its duty to endeavour to obtain the best price for the estate.

29 In *Re Selkirk* (1987), 64 C.B.R. (N.S.) 140 (Ont. S.C.), at p. 142, McRae J. expressed a similar view:

The court will not lightly withhold approval of a sale by the receiver, particularly in a case such as this where the receiver is given rather wide discretionary authority as per the order of Mr. Justice Trainor and, of course, where the receiver is an officer of this court. Only in a case where there seems to be some unfairness in the process of the sale or *where there are substantially higher offers which would tend to show that the sale was improvident* will the court withhold approval. It is important that the court recognize the commercial exigencies that would flow if prospective purchasers are allowed to wait until the sale is in court for approval before submitting their final offer. This is something that must be discouraged.

[Emphasis added.]

30 What those cases show is that the prices in other offers have relevance only if they show that the price contained in the offer accepted by the receiver was so unreasonably low as to demonstrate that the receiver was improvident in accepting it. I am of the opinion, therefore, that if they do not tend to show that the receiver was improvident, they should not be considered upon a motion to confirm a sale recommended by a court-appointed receiver. If they were, the process would be changed from a sale by a receiver, subject to court approval, into an auction conducted by the court at the time approval is sought. In my opinion, the latter course is unfair to the person who has entered bona fide into an agreement with the receiver, can only lead to chaos, and must be discouraged.

31 If, however, the subsequent offer is so substantially higher than the sale recommended by the receiver, then it may be that the receiver has not conducted the sale properly. In such circumstances, the court would be justified itself in entering into the sale process by considering competitive bids. However, I think that that process should be entered into only if the court is satisfied that the receiver has not properly conducted the sale which it has recommended to the court.

32 It is necessary to consider the two offers. Rosenberg J. held that the 922 offer was slightly better or marginally better than the OEL offer. He concluded that the difference in the two offers did not show that the sale process adopted by the receiver was inadequate or improvident.

33 Counsel for the appellants complained about the manner in which Rosenberg J. conducted the hearing of the motion to confirm the OEL sale. The complaint was that when they began to discuss a comparison of the two offers, Rosenberg J. said that he considered the 922 offer to be better than the OEL offer. Counsel said that when that comment was made, they did not think it necessary to argue further the question of the difference in value between the two offers. They complain that the finding that the 922 offer was only marginally better or slightly better than the OEL offer was made without them having had the opportunity to argue that the 922 offer was substantially better or significantly better than the OEL offer. I cannot understand how counsel could have thought that by expressing the opinion that the 922 offer was better, Rosenberg J. was saying that it was a significantly or substantially better one. Nor can I comprehend how counsel took the comment to mean that they were foreclosed from arguing that the offer was significantly or substantially better. If there was some misunderstanding on the part of counsel, it should have been raised before Rosenberg J. at the time. I am sure that if it had been, the misunderstanding would have been cleared up quickly. Nevertheless, this court permitted extensive argument dealing with the comparison of the two offers.

34 The 922 offer provided for \$6 million cash to be paid on closing with a royalty based upon a percentage of Air Toronto profits over a period of 5 years up to a maximum of \$3 million. The OEL offer provided for a payment of \$2 million on closing with a royalty paid on gross revenues over a 5-year period. In the short term, the 922 offer is obviously better because there is substantially more cash up front. The chances of future returns are substantially greater in the OEL offer because royalties are paid on gross revenues, while the royalties under the 922 offer are paid only on profits. There is an element of risk involved in each offer.

35 The receiver studied the two offers. It compared them and took into account the risks, the advantages and the disadvantages of each. It considered the appropriate contingencies. It is not necessary to outline the factors which were taken into account by the receiver because the manager of its insolvency practice filed an affidavit outlining the considerations which were weighed in its evaluation of the two offers. They seem to me to be reasonable ones. That affidavit concluded with the following paragraph:

24. On the basis of these considerations the Receiver has approved the OEL offer and has concluded that it represents the achievement of the highest possible value at this time for the Air Toronto division of SoundAir.

36 The court appointed the receiver to conduct the sale of Air Toronto, and entrusted it with the responsibility of deciding what is the best offer. I put great weight upon the opinion of the receiver. It swore to the court which appointed it that the OEL offer represents the achievement of the highest possible value at this time for Air Toronto. I have not been convinced that the receiver was wrong when he made that assessment. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the 922 offer does not demonstrate any failure upon the part of the receiver to act properly and providently.

37 It follows that if Rosenberg J. was correct when he found that the 922 offer was in fact better, I agree with him that it could only have been slightly or marginally better. The 922 offer does not lead to an inference that the disposition strategy of the receiver was inadequate, unsuccessful or improvident, nor that the price was unreasonable.

38 I am, therefore, of the opinion the the receiver made a sufficient effort to get the best price, and has not acted improvidently.

2. Consideration of the Interests of all Parties

39 It is well established that the primary interest is that of the creditors of the debtor: see *Crown Trust Co. v. Rosenberg*, supra, and *Re Selkirk*, supra (Saunders J.). However, as Saunders J. pointed out in *Re Beauty Counsellors*, supra at p. 244 [C.B.R.], "it is not the only or overriding consideration."

40 In my opinion, there are other persons whose interests require consideration. In an appropriate case, the interests of the debtor must be taken into account. I think also, in a case such as this, where a purchaser has bargained at some length and doubtless at considerable expense with the receiver, the interests of the purchaser ought to be taken into account. While it is not explicitly stated in such cases as *Crown Trust Co. v. Rosenberg*, supra, *Re Selkirk* (1986), supra, *Re Beauty Counsellors*, supra, *Re Selkirk* (1987), supra, and (*Cameron*), supra, I think they clearly imply that the interests of a person who has negotiated an agreement with a court-appointed receiver are very important.

41 In this case, the interests of all parties who would have an interest in the process were considered by the receiver and by Rosenberg J.

3. Consideration of the Efficacy and Integrity of the Process by which the Offer was Obtained

42 While it is accepted that the primary concern of a receiver is the protecting of the interests of the creditors, there is a secondary but very important consideration, and that is the integrity of the process by which the sale is effected. This is particularly so in the case of a sale of such a unique asset as an airline as a going concern.

43 The importance of a court protecting the integrity of the process has been stated in a number of cases. First, I refer to *Re Selkirk*, supra, where Saunders J. said at p. 246 [C.B.R.]:

In dealing with the request for approval, the court has to be concerned primarily with protecting the interest of the creditors of the former bankrupt. A secondary but important consideration is that the process under which the sale agreement is arrived at should be consistent with commercial efficacy and integrity.

In that connection I adopt the principles stated by Macdonald J.A. of the Nova Scotia Supreme Court (Appeal Division) in *Cameron v. Bank of N.S.* (1981), 38 C.B.R. (N.S.) 1, 45 N.S.R. (2d) 303, 86 A.P.R. 303 (C.A.), where he said at p. 11:

In my opinion if the decision of the receiver to enter into an agreement of sale, subject to court approval, with respect to certain assets is reasonable and sound under the circumstances at the time existing it should not be set aside simply because a later and higher bid is made. To do so would literally create chaos in the commercial world and receivers and purchasers would never be sure they had a binding agreement. On the contrary, they would know that other bids could be received and considered up until the application for court approval is heard — this would be an intolerable situation.

While those remarks may have been made in the context of a bidding situation rather than a private sale, I consider them to be equally applicable to a negotiation process leading to a private sale. Where the court is concerned with the disposition of property, the purpose of appointing a receiver is to have the receiver do the work that the court would otherwise have to do.

44 In *Salima Investments Ltd. v. Bank of Montreal* (1985), 59 C.B.R. (N.S.) 242, 41 Alta. L.R. (2d) 58, 65 A.R. 372, 21 D.L.R. (4th) 473 at p. 476 [D.L.R.], the Alberta Court of Appeal said that sale by tender is not necessarily the best way to sell a business as an ongoing concern. It went on to say that when some other method is used which is provident, the court should not undermine the process by refusing to confirm the sale.

45 Finally, I refer to the reasoning of Anderson J. in *Crown Trust Co. v. Rosenberg*, supra, at p. 124 [O.R.]:

While every proper effort must always be made to assure maximum recovery consistent with the limitations inherent in the process, no method has yet been devised to entirely eliminate those limitations or to avoid their consequences. *Certainly it is not to be found in loosening the entire foundation of the system. Thus to compare the results of the process in this case with what might have been recovered in some other set of circumstances is neither logical nor practical.*

[Emphasis added.]

46 It is my opinion that the court must exercise extreme caution before it interferes with the process adopted by a receiver to sell an unusual asset. It is important that prospective purchasers know that, if they are acting in good faith, bargain seriously with a receiver and enter into an agreement with it, a court will not lightly interfere with the commercial judgment of the receiver to sell the asset to them.

47 Before this court, counsel for those opposing the confirmation of the sale to OEL suggested many different ways in which the receiver could have conducted the process other than the way which he did. However, the evidence does not convince me that the receiver used an improper method of attempting to sell the airline. The answer to those submissions is found in the comment of Anderson J. in *Crown Trust Co. v. Rosenberg*, supra, at p. 109 [O.R.]:

The court ought not to sit as on appeal from the decision of the Receiver, reviewing in minute detail every element of the process by which the decision is reached. To do so would be a futile and duplicitous exercise.

48 It would be a futile and duplicitous exercise for this court to examine in minute detail all of circumstances leading up to the acceptance of the OEL offer. Having considered the process adopted by the receiver, it is my opinion that the process adopted was a reasonable and prudent one.

4. Was there unfairness in the process?

49 As a general rule, I do not think it appropriate for the court to go into the minutia of the process or of the selling strategy adopted by the receiver. However, the court has a responsibility to decide whether the process was fair. The only part of this process which I could find that might give even a superficial impression of unfairness is the failure of the receiver to give an offering memorandum to those who expressed an interest in the purchase of Air Toronto.

50 I will outline the circumstances which relate to the allegation that the receiver was unfair in failing to provide an offering memorandum. In the latter part of 1990, as part of its selling strategy, the receiver was in the process of preparing an offering memorandum to give to persons who expressed an interest in the purchase of Air Toronto. The offering memorandum got as far as draft form, but was never released to anyone, although a copy of the draft eventually got into the hands of CCFL before it submitted the first 922 offer on March 7, 1991. A copy of the offering memorandum forms part of the record, and it seems to me to be little more than puffery, without any hard information which a sophisticated purchaser would require in order to make a serious bid.

51 The offering memorandum had not been completed by February 11, 1991. On that date, the receiver entered into the letter of intent to negotiate with OEL. The letter of intent contained a provision that during its currency the receiver would not negotiate with any other party. The letter of intent was renewed from time to time until the OEL offer was received on March 6, 1991.

52 The receiver did not proceed with the offering memorandum because to do so would violate the spirit, if not the letter, of its letter of intent with OEL.

53 I do not think that the conduct of the receiver shows any unfairness towards 922. When I speak of 922, I do so in the context that Air Canada and CCFL are identified with it. I start by saying that the receiver acted reasonably when it entered into exclusive negotiations with OEL. I find it strange that a company, with which Air Canada is closely and intimately involved, would say that it was unfair for the receiver to enter into a time-limited agreement to negotiate exclusively with OEL. That is precisely the arrangement which Air Canada insisted upon when it negotiated with the receiver in the spring and summer of 1990. If it was not unfair for Air Canada to have such an agreement, I do not understand why it was unfair for OEL to have a similar one. In fact, both Air Canada and OEL in its turn were acting reasonably when they required exclusive negotiating rights to prevent their negotiations from being used as a bargaining lever with other potential purchasers. The fact that Air Canada insisted upon an exclusive negotiating right while it was negotiating with the receiver demonstrates the commercial efficacy of OEL being given the same right during its negotiations with the receiver. I see no unfairness on the part of the receiver when it honoured its letter of intent with OEL by not releasing the offering memorandum during the negotiations with OEL.

54 Moreover, I am not prepared to find that 922 was in any way prejudiced by the fact that it did not have an offering memorandum. It made an offer on March 7, 1991, which it contends to this day was a better offer than that of OEL. 922 has not convinced me that if it had an offering memorandum, its offer would have been any different or any better than it actually was. The fatal problem with the first 922 offer was that it contained a condition which was completely unacceptable to the receiver. The receiver, properly, in my opinion, rejected the offer out of hand because of that condition. That condition did not relate to any information which could have conceivably been in an offering memorandum prepared by the receiver. It was about the resolution of a dispute between CCFL and the Royal Bank, something the receiver knew nothing about.

55 Further evidence of the lack of prejudice which the absence of an offering memorandum has caused 922 is found in CCFL's stance before this court. During argument, its counsel suggested as a possible resolution of this appeal that this court should call for new bids, evaluate them and then order a sale to the party who put in the better bid. In such a case, counsel for CCFL said that 922 would be prepared to bid within 7 days of the court's decision. I would have thought that, if there were anything to CCFL's suggestion that the failure to provide an offering memorandum was unfair to 922, that it would have told the court that it needed more information before it would be able to make a bid.

56 I am satisfied that Air Canada and CCFL have, and at all times had, all of the information which they would have needed to make what to them would be a commercially viable offer to the receiver. I think that an offering memorandum was of no commercial consequence to them, but the absence of one has since become a valuable tactical weapon.

57 It is my opinion that there is no convincing proof that if an offering memorandum had been widely distributed among persons qualified to have purchased Air Toronto, a viable offer would have come forth from a party other than 922 or OEL. Therefore, the failure to provide an offering memorandum was neither unfair, nor did it prejudice the obtaining of a better price on March 8, 1991, than that contained in the OEL offer. I would not give effect to the contention that the process adopted by the receiver was an unfair one.

58 There are two statements by Anderson J. contained in *Crown Trust Co. v. Rosenberg*, supra, which I adopt as my own. The first is at p. 109 [O.R.]:

The court should not proceed against the recommendations of its Receiver except in special circumstances and where the necessity and propriety of doing so are plain. Any other rule or approach would emasculate the role of the Receiver and make it almost inevitable that the final negotiation of every sale would take place on the motion for approval.

The second is at p. 111 [O.R.]:

It is equally clear, in my view, though perhaps not so clearly enunciated, that it is only in an exceptional case that the court will intervene and proceed contrary to the Receiver's recommendations if satisfied, as I am, that the Receiver has acted reasonably, prudently and fairly and not arbitrarily.

In this case the receiver acted reasonably, prudently, fairly and not arbitrarily. I am of the opinion, therefore, that the process adopted by the receiver in reaching an agreement was a just one.

59 In his reasons for judgment, after discussing the circumstances leading to the 922 offer, Rosenberg J. said this:

They created a situation as of March 8th, where the Receiver was faced with two offers, one of which was in acceptable form and one of which could not possibly be accepted in its present form. The Receiver acted appropriately in accepting the OEL offer.

I agree.

60 The receiver made proper and sufficient efforts to get the best price that it could for the assets of Air Toronto. It adopted a reasonable and effective process to sell the airline which was fair to all persons who might be interested in purchasing it. It is my opinion, therefore, that the receiver properly carried out the mandate which was given to it by the order of O'Brien J. It follows that Rosenberg J. was correct when he confirmed the sale to OEL.

II. The effect of the support of the 922 offer by the two secured creditors.

61 As I noted earlier, the 922 offer was supported before Rosenberg J., and in this court, by CCFL and by the Royal Bank, the two secured creditors. It was argued that, because the interests of the creditors are primary, the court ought to give effect to their wish that the 922 offer be accepted. I would not accede to that suggestion for two reasons.

62 The first reason is related to the fact that the creditors chose to have a receiver appointed by the court. It was open to them to appoint a private receiver pursuant to the authority of their security documents. Had they done so, then they would have had control of the process and could have sold Air Toronto to whom they wished. However, acting privately and controlling the process involves some risks. The appointment of a receiver by the court insulates the creditors from those risks. But, insulation from those risks carries with it the loss of control over the process of disposition of the assets. As I have attempted to explain in these reasons, when a receiver's sale is before the court for confirmation, the only issues are the propriety of the conduct of the receiver and whether it acted providently. The function of the court at that stage is not to step in and do the receiver's work, or change the sale strategy adopted by the receiver. Creditors who asked the court to appoint a receiver to dispose of assets should not be allowed to take over control of the process by the simple expedient of supporting another purchaser if they do not agree with the sale made by the receiver. That would take away all respect for the process of sale by a court-appointed receiver.

63 There can be no doubt that the interests of the creditor are an important consideration in determining whether the receiver has properly conducted a sale. The opinion of the creditors as to which offer ought to be accepted is something to be taken into account. But if the court decides that the receiver has acted properly and providently, those views are not necessarily determinative. Because, in this case, the receiver acted properly and providently, I do not think that the views of the creditors should override the considered judgment of the receiver.

64 The second reason is that, in the particular circumstances of this case, I do not think the support of CCFL and the Royal Bank of the 922 offer is entitled to any weight. The support given by CCFL can be dealt with summarily. It is a co-owner of 922. It is hardly surprising and not very impressive to hear that it supports the offer which it is making for the debtor's assets.

65 The support by the Royal Bank requires more consideration and involves some reference to the circumstances. On March 6, 1991, when the first 922 offer was made, there was in existence an inter-lender agreement between the Royal Bank and CCFL. That agreement dealt with the share of the proceeds of the sale of Air Toronto which each creditor would receive. At

the time, a dispute between the Royal Bank and CCFL about the interpretation of that agreement was pending in the courts. The unacceptable condition in the first 922 offer related to the settlement of the inter-lender dispute. The condition required that the dispute be resolved in a way which would substantially favour CCFL. It required that CCFL receive \$3,375,000 of the \$6 million cash payment and the balance, including the royalties, if any, be paid to the Royal Bank. The Royal Bank did not agree with that split of the sale proceeds.

66 On April 5, 1991, the Royal Bank and CCFL agreed to settle the inter-lender dispute. The settlement was that if the 922 offer was accepted by the court, CCFL would receive only \$1 million, and the Royal Bank would receive \$5 million plus any royalties which might be paid. It was only in consideration of that settlement that the Royal Bank agreed to support the 922 offer.

67 The Royal Bank's support of the 922 offer is so affected by the very substantial benefit which it wanted to obtain from the settlement of the inter-lender dispute that, in my opinion, its support is devoid of any objectivity. I think it has no weight.

68 While there may be circumstances where the unanimous support by the creditors of a particular offer could conceivably override the proper and provident conduct of a sale by a receiver, I do not think that this is such a case. This is a case where the receiver has acted properly and in a provident way. It would make a mockery out of the judicial process, under which a mandate was given to this receiver to sell this airline if the support by these creditors of the 922 offer were permitted to carry the day. I give no weight to the support which they give to the 922 offer.

69 In its factum, the receiver pointed out that, because of greater liabilities imposed upon private receivers by various statutes such as the *Employment Standards Act*, R.S.O. 1980, c. 137, and the *Environmental Protection Act*, R.S.O. 1980, c. 141, it is likely that more and more the courts will be asked to appoint receivers in insolvencies. In those circumstances, I think that creditors who ask for court-appointed receivers and business people who choose to deal with those receivers should know that if those receivers act properly and providently, their decisions and judgments will be given great weight by the courts who appoint them. I have decided this appeal in the way I have in order to assure business people who deal with court-appointed receivers that they can have confidence that an agreement which they make with a court-appointed receiver will be far more than a platform upon which others may bargain at the court approval stage. I think that persons who enter into agreements with court-appointed receivers, following a disposition procedure that is appropriate given the nature of the assets involved, should expect that their bargain will be confirmed by the court.

70 The process is very important. It should be carefully protected so that the ability of court-appointed receivers to negotiate the best price possible is strengthened and supported. Because this receiver acted properly and providently in entering into the OEL agreement, I am of the opinion that Rosenberg J. was right when he approved the sale to OEL and dismissed the motion to approve the 922 offer.

71 I would, accordingly, dismiss the appeal. I would award the receiver, OEL and Frontier Airlines Limited their costs out of the Soundair estate, those of the receiver on a solicitor-client scale. I would make no order as to the costs of any of the other parties or intervenors.

McKinlay J.A. :

72 I agree with Galligan J.A. in result, but wish to emphasize that I do so on the basis that the undertaking being sold in this case was of a very special and unusual nature. It is most important that the integrity of procedures followed by court-appointed receivers be protected in the interests of both commercial morality and the future confidence of business persons in their dealings with receivers. Consequently, in all cases, the court should carefully scrutinize the procedure followed by the receiver to determine whether it satisfies the tests set out by Anderson J. in *Crown Trust Co. v. Rosenberg* (1986), 67 C.B.R. (N.S.) 320n, 60 O.R. (2d) 87, 22 C.P.C. (2d) 131, 39 D.L.R. (4th) 526 (H.C.). While the procedure carried out by the receiver in this case, as described by Galligan J.A., was appropriate, given the unfolding of events and the unique nature of the assets involved, it is not a procedure that is likely to be appropriate in many receivership sales.

73 I should like to add that where there is a small number of creditors who are the only parties with a real interest in the proceeds of the sale (i.e., where it is clear that the highest price attainable would result in recovery so low that no other creditors,

shareholders, guarantors, etc., could possibly benefit therefore), the wishes of the interested creditors should be very seriously considered by the receiver. It is true, as Galligan J.A. points out, that in seeking the court appointment of a receiver, the moving parties also seek the protection of the court in carrying out the receiver's functions. However, it is also true that in utilizing the court process, the moving parties have opened the whole process to detailed scrutiny by all involved, and have probably added significantly to their costs and consequent shortfall as a result of so doing. The adoption of the court process should in no way diminish the rights of any party, and most certainly not the rights of the only parties with a real interest. Where a receiver asks for court approval of a sale which is opposed by the only parties in interest, the court should scrutinize with great care the procedure followed by the receiver. I agree with Galligan J.A. that in this case that was done. I am satisfied that the rights of all parties were properly considered by the receiver, by the learned motions court judge, and by Galligan J.A.

Goodman J.A. (dissenting):

74 I have had the opportunity of reading the reasons for judgment herein of Galligan and McKinlay JJ.A. Respectfully, I am unable to agree with their conclusion.

75 The case at bar is an exceptional one in the sense that upon the application made for approval of the sale of the assets of Air Toronto, two competing offers were placed before Rosenberg J. Those two offers were that of OEL and that of 922, a company incorporated for the purpose of acquiring Air Toronto. Its shares were owned equally by CCFL and Air Canada. It was conceded by all parties to these proceedings that the only persons who had any interest in the proceeds of the sale were two secured creditors, viz., CCFL and the Royal Bank of Canada. Those two creditors were unanimous in their position that they desired the court to approve the sale to 922. We were not referred to, nor am I aware of, any case where a court has refused to abide by the unanimous wishes of the only interested creditors for the approval of a specific offer made in receivership proceedings.

76 In *British Columbia Developments Corp. v. Spun Cast Industries Ltd.* (1977), 26 C.B.R. (N.S.) 28, 5 B.C.L.R. 94 (S.C.), Berger J. said at p. 30 [C.B.R.]:

Here all of those with a financial stake in the plant have joined in seeking the court's approval of the sale to Fincas. This court does not have a roving commission to decide what is best for investors and businessmen when they have agreed among themselves what course of action they should follow. It is their money.

77 I agree with that statement. It is particularly apt to this case. The two secured creditors will suffer a shortfall of approximately \$50 million. They have a tremendous interest in the sale of assets which form part of their security. I agree with the finding of Rosenberg J. that the offer of 922 is superior to that of OEL. He concluded that the 922 offer is marginally superior. If by that he meant that mathematically it was likely to provide slightly more in the way of proceeds, it is difficult to take issue with that finding. If, on the other hand, he meant that having regard to all considerations it was only marginally superior, I cannot agree. He said in his reasons:

I have come to the conclusion that knowledgeable creditors such as the Royal Bank would prefer the 922 offer even if the other factors influencing their decision were not present. No matter what adjustments had to be made, the 922 offer results in more cash immediately. Creditors facing the type of loss the Royal Bank is taking in this case would not be anxious to rely on contingencies especially in the present circumstances surrounding the airline industry.

78 I agree with that statement completely. It is apparent that the difference between the two offers insofar as cash on closing is concerned amounts to approximately \$3 million to \$4 million. The bank submitted that it did not wish to gamble any further with respect to its investment, and that the acceptance and court approval of the OEL offer in effect supplanted its position as a secured creditor with respect to the amount owing over and above the down payment and placed it in the position of a joint entrepreneur, but one with no control. This results from the fact that the OEL offer did not provide for any security for any funds which might be forthcoming over and above the initial down payment on closing.

79 In *Cameron v. Bank of Nova Scotia* (1981), 38 C.B.R. (N.S.) 1, 45 N.S.R. (2d) 303, 86 A.P.R. 303 (C.A.), Hart J.A., speaking for the majority of the court, said at p. 10 [C.B.R.]:

Here we are dealing with a receiver appointed at the instance of one major creditor, who chose to insert in the contract of sale a provision making it subject to the approval of the court. This, in my opinion, shows an intention on behalf of the parties to invoke the normal equitable doctrines which place the court in the position of looking to the interests of all persons concerned before giving its blessing to a particular transaction submitted for approval. In these circumstances the court would not consider itself bound by the contract entered into in good faith by the receiver but would have to look to the broader picture to see that that contract was for the benefit of the creditors as a whole. When there was evidence that a higher price was readily available for the property the chambers judge was, in my opinion, justified in exercising his discretion as he did. Otherwise he could have deprived the creditors of a substantial sum of money.

80 This statement is apposite to the circumstances of the case at bar. I hasten to add that in my opinion it is not only price which is to be considered in the exercise of the judge's discretion. It may very well be, as I believe to be so in this case, that the amount of cash is the most important element in determining which of the two offers is for the benefit and in the best interest of the creditors.

81 It is my view, and the statement of Hart J.A. is consistent therewith, that the fact that a creditor has requested an order of the court appointing a receiver does not in any way diminish or derogate from his right to obtain the maximum benefit to be derived from any disposition of the debtor's assets. I agree completely with the views expressed by McKinlay J.A. in that regard in her reasons.

82 It is my further view that any negotiations which took place between the only two interested creditors in deciding to support the approval of the 922 offer were not relevant to the determination by the presiding judge of the issues involved in the motion for approval of either one of the two offers, nor are they relevant in determining the outcome of this appeal. It is sufficient that the two creditors have decided unanimously what is in their best interest, and the appeal must be considered in the light of that decision. It so happens, however, that there is ample evidence to support their conclusion that the approval of the 922 offer is in their best interests.

83 I am satisfied that the interests of the creditors are the prime consideration for both the receiver and the court. In *Re Beauty Counsellors of Canada Ltd.* (1986), 58 C.B.R. (N.S.) 237 (Ont. S.C.), Saunders J. said at p. 243:

This does not mean that a court should ignore a new and higher bid made after acceptance where there has been no unfairness in the process. The interests of the creditors, while not the only consideration, are the prime consideration.

84 I agree with that statement of the law. In *Re Selkirk* (1986), 58 C.B.R. (N.S.) 245 (Ont. S.C.), Saunders J. heard an application for court approval of the sale by the sheriff of real property in bankruptcy proceedings. The sheriff had been previously ordered to list the property for sale subject to approval of the court. Saunders J. said at p. 246:

In dealing with the request for approval, the court has to be concerned primarily with protecting the interests of the creditors of the former bankrupt. A secondary but important consideration is that the process under which the sale agreement is arrived at should be consistent with commercial efficacy and integrity.

85 I am in agreement with that statement as a matter of general principle. Saunders J. further stated that he adopted the principles stated by Macdonald J.A. in *Cameron*, supra, quoted by Galligan J.A. in his reasons. In *Cameron*, the remarks of Macdonald J.A. related to situations involving the calling of bids and fixing a time limit for the making of such bids. In those circumstances the process is so clear as a matter of commercial practice that an interference by the court in such process might have a deleterious effect on the efficacy of receivership proceedings in other cases. But Macdonald J.A. recognized that even in bid or tender cases where the offeror for whose bid approval is sought has complied with all requirements, a court might not approve the agreement of purchase and sale entered into by the receiver. He said at pp. 11-12 [C.B.R.]:

There are, of course, many reasons why a court might not approve an agreement of purchase and sale, viz., where the offer accepted is so low in relation to the appraised value as to be unrealistic; or, where the circumstances indicate that insufficient time was allowed for the making of bids or that inadequate notice of sale by bid was given (where the receiver sells property

by the bid method); or, where it can be said that the proposed sale is not in the best interest of either the creditors or the owner. Court approval must involve the delicate balancing of competing interests and not simply a consideration of the interests of the creditors.

86 The deficiency in the present case is so large that there has been no suggestion of a competing interest between the owner and the creditors.

87 I agree that the same reasoning may apply to a negotiation process leading to a private sale, but the procedure and process applicable to private sales of a wide variety of businesses and undertakings with the multiplicity of individual considerations applicable and perhaps peculiar to the particular business is not so clearly established that a departure by the court from the process adopted by the receiver in a particular case will result in commercial chaos to the detriment of future receivership proceedings. Each case must be decided on its own merits, and it is necessary to consider the process used by the receiver in the present proceedings and to determine whether it was unfair, improvident or inadequate.

88 It is important to note at the outset that Rosenberg J. made the following statement in his reasons:

On March 8, 1991 the trustee accepted the OEL offer subject to court approval. The Receiver at that time had no other offer before it that was in final form or could possibly be accepted. The Receiver had at the time the knowledge that Air Canada with CCFL had not bargained in good faith and had not fulfilled the promise of its letter of March 1st. The Receiver was justified in assuming that Air Canada and CCFL's offer was a long way from being in an acceptable form and that Air Canada and CCFL's objective was to interrupt the finalizing of the OEL agreement and to retain as long as possible the Air Toronto connector traffic flowing into Terminal 2 for the benefit of Air Canada.

89 In my opinion there was no evidence before him or before this court to indicate that Air Canada, with CCFL, had not bargained in good faith, and that the receiver had knowledge of such lack of good faith. Indeed, on his appeal, counsel for the receiver stated that he was not alleging Air Canada and CCFL had not bargained in good faith. Air Canada had frankly stated at the time that it had made its offer to purchase, which was eventually refused by the receiver, that it would not become involved in an "auction" to purchase the undertaking of Air Canada and that, although it would fulfil its contractual obligations to provide connecting services to Air Toronto, it would do no more than it was legally required to do insofar as facilitating the purchase of Air Toronto by any other person. In so doing, Air Canada may have been playing "hardball," as its behaviour was characterized by some of the counsel for opposing parties. It was nevertheless merely openly asserting its legal position, as it was entitled to do.

90 Furthermore, there was no evidence before Rosenberg J. or this court that the receiver had assumed that Air Canada and CCFL's objective in making an offer was to interrupt the finalizing of the OEL agreement and to retain as long as possible the Air Toronto connector traffic flowing into Terminal 2 for the benefit of Air Canada. Indeed, there was no evidence to support such an assumption in any event, although it is clear that 922, and through it CCFL and Air Canada, were endeavouring to present an offer to purchase which would be accepted and/or approved by the court in preference to the offer made by OEL.

91 To the extent that approval of the OEL agreement by Rosenberg J. was based on the alleged lack of good faith in bargaining and improper motivation with respect to connector traffic on the part of Air Canada and CCFL, it cannot be supported.

92 I would also point out that rather than saying there was no other offer before it that was final in form, it would have been more accurate to have said that there was *no unconditional* offer before it.

93 In considering the material and evidence placed before the court, I am satisfied that the receiver was at all times acting in good faith. I have reached the conclusion, however, that the process which he used was unfair insofar as 922 is concerned, and improvident insofar as the two secured creditors are concerned.

94 Air Canada had been negotiating with Soundair Corporation for the purchase from it of Air Toronto for a considerable period of time prior to the appointment of a receiver by the court. It had given a letter of intent indicating a prospective sale price of \$18 million. After the appointment of the receiver, by agreement dated April 30, 1990, Air Canada continued its negotiations for the purchase of Air Toronto with the receiver. Although this agreement contained a clause which provided that the receiver

"shall not negotiate for the sale ... of Air Toronto with any person except Air Canada," it further provided that the receiver would not be in breach of that provision merely by receiving unsolicited offers for all or any of the assets of Air Toronto. In addition, the agreement, which had a term commencing on April 30, 1990, could be terminated on the fifth business day following the delivery of a written notice of termination by one party to the other. I point out this provision merely to indicate that the exclusivity privilege extended by the receiver to Air Canada was of short duration at the receiver's option.

95 As a result of due diligence investigations carried out by Air Canada during the months of April, May and June of 1990, Air Canada reduced its offer to \$8.1 million conditional upon there being \$4 million in tangible assets. The offer was made on June 14, 1990, and was open for acceptance until June 29, 1990.

96 By amending agreement dated June 19, 1990, the receiver was released from its covenant to refrain from negotiating for the sale of the Air Toronto business and assets to any person other than Air Canada. By virtue of this amending agreement, the receiver had put itself in the position of having a firm offer in hand, with the right to negotiate and accept offers from other persons. Air Canada, in these circumstances, was in the subservient position. The receiver, in the exercise of its judgment and discretion, allowed the Air Canada offer to lapse. On July 20, 1990, Air Canada served a notice of termination of the April 30, 1990 agreement.

97 Apparently as a result of advice received from the receiver to the effect that the receiver intended to conduct an auction for the sale of the assets and business of the Air Toronto division of Soundair Corporation, the solicitors for Air Canada advised the receiver by letter dated July 20, 1990, in part as follows:

Air Canada has instructed us to advise you that it does not intend to submit a further offer in the auction process.

98 This statement, together with other statements set forth in the letter, was sufficient to indicate that Air Canada was not interested in purchasing Air Toronto in the process apparently contemplated by the receiver at that time. It did not form a proper foundation for the receiver to conclude that there was no realistic possibility of selling Air Toronto [to] Air Canada, either alone or in conjunction with some other person, in different circumstances. In June 1990, the receiver was of the opinion that the fair value of Air Toronto was between \$10 million and \$12 million.

99 In August 1990, the receiver contacted a number of interested parties. A number of offers were received which were not deemed to be satisfactory. One such offer, received on August 20, 1990, came as a joint offer from OEL and Air Ontario (an Air Canada connector). It was for the sum of \$3 million for the good will relating to certain Air Toronto routes, but did not include the purchase of any tangible assets or leasehold interests.

100 In December 1990, the receiver was approached by the management of Canadian Partner (operated by OEL) for the purpose of evaluating the benefits of an amalgamated Air Toronto/Air Partner operation. The negotiations continued from December of 1990 to February of 1991, culminating in the OEL agreement dated March 8, 1991.

101 On or before December 1990, CCFL advised the receiver that it intended to make a bid for the Air Toronto assets. The receiver, in August of 1990, for the purpose of facilitating the sale of Air Toronto assets, commenced the preparation of an operating memorandum. He prepared no less than six draft operating memoranda with dates from October 1990 through March 1, 1991. None of these were distributed to any prospective bidder despite requests having been received therefor, with the exception of an early draft provided to CCFL without the receiver's knowledge.

102 During the period December 1990 to the end of January 1991, the receiver advised CCFL that the offering memorandum was in the process of being prepared and would be ready soon for distribution. He further advised CCFL that it should await the receipt of the memorandum before submitting a formal offer to purchase the Air Toronto assets.

103 By late January, CCFL had become aware that the receiver was negotiating with OEL for the sale of Air Toronto. In fact, on February 11, 1991, the receiver signed a letter of intent with OEL wherein it had specifically agreed not to negotiate with any other potential bidders or solicit any offers from others.

104 By letter dated February 25, 1991, the solicitors for CCFL made a written request to the receiver for the offering memorandum. The receiver did not reply to the letter because he felt he was precluded from so doing by the provisions of the letter of intent dated February 11, 1991. Other prospective purchasers were also unsuccessful in obtaining the promised memorandum to assist them in preparing their bids. It should be noted that, exclusivity provision of the letter of intent expired on February 20, 1991. This provision was extended on three occasions, viz., February 19, 22 and March 5, 1991. It is clear that from a legal standpoint the receiver, by refusing to extend the time, could have dealt with other prospective purchasers, and specifically with 922.

105 It was not until March 1, 1991, that CCFL had obtained sufficient information to enable it to make a bid through 922. It succeeded in so doing through its own efforts through sources other than the receiver. By that time the receiver had already entered into the letter of intent with OEL. Notwithstanding the fact that the receiver knew since December of 1990 that CCFL wished to make a bid for the assets of Air Toronto (and there is no evidence to suggest that at that time such a bid would be in conjunction with Air Canada or that Air Canada was in any way connected with CCFL), it took no steps to provide CCFL with information necessary to enable it to make an intelligent bid, and indeed suggested delaying the making of the bid until an offering memorandum had been prepared and provided. In the meantime, by entering into the letter of intent with OEL, it put itself in a position where it could not negotiate with CCFL or provide the information requested.

106 On February 28, 1991, the solicitors for CCFL telephoned the receiver and were advised for the first time that the receiver had made a business decision to negotiate solely with OEL and would not negotiate with anyone else in the interim.

107 By letter dated March 1, 1991, CCFL advised the receiver that it intended to submit a bid. It set forth the essential terms of the bid and stated that it would be subject to customary commercial provisions. On March 7, 1991 CCFL and Air Canada, jointly through 922, submitted an offer to purchase Air Toronto upon the terms set forth in the letter dated March 1, 1991. It included a provision that the offer was conditional upon the interpretation of an inter-lender agreement which set out the relative distribution of proceeds as between CCFL and the Royal Bank. It is common ground that it was a condition over which the receiver had no control, and accordingly would not have been acceptable on that ground alone. The receiver did not, however, contact CCFL in order to negotiate or request the removal of the condition, although it appears that its agreement with OEL not to negotiate with any person other than OEL expired on March 6, 1991.

108 The fact of the matter is that by March 7, 1991, the receiver had received the offer from OEL which was subsequently approved by Rosenberg J. That offer was accepted by the receiver on March 8, 1991. Notwithstanding the fact that OEL had been negotiating the purchase for a period of approximately 3 months, the offer contained a provision for the sole benefit of the purchaser that it was subject to the purchaser obtaining "a financing commitment within 45 days of the date hereof in an amount not less than the Purchase Price from the Royal Bank of Canada or other financial institution upon terms and conditions acceptable to them. In the event that such a financing commitment is not obtained within such 45 day period, the purchaser or OEL shall have the right to terminate this agreement upon giving written notice of termination to the vendor on the first Business Day following the expiry of the said period." The purchaser was also given the right to waive the condition.

109 In effect, the agreement was tantamount to a 45-day option to purchase, excluding the right of any other person to purchase Air Toronto during that period of time and thereafter if the condition was fulfilled or waived. The agreement was, of course, stated to be subject to court approval.

110 In my opinion, the process and procedure adopted by the receiver was unfair to CCFL. Although it was aware from December 1990 that CCFL was interested in making an offer, it effectively delayed the making of such offer by continually referring to the preparation of the offering memorandum. It did not endeavour during the period December 1990 to March 7, 1991, to negotiate with CCFL in any way the possible terms of purchase and sale agreement. In the result, no offer was sought from CCFL by the receiver prior to February 11, 1991, and thereafter it put itself in the position of being unable to negotiate with anyone other than OEL. The receiver then, on March 8, 1991, chose to accept an offer which was conditional in nature without prior consultation with CCFL (922) to see whether it was prepared to remove the condition in its offer.

111 I do not doubt that the receiver felt that it was more likely that the condition in the OEL offer would be fulfilled than the condition in the 922 offer. It may be that the receiver, having negotiated for a period of 3 months with OEL, was fearful that it might lose the offer if OEL discovered that it was negotiating with another person. Nevertheless, it seems to me that it was imprudent and unfair on the part of the receiver to ignore an offer from an interested party which offered approximately triple the cash down payment without giving a chance to the offeror to remove the conditions or other terms which made the offer unacceptable to it. The potential loss was that of an agreement which amounted to little more than an option in favour of the offeror.

112 In my opinion the procedure adopted by the receiver was unfair to CCFL in that, in effect, it gave OEL the opportunity of engaging in exclusive negotiations for a period of 3 months, notwithstanding the fact that it knew CCFL was interested in making an offer. The receiver did not indicate a deadline by which offers were to be submitted, and it did not at any time indicate the structure or nature of an offer which might be acceptable to it.

113 In his reasons, Rosenberg J. stated that as of March 1, CCFL and Air Canada had all the information that they needed, and any allegations of unfairness in the negotiating process by the receiver had disappeared. He said:

They created a situation as of March 8, where the receiver was faced with two offers, one of which was acceptable in form and one of which could not possibly be accepted in its present form. The Receiver acted appropriately in accepting the OEL offer.

If he meant by "acceptable in form" that it was acceptable to the receiver, then obviously OEL had the unfair advantage of its lengthy negotiations with the receiver to ascertain what kind of an offer would be acceptable to the receiver. If, on the other hand, he meant that the 922 offer was unacceptable in its form because it was conditional, it can hardly be said that the OEL offer was more acceptable in this regard, as it contained a condition with respect to financing terms and conditions "*acceptable to them*."

114 It should be noted that on March 13, 1991, the representatives of 922 first met with the receiver to review its offer of March 7, 1991, and at the request of the receiver, withdrew the inter-lender condition from its offer. On March 14, 1991, OEL removed the financing condition from its offer. By order of Rosenberg J. dated March 26, 1991, CCFL was given until April 5, 1991, to submit a bid, and on April 5, 1991, 922 submitted its offer with the inter-lender condition removed.

115 In my opinion, the offer accepted by the receiver is improvident and unfair insofar as the two creditors are concerned. It is not improvident in the sense that the price offered by 922 greatly exceeded that offered by OEL. In the final analysis it may not be greater at all. The salient fact is that the cash down payment in the 922 offer constitutes proximately two thirds of the contemplated sale price, whereas the cash down payment in the OEL transaction constitutes approximately 20 to 25 per cent of the contemplated sale price. In terms of absolute dollars, the down payment in the 922 offer would likely exceed that provided for in the OEL agreement by approximately \$3 million to \$4 million.

116 In *Re Beauty Counsellors of Canada Ltd.*, supra, Saunders J. said at p. 243 [C.B.R.]:

If a substantially higher bid turns up at the approval stage, the court should consider it. Such a bid may indicate, for example, that the trustee has not properly carried out its duty to endeavour to obtain the best price for the estate. In such a case the proper course might be to refuse approval and to ask the trustee to recommence the process.

117 I accept that statement as being an accurate statement of the law. I would add, however, as previously indicated, that in determining what is the best price for the estate, the receiver or court should not limit its consideration to which offer provides for the greater sale price. The amount of down payment and the provision or lack thereof to secure payment of the balance of the purchase price over and above the down payment may be the most important factor to be considered, and I am of the view that is so in the present case. It is clear that that was the view of the only creditors who can benefit from the sale of Air Toronto.

118 I note that in the case at bar the 922 offer in conditional form was presented to the receiver before it accepted the OEL offer. The receiver, in good faith, although I believe mistakenly, decided that the OEL offer was the better offer. At that time

the receiver did not have the benefit of the views of the two secured creditors in that regard. At the time of the application for approval before Rosenberg J., the stated preference of the two interested creditors was made quite clear. He found as fact that knowledgeable creditors would not be anxious to rely on contingencies in the present circumstances surrounding the airline industry. It is reasonable to expect that a receiver would be no less knowledgeable in that regard, and it is his primary duty to protect the interests of the creditors. In my view, it was an improvident act on the part of the receiver to have accepted the conditional offer made by OEL, and Rosenberg J. erred in failing to dismiss the application of the receiver for approval of the OEL offer. It would be most inequitable to foist upon the two creditors, who have already been seriously hurt, more unnecessary contingencies.

119 Although in other circumstances it might be appropriate to ask the receiver to recommence the process, in my opinion, it would not be appropriate to do so in this case. The only two interested creditors support the acceptance of the 922 offer, and the court should so order.

120 Although I would be prepared to dispose of the case on the grounds stated above, some comment should be addressed to the question of interference by the court with the process and procedure adopted by the receiver.

121 I am in agreement with the view expressed by McKinlay J.A. in her reasons that the undertaking being sold in this case was of a very special and unusual nature. As a result, the procedure adopted by the receiver was somewhat unusual. At the outset, in accordance with the terms of the receiving order, it dealt solely with Air Canada. It then appears that the receiver contemplated a sale of the assets by way of auction, and still later contemplated the preparation and distribution of an offering memorandum inviting bids. At some point, without advice to CCFL, it abandoned that idea and reverted to exclusive negotiations with one interested party. This entire process is not one which is customary or widely accepted as a general practice in the commercial world. It was somewhat unique, having regard to the circumstances of this case. In my opinion, the refusal of the court to approve the offer accepted by the receiver would not reflect on the integrity of procedures followed by court-appointed receivers, and is not the type of refusal which will have a tendency to undermine the future confidence of business persons in dealing with receivers.

122 Rosenberg J. stated that the Royal Bank was aware of the process used and tacitly approved it. He said it knew the terms of the letter of intent in February 1991, and made no comment. The Royal Bank did, however, indicate to the receiver that it was not satisfied with the contemplated price, nor the amount of the down payment. It did not, however, tell the receiver to adopt a different process in endeavouring to sell the Air Toronto assets. It is not clear from the material filed that at the time it became aware of the letter of intent that it knew that CCFL was interested in purchasing Air Toronto.

123 I am further of the opinion that a prospective purchaser who has been given an opportunity to engage in exclusive negotiations with a receiver for relatively short periods of time which are extended from time to time by the receiver, and who then makes a conditional offer, the condition of which is for his sole benefit and must be fulfilled to his satisfaction unless waived by him, and which he knows is to be subject to court approval, cannot legitimately claim to have been unfairly dealt with if the court refuses to approve the offer and approves a substantially better one.

124 In conclusion, I feel that I must comment on the statement made by Galligan J.A. in his reasons to the effect that the suggestion made by counsel for 922 constitutes evidence of lack of prejudice resulting from the absence of an offering memorandum. It should be pointed out that the court invited counsel to indicate the manner in which the problem should be resolved in the event that the court concluded that the order approving the OEL offer should be set aside. There was no evidence before the court with respect to what additional information may have been acquired by CCFL since March 8, 1991, and no inquiry was made in that regard. Accordingly, I am of the view that no adverse inference should be drawn from the proposal made as a result of the court's invitation.

125 For the above reasons I would allow the appeal one set of costs to CCFL-922, set aside the order of Rosenberg J., dismiss the receiver's motion with one set of costs to CCFL-922 and order that the assets of Air Toronto be sold to numbered corporation 922246 on the terms set forth in its offer with appropriate adjustments to provide for the delay in its execution. Costs awarded shall be payable out of the estate of Soundair Corporation. The costs incurred by the receiver in making the application and

responding to the appeal shall be paid to him out of the assets of the estate of Soundair Corporation on a solicitor-client basis. I would make no order as to costs of any of the other parties or intervenors.

Appeal dismissed.

TAB 8

2016 ABQB 257
Alberta Court of Queen's Bench

Sanjel Corp., Re

2016 CarswellAlta 900, 2016 ABQB 257, [2016] A.W.L.D. 2474, 266 A.C.W.S. (3d) 542, 36 C.B.R. (6th) 239

**In the Matter of the Companies' Creditors
Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as amended**

In the Matter of the Compromise or Arrangement of Sanjel Corporation, Sanjel Canada Ltd., Terracor Group Ltd., Suretech Group Ltd., Suretech Completions Canada Ltd., Sanjel Energy Services (USA) Inc., Sanjel (USA) Inc., Suretech Completions (USA) Inc., Sanjel Capital (USA) Inc., Terracor (USA) Inc., Terracor Resources (USA) Inc., Terracor Logistics (USA) Inc., Sanjel Middle East Ltd., Sanjel Latin America Limited and Sanjel Energy Services DMCC

B.E. Romaine J.

Heard: April 28, 2016

Judgment: May 16, 2016

Docket: Calgary 1601-03143

Counsel: Chris Simard, Alexis Teasdale, for Sanjel Group

Subject: Insolvency

Related Abridgment Classifications

Bankruptcy and insolvency

[XIX Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act](#)

[XIX.5 Miscellaneous](#)

Headnote

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Miscellaneous

Sale of assets — Debtor companies were severely impacted by economic downturn, and breached covenants under credit agreement with secured creditors — Debtors agreed with secured creditors to implement Sales and Investment Solicitation Process (SISP), which resulted in proposed asset sales that would provide no recovery for unsecured creditors — Debtors were granted Initial Order under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Debtors brought application for order approving sales transactions generated through SISP — Trustee of bonds brought application for order dismissing debtors' application, and allowing bondholders to propose plan of arrangement, among other relief — Debtors' application granted; trustee's application dismissed — As result of enactment of s. 36 of Act, there was no jurisdictional impediment to sale of assets where such sales met requisite tests, even in absence of plan of arrangement — Fact that SISP occurred before seeking protection under Act did not amount to abuse of Act — Despite speed and economic environment, SISP was reasonable, competitive and robust, and generated range of bids significantly above liquidation value — Allegations of bad faith were not supported by evidence — Bondholders were aware of SISP and intention to obtain protection under Act, and were not improperly denied access to information — Factors in s. 36(3) of Act favoured approval of proposed sales — Further allegations raised after hearing were duly investigated by monitor and shown to be groundless.

Table of Authorities

Cases considered by B.E. Romaine J.:

AbitibiBowater inc., Re (2010), 2010 QCCS 1742, 2010 CarswellQue 4082, 71 C.B.R. (5th) 220 (C.S. Que.) — considered
Algoma Steel Inc., Re (2001), 2001 CarswellOnt 1742, 25 C.B.R. (4th) 194, 147 O.A.C. 291 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to
Bloom Lake, g.p.l., Re (2015), 2015 QCCS 1920, 2015 CarswellQue 4072, 27 C.B.R. (6th) 1 (C.S. Que.) — considered

Nelson Education Ltd., Re (2015), 2015 ONSC 5557, 2015 CarswellOnt 13576, 29 C.B.R. (6th) 140 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — considered

Nortel Networks Corp., Re (2009), 2009 CarswellOnt 4467, 55 C.B.R. (5th) 229 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — followed

Royal Bank v. Soundair Corp. (1991), 7 C.B.R. (3d) 1, 83 D.L.R. (4th) 76, 46 O.A.C. 321, 4 O.R. (3d) 1, 1991 CarswellOnt 205 (Ont. C.A.) — followed

SemCanada Crude Co., Re (2009), 2009 ABQB 490, 2009 CarswellAlta 1269, 57 C.B.R. (5th) 205, 479 A.R. 318 (Alta. Q.B.) — referred to

Target Canada Co., Re (2015), 2015 ONSC 303, 2015 CarswellOnt 620, 22 C.B.R. (6th) 323 (Ont. S.C.J.) — considered

Windsor Machine & Stamping Ltd., Re (2009), 2009 CarswellOnt 4471, 55 C.B.R. (5th) 241 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Statutes considered:

Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C.

Chapter 11 — referred to

Chapter 15 — referred to

Business Corporations Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. B-9

Generally — referred to

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36

Generally — referred to

s. 6 — considered

s. 36 — considered

s. 36(3) — considered

s. 36(4) — referred to

s. 36(5) — considered

APPLICATION by debtor companies for orders approving sales of assets generated through Sales and Investment Solicitation Process; APPLICATION by trustee of the bonds for order dismissing debtors' application, allowing bondholders to propose plan of arrangement, and other relief.

B.E. Romaine J.:

I. Introduction

1 The Sanjel debtors seek orders approving certain sales of assets generated through a SISF that was conducted prior to the debtors filing under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*. The proceeds of the sales will be insufficient to fully payout the secured creditor, and will generate no return to unsecured creditors, including the holders of unsecured Bonds.

2 The Trustee of the Bonds challenged the process under which the SISF was conducted, and the use of what he characterized as a liquidating CCAA in this situation. He alleged that the use of the CCAA to effect a pre-packaged sale of the debtors' assets for the benefit of the secured creditor was an abuse of the letter and spirit of the CCAA. He also alleged that bad faith and collusion tainted the integrity of the SISF.

3 After reviewing extensive evidence and hearing submissions from interested parties, I decided to allow the application to approve the sales, and dismiss the application of the Trustee. These are my reasons.

II. Facts

4 On April 4, 2016, the Sanjel Corporation and its affiliates were granted an Initial Order under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c.C-36, as amended. PricewaterhouseCoopers Inc., ("PWC") was appointed as Monitor of the applicants.

5 Sanjel and its affiliates (the "Sanjel Group" or "Sanjel") provide fracturing, cementing, coiled tubing and reservoir services to the oil and gas industry in Canada, the United States and Saudi Arabia. Sanjel Corporation, the parent company, is a private corporation, the shares of which are owned by the MacDonald Group Ltd. It was incorporated under the *Alberta Business Corporations Act* in 1980, and its principal executive and registered office is located in Calgary. Four of the other members of the group were incorporated in Alberta, seven in various American states and three in offshore jurisdictions.

6 The sole director of all Canadian and US Sanjel companies resides in Calgary, as do all of the officers of these companies. The affidavit in support of the Initial Order sets out a number of factors relevant to the Sanjel Group's ability to file under the CCAA and that would be relevant to a determination of a Centre of Main Interest ("COMI") of the Sanjel Group. In subsequent Chapter 15 proceedings in the United States, the US Court declared COMI to be located in Canada and the CCAA proceedings to be a "foreign main proceeding." It is clear that the Sanjel Group is a fully integrated business centralized in Calgary.

7 Sanjel Corporation and Sanjel (USA) Inc. are borrowers under a credit agreement (the "Bank Credit Facility") dated April 21, 2015 with a banking syndicate (the "Syndicate") led by Alberta Treasury Branches as agent. The total amount outstanding under the Bank Credit Facility at the time of the CCAA filing was approximately \$415.5 million. The Syndicate has perfected security interests over substantially all of the assets of the Sanjel Group, and is the principal secured creditor of the Sanjel Group in these CCAA proceedings.

8 On June 18, 2014, Sanjel Corporation issued US \$300 million 7.5% Callable Bonds due June 19, 2019. Interest is payable on the Bonds semi-annually on June 19 and December 19. The Bonds are unsecured. Nordic Trust ASA (the "Trustee") is the trustee under the Bond Agreement.

9 The Sanjel Group has been severely impacted by the catastrophic drop in global oil and gas prices since mid-2014. Over the last 18 months, the Sanjel Group has taken aggressive steps to cut costs, including by reducing staffing levels by more than half. However, by late October, 2015, Sanjel Corporation was in breach of certain covenants under the Bank Credit Facility. By late December, 2016, the Syndicate was in a position to exercise enforcement rights. In addition, an interest payment of USD \$11,250,000 was due on the Bonds on December 19, 2015. Since late 2015, the Sanjel Group has been in negotiations with both the Syndicate and two bondholders, Ascribe Capital LLC and Clearlake Capital Group L.P., (the "Ad Hoc Bondholders"). The Ad Hoc Bondholders hold over 45% of the Bonds.

10 In the fall of 2015, Sanjel Corporation engaged Bank of America Merrill Lynch ("BAML") to identify strategic partners and attempt to raise additional capital for the Sanjel Group. BAML contacted 28 private equity firms; 19 non-disclosure agreements were executed and 9 management presentations were made. However, the BAML process did not result in a successful transaction.

11 In December, 2015, the Ad Hoc Bondholders retained a New York law firm, Fried Frank, as their legal advisor and Moelis & Company as their financial advisor.

12 On December 10, 2015, Fried Frank conveyed a proposal from the Ad Hoc Bondholders to Sanjel. Under this proposal, Sanjel would be required to pay the USD \$11,250,000 interest payment. Provided that the interest payment was made, the bondholders would agree to a standstill agreement for the same period as may be agreed with the Syndicate. In return, the Ad Hoc Bondholders would lend back their pro rata share of that interest payment to Sanjel in return for secured notes ranking *pari passu* with the Bank Credit Facility, bearing interest at the same rate as the Bank Credit Facility plus 2%. The new notes would not be repaid until the Bank Credit Facility was repaid.

13 The Ad Hoc Bondholders indicated that they would consider acting as standby lenders to Sanjel for the remainder of the interest payment and would offer the other bondholders the option of lending back their pro-rata share to Sanjel on the same

basis. If they agreed to be standby lenders, the Ad Hoc Bondholders would receive a commitment fee equal to 10% of their standby commitment, payable in new notes.

14 The proposal letter indicated that the Ad Hoc Bondholders were aware that Sanjel had been engaged in a process to address liquidity and leverage issues over the past few months, including attempting to raise equity to sell assets. In their view, Sanjel had exhausted those efforts, and the only remaining option was a deal negotiated with the bondholders. However, the Ad Hoc Bondholders would only embark on such a process if the December 19, 2015 interest payment was made.

15 Sanjel rejected the proposal on December 14, 2015. It is noteworthy that the Bank Credit Facility includes a negative covenant prohibiting Sanjel from granting a security interest over its assets. The Syndicate advised Sanjel that the Ad Hoc Bondholders' proposal to have their existing unsecured position elevated to rank *pari passu* with the Bank Credit Facility was unacceptable, and that it would not provide its consent.

16 On December 15, 2015, the Ad Hoc Bondholders advised counsel to the Syndicate that they wished to work towards a restructuring, which they envisaged would involve paying down a portion of the Syndicate's debt "in an amount to be mutually agreed on". They also suggested that Sanjel would implement a rights offering to holders of Bonds and then to existing equity, with a conversion of the Bonds into new debt and equity.

17 On or about December 15, 2015, the Ad Hoc Bondholders sent Sanjel a draft waiver and standstill agreement, which required the payment of part of the December 19 interest payment by December 23, 2015 and the payment of the fees and disbursements of Fried Frank and Moelis in return for arranging for a bondholder meeting to be called to consider a period of forbearance to March 31, 2016.

18 Fried Frank and Moelis executed Non-Disclosure Agreements ("NDAs") on December 24, 2015, but the Ad Hoc Bondholders did not, thus not restricting their right to trade the Bonds. Fried Frank and Moelis were granted access to a Sanjel virtual database ("VDR") on January 9, 2016.

19 By January, 2016, given the prolonged downturn in oil and gas prices, Sanjel's liquidity was limited. Events of default under the Bank Credit Facility that had occurred as of October 31, 2015 were exacerbated by a cross-default based on the non-payment of interest under the Bond Agreement. As of January 31, 2016, the Sanjel Group had total consolidated liabilities of approximately \$1.064 billion.

20 Sanjel was facing very significant negative cash flow projections over the next few months. As of early January, 2016, Sanjel's projected cash flows showed that its cash position would deteriorate by more than half as of the first week of April, 2016, and would be further reduced by anticipated forbearance payments.

21 In the circumstances, Sanjel agreed with the Syndicate to implement a Sales and Investment Solicitation Process ("SISP"). Sanjel states that it hoped that if a SISP was implemented, it might find a transaction that preserved the business as a going concern, which would maximize stakeholder value and preserve goodwill and jobs.

22 In mid-January, 2016, Sanjel engaged PWC as a proposed Monitor in the event it would become necessary to file under the CCAA.

23 The SISP was commenced on behalf of Sanjel by its financial advisors, PJT Partners Inc. ("PJT") and Credit Suisse Securities (CANADA), Inc. ("CS") on January 17, 2016. The advisors contacted prospective bidders, many of whom had already been identified through the BAML process of late 2015.

24 The process of soliciting non-bidding indications of interest ran from January 17, 2016 to February 22, 2016. On January 26, 2016, the advisers updated and opened a VDR available to anyone who had signed a NDA. A teaser letter was distributed and meetings and conference calls were held with bidders. A process letter was distributed on January 28, 2016. Nine indications of interest were submitted on or about February 22, 2016.

25 Before and during the SISP process, Sanjel was negotiating with both the Syndicate and the Ad Hoc Bondholders with respect to separate forbearance agreements, and with the Ad Hoc Bondholders with respect to NDAs to be signed by the Ad Hoc Bondholders. The Ad Hoc Bondholders complain that there was a delay of almost a month before Sanjel's counsel responded to a mark-up of a NDA provided by Fried Frank, but negotiations were stymied by the Ad Hoc Bondholders' insistence that the December interest payment be paid. Until this issue was settled, there was no reason to finalize the NDAs. In addition, it was not until January 29, 2016 that representatives of the Ad Hoc Bondholders advised Sanjel that they were prepared to be restricted from trading and therefore able to receive confidential information. During this period of time, the Ad Hoc Bondholders refused to meet with Sanjel management when they travelled to New York on January 20, 2016.

26 On February 1, 2016, counsel to Sanjel sent counsel to the Ad Hoc Bondholders a copy of the draft forbearance agreement between the Syndicate and Sanjel, which set out the key dates of the SISP, including the completion of definitive purchase and sales agreements by March 24, 2016. It would have been clear to the Ad Hoc Bondholders from this draft that Sanjel was proceeding on a dual track basis, considering both a potential stand-alone restructuring of the company and a sales process.

27 The Ad Hoc Bondholders made a second proposal to Sanjel on February 2, 2016, very shortly after the NDAs were signed. This proposal involved the Syndicate recovering a portion of its loan from Sanjel's existing cash reserves and a rights offering backstopped by the Ad Hoc Bondholders. A portion of the Bonds would be converted into equity. The December interest payment would have to be paid. Sanjel's management team met with the Ad Hoc Bondholders and their advisors in New York on February 3, 2016 and Sanjel's team, the Syndicate and its advisors and the Ad Hoc Bondholders met on February 8, 2016.

28 Sanjel delivered an indicative restructuring term sheet to the Ad Hoc Bondholders on February 12, 2016, as required by the forbearance agreement that the parties were negotiating. The restructuring term sheet emphasized that a bondholder-led restructuring would require significant new money, a significant capital commitment and ongoing capital, with a significant pay-down of the Syndicate's debt.

29 Commencing on February 15, 2016, Sanjel allowed representatives of Alvarez and Marsal ("A&M"), advisors to the Ad Hoc Bondholders, to attend in Calgary and conduct due diligence.

30 On February 18, 2016, Sanjel uploaded to its VDR the final, unsigned versions of the Syndicate Amending and Forbearance Agreement and the Bondholders Forbearance Agreement.

31 Under the SISP, preliminary, non-binding indications of interest were delivered to the advisors and the company by February 22, 2016. Six such indications of interest were received, all of which were materially superior to the Ad Hoc Bondholders proposal of February 2, 2016. The Ad Hoc Bondholders have admitted that they were aware of the milestones under the SISP and the Bank Forbearance Agreement by mid-February, 2016, although it is clear that their advisors would have been aware of these milestones from February 1, 2016.

32 As part of finalizing the form of Bond Forbearance Agreement, counsel for Sanjel and for the Ad Hoc Bondholders had negotiated a form of summons that would be used to call a bondholder meeting to consider the agreement. The only item for consideration to be considered at the meeting was to be the Bond Forbearance Agreement. The plan was to have 2/3 of the bondholders approve and execute the Bond Forbearance Agreement, and then to hold a bondholders meeting.

33 Instead, on February 25, 2016, the Ad Hoc Bondholders caused the Trustee to issue a summons for a meeting on March 10, 2016 to consider and vote on a) whether to declare the Bonds in default, accelerate them and exercise remedies, including commencing involuntary bankruptcy proceedings against Sanjel under Chapter 11 of the *United States Bankruptcy Code*, including claims against the MacDonald family and MacBain Properties Ltd., which owns the business premises that are leased by the Sanjel Group or b) approve the Bond Forbearance Agreement.

34 On March 2, 2016, the Ad Hoc Bondholders submitted a restructuring proposal to Sanjel. This proposal provided no cash recovery to the Syndicate. Instead, a portion of the debt owed to the Syndicate would be converted to a new loan and the remainder extinguished, with the Syndicate receiving warrants in a reorganized company. There would be a Chapter 11

filing and the bondholders would provide a debtor-in-possession ("DIP") facility to rank *pari passu* with the Syndicate debt. Bondholders who contributed to the DIP would receive new 2nd lien notes for part of their previous notes, the remainder being extinguished. The DIP facility would be converted into 100% of the equity of the reorganized company. Sanjel would be required to appoint a Chief Restructuring Officer ("CRO") designated by the Ad Hoc Bondholders.

35 On March 4, 2016, in a follow-up letter to a telephone meeting on March 3, 2016, US counsel to the Syndicate wrote to Fried Frank requesting that the March 10 bondholders meeting be adjourned to March 31, 2016. Canadian counsel to Sanjel made the same request of the Trustee.

36 Also on March 4, 2016, a template Asset Purchase Agreement ("APA") for SISP bidders was posted on the VDRs, which disclosed a CCAA/Chapter 15 filing with PWC as designated Monitor. This template agreement was available to the Ad Hoc Bondholders and their advisors.

37 Counsel for the Ad Hoc Bondholders replied on March 5, 2016 that they would advise the Trustee to postpone the March 10 meeting subject to:

- a) a response to their March 2 proposal by March 10, 2016;
- b) full disclosure of company records for A&M's representative, "so that [that representative] is ready and best positioned to commence his duties as Chief Restructuring Officer for the Company".
- c) payment by March 7, 2016 of roughly USD \$2.2 million in fees and disbursements for the Ad Hoc Bondholders' legal and financial advisors.

38 After some negotiation, Sanjel agreed to these terms for an adjournment, other than with respect to a small deduction in fees and disbursements. Sanjel made it clear that it reserved all rights with respect to the appointment of a CRO and a filing under Chapter 11, which it would not agree to at that time. On March 8, 2016 the Trustee confirmed that the meeting would be postponed to March 31.

39 On March 9, 2016, second round bids under the SISP were received. Five bids were received, all of which were materially superior to the Ad Hoc Bondholders' March 2, 2016 proposal in terms of cash recovery for the Syndicate.

40 An information update conference for bondholders was scheduled to be held on March 11, 2016, at which Sanjel, the Trustee and the Ad Hoc Bondholders would provide an update to any bondholder that wished to call in. This was rescheduled by the Trustee to March 31, 2016.

41 On March 11, 2016, the Syndicate sent the counter-offer required by the postponement of meeting agreement to the Ad Hoc Bondholders. This counter-proposal made it clear that there would be a CCAA/Chapter 15 process, rather than a Chapter 11 process. While this counter-proposal is confidential, it is fair to say that the parties were far apart in their negotiations, particularly with respect to treatment of the Syndicate indebtedness.

42 Also on March 11, 2016, a representative of Sanjel met with A&M's representative and discussed Sanjel's intention to disclaim certain leases in the anticipated CCAA proceedings.

43 Following receipt of the second round bids, Sanjel and its advisors identified the top three bidders and began negotiations with them with the goal of finalizing due diligence and being in a position to execute final APAs on March 24, 2016, as indicated in the Bank Forbearance Agreement.

44 In the meantime, Sanjel continued meetings with the A&M representative, who asked for, and was provided with:

- a) access to the newly created VDR for second stage bidders/investors in the SISP on March 12, 2016.

b) draft materials relating to the CCAA filing, including current drafts of cash flow projections and drafts of stakeholder communication regarding the CCAA, on March 21, 2016.

45 On March 20, 2016, the Ad Hoc Bondholders provided Sanjel and the Syndicate with a third restructuring proposal. This one provided for some paydown of the Syndicate's debt, but involved less than half of that recovery in new money, about the same amount in debt secured by accounts receivable and a substantial amount of bank debt rolled over into a new loan. It also provided for a DIP facility to rank *pari passu* with a new bank credit facility in the event of a liquidation and the conversion of some bondholder debt into secured notes.

46 On March 23, 2016, counsel for Sanjel requested that the Trustee postpone the bondholder meeting scheduled for March 31, 2016 to April 14, 2016. He also proposed to set up the requested informational update on March 31, 2016. On March 25, 2016, counsel for the Trustee consented to this request.

47 In the SISF, final bids were received from the three top bidders on March 24, 2016, with negotiations to continue on final APAs. On the same day, Sanjel and its advisors hosted a call with A&M and Moelis, during which they walked through a 13 week cash forecast.

48 On March 31, 2016 the Syndicate and the Ad Hoc Bondholders had discussions with respect to the Ad Hoc Bondholders' March 20 proposal. In previous correspondence, the Syndicate's counsel had questioned the adequacy of the proposed DIP financing in the proposal and noted Sanjel's significant cash needs following exit from an insolvency proceeding, as opposed to the proposal's assumption that there would be better cash flow. At the conclusion of the call, the Ad Hoc Bondholders indicated that they would provide further modelling with respect to their proposal.

49 On April 3, 2016, Sanjel entered into final APAs with the proposed purchasers, STEP and Liberty. On April 4, 2016, the Sanjel Group filed for CCAA protection. Counsel for Sanjel Group disclosed that the application was made without notice to the Ad Hoc Bondholders. He submitted that notice would imperil the CCAA proceedings as the bondholders may, with notice, have pre-empted the CCAA filing by an involuntary filing under Chapter 11. There is no requirement to give notice to unsecured creditors of a CCAA filing. There are circumstances, and this was one of them, where it is appropriate to seek an initial order on an ex parte basis:

This may be an appropriate — even necessary — step in order to prevent "creditors from moving to realize on their claims, essentially a 'stampede to the assets' once creditors learn of the debtor's financial distress": J.P. Sarra, *Rescue! The Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* (2007), at p. 55 ("Rescue!"); see also *Algoma Steel Inc., Re* (2001), 25 C.B.R. (4th) 194 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 7

50 On April 11, 2016, the Ad Hoc Bondholders presented their fourth proposal for restructuring, not to Sanjel but to the Syndicate. This proposal increases the amount the bondholders would contribute to Sanjel for new equity, which would be used to repay a portion of the Syndicate's loan.

51 According to Fried Frank, the Syndicate's counsel responded on April 13, 2016 advising that while they appreciated the work done by the Ad Hoc Bondholders, the Syndicate preferred the sale route. The Syndicate proposed alternatives that it might consider involving a higher pay-out of the Syndicate's debt than offered by the April 11, 2016 proposal. The Ad Hoc Bondholders have not responded.

52 The Sanjel Group apply for an order approving the sales transactions generated through the SISF, being a sales agreement between Sanjel and STEP Energy Services Ltd., including an assignment of the sale of the debtor's cementing assets in favour of 1961531 Alberta Ltd., and a sales agreement between Sanjel and Liberty.

53 The Trustee applied for an order dismissing the application for approval of these transactions, allowing the Ad Hoc Bondholders to propose a plan of arrangement, lifting the stay to allow the Trustee to commence a Chapter 11 filing and directing a new Court-monitored SISF, among other applications

III. Applicable Law

54 Section 36(3) of the CCAA sets out six non-exhaustive factors that must be considered in approving a sale by a CCAA debtor of assets outside the ordinary course of business. They are:

- (a) whether the process leading to the proposed sale was reasonable in the circumstances;
- (b) whether the Monitor approved the process leading to the proposed sale;
- (c) whether the Monitor filed with the court a report stating that in its opinion the sale would be more beneficial to creditors than a sale or disposition under a bankruptcy;
- (d) the extent to which the creditors were consulted;
- (e) the effects of the proposed sale on creditors and other interested parties; and
- (f) whether the consideration to be received for the assets is reasonable and fair, taking into account their market value.

55 In this case, the Monitor was not in place at the time of the process leading to the proposed sales, nor at the time the SISF was commenced. However, the Monitor has given an opinion on the process, which I will consider as part of my review.

56 Prior to the enactment of section 36, CCAA courts considered what are known as the Soundair principles in considering approval application, and they are still useful guidelines:

- a) Was there a sufficient effort made to get the price at issue? Did the debtor company act improvidently?
- b) Were the interests of all parties considered?
- c) Are there any questions about the efficacy and integrity of the process by which offers were obtained?
- d) Was there unfairness in the working out of the process?

Royal Bank v. Soundair Corp., 1991 CarswellOnt 205 (Ont. C.A.) at para 20.

57 Gascon, J. (as he then was) suggested in *AbitibiBowater inc.*, Re, 2010 QCCS 1742 (C.S. Que.) at paras 70-72 that a court should give due consideration to two further factors:

- a) the business judgment rule, in that a court will not lightly interfere with the exercise of the commercial and business judgment of the debtor company and the monitor in the context of an asset sale where the marketing and sale process was fair, reasonable, transparent and efficient; and
- b) the weight to be given to the recommendation of the monitor.

58 As noted by Gascon, J., it is not desirable for a bidder to wait to the last minute, even up to a court approval stage, to submit its best offer. However, a court can consider such an offer, if it is evidence that the debtor company did not properly carry out its duty to obtain the best price for creditors.

IV. Analysis

59 The Trustee has raised a number of objections to the proposed sales, many of which relate to the factors and principles set out in section 36 of the CCAA, the Soundair principles and the AbitibiBowater factors:

A. The Trustee submits that the CCAA can only be used to liquidate the assets of a debtor company and distribute the proceeds where such use is uncontested or where there is clear evidence that the CCAA provides scope for greater recoveries than would be available on a bankruptcy.

60 Most of the cases relied upon by the Trustee with respect to this submission predate the 2009 enactment of section 36 of the CCAA. While prior to this change to the CCAA, there was some authority that questioned whether the CCAA should be used to carry out a liquidation of a debtors' assets, there was also authority that accepted this as a proper use of the statute.

61 An analysis of the pre-section 36 state of the law on this issue, and support for the latter view, is well summarized in *Nortel Networks Corp., Re*, [2009] O.J. No. 3169 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]). As noted by Morawetz, J. at para 28 of that decision, the CCAA is a flexible statute, particularly useful in complex insolvency cases in which the court is required to balance numerous constituents and myriad interests. This is such a case.

62 Section 36 now provides that a CCAA court may authorize the sale or disposition of assets outside the ordinary course of business if authorized to do so by court order. There is thus no jurisdictional impediment to the sale of assets where such sales meet the requisite tests, even in the absence of a plan of arrangement.

63 Morawetz, J in *Target Canada Co., Re*, 2015 ONSC 303 (Ont. S.C.J.) at paras 32 and 33, describes the change brought about by section 36:

Prior to the 2009 amendments to the CCAA, Canadian courts accepted that, in appropriate circumstances, debtor companies were entitled to seek the protection of the CCAA where the outcome was not going to be a going concern restructuring, but instead, a "liquidation" or wind-down of the debtor companies' assets or business.

The 2009 amendments did not expressly address whether the CCAA could be used generally to wind-down the business of a debtor company. However, I am satisfied that the enactment of section 36 of the CCAA, which establishes a process for a debtor company to sell assets outside the ordinary course of business while under CCAA protection, is consistent with the principle that the CCAA can be a vehicle to downsize or wind-down a debtor company's business.

See also *Re Brainhunter Inc.*, 2009 CarswellOnt 8207 at para 15.

64 Whether before or after the enactment of section 36, Canadian courts have approved en bloc sales of a debtor company, recognizing that such sales are consistent with the broad remedial purpose and flexibility of the CCAA.

65 What the provisions of the CCAA can provide in situations such as those facing the Sanjel Group is a court-supervised process of the execution of the sales, with provision for liquidity and the continuation of the business through the process provided by interim financing, a Key Employee Retention Plan that attempts to ensure that key employees are given an incentive to ensure a seamless transition, critical supplier relief that keeps operations functioning pending the closing of the sales and a process whereby a company with operations in Canada, the United States and internationally is able to invoke the aid of both Canadian and US courts during the process. It is true that the actual SISP process preceded the CCAA filing, and I will address that factor later in this decision.

66 As counsel to the Sanjel Group notes, this type of insolvency proceeding is well-suited to the current catastrophic downturn of the economy in Alberta, with companies at the limit of their liquidity. It allows a business to be kept together and sold as a going concern to the extent possible. There have been a number of recent similar filings in this jurisdiction: the filing in Southern Pacific and Quicksilver are examples.

67 The Monitor supports the sales, and is of the view, supported by investigation into the likely range of forced sale liquidation recoveries with financial advisors and others with industry knowledge, that a liquidation of assets would not generate a better result than the consideration contemplated by the proposed sales. The Monitor's investigations were hampered by the lack of recent sales of similar businesses, but I am satisfied by its thorough report that the Monitor's investigation of likely recoveries

is the best estimate available. A CS estimate provided a different analysis, but I am satisfied by the evidence that it has little probative value.

68 In summary, this is not an inappropriate use of the CCAA arising from the nature of the proposed sales.

B. The Trustee submits that the proposed sales are the product of a defective SISP conducted outside of the CCAA.

69 It is true that the SISP, and the restructuring negotiations with the Ad Hoc Bondholders, took place prior to the filing under the CCAA, that this was a "pre-pack" filing.

70 A pre-filing SISP is not of itself abusive of the CCAA. Nothing in the statute precludes it. Of course, a pre-filing SISP must meet the principles and requirements of section 36 of the CCAA and must be considered against the Soundair principles. The Trustee submits that such a SISP should be subject to heightened scrutiny. It may well be correct that a pre-filing SISP will be subject to greater challenges from stakeholders, and that it may be more difficult for the debtor company to establish that it was conducted in a fair and effective manner, given the lack of supervision by the Court and the Monitor, who as a court officer has statutory duties.

71 Without prior court approval of the process, conducting a SISP outside of the CCAA means that both the procedure and the execution of the SISP are open to attack by aggrieved stakeholders and bitter bidders, as has been the case here. Any evidence or reasonable allegations of impropriety would have to be investigated carefully, whereas in a court-approved process, comfort can be obtained through the Monitor's review and the Court's approval of the process in advance. However, in the end, it is the specific details of the SISP as conducted that will be scrutinized.

72 Similar issues were considered in *Nelson Education Ltd., Re*, 2015 ONSC 5557 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) at paras 31-32, and in *Bloom Lake, g.p.l., Re*, 2015 QCCS 1920 (C.S. Que.) at para 21.

73 The Trustee submits that the SISP was defective in that its timelines were truncated and that it was destined not to generate offers that maximized value for all stakeholders. The Trustee filed an affidavit of a representative of Moelis indicating that it would be typical in a SISP to establish a deadline for non-binding offers one or two months following commencement of the process, while in this SISP, participants had only 12 to 25 days to evaluate the business and provide non-binding indications of interest. This opinion did not address the previous BAML process that identified likely purchasers and thus lengthened the review process for these parties who participated in the first process. The Trustee's advisor was also critical that the SISP provided only 16 days for final offers, suggesting that it is more typical to provide two months.

74 While likely correct for normal-course SISP's, this analysis does not take into account the high cash burn situation of these debtors, nor the deteriorating market. The Moelis opinion suggests that potential purchaser would have a heightened diligence requirement in the current unfavourable market conditions, requiring extra time for due diligence. However, despite the speed of the SISP, it appears to have generated a range of bids significantly above liquidation value. The process was not limited to the SISP, but included the previous BAML process and the negotiations with the Ad Hoc Bondholders.

75 The evidence discloses a thorough and comprehensive canvassing of the relevant markets for the debtors and their assets despite the aggressive timelines. The BAML process identified some interested parties and Sanjel's financial advisors built on that process by re-engaging with 28 private equity firms that had already expressed interest in these unique assets as well as identifying new potential purchasers, reaching out to 85 potential buyers.

76 Of those 85 parties, 37 executed NDAs, 25 conducted due diligence and 17 met with the management team. Eight submitted non-binding indications of interest, five were invited to submit second-round bids and finally the top three were chosen for the continuation of negotiations to final agreements.

77 While some interested parties may have found the time limits challenging, a reasonable number were able to meet them and submit bids. I am satisfied from the evidence that, despite a challenging economic environment, the process was competitive and robust.

78 I also note the comments of the Monitor in its First Report dated April 12, 2016. While it was not directly involved in the SISP, the Monitor reports that the financial advisors advised the Monitor, that given the size and complexity of the Sanjel Group's operations and the time frames involved, all strategic and financial sponsors known to the advisors were contacted during the SISP and that it is unlikely that extending the SISP time frames in the current market would have resulted in materially better offers.

79 Based on this advice and the Monitor's observations since its involvement in the SISP from mid-February 2016, the Monitor is of the opinion that it is highly improbable that another post-filing sales process would yield offers materially in excess of those received.

80 Finally, I note that the Ad Hoc Bondholders' own March 20 proposal envisaged a pre-packaged CCAA proceedings. A sales process is only required to be reasonable, not perfect. I am satisfied that this SISP was run appropriately and reasonably, and that it adequately canvassed the relevant market for the Sanjel Group and its assets.

C. The Ad Hoc Bondholders submit that negotiations among them, the Sanjel Group and the Syndicate were a sham conducted by Sanjel to delay the Ad Hoc Bondholders from taking action under Chapter 11 while it finalized the APAs. The Trustee alleges that the SISP has been conducted and the CCAA filing occurred in an atmosphere tainted by manoeuvring for advantage, bad faith, deception, secrecy, artificial haste and excessive deference by the Sanjel Group to the Syndicate.

81 These are serious allegations, but they are not supported by the evidence.

82 As the somewhat lengthy history of negotiations establishes, the Ad Hoc Bondholders had almost three months to present and negotiate restructuring proposals, with access to confidential information afforded to their advisors from January 9, 2016, weeks before the SISP participants. They presented four proposals, the last one after final bids had been received in the SISP. Although the final proposal breached the timelines of the SISP process, and could potentially raise an issue with respect to the integrity of the SISP process, Sanjel, the Syndicate and the prospective purchasers are not pressing that argument, as they take the position that the final offer is inferior at any rate.

83 These proposals received responses from Sanjel and the Syndicate, and counter proposals were received. The evidence discloses that, in all proposals and counter proposals, the parties were far apart on a major issue: the extent to which the Syndicate's debt was to be paid down and how far it was willing to allow a portion to remain at risk.

84 The Ad Hoc Bondholders were aware of the SISP from its commencement, and aware of the timing of the process. Throughout the SISP, the financial advisors had regular contact with Moelis and Fried Frank and directly with the Ad Hoc Bondholders. Michael Genereux, the lead partner at PJT with respect to the SISP, has sworn that he believes the Ad Hoc Bondholders were aware of the SISP and that it was progressing at a rapid pace. He says that he urged the Ad Hoc Bondholders to accelerate the pace at which they were advancing their restructuring negotiations.

85 The Ad Hoc Bondholders were aware, or should have been aware, that the Sanjel Group intended a CCAA/Chapter 15 process from at the latest mid-March, 2016. Their representative from A&M was aware of the possibility of a CCAA filing from March 4, 2016. Reference to PWC as Monitor under the CCAA was available through the template APAs from March 4, 2016

86 The Trustee and the Ad Hoc Bondholders submit that the Ad Hoc Bondholders' April 11, 2016 proposal provides superior recovery to the proposed sales generated by the SISP, that it "implies" a purchase price significantly in excess of the values generated by the APAs. The proposal, which was made directly to the Syndicate, was rejected by the Syndicate. It provides less immediate recovery to the Syndicate, and leaves a substantial portion of the Syndicate debt outstanding in a difficult and highly uncertain economic environment. It fails to address previously-expressed concerns about the need for capital going forward. The implied value of the proposal appears to rest on assumptions about improved economic recovery that the Syndicate does not accept or share.

87 In addition, the proposal would require at least six months to execute and leaves a number of questions outstanding, not the least being whether a plan that raises some and not all unsecured debt to secured status would pass muster. The proposal was rejected by the Syndicate for reasonable and defensible justifications.

88 The Ad Hoc Bondholders describe their proposal as a "germ" of a viable plan. While a germ of a viable plan may be sufficient to justify the commencement of a CCAA proceeding, it is not comparable to the proposed sales generated by a reasonably-run and thorough SISF.

89 The Trustee also submits that the Court should not be deterred by the Syndicate's rejection of the proposal, insisting on its value and citing cases where a creditor's stated intention not to accept a plan did not prevent a CCAA filing from proceeding. This is a different situation: the Ad Hoc Bondholder's proposals are specific proposals with clear risks of timing and certainty. It is not up to this Court to second guess the Syndicate's rejection of such a plan, even if inclined to do so.

90 The Trustee submits that Sanjel did not act in good faith towards the Ad Hoc Bondholders in the period leading up to the filing. The Trustee notes that, contrary to the terms of the Bond Agreement, Sanjel failed to disclose to the bondholders that the Syndicate had issued a demand for payment acceleration and a notice of intention to enforce security pursuant to the terms of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (the "Demand Acceleration and NOI") on March 18, 2016. While this was a contractual breach, the Ad Hoc Bondholders were well aware that Sanjel was in breach of the Bank Credit Facility, and that the Syndicate was taking steps to enforce its rights in negotiations with Sanjel and the Ad Hoc Bondholders. The Syndicate, and the Ad Hoc Bondholders, were both careful to preserve their rights of enforcement in proposals and counter-proposals. In fact, the Syndicate did not exercise its right to set-off, and has allowed Sanjel to continue to have access to liquidity going into the CCAA process.

91 This failure by Sanjel to advise the Trustee, (and other unsecured creditors that had similar provisions in their contracts), of this further step by the Syndicate does not constitute a reason to refuse to approve that APAs.

92 The Trustee submits that Sanjel failed to make full and plain disclosure during the initial hearing because it failed to disclose that in 2015, 62 % of the Sanjel Group's revenue was generated in the United States. Sanjel made extensive disclosure of its corporate structure and the integration of its business in its initial filing, including the fact that the Sanjel Group's "nerve centre", management team and treasury and financial functions are largely based in Calgary. The factors disclosed were more than sufficient to establish jurisdiction for a CCAA filing. The US Court in the Chapter 15 filing found the Sanjel Group's COMI to be in Calgary. The single statistic of 2015 revenue would not have changed the outcome of the Initial Order.

93 The Trustee's most serious allegation, given its implications for the professional reputations of those involved, is that Sanjel and its counsel and the Syndicate and its counsel misled the Trustee and the Ad Hoc Bondholders in their requests for adjournment of the bondholders' meeting, that the correspondence relating to the requests for adjournment created an obligation to negotiate in good faith, and that Sanjel and the Syndicate failed to do so. The Trustee and the Ad Hoc Bondholders allege that Sanjel and the Syndicate were negotiating with the Ad Hoc Bondholders only to gain time to finalize the APAs and file under the CCAA.

94 Again, this serious allegation is not supported by the evidence. The correspondence relating to the adjournment requests discloses no promises to hold off proceedings. The letter of request for the first adjournment for counsel to the Syndicate, while it refers to engaging with the Ad Hoc Bondholders with respect to the March 2, 2016 proposal, stipulates that in requesting the postponement of the meeting, counsel is not promising any course of action and reserves all rights.

95 The request from counsel to Sanjel refers to the dual track of negotiating a financial restructuring and/or sale of assets. It speaks of focusing on negotiations for the balance of the month, instead of "prospective enforcement action as proposed for consideration at the scheduled bondholders meeting," as was threatened by the notice of meeting. The Ad Hoc Bondholders were well-compensated financially for this adjournment.

96 The second request to adjourn the meeting to April 14, 2016 was similarly without any promise to forbear and the acceptance of the request by the Trustee did not impose any conditions nor give any reasons for the acceptance. The

representatives of the Ad Hoc Bondholders are knowledgeable and sophisticated with respect to financing and insolvency matters. They cannot be said to have been misled by the language used in the adjournment requests.

97 The Trustee submits that the CCAA process to date has been engineered to effect a foreclosure in favour of the Syndicate "to the serious and material prejudice of the Bondholders" and other unsecured creditors.

98 The SISP did not disclose any possibility that, in the current economic climate, the disposition of the assets would generate even enough to cover the debt owed to the secured creditors. The proposals made by the Ad Hoc Bondholders did not offer nearly enough to pay out that debt.

99 The views of the Syndicate and its priority rights must be given due consideration: *Windsor Machine & Stamping Ltd., Re*, 2009 CarswellOnt 4471 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) at para 43.

100 Section 6 of the CCAA requires that any compromise of creditors' rights must be supported by a double majority of the affected creditors. The Syndicate (as the principal secured creditor group) and the Ad Hoc Bondholders (as unsecured creditors with other unsecured creditors) would form separate voting classes for the purposes of a vote on any plan of arrangement. Each class must have a double majority of creditors, representing both two-thirds in value and a majority of number, voting in support of the plan as a condition precedent to court approval. Thus, the Syndicate holds an effective "veto" over the approval of any plan proposed by the Ad Hoc Bondholders: *SemCanada Crude Co., Re*, 2009 ABQB 490 (Alta. Q.B.) at para 22.

101 As noted by the Syndicate, the Ad Hoc Bondholders proposals, including the April 11, 2016 proposal, pose substantial risk to the Syndicate, and it is under no obligation to support them. There is no evidence that the Syndicate is acting unreasonably or unfairly in asserting that it would exercise the statutory protection afforded to a secured creditor under the CCAA; in fact, the evidence is that the Syndicate was willing to consider a less than 100% payout in negotiations with the Ad Hoc Bondholders. There was however no agreement as to the extent of the payout and the extent to which the Syndicate would agree to remain at risk.

102 The prejudice to the bondholders is that they were unable to persuade the secured creditors to compromise or put its financial interests at risk in order to provide the bondholders with some chance that an improved economic climate may save this enterprise. As noted, the Syndicate had doubts that the Ad Hoc Bondholder's proposals would even provide sufficient operating capital to keep the Sanjel Group operating for the months it would take to implement their proposals.

103 The prejudice, if any, to the Ad Hoc Bondholders is that they were not able to pre-empt the CCAA filing with a filing under Chapter 11 of the *United States Bankruptcy Code*, with an automatic stay that, according to US bankruptcy law, has worldwide effect. A subsequent CCAA filing could be considered a breach of the stay, and provoke a jurisdictional issue that would delay proceedings and prove expensive to the Syndicate, improving the Ad Hoc Bondholders' bargaining position.

104 While there is only hearsay opinion before me with respect to the advantages of a Chapter 11 filing, the Trustee suggests that under such a filing:

- (a) the Liberty and Step APAs would have been subject to market test and to higher and better offers;
- (b) Sanjel could confirm a plan without the consent of the Syndicate; and
- (c) parties in interest and estate fiduciaries could pursue claims and causes of action against Sanjel, the Syndicate, Sanjel's equity holders and MacBain.

105 Sanjel cites academic commentary that the cram-down provisions of Chapter 11 require strict compliance so as not to override the protections and elections available to secured creditors in opposition to a plan that they do not support. Specifically, if a class of creditors is impaired, the plan must be fair and equitable with respect to that class.

106 This is an issue for the US Courts. However, even if the Chapter 15 filing was replaced by a Chapter 11 filing, the current CCAA proceedings would not be terminated and any restructuring in the United States would necessarily have to be coordinated

with these CCAA proceedings. Accordingly, the voting requirements for any plan of arrangement or the requirements for approval of a sale under the CCAA could not be avoided.

D. The Ad Hoc Bondholders were prejudiced in that they were not provided with information regarding the process and the bids received.

107 The Ad Hoc Bondholders had access to the same information afforded to bidders under the SISP and more. They were able to make proposals both before and after that process. Their financial advisors were afforded an opportunity for due diligence, and exercised it.

108 What they did not receive was disclosure of the details of the bids. There was a dispute about whether or not the Ad Hoc Bondholders could be considered "bidders". While they were not part of the SISP, they certainly had interests in conflict with the SISP bidders. Had the bids been disclosed to them, there would indeed have been concern over the integrity of the process, as such disclosure would allow them to tailor their proposals in such a way as to undermine the bids.

109 The Ad Hoc Bondholders were aware that they would not be given copies of the bids by mid-February, 2016 when the Bondholders Forbearance Agreement was settled, as it included a provision clarifying that they were not entitled to any pricing or bidder information from the SISP.

110 The Bond Forbearance Agreement also recognized that, while Sanjel would negotiate in good faith with the Ad Hoc Bondholders, nothing restricted its ability to enter into or conduct negotiations with respect to potential sales or other transactions. It was only on March 14, 2016 that the Ad Hoc Bondholders requested third party bid information.

111 The Ad Hoc Bondholders were not improperly denied access to information, and would not have been entitled to know details of the third party bids.

V. Conclusion

112 I am satisfied by the evidence before me that the factors set out in section 36(3) of the CCAA and Soundair favour the approval of the proposed sales. Specifically:

(a) the process, while not conducted under the CCAA, was nevertheless reasonable in the circumstances, as established by the evidence. It was brief, but not unreasonably brief, given the previous BAML process, current economic climate and the deteriorating financial position of the Sanjel Group;

(b) while the Monitor was not directly involved and did not actively participate in the SISP process prior to February 24, 2016, the Monitor has reviewed the process and is of the opinion that the SISP was a robust process run fairly and reasonably, and that sufficient efforts were made to obtain the best price possible for the Sanjel Group's assets in that process. I agree with the Monitor's assessment from my review of the evidence.

It is the Monitor's view, based on (i) the advice of CS and PJT, (ii) the nature of the Sanjel Group's operations and assets, (iii) the market conditions over the past year, (iv) the proposals received in the context of the SISP and from the Ad Hoc Bondholders, (v) the current ongoing depressed condition of the market and (vi) the underlying value of the Sanjel Group's assets, it is highly improbable that another post-filing sales process would yield offers for the Canadian and U.S. operations materially in excess of the values contained in the STEP and Liberty APAs.

I accept the Monitor's opinion in that regard, and nothing in my review of the evidence and the submissions of interested parties causes me to doubt that opinion.

(c) The Monitor has provided an opinion that the proposed sales are more beneficial to creditors than a sale or disposition under bankruptcy.

(d) Creditors, other than trade creditors, were consulted and involved in the process.

(e) While the sales provide no return to any creditor other than the Syndicate, I am satisfied that all other viable or reasonable options were considered. While there is no guarantee of further employment arising from the sale, there is the prospect that since the business will continue to operate until the sale, there will be an opportunity for employment for Sanjel employees with the new enterprises, and an opportunity for suppliers to continue to supply them.

(f) I am satisfied from the evidence that the consideration to be received for the assets is reasonable and fair.

I therefore approve the sale approval and vesting orders sought by the Sanjel Group.

VI. Postscript

113 On May 9, 2016, before these reasons were released, I received a copy of a letter dated May 5, 2016 from Fried Frank on behalf of the Ad Hoc Bondholders addressed to Canadian and US counsel for the Sanjel Group, the Monitor, the Syndicate and the prospective purchasers. In extravagant language, the Ad Hoc Bondholders state that they have become aware of information that the addressees are "duty bound" to bring to the attention of the Courts as officers of the Courts. That information is that Shane Hooker has been designated to lead the Canadian cementing operations when the STEP sale closes, according to a STEP press release. Evidently, Mr. Hooker is married to the daughter of Dan MacDonald, the chairman of Sanjel's board, and is the sister of Darin MacDonald, who was Chief Executive Officer of Sanjel and head of the restructuring committee.

114 The letter asserts the following:

a) There are "substantial and material" connections between STEP and the MacDonald family. It appears that the basis for this statement is that Mr. Hooker is married to Mr. MacDonald's daughter and an employee and "executive in residence" of ARC Financial Corp., STEP's financial sponsor in the sale;

b) Mr. Hooker is "an intimate beneficiary of all that is and all that belongs to the MacDonald family." In subsequent correspondence with the Monitor, it appears that the Ad Hoc Bondholders have no evidence to support this allegation;

c) Mr. Hooker is "the loyal son-in-law and brother-in-law" of the MacDonald family. Again, the Ad Hoc Bondholders admit that they have no information to support this allegation;

d) By reason of Mr. Hooker's relationship with the "MacDonald family", the proposed STEP transaction and the entirety of the SISP process "is tainted and worse". "(O)ur clients have every reason to believe the substance, of self-dealing and deception of the highest order";

e) "Mr. Hooker's personal and professional ties to the MacDonald family raise the spectre that all at hand is and has been a thinly-veiled scheme between the Company and the Syndicate and their advisors to deliver, on the one hand, an adequate recovery to the Syndicate and, on the other hand, Sanjel's Canadian assets back into the hands of the MacDonald family thereby working a substantial forfeiture of value to the Bondholders and all other unsecured creditors of the Company".

115 The letter repeats previous allegations that the SISP was "driven by self-interest and self-dealing", "riddled with conflicts of interest", "inappropriate and flawed in every respect", "chilled, inadequate" and "not conducted in good faith and efforts were undertaken to mislead and misdirect the company's stakeholders". It alleges:

a) "That none of this has been brought to the attention of the Courts and all parties in interest is reprehensible at best and has all indicia of fraudulent intent and purpose."

b) "Be advised that with respect to each and all of you and each and all of your respective clients as well as with respect to STEP, Liberty and any and all funding sources and sponsors for each, our clients hereby reserve all of their rights and remedies with respect to any and all claims and causes of action of every kind and nature whatsoever whether such claims and causes of action are grounded in contract, tort, equity, statute and otherwise including, but not limited to, any and all breach of fiduciary duties, civil conspiracy, tortious interference and lender liability."

c) "... the efforts to continue with malfeasance wrapped in the cloak of SISP and CCAA by each and all of you and your clients must stop now. As above, the Courts and others should and must be informed, the failure to do so is and will be a misrepresentation and fraud on the Courts."

116 The letter comments that "(w)hen Justice Romaine is in receipt of the information, she will have reason and basis and we believe that Her Ladyship will be constrained, to vacate the order."

117 The Monitor took immediate action to investigate these serious allegations of fraud, misrepresentation, conspiracy and collusion, requesting urgent responses from counsel for Sanjel, the Syndicate, Mr. MacDonald, PJT and CS. Relevant witnesses were contacted and follow-up questions directed. The Monitor was also in contact with Fried Frank to determine the source of the allegations, and what investigation had been undertaken by Fried Frank or the Ad Hoc Bondholders to verify or support their allegations.

118 On Saturday, May 7, 2016, Fried Frank made the further allegation that potential bidders in the SISP were provided with forecasts that were far worse than actual results in order to facilitate the alleged fraud and conspiracy. The Monitor added this allegation to its investigation.

119 The Monitor was satisfied by its rapid but thorough investigations that:

a) Mr. Hooker and Mr. MacDonald have been estranged for the last two and a half-years, and have had no communication on any personal or business matters;

b) Mr. Hooker left Sanjel in March, 2014 and began working for ARC Financial in the fall of 2015 to assist ARC in an unrelated transaction. ARC is a large private investor focussed on energy, which provides financing through a number of funds financed by from third party investors. ARC is the primary financial stakeholder in the STEP acquisition. No one from the MacDonald family has an ownership position in ARC, nor are any of them investors in any ARC funds. Mr. Hooker has no involvement in ARC's fundraising efforts or fund deployment and he has no ownership interest in ARC;

c) Mr. MacDonald had no involvement in the negotiation of the STEP APA, other than attendance as a Sanjel representative at three meetings between November 2015 and January 2016, before the SISP was commenced;

d) Mr. Crilly as CFO of Sanjel (and later CRO) led the SISP process for Sanjel, while Mr. MacDonald concentrated on attempting to find a buyer for the whole company;

e) The senior Mr. MacDonald has not had an active role in Sanjel's management for years, was not involved in the SISP and does not own shares in STEP or ARC;

f) Mr. Hooker's involvement with the SISP and negotiations with STEP was limited to conducting on-site diligence on behalf of STEP;

g) Sanjel has no direct or indirect ownership interest or other financial interest in ARC, STEP, the newly formed company that will be purchasing the cementing assets or any other entity owned or controlled by ARC;

h) No consideration was provided to Mr. Hooker or either Mr. MacDonald in connection with the STEP APA;

i) In the opinion of many of those who provided responses, the relationship between Mr. Hooker and Mr. MacDonald had an adverse effect, if anything, on the merits of the STEP bid. The advisors and the Syndicate repeat their previous position that the STEP offer, in combination with the Liberty offer, was materially superior to any en bloc bid or combination of bids, and was supported on the basis of its economic merits.

120 This information was largely confirmed by a number of sources. The Monitor did not obtain sworn statements, nor conduct any kind of discovery process. It did not present the information in its Sixth Report to the Court as evidence, but as a report on its investigation to determine whether there was any probative value to the Ad Hoc Bondholders' allegations.

121 When the Monitor was unable to find any real evidence to support the allegations, other than the bare fact that Mr. Hooker is an employee of ARC and is married to Mr. MacDonald's sister, it asked the Ad Hoc Bondholders if they had any supporting evidence. The substance of counsel to the Ad Hoc Bondholders' response is that there is an appearance of inappropriate dealing (arising from the relationship), and that it was up to the Monitor to investigate this.

122 The Ad Hoc Bondholders instead provided the Monitor with a list of additional questions that they wish the Monitor to investigate through sworn statements subject to cross-examination. These questions appear designed to elicit some evidence that may support the Ad Hoc Bondholder's speculations.

123 The Monitor cannot be faulted for failing to obtain sworn evidence from relevant parties. The allegations were made after approval of the APAs in the context of tight timelines to the closing of the transactions and the risk of losing the recommended sales transactions. If the Monitor had discovered anything that would give any legitimacy to the allegations, or raise any doubt about the integrity of the SISP, it may have been appropriate to direct further investigation, including sworn evidence. However, mere speculation resting on a family relationship is insufficient to require the Monitor to undertake further expensive investigation or to conduct a fishing expedition. This is particularly the case as there is no real evidence that Mr. Hooker's prospective employment will benefit either Mr. MacDonald or Sanjel in any way, or Mr. Hooker himself, other than the offer of employment.

124 This is not a case where evidence that should be presented in affidavit form has been incorporated improperly into a Monitor's report. The Monitor decided, quite properly, that at this stage of the process, a quick investigation to determine whether there was any real basis for the Ad Hoc Bondholders complaint was warranted. This investigation has satisfied the Monitor that, other than the fact that Mr. Hooker is indeed Mr. MacDonald's brother-in-law, there is no evidence of collusion between them, Mr. MacDonald was not involved in the STEP APA, Mr. Hooker was in no position to influence that STEP APA and no evidence that Mr. Hooker or the "MacDonald family" will profit in any way from the STEP APA, other than Mr. Hooker's offer of employment.

125 Given the lack of any indicia that there is any basis for the Ad Hoc Bondholders' speculations of fraud or conspiracy, there is no reason for this Court to require the Monitor to take further steps to investigate the allegations, which appear to be thinly veiled and reckless attempts to delay and obfuscate the process.

126 With respect to the allegations that potential bidders were provided with forecasts far worse than actual results in order to facilitate the alleged fraud and conspiracy, the Monitor has reviewed the forecasts and the variances from the forecasts provided during the SISP to actuals. The Monitor reports that these relate to collection of accounts receivable and payment of accounts payable. The actual collection of receivables was better than forecasted for the months of March and April. However, the Monitor understands that is a temporary timing variance based on earlier collection of receivables and does not represent a permanent improvement in Sanjel's actual cash position.

127 Thus, the Monitor is of the view that the allegations by the Ad Hoc Bondholders with respect to forecasts being far worse than actual results lack merit.

128 I accept the Monitor's advice on this issue.

129 With respect to disclosure, the Monitor was not aware of the connection between STEP and the company alleged in the Fried Frank letter. The Monitor has reported that it did not become aware of anything that would support or substantiate the allegations since its involvement in the SISP process after February 24, 2016.

130 The Ad Hoc Bondholders' allegations are in essence that the SISP was structured to achieve a preferential outcome for the MacDonald family through the familial connections between Mr. Hooker and the MacDonald family. If a sale of assets of a debtor company is to be made to a person related to the debtor, the Court may only approve the sale if it is satisfied that:

(a) good faith efforts were made to sell or otherwise dispose of the assets to persons who are not related to the debtor company; and

(b) the consideration to be received is superior to the consideration that would be received under any other offer made in accordance with the process leading to the proposed sale: CCAA section 36(4).

131 A related party pursuant to section 36(5) is defined to include certain categories of persons, and neither Mr. Hooker, his wife or either Mr. MacDonald fall into these categories.

132 There is no evidence or indication that any member of the "MacDonald family" will benefit from the STEP APA, other than Mr. Hooker's offer of employment. I am therefore satisfied that section 36(3) is not applicable to the STEP or the Liberty transactions and that no disclosure of any relationship was necessary before the APAs were approved.

133 Even if disclosure had been made, given the evidence before me with respect to the SISP process and the offers received, I would have been satisfied the requirements of section 36(3) were met.

134 In conclusion, the allegations of the Ad Hoc Bondholders do not change my decision with respect to approval of the APAs. I see no reason why the Monitor should continue its investigation.

135 The issue of who should bear the cost of the investigation into these allegations is reserved.

Debtors' application granted; trustee's application dismissed.

TAB 9

2020 ABQB 332
Alberta Court of Queen's Bench

Bellatrix Exploration Ltd., Re

2020 CarswellAlta 966, 2020 ABQB 332, [2020] A.W.L.D. 2058, 318 A.C.W.S. (3d) 537, 80 C.B.R. (6th) 97

**In the Matter of the Companies' Creditors
Arrangement Act, RSC 1985, c.C-36, as amended**

And In the Matter of the Plan of Compromise or Arrangement of Bellatrix Exploration Ltd.

M.H. Hollins J.

Heard: May 7, 2020

Judgment: May 21, 2020

Docket: Calgary 1901-13767

Counsel: Robert J. Chadwick, Caroline Descours, Andrew Harmes, for Bellatrix Exploration Ltd.

Sean F. Collins, for Winslow Resources Inc.

Tom Cumming, Caireen Hanert, Warren Foley, Ram Sankaran, for Yangarra Resources Ltd.

Kelly Bourassa, James Reid, Peter Bychawski, for First Lien Lenders

Michael Hanlon, Adam Maerov, Kourtney Rylands, for U.S. Bank National Association, in its capacities as Second Lien Notes Trustee and Third Lien Notes Trustee

Ed Halt, for First Lien Lenders

Josef G. A. Kruger, Robyn Gurofsky, for Monitor

Maria Lavelle, for Alberta Energy Regulator

Howard A. Gorman, Q.C., Gunnar Benediktsson, for BP Canada Energy Group ULC

Guy Martel & Danny Vu, for EIG/KKR

Michael Shakra, Kevin J. Zych, Chris Simnard, Kristopher Hanc, for Ad Hoc Committee of Second Lien and Third Lien Noteholders

Alexis Teasdale, Karen Dawson, for Bull Moose Capital Ltd.

Randal Van de Mossalaer, Emily Paplawski, for Keyera Patnrship

Brad Angove, for Nelson Brothers Oilfield Services 1997 Ltd. and Gen7 Environmental Solutions Ltd.

Joseph Reynaud, Leland Corbett, for Stream Asset Financial Lumos LP, by its General Partner Stream Asset Financial Lumos Corp

Kelsey Meyer, for SCCP Ferrier Facility LP

Louis Belzil, for Jo-Anne Reynolds

Shane King, for Bidell Gas Compression

Marian Baldwin Fuerst, for Delaware Trust Company

Mikkel Arnston, for Thomas Group Inc.

Jennie Buchanan, Frankie Deni, for Mark Stephen

Christa Nicholson, Andrew MacGregor, for TAQA North Ltd

Colin Feasby, for Bank of Montreal

Jordan Milne, Lori Williams, for Indian Oil and Gas Canada (IOGC)

Jeffrey Poole, Ian Carruthers, for O'Chiese First Nation

Subject: Insolvency

Related Abridgment Classifications

Bankruptcy and insolvency

XIX Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act**XIX.3 Arrangements****XIX.3.b Approval by court****XIX.3.b.i "Fair and reasonable"****Table of Authorities****Cases considered by *M.H. Hollins J.*:**

Beauty Counsellors of Canada Ltd., Re (1986), 58 C.B.R. (N.S.) 237, 1986 CarswellOnt 171 (Ont. S.C.) — referred to

Cameron v. Bank of Nova Scotia (1981), 38 C.B.R. (N.S.) 1, 45 N.S.R. (2d) 303, 86 A.P.R. 303, 1981 CarswellNS 47 (N.S. C.A.) — referred to

Grant Forest Products Inc., Re (2010), 2010 ONSC 1846, 2010 CarswellOnt 2445, 67 C.B.R. (5th) 258 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Nortel Networks Corp., Re (2009), 2009 CarswellOnt 4467, 55 C.B.R. (5th) 229 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — considered

Royal Bank v. Soundair Corp. (1991), 7 C.B.R. (3d) 1, 83 D.L.R. (4th) 76, 46 O.A.C. 321, 4 O.R. (3d) 1, 1991 CarswellOnt 205 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to

Sierra Club of Canada v. Canada (Minister of Finance) (2002), 2002 SCC 41, 2002 CarswellNat 822, 2002 CarswellNat 823, (sub nom. *Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. v. Sierra Club of Canada*) 211 D.L.R. (4th) 193, (sub nom. *Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. v. Sierra Club of Canada*) 18 C.P.R. (4th) 1, 44 C.E.L.R. (N.S.) 161, 287 N.R. 203, 20 C.P.C. (5th) 1, 40 Admin. L.R. (3d) 1, (sub nom. *Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. v. Sierra Club of Canada*) 93 C.R.R. (2d) 219, 223 F.T.R. 137 (note), [2002] 2 S.C.R. 522, 2002 CSC 41 (S.C.C.) — referred to

Statutes considered:

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36

Generally — referred to

s. 11.3 [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] — considered

s. 36(3) — considered

APPLICATION for approval of asset purchase agreement.

***M.H. Hollins J.*:**

1 Bellatrix Exploration Ltd. is an oil and gas company involved in proceedings under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, RSC 1985, c.C-36 (*CCAA*). It has been soliciting offers to purchase its assets or shares over approximately the last six months. On Thursday, May 7, 2020, I heard Bellatrix' application for an Order approving the Asset Purchase Agreement it signed with Winslow Resources Inc. on April 22, 2020. Winslow's offer was backed by its parent company, Return Energy Inc. doing business as Spartan Delta Corp. For consistency with other material filed in this Action, that purchaser is referred to herein as Spartan.

2 The Spartan Asset Purchase Agreement, if approved, would produce sufficient funds to pay the *CCAA* priority charges and a substantial portion of the first lienholder notes, as well as providing for the assumption of other contractual and statutory obligations. It would not be sufficient to pay the entire first lienholder debt and would leave nothing for the second or third lien note holders.

3 The application to approve was opposed by a group of creditors holding the majority of the second lien notes of Bellatrix, namely FS/EIG Advisor LLC and FS/KKR Advisor LC (EIG/KKR), as well as the remaining minority of second lien noteholders, separately represented.

4 EIG/KKR cross-applied for an adjournment of Bellatrix' application for a period of just less than 3 weeks in order to put an alternative, and in their opinion, better offer before the Court. The adjournment application was opposed by all the parties

supporting the Spartan bid, namely Bellatrix, the Monitor PricewaterhouseCoopers Inc. (PWC), the first lien noteholders and their lenders, the prospective purchaser and by numerous other parties with which Bellatrix does business.

5 I dismissed EIG/KKR's application for the adjournment and approved the Spartan Asset Purchase Agreement. I provided brief oral reasons on May 8, 2020 with these written reasons to follow.

Background

6 Bellatrix Exploration Ltd. is a Calgary-based oil and gas company with assets in Saskatchewan, Alberta and British Columbia. Its President/Chief Executive Officer deposed to a number of market conditions which have depressed commodity prices and created uncertainty in the market, resulting in Bellatrix seeking *CCAA* protection. An Initial Order under the *CCAA* was granted on October 2, 2019. That was quickly followed by the Order approving the Sales and Investment Solicitation Process (SISP) on October 9, 2019.

7 The first phase of the SISP was to solicit non-binding expressions of interest in the purchase of the assets or shares of Bellatrix. From those received, Bellatrix and the court-appointed Sale Advisor, Bank of Montreal Capital Markets (BMO), would then select parties to participate in second phase, during which those parties would complete their due diligence and formulate binding bids.

8 Under the SISP, Phase I ran to November 13, 2019. The parties proceeding to Phase II were to submit binding bids by a date to be chosen by the Bellatrix, called the Binding Bid Deadline (ultimately February 6, 2020). The SISP required Binding Bids to be, *inter alia*, irrevocable and accompanied by an irrevocable financial commitment from any entity financing a particular bid.

9 Bellatrix' existing creditors were also entitled to participate in the sales process. These creditor bidders were not required to participate in Phase I of the SISP and in fact were not required to submit their bid by the Binding Bid Deadline. They were entitled to be advised whether any third-party bids being considered would be sufficient to pay out the Secured Notes (defined as the first, second and third lien noteholders collectively) and to receive detailed information about any such third-party bids.

10 Bellatrix and the Monitor were permitted, but not required, to consult with any bidders, including the potential creditor bidders, after the Binding Bid Deadline. Subject to consulting with the Monitor, Bellatrix retained discretion to reject any bid, regardless of compliance with the SISP.

11 The second lien noteholders had negotiated some provisions into the SISP to protect their position in the bidding process. One, referred to above, was their ability to submit bids after the third-party bidding was concluded. A second advantage was their ability to include the value of their debt as part of an offer. However, any credit bid was still required to have any financing firmly in place. The language of Clause 13 of the SISP is as follows:

For certainty, a Potential Credit Bidder shall provide written evidence of all required funding or financing to advance the cash consideration necessary to satisfy such priority payments and the New Money Notes [defined in the second note indenture] in full in cash or otherwise assume such obligations in full, and that any such credit bid shall not be conditional upon obtaining financing, acceptable to each of the Sale Advisor and the Monitor in their sole discretion.

12 EIG/KKR had indicated as early as December of 2019 that they might participate in the bid process, depending on the extent to which the Binding Bids received addressed their financial interests.

13 Bellatrix received no qualifying Binding Bids by February 6, 2020 but, along with BMO and the Monitor, continued to consult with interested parties, including EIG/KKR. The resulting bid from Spartan was to purchase substantially all Bellatrix' oil and gas assets for \$87,357,000 (the Spartan Bid). This would pay all amounts owing under the Key Employee Retention Plan (KERP) approved in the Initial Order, all priority charges of BMO, the Monitor, the Bellatrix Directors and the Interim Financing (as described in paragraph 42 of the Initial Order) and a substantial portion of the first lien noteholders' debt, which totaled approximately \$90M.

14 On March 10, 2020, the Monitor advised EIG/KKR that the bid under consideration would not generate any payment to them as it was not likely to completely pay out the first lien noteholders. The second lien noteholders held approximately \$197M in debt and the third lien noteholders approximately another \$66M. Beginning April 1, 2020, counsel for EIG/KKR and for Bellatrix began to trade mark ups of the EIG/KKR proposal.

15 On April 13, 2020, EIG/KKR submitted a draft term sheet proposing a purchase backed by financing from the First Lien Lenders (a syndicate of National Bank, Canadian Western Bank and Alberta Treasury Branches), which financing would be replaced within 12 months of closing, plus some new cash from the second lien noteholders. On April 20, 2020, a revised term sheet was provided by EIG/KKR which replaced the reference to financing from the First Lien Lenders to financing from unidentified third-party lenders with whom EIG/KKR was "in discussions". At some later point, a company name was inserted in that part of the EIG/KKR term sheet but by the time of this application, that had changed again and CIBC was the proposed financier of the EIG/KKR offer.

16 After receipt of the third version of the non-binding bid of EIG/KKR on April 20, 2020, the Board of Directors of Bellatrix met to consider their options. They voted to approve the Spartan Bid and on April 22, 2020, signed the Asset Purchase Agreement, subject to the court approval now sought.

Adjournment

17 The request of EIG/KKR for an adjournment was intertwined with its objection to Bellatrix' approval of the Spartan bid. The additional time requested was for the purpose of finalizing its offer so that it could be more fairly considered alongside the Spartan Bid. By the time of the court application, EIG/KKR confirmed that it was in discussions with Westbrick Energy Ltd, a local oil and gas operator owned mostly by EIG/KKR, about participating in the EIG/KKR bid. It was submitted that, even with financing, a successful purchaser would need to partner with a company with industry knowledge.

18 Westbrick had been one of the early third-party bidders in its own right, having submitted several non-binding bids through Phases I and II but dropping out of the bidding in late February. When the Spartan Bid was received by Bellatrix on March 10, 2020, Westbrick was contacted again but did not participate further until its name came up as part of EIG/KKR's alternative non-binding bid.

19 Westbrick's interest at this approval stage is still subject to confirmatory due diligence. In fact, one of the bases on which EIG/KKR sought the adjournment was the refusal of the Monitor to allow Westbrick into the data room in the days before the application, which EIG/KKR argued had delayed its progress. The Monitor provided no written explanation to EIG/KKR at the time but it became apparent during the course of argument that its reluctance to do so was based, at least in part, on the fact that Westbrick had participated in earlier phases of the process and so already had that information about the Bellatrix assets. The fact that it wanted to do further due diligence as part of a credit bid when it had already failed to capture the interest of Bellatrix, BMO or the Monitor earlier in the process was not compelling to the Monitor, nor to this Court.

20 Westbrick's equivocal commitment was only part of EIG/KKR's problems, second to the lack of any firm financing commitment. As mentioned, CIBC was proposing to lend an amount sufficient to pay the priority charges plus the first lien noteholder debt, with the second lien noteholders proposing to then convert their debt to an equity position in the company. However, the borrower (presumably a partnership of EIG/KRR and Westbrick, or their respective designates) would still need to qualify to assume all the liabilities and obligations of the ongoing business of Bellatrix.

21 More importantly, CIBC expressly was not yet committed to providing that funding. Its willingness to proceed was contingent on a number of outstanding items, including:

- a. satisfactory final negotiations;
- b. the absence of any material adverse change (which could include the claims already anticipated by at least two of the counterparties to Bellatrix contracts);

- c. acceptable arrangements being made between CIBC and Westbrick or another operator; and
- d. no adverse change in the capital markets generally.

22 Against the backdrop of the precarious current oil and gas market, all these outstanding conditions limited EIG/KKR's ability to present this proposal as close enough to final to justify putting everything on hold for another few weeks in hopes that all the pieces would fall into place.

23 EIG/KKR quite properly emphasized that they are significant stakeholders in the proceedings generally and the most significant stakeholders at this precise juncture, given the consequences to them if the Spartan Bid is effectively the only option left. EIG/KKR also pointed out that the company had sufficient short-term financing to continue operating during the requested adjournment, courtesy of their agreement to provide the interim financing under the Initial Order. EIG/KKR said that their willingness to provide that interim financing, without which the SISP could not have been conducted, was part of their plan to protect their position, should that become necessary.

24 It appears that EIG/KKR thought they would have more time and more opportunity to finalize a competing proposal than what was afforded to them. They pointed out, legitimately, that the COVID pandemic has created logistical challenges and has introduced even more uncertainty into financial markets, making it more difficult to get the Westbrick bid in a final form.

25 Bellatrix, along with all the other parties backing the Spartan Bid, argued that EIG/KKR had had more than ample time to negotiate the financing for a Binding Bid, having known from October of last year that they could end up needing to put a competing offer forward. More importantly, as of March 10, 2020, EIG/KKR knew unequivocally that the only offer in play was going to see them receive no recovery on their debt at all. From that point, if not before, it was incumbent on them to move quickly, presumably building on work done beforehand, to finalize their competing bid.

26 They were unable to do this. I accept that the COVID pandemic, which was narrowly preceded by a severe and historic drop in the commodity prices for oil, made it very difficult to secure the missing financial and operational commitments. However, it is equally obvious that these factors may continue to affect market conditions negatively for some unknown period of time. Indeed, the uncertainty around the likely duration of these negative market forces is the reason given by the Bellatrix Board of Directors for approving the Spartan Bid. While the Spartan Bid is not ideal — certainly not for Bellatrix' creditors — it does allow the transfer of the company as a going concern to a bidder who had its financing secured and was ready to close on time, removing as much uncertainty around this transaction as possible. It is the proverbial bird in hand.

27 This Court has discretion to allow or deny requests for adjournment of proceedings before it. However, that discretion, as all judicial discretion, must be exercised with a view to the fairness of the proceedings to all parties. The impact of denying EIG/KKR's adjournment application is devastating to them and to the investors they represent. However, putting the CCAA proceedings on hold for the next few weeks carries its own costs and risks to the other participating parties.

28 Spartan, as the successful bidder, was not shy about arguing the unfairness inherent in a process that imposed a number of conditions and deadlines on bidders, all of which it met in order to make a firm financial commitment in the midst of a difficult and uncertain market, only to be forced to unilaterally leave its offer on the table while a competing offer is further developed.

29 Certainly, there is more than ample jurisprudence for considering the integrity of the process itself in this analysis; *Grant Forest Products Inc., Re*, 2010 ONSC 1846 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) at paras.28-33. In *Royal Bank v. Soundair Corp.*, 1991 CarswellOnt 205 (Ont. C.A.) at para. 22, the Ontario Court of Appeal adopted the caution of the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal in *Cameron v. Bank of Nova Scotia* (1981), 38 C.B.R. (N.S.) 1 (N.S. C.A.) at p.11:

In my opinion if the decision of the receiver to enter into an agreement of sale, subject to court approval, with respect to certain assets is reasonable and sound under the circumstances at the time existing it should not be set aside simply because a later and higher bid is made. To do so would literally create chaos in the commercial world and receivers and purchasers would never be sure they had a binding agreement.

30 The application to approve the sale in a *CCAA* proceeding is not a "rubber stamp" exercise. The Court must retain and execute its mandate to balance the interests of stakeholders affected by any offer, even one arriving late. However, an important factor in that exercise may be protecting the predictability of the process, for these participants and possibly for others in future proceedings. While buyers, including Spartan, know that their purchase is subject to court approval, any arbitrary exercise of that discretion may well discourage similar transactions necessary to promote the purposes of this legislation.

31 While there was no imminent threat of Spartan withdrawing its offer, the Asset Purchase Agreement approved and executed by Bellatrix' Board of Directors has a June 30, 2020 closing date. No one wants to see that date jeopardized and it already appears that there are a number of pre-closing issues that will need to be addressed in short order to preserve this sale.

32 And practically speaking, while Bellatrix does have access to interim financing, whatever additional costs and losses are incurred over the next few weeks would come directly from the residue of the purchase price going to the first lien noteholders because that financing is a priority charge. They are the ones financing the adjournment and they object to doing so.

33 I am balancing the ongoing costs, not just in Bellatrix' operations but in the continued involvement in this litigation of these many parties, their executives, lawyers and the third-party advisors, as well as the risk, small but serious in consequence, of losing the one Binding Bid made against the chance for EIG/KKR to finalize a proposal in a matter of weeks that has not crystallized in months and still seems somewhat fluid and uncertain.

34 As difficult as the decision is, in my view, the sales process must continue as scheduled. The adjournment request is denied.

Approval of the Asset Purchase Agreement

35 Apart from dismissing the application by EIG/KKR for an adjournment, this Court must still review the Spartan Bid against the statutory and common law criteria for approval. EIG/KKR and the remaining second lien noteholders opposed the sale to Spartan because it provides no recovery to them or any subsequent creditors. Although some parties reserved their rights to argue about the form of Order and their inclusion or exclusion on the anticipated s.11.3 application, no other parties opposed the Spartan Bid.

36 Although the *CCAA* itself contains no description of its objectives, a number of purposes of this legislation have been identified in case law. For our purposes, the most germane include the goal of permitting a company to stay in business and thereby avoid the social and economic costs of liquidation and the goal of giving the company the chance of finding an arrangement acceptable to its creditors or which, at least, seeks to balance the interests of the company's stakeholders.

37 Section 36(3) of the *CCAA* sets out a non-exhaustive list of factors to consider on an application to approve a sale. The related criteria from the common law are included in this list where relevant.

A. Whether the Sales Process was Reasonable

38 There was no real complaint at this application about the form of the SISP approved by this Court in October, 2019. As is often the case, much of the work necessary to proffer the assets for sale had been done prior to the court order. BMO was appointed as the Sale Advisor to assist Bellatrix in soliciting and developing potential bids. The process was to be overseen by the Monitor, as appointed in the Initial Order.

39 The first phase, as mentioned, was just over one month. The deadline for binding bids in Phase II was not included in the SISP or in the SISP Order but was to be set by Bellatrix with the Monitor's consent.

40 The process as envisioned was reasonable. It was also designed to be efficient; *Soundair* at para.16. Bellatrix set the deadline for binding bids at January 13, 2020 and then extended that deadline to February 7, 2020. There was no suggestion that this information was not communicated in a proper and timely way. The period of time between October 9, 2019 and February 7, 2020 was short enough to protect the value of the company assets for sale and long enough to provide Bellatrix with a good look at the market prospects, as discussed *infra*.

41 Not only was there no dispute about the reasonability of the SISP before me, there had been no dispute about the final form of the SISP before the issuing Justice on October 9, 2019. As is often the case, the parties had negotiated their own concessions which were represented in that Order. Indeed, even EIG/KKR made the point that they had negotiated certain concessions in the form of the SISP before it was approved by the Court.

42 I will also address the implementation of the sales process at this juncture, although I realize that is often done separately from a review of the mechanics of the process itself. The relevant cases make it clear, and it is completely intuitive, that the process must not only be designed to be fair but must be fairly implemented.

43 EIG/KKR complained of a number of developments they felt were unfair; that they provided the necessary interim financing in order to protect their interests and then were "cut out" of the final bidding, that the First Lien Lenders opted to finance the Spartan Bid even though EIG/KKR had approached them first) and that EIG/KKR had made it known throughout the sales process that they might wish to put in a credit bid if whatever offer(s) came out of the SISP did not provide for recovery for the second lien noteholders.

44 While it is true that EIG/KKR did provide the interim financing without which Bellatrix would not have had the opportunity to look for a purchaser under the protection of the *CCAA*, it is equally true that EIG/KKR's *quid pro quo* for doing so are the fees and interest payments they will receive in a priority position. It should not be treated as consideration for a strategic advantage to a credit bidder, at least not beyond what was negotiated in the SISP.

45 The First Lien Lenders chose to back the Spartan Bid, even though that offer meant that the first lien debt advanced by that syndicate would not be paid out to those noteholders in full. It did so knowing that EIG/KKR was working on an alternative that would, if successful, see a more full recovery. It is safe to infer that the certainty of the Spartan Bid outweighed the possibility of increased recovery under a much less certain scenario.

46 The Bellatrix Affidavit filed for this application also indicated that the Monitor had been notified at some prior point in time that Spartan might receive confidential information that it ought not to have had. The Monitor investigated and determined that this had not affected the process or provided any advantage to Spartan as a bidder. Given what little information I had about this information and its source, combined with the fact that it was not much pursued in argument, I am similarly convinced that it evidences no impropriety that has affected the sales process or the result.

B. Whether the Monitor approved of the SISP

47 The Monitor supported the Court's approval of the SISP at the October 9, 2019 application.

C. Whether the Monitor Supports the Proposed Sale

48 The Monitor supports the proposed sale of the Bellatrix assets to Spartan for the reasons set out in its Sixth Report. Those reasons included the experience of BMO as the Sale Advisor, the interest expressed in the Bellatrix assets from industry participants, the time taken to market the assets and its own experience in overseeing sales processes similar to this one. The Monitor's opinion was that the process was fair and open. While the Monitor, among others, engaged in ongoing discussions with EIG/KKR, those discussions did not culminate in a binding bid from EIG/KKR or any credit bidder.

49 Because the Monitor is assumed to be independent and experienced, the Court is entitled to rely on the opinion of the Monitor, albeit not blindly. As quoted in *Soundair* at paragraph 21:

If the court were to reject the recommendation of the Receiver in any but the most exceptional circumstances, it would materially diminish and weaken the role of the Receiver both in the perception of receiver and in the perception of any others who might have occasion to deal with them. It would lead to the conclusion that the decision of the Receiver was of little weight and that the real decision was always made upon the motion for approval. That would be a consequence susceptible of immensely damaging results to the disposition of assets by court-appointed receivers; *Crown Trust Co v Rosenberg* (1986), 60 OR (2d) 87 at p.112

50 In my view, the Monitor has discharged its duties to this point and its recommendation that the Spartan Asset Purchase Agreement be approved is entitled to due consideration.

D. The Extent to which the Company's Creditors were Consulted

51 The Monitor's Report and the Affidavit of Mark Caiger of BMO outline the consultations undertaken with the various groups of creditors. EIG/KKR argued that they were not properly consulted because they were not provided with a copy of the final Spartan Asset Purchase Agreement, either as proposed or as signed. They say this was in contravention of Clause 7 of the SISP, which entitled them to receive further, detailed information about a competing third-party bid "in a form satisfactory to Bellatrix and the Monitor, more detailed information in respect of any such Binding Bid, including copies of the Binding Bid and any definitive agreement(s) in connection therewith" (Clause 7, SISP).

52 However, a careful reading of that paragraph shows that the Monitor and BMO expressly retained the ability to vet information given to any credit bidder. While no particularly satisfactory explanation was provided to me as to why that document was not provided to EIG/KKR, I cannot conclude that EIG/KKR suffered any disadvantage as a result.

53 In *Soundair*, the unsuccessful bidder complained it was not given needed information, specifically an offering memorandum. However, the Court found the bidder was not prejudiced by that decision of the Receiver, rather its offer was rejected because it contained a condition unacceptable to the Receiver; *Soundair* at paras.50-57. Similarly, the provision of the Spartan Asset Purchase Agreement itself was not necessary for EIG/KKR to get the financing in place that it was missing.

54 The most important thing for EIG/KKR to know as creditors and potential competing bidders was the information given to them on March 10, 2020; that the only offer left was one that would be insufficient to pay anything beyond a portion of the first lien noteholders. Their real complaint is that the SISP afforded them no set period of time in which to finalize their bid and that Bellatrix, the Monitor and BMO should have put Spartan on ice to afford EIG/KKR an adequate and mutually-communicated/accepted period of time in which to finalize their competing bid.

55 While I understand why EIG/KKR would be unhappy about the way things unfolded, I cannot conclude that the process was unfair to them. The SISP, which they negotiated with Bellatrix and others, did not provide that cushion of time — it only said that credit bids could be submitted after third party bids. The SISP further reserved to BMO and the Monitor the "sole discretion" to decide whether the financing arrangements for any credit bid were satisfactory.

56 When the Bellatrix Board of Directors considered the Spartan offer on April 20, 2020, it opted to lock Spartan in by signing the Asset Purchase Agreement. EIG/KKR was not in a position at that time to give the Board any other viable options, nor had that changed appreciably by the time of this application.

57 Service of Bellatrix' application and supporting Affidavit was effected on April 27, 2020 although the date for the hearing was not set or communicated until April 30, 2020. There was almost two weeks between service of the application and the return date of the motion. EIG/KKR certainly moved quickly within that time to put together their own Affidavit and to provide written confirmation of CIBC's interest. However, it was not the timing of the motion that was problematic, it was the failure of EIG/KKR to advance a firm competing offer before that; if not after March 10, 2020 then after April 23, 2020 when they learned more specifics of the Spartan transaction from the public announcement.

E. The Effects of the Proposed Sale on Creditors and Other Stakeholders

58 While this Court is to consider the effect of the proposed sale on all stakeholders, the primary stakeholders are obviously the company's creditors. They have financed the company to their detriment and now hold compromised security for those debts. They have only the process itself to assist them.

59 The Spartan Bid will see the first lien noteholders paid a portion of their outstanding debt but not all. The second and third lien noteholders will receive nothing. While some of the earlier non-binding bids would have been sufficient to pay the first lien debt in full plus some of the second lien debt, making the second lien noteholders the fulcrum creditors, that shifted

over time to the point where the only certain offer on the table no longer covered the first lien noteholders. As I understand the Monitor's argument, that meant that the first lien noteholders became the fulcrum creditors and thus their preferences took on more importance.

60 Assuming that I am understanding the meaning of the term correctly, I accept the Monitor's submissions. That does not absolve the Monitor nor the Bellatrix Board from consideration of other creditors, nor was that suggested; *Soundair* at para.21. Rather, it was argued that the Bellatrix Board, with assistance from BMO and the Monitor, did consider the effect on these stakeholders before accepting the Spartan Bid.

61 The Spartan Asset Purchase Agreement obligates Spartan to assume the obligations and liabilities, except relating to excluded assets. This will include environmental liabilities, as well as employment, regulatory and contractual obligations. The parties represented at the approval hearing included various contracting parties and regulators, all of whom supported the Spartan Bid. While they cannot be assumed to be overly concerned about which of Bellatrix' creditors receive payment, it is important to remember that these other stakeholders do represent the beneficiaries of a sale of the company as a going concern. From an overarching economic view, keeping contracts intact and people employed is a significant and positive factor.

62 It is axiomatic that considering someone's interests is not the same thing as satisfying those interests. I accept the submissions of Bellatrix, the Monitor, BMO and the other parties supporting the Spartan bid that the interests of all parties and particularly the creditors were considered. The weighing of these competing interests and the ultimate decision by the Board to accept the Spartan bid are discussed below.

F. Is the Sale Price Fair and Reasonable?

63 For EIG/KKR, the price on the proposed sale does not seem fair or reasonable because it believes that, given more time, it could present an offer to purchase the Bellatrix assets for much more than Spartan has offered. As I said in my brief oral decision, if the Westbrick offer had included committed financing, was unconditional and irrevocable and for a much higher price, that may have changed the assessment of the Spartan bid. Where a substantially higher bid turns up at the approval stage, it may indicate that all reasonable attempts to get the best offer were not made; *Soundair* at para. 28 quoting from *Beauty Counsellors of Canada Ltd., Re* (1986), 58 C.B.R. (N.S.) 237 (Ont. S.C.).

64 However, the Westbrick offer cannot be said to be truly comparable to the Spartan Bid because of its outstanding conditions. The Bellatrix Board of Directors, the first lien noteholders and all the independent advisors to the company recommended a lower but certain offer over a higher but uncertain offer. The Board of Directors, who have statutory and common law fiduciary obligations to act in the best interests of the company as a whole, considered their options and chose this proposal. In fact, they committed to the sale in order to make sure that the one Binding Bid they did have did not disappear before this application could be heard and decided. The exercise of their business judgment deserves a measure of deference.

65 The directors were assisted, as was Bellatrix and as is this Court, by an independent Monitor and an independent Sale Advisor, both of whom were working to find an arrangement that would benefit the entire economic community, with focus on the creditors. Bellatrix received six conditional non-binding offers during Phase II but no binding bids, plus two additional non-binding bids after February 6, 2020. Bellatrix, BMO and the Monitor then continued to work with all these bidders and with EIG/KKR to try and convert non-binding bids into binding bids.

66 I am satisfied that the sufficient efforts were made to find the best possible price. While it will satisfy only a small portion of the company's entire debt, it is still the only unconditional offer in play, notwithstanding the time anticipated by the SISF plus the additional time since Phase II officially expired in February. As so succinctly put in *Nortel Networks Corp., Re*, 2009 CarswellOnt 4467 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) at para.49, there is no better viable alternative.

Conclusion

67 The fact that the only offeror willing to make an unconditional, fully financed commitment will still result in a shortfall is not evidence that the process was flawed or unfair, that stakeholders were ignored or that the price is not reasonable. Rather,

the fact that a court-approved and competently-managed sales process narrowed to only one viable offer when conditions had to be removed is reflective of the challenges in our economic markets and in this industry in particular.

68 It is understandable, even if not ideal, that the Bellatrix directors ultimately concluded that accepting the Spartan offer was in the best interests of the company and its stakeholders collectively. The fact that that decision is now supported by virtually all affected parties is also important.

69 I am satisfied that Bellatrix has met the tests, both statutory and common law, for approving the Spartan Asset Purchase Agreement.

Sealing Orders

70 Bellatrix applied to seal confidential portions of and supplements to the Monitors' reports. EIG/KKR applied to seal the Affidavit of Eric Long. No parties opposed any of this relief. As the Spartan Asset Purchase Agreement has yet to close and having reviewed the information sought to be sealed, I am satisfied that the tests for doing so have been satisfied; *Sierra Club of Canada v. Canada (Minister of Finance)*, 2002 SCC 41 (S.C.C.) at para.53

71 The sealing orders requested are granted. Counsel are requested to include in the form of Order time limits for the expiration thereof.

Application granted.

TAB 10

2012 QCCS 4074
Cour supérieure du Québec

Aveos Fleet Performance Inc./Aveos performance aéronautique inc., Re

2012 CarswellQue 8620, 2012 QCCS 4074, 231 A.C.W.S. (3d) 128, EYB 2012-210535

In the matter of the proposed plan of compromise and arrangement of: Aveos Fleet Performance Inc./Aveos performance aéronautique inc. and Aero Technical US, Inc., Debtors-Petitioners, and FTI Consulting Canada Inc., Monitor, v. MTU Aero Engines GMBH and International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, Contesting parties, and Lufthansa Technik AG, Air Canada, Crédit Suisse AG, Cayman Island Branch, as Fondé de Pouvoir, Aveos Holding Company, as Fondé de Pouvoir, Breof/Belmont Ban L.P., The Attorney General of Canada, Aon Hewitt, as Administrator of the Aveos Fleet Performance Inc. pension plans, Quebec Revenue Agency, Canada Revenue Agency and Registrar of the Personal and Movable real rights Register of Quebec, Mis en cause

Gouin J.C.S.

Heard: 22 august 2012 - 23 august 2012

Judgment: 24 august 2012

Docket: C.S. Qué. Montréal 500-11-042345-120

Counsel: *Me Roger Simard, Me Ari Sorek*, for Debtors/Petitioners

Me Sylvain Rigaud, for Monitor

Me François Gagnon, Me Vanessa Jodoin, for MTU Aero Engines GmbH

Me Gerry Apostolatos, Me Hugh O'Reilly, for International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers

Me Luc Béliveau, Me Luc Morin, for Lufthansa Technik AG

Me Louise-Hélène Sénécal, for Air Canada

Me Bernard Boucher, for Credit Suisse AG, et al

Subject: Insolvency

Gouin J.S.C.:

JUDGMENT (on the Assignment of the Air Canada Contract)

INTRODUCTION

1 The Court is seized with a « Motion for an Order Authorizing the Assignment [to Lufthansa] of the Air Canada Contract and for a Vesting Order » (the « *Aveos Motion* »), presented by the Debtor Aveos Fleet Performance Inc. (« *Aveos* »), pursuant to Section 36 of the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* (the « *CCAA* ») ¹.

2 The Court is also seized with a « Motion to Approve the Assignment to MTU of the Air Canada Contract and other Assets and for the Issuance of a Vesting Order » (the « *MTU Motion* »), presented by the Contesting Party MTU Aero Engines GmbH (« *MTU* »).

3 All capitalized terms, not otherwise defined herein, shall have the meaning ascribed to them in the Aveos Motion.

CONTEXT

4 On April 20, 2012, Justice Mark Schragger, j.s.c., issued an order² (the « *DPO* ») approving a divestiture process (the « *Divestiture Process* ») to be followed by Aveos for the sale of some of its assets. As of today, the Divestiture Process was successfully implemented in 12 different transactions.

5 On May 30, 2012, Aveos and the *Mise-en-cause Air Canada* entered into an Engine Maintenance Services Agreement for Air Canada's CFM56-5A and CFM56-5B aircraft engines (the « *Air Canada Contract* »)³, with the express intent and purpose of having same assigned by Aveos to a designated assignee acceptable to Air Canada, on or prior to August 15, 2012. Since then, this delay has been extended to August 24, 2012, at 7:00 pm, as confirmed by Air Canada's counsel during the hearing on August 23, 2012.

6 Aveos, with the help of its chief restructuring officer, Mr Jonathan Solursh (the « *CRO* »), and the Monitor, followed the procedure provided in the Divestiture Process to find qualified bidders for the assignment of the Air Canada Contract.

7 Two qualified bidders were retained by Aveos, namely MTU and the *Mise-en-cause Lufthansa Technik AG* (« *Lufthansa* ») and, at the end of the bidding process, Lufthansa's bid was accepted by Aveos, hence the Aveos Motion.

8 Both, Lufthansa and MTU are assignees acceptable to Air Canada pursuant to the Air Canada Contract.

9 The *Mise-en-cause Credit Suisse AG* (« *Credit Suisse* »), as *fondé de pouvoir* for secured creditors, intervenes to support the Aveos Motion and to remind all Aveos' stakeholders that it holds first ranking rights on the Air Canada Contract and on the proceeds of sale thereof.

10 MTU contests the granting of the Aveos Motion on the basis that the implementation of the Divestiture Process was deprived of the needed transparency, integrity and efficacy, and was unfair toward MTU.

11 Therefore, by the MTU Motion, MTU requests the Court to dismiss the Aveos Motion and to authorize the assignment of the Air Canada Contract to it, subject to the terms of its final bid tabled with Aveos on August 7, 2012 (the « *MTU Bid* »)⁴, as amended on August 9 and 14, 2012.

12 The Contesting Party International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (the « *Union* »), which represents approximately 2 500 former employees of Aveos across Canada, contests the Aveos Motion and supports the MTU Motion, specially on the basis that it would preserve more jobs in Canada.

13 Lufthansa supports the Aveos Motion and contests the MTU Motion.

TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE

14 As mentioned above, the Air Canada Contract provides expressly that its assignment has to take place on or prior to August 24, 2012, at 7:00 pm. If it is not assigned by that time, the Air Canada Contract « shall irrevocably terminate »⁵.

15 This means that by the end of the day today, the Air Canada Contract will be worth nothing for Aveos and all its stakeholders.

16 This is a crucial element for this Judgment. Time is of the essence for all interested parties, including this Court.

17 In those circumstances, this judgment will be limited to the most essential elements of the debate, so as to avoid a contestation only on principles.

COURT AUTHORIZED DIVESTITURE PROCESS

18 One other crucial element for this Judgment is that, as mentioned above, the Divestiture Process followed by Aveos for the assignment of the Air Canada Contract has already been approved and authorized by this Court pursuant to the DPO, with no objection or contestation whatsoever from any person.

19 Furthermore, any bidder was requested to represent and warrant that it « has reviewed and accepted in full the terms and conditions of the Divestiture Process [under the DPO] », as did MTU on June 6, 2012⁶ and on August 7, 2012⁷, when it tabled the MTU Bid.

20 Therefore, the Divestiture Process, including all its steps and phases, its appropriateness and efficiency, cannot be challenged at this point in time. The Divestiture Process of the Air Canada Contract is governed by a final judgment⁸, namely the DPO.

21 As the Court mentioned to the parties, the Divestiture Process provided under the DPO is quite unique, specially in light of the following two articles :

4. PHASE 2: NEGOTIATION OF BIDS

4.1 Aveos will negotiate with the Phase 2 Qualified Bidders to finalize the terms of their Bids. This process may involve discussions between each Phase 2 Qualified Bidder and customers, the IAMAW, regulatory authorities and other interested parties. Eight calendar days is the time period allocated for such discussions. Two additional days will be set aside for face to face negotiations between Aveos and Phase 2 Qualified Bidders, pursuant to a final private and confidential closed auction to negotiate, finalize and select the Accepted Bids.

4.2 Upon a final Phase 2 Qualified Bid being executed by a Bidder on terms acceptable to Aveos, Aveos may accept such Bid subject to (i) approval by the Monitor and (ii) Court authorization and the issuance of a Vesting Order and such Phase 2 Qualified Bid shall constitute an Accepted bid.

(The Court underlines)

22 The crux of the debate between Aveos and MTU boils down to the interpretation and implementation of these two articles.

23 Essentially, when a bidder becomes a « Phase 2 Qualified Bidder », he has eight calendar days (this delay was extended to 60 days in the present instance) to discuss with third parties, in order to cleanse any conditions or pending matters related to his bid, so as to table an unconditional bid for the final phase, namely the private auction provided in the last sentence of article 4.1 of the Divestiture Process (the « *Private Auction* »).

24 Moreover, there is an ultimate phase further to the Private Auction, namely the acceptance, by Aveos, of such unconditional winning bid, with terms acceptable to Aveos, and signed by the winning bidder, as provided in article 4.2 of the Divestiture Process.

25 This means that Aveos may even decide to refuse such unconditional and signed winning bid resulting from the Private Auction, and acceptable to Aveos.

26 The Divestiture Process says what it says. In fact, it was structured so as to maximize Aveos' chances of getting as much value as possible for its assets and, for that purpose, it provides for applicable « informal » and « *de bene esse* » rules or, put differently, it does not provide for « formal » rules.

27 As the Court pointed out during the hearing, it is a kind of « extreme sport », and the choice is « you play the game » or « you don't play the game ». But if you decide to bid, you know the process and applicable rules, and you accept them, together with the ensuing risks and consequences.

28 But, having said that, the Divestiture Process still needs to be implemented transparently, fairly and with integrity. MTU argues that it has not been toward it, hence the MTU Motion.

MTU'S CONTESTATION

29 Essentially, MTU alleges, *inter alia*, that :

- a. it was induced by the CRO to submit its best offer (« please put your best foot forward in the bidding »⁹) by August 7, 2012 (the « **Alleged Deadline** »);
- b. there has never been any mention of a subsequent Private Auction after the Alleged Dead Line; on the contrary, MTU was induced by the CRO to believe that the bidding process will be final by the Alleged Deadline, subject to Aveos' acceptance of the winning bid;
- c. according to MTU, the MTU Bid tabled by the Alleged Deadline, which was conditional to purchasing also tooling equipment (the « **Tooling** »), was higher than the bid tabled by Lufthansa on that same day (the « **Lufthansa Bid** »);
- d. at a breakfast held on August 8, 2012, the CRO asked MTU if there was any way to extract more value from the MTU Bid; later that day, the CRO amounted the expected increase at between 500 000 \$ and 550 000 \$. MTU was astonished by such a request;
- e. MTU always understood that the tabled bids were only subject to Aveos' review and analysis, to be followed by Aveos' decision with respect to the winning bidder and which would be provided by no later than August 10, 2012;
- f. In fact, Aveos has accepted Lufthansa as winning bidder further to the latter increasing the amount of the Lufthansa Bid twice on August 9, 2012, namely after the Alleged Deadline;
- g. Aveos changed the rules of the game in the course of the Divestiture Process, and it was impossible for MTU to obtain necessary board approval in order to increase the MTU Bid. Nevertheless, on August 9, 2012, MTU increased the MTU Bid by 200 000 \$, but to be applied on the Tooling;
- h. therefore, these irregularities in the Divestiture Process pursuant to the DPO have jeopardized the integrity and efficacy thereof, and introduced unfairness in the process.

UNION'S CONTESTATION

30 The Union supports the MTU Motion and believes that, if the MTU Bid is approved by the Court, it will preserve between 100 and 150 jobs in Canada.

31 The Union stresses on the fact that the former employees are also creditors of Aveos, and are key commercial stakeholders of Aveos.

32 The Union submits that when balancing the various factors outlined in Section 36 of the CCAA, the Court should take into account, *inter alia*, maintaining jobs in the Canadian community.

AVEOS' and CRO'S POSITION

33 Aveos and the CRO submit that they have strictly applied the Divestiture Process provided under the DPO, including holding the Private Auction.

34 In fact, the Alleged Deadline was the starting point of the Private Auction, and its communication with MTU on August 9, 2012, resulted in an increase of the MTU Bid, albeit MTU was surprised by this last phase.

35 In any event, MTU had already decided that it will not increase the portion of the MTU Bid applicable to the Air Canada Contract¹⁰, it was rather betting on the apparent added value in preserving some highly-qualified jobs, but with no firm commitment in that regard.

36 MTU was only prepared to slightly increase the MTU Bid on the Tooling, which was unacceptable to Aveos, as the Tooling had already been sold to a liquidator, namely Maynards Industries Ltd.

37 This condition was a real problem for Aveos, as the MTU Bid could not, in any event, be accepted as such. It had to be withdrawn by the Alleged Deadline, but it was not.

38 In such circumstances, Aveos and the CRO had to discount the negative impact of such condition when they analyzed and compared the MTU Bid to the Lufthansa Bid, thereby reducing the assessed value of the MTU Bid for the Air Canada Contract. The Lufthansa Bid was then slightly higher than the MTU Bid ¹¹.

39 On the other hand, Aveos and the CRO point out that Lufthansa abided by the rules of the Divestiture Process, and participated in the Private Auction.

40 Indeed, Lufthansa doubled the amount of the Lufthansa Bid in the morning of August 9, 2012, and increased it by an additional 50% of the original amount, late afternoon, on August 9, 2012. ¹²

41 Face with such substantial increases, Aveos had no choice but to accept the increased Lufthansa Bid, compared to a much lower and conditional MTU Bid.

42 It is only on August 14, 2012, namely the day the Aveos Motion was initially scheduled to proceed before Justice Jean-Yves Lalonde, j.s.c., for court authorization of the increased Lufthansa Bid, that MTU finally waived its condition relating to the purchase of the Tooling.

43 Aveos and the CRO submit that if MTU misunderstood the Divestiture Process or made the wrong assumptions, it cannot blame anyone but itself. Indeed, MTU retained Canadian counsel only on August 9, 2012, but, on June 6 and August 7, 2012, it warranted and represented, in the MTU Bid, that it « has reviewed and accepted in full the terms and conditions of the Divestiture Process » ¹³.

44 To accept MTU's position would be to disregard the rules of the Divestiture Process, and would be totally unfair to Lufthansa.

LUFTHANSA POSITION

45 Lufthansa understood very well the bidding process provided under the Divestiture Process, and it abided by it.

46 Lufthansa insists, it should not be the victim of MTU's wrong assumptions, and MTU's misinterpretation and misunderstanding of the Divestiture Process, otherwise it would be unfair to Lufthansa.

MONITOR'S POSITION

47 The Monitor, in addition to the points raised by Aveos and the CRO, confirms ¹⁴ that the whole bidding process was reasonable and conducted in accordance with the rules provided in the Divestiture Process, and was fair and transparent. He strongly supports the Aveos Motion.

ISSUE

48 The only issue is whether or not the bidding process provided under the Divestiture Process pursuant to the DPO was implemented with transparency, integrity and efficacy, and was fair toward MTU.

LAW

49 Section 36(3) of the CCAA lists some of the factors that the Court considers before authorizing a sale of assets. They are :

- a. whether the process leading to the proposed sale or disposition was reasonable in the circumstances;
- b. whether the monitor approved the process leading to the proposed sale or disposition;
- c. whether the monitor filed with the court a report stating that in their opinion the sale or disposition would be more beneficial to the creditors than a sale or disposition under a bankruptcy;
- d. the extent to which the creditors were consulted;
- e. the effects of the proposed sale or disposition on the creditors and other interested parties; and
- f. whether the consideration to be received for the assets is reasonable and fair, taking into account their market value.

50 As a reminder and for the purposes hereof, the Court refers to the following principles developed by the case law on this topic :

a. 44 I agree with the submission of counsel on behalf of the Applicant that the list of factors set out in s. 36(3) largely overlaps with the criteria established in *Royal Bank of Canada v. Soundair Corp.* (1991), 4 O.R. (3d) 1 (C.A.) [*Soundair*]. *Soundair* summarized the factors the court should consider when assessing whether to approve a transaction to sell assets:

(a) whether the court-appointed officer has made sufficient effort to get the best price and has not acted improvidently;

(b) the interests of all parties;

(c) the efficacy and integrity of the process by which offers are obtained; and

(d) whether there has been unfairness in the working out of the process. »¹⁵

b. 29 It is now well established in insolvency law in Canada that once a process has been put in place by Court Order for the sale of assets of a failing business, that process should be honoured, excepting extraordinary circumstances. »¹⁶

c. 40 The parties have agreed to go through the bidding process. Once the bidding process is started, then there is no coming back. Or if there is coming back, it is because the process is vitiated by an illegality or non-compliance of proper procedures and not because a bidder has decided to credit bid in accordance with the bidding procedures previously adopted by the Court. »¹⁷

d. [73] Le rôle et l'opinion du Contrôleur et l'approbation du processus proposé par la Débitrice ne peut non plus être écarté à la légère. En l'absence d'une démonstration claire et non-équivoque d'une mauvaise interprétation des faits de sa part, le Tribunal doit faire preuve de grande prudence avant de mettre son opinion et ses conclusions de côté et d'y substituer sa propre décision. »¹⁸

e. « 70 That being so, it is not for this Court to second-guess the commercial and business judgment properly exercised by the Petitioners and the Monitor.

71 A court will not lightly interfere with the exercise of this commercial and business judgment in the context of an asset sale where the marketing and sale process was fair, reasonable, transparent and efficient. This is certainly not a case where it should. »¹⁹

f. « 59 The balance of interests clearly favours approval. The Monitor supports and recommends the approval sought. The recommendation of the Monitor, a court-appointed officer experienced in the insolvency field, carries great weight with

the Court in any approval process. Absent some compelling, exceptional factor to the contrary, a Court should accept an applicant's proposed sale process where it is recommended by the Monitor and supported by the Stakeholders[FN6]. »²⁰

DISCUSSION

51 Essentially, MTU is asking the Court to confirm that the Divestiture Process provided under the DPO was amended further to the CRO requesting MTU « *to put your best foot forward in the bidding* » by August 7, 2012, thereby eliminating any subsequent bidding phase, namely the Private Auction or, put differently, that August 7, 2012 was the closure of the Private Auction.

52 The Court is satisfied, after almost two days of hearing, that the Divestiture Process has not been amended and has been followed in accordance with its term and conditions.

53 The evidence adduced does not support the alleged unfairness in the implementation of the Divestiture Process. MTU has not been treated unfairly.

54 In a nutshell, the Court retains the following from its judiciary review of the « global picture » in this matter :

- a. The Divestiture Process was duly approved and authorized by the DPO.
- b. On June 6 and August 7, 2012, MTU represented and warranted that it « has reviewed and accepted in full the terms and conditions of the Divestiture Process ».
- c. The Divestiture Process provides for an informal Private Auction once the « Phase 2 Qualified Bids » have cleansed their respective bids, in order to obtain unconditional bids.
- d. At the beginning of the Private Auction, namely on August 7, 2012, the MTU Bid was still conditional to its purchase of the Tooling. That condition was withdrawn only on August 14, 2012, namely after the closure of the Private Auction.
- e. Between August 8 and 10, 2012, MTU was not prevented from increasing or improving its MTU Bid. On the contrary, it was allowed every possible chance to increase the MTU Bid and, in fact, MTU increased it by 200 000 \$.
- f. During that same period, Lufthansa increased the Lufthansa Bid by 2 1/2 times the original amount thereof, which is significantly higher than what is allocated under the MTU Bid for the Air Canada Contract.
- g. Credit Suisse has prior ranking rights on the Air Canada Contract, and on the proceeds of sale thereof. It is an important player in the Divestiture Process and it supports the Aveos Motion.
- h. Lufthansa followed and abided by the rules of the Divestiture Process, and it should not be penalized by MTU's misunderstanding thereof.
- i. If, as suggested by MTU, the Divestiture Process was implicitly amended by the CRO through conversations and exchanges of letters and emails, MTU should then have raised questions, specially when it was asked to « please put your best foot forward in the bidding ».
- j. MTU cannot draw such conclusion from its personal interpretation of the facts and circumstances. The terms of the Divestiture Process prevail.
- k. MTU's argument to the effect that, if it had known that there would be a Private Auction beginning on August 7, 2012, it would have obtained the necessary internal board's authorization and would not have tabled its best offer on August 7, 2012, as requested by the CRO, is untenable.

- l. In a negotiation mode, you are always asked to give your best offer. In a certain way, it only confirms that MTU was not prepared to offer more for the Air Canada Contract, hence its denial of the Private Auction phase.
- m. Furthermore, even if, only for discussion purposes, the Alleged Deadline was the closure of the Private Auction, the Lufthansa Bid is still slightly higher than the MTU Bid.
- n. MTU cannot ask that the potential job opportunities be considered as adding value to the MTU Bid. Unfortunately, at that point in time, only firm commitments count, not « wishes ».
- o. The Monitor²¹ and the CRO²² confirm the transparency, integrity, efficacy and fairness of the implementation of the Divestiture Process, including toward MTU, and they support the Aveos Motion
- p. Last but not least, if the Air Canada Contract is not assigned by 7:00 pm today, it will irrevocably terminate and be worth nothing for Aveos and its stakeholders.

CONCLUSION

55 The Court is of the opinion that the Divestiture Process, authorized pursuant to the DPO and followed for the assignment of the Air Canada Contract, was implemented with transparency, integrity and efficacy, and that the whole process was fair toward MTU. The opposite decision would, inevitably, be unfair toward Lufthansa.

56 Therefore, the Aveos Motion will be granted, and the MTU Motion will be dismissed, both without costs, considering the urgency and complexity of the matter, and the number of parties involved.

56 *FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT :*

57 *DISMISSES* MTU Aero Engines GmbH'S « Motion to Approve the Assignment to MTU of the Air Canada Contract and other Assets and for the Issuance of a Vesting Order » (MTU Motion);

58 *GRANTS* the Debtors/Petitioners' « Motion for an Order Authorizing the Assignment of a Contract by the Petitioners and for a Vesting Order (Air Canada Contract) » (Aveos Motion) (the « *Motion* »);

59 *DECLARES* sufficient and valid the service and notice of the Motion on all persons and *DISPENSES* with any further requirements for service or notice thereof;

60 *DECLARES* that all capitalized terms not otherwise defined herein shall have the meaning ascribed to them in the Initial Order, as amended and restated, or, otherwise, in the Motion;

61 *AUTHORIZES* Aveos Fleet Performance Inc./Aveos Performance Aéronautique Inc. (hereinafter "*Aveos*") to enter into and give effect to the asset purchase agreement, being *Exhibit P-1* to the Motion, (the "*LHT Agreement*") between Aveos and Lufthansa Technik AG (together with any designated affiliate, the "*Purchaser*");

62 *AUTHORIZES* and *RATIFIES* the LHT Agreement and the transaction contemplated therein (the "*Transaction*"), and *ORDERS* that Exhibit P-1 be sealed and that a redacted copy removing financial or confidential information therefrom be filed in the Court record and made available to the Service List;

63 *AUTHORIZES* the assignment of the Engine Maintenance Services Agreement between Aveos and Air Canada dated May 30, 2012 (the "*Air Canada Contract*") to LHT;

64 *AUTHORIZES* Aveos to perform its obligations under the LHT Agreement and the Transaction;

65 *AUTHORIZES* Aveos to:

a) take any and all actions necessary to proceed with the LHT Agreement and the Transaction, including, without limitation, to execute and deliver any documents and assurances governing or giving effect to the LHT Agreement and the Transaction as Aveos, in its discretion, may deem to be reasonably necessary or advisable to conclude the LHT Agreement and the Transaction, including the execution of such deeds, contracts, or documents as may be contemplated in the LHT Agreement and all such deeds, contracts or documents are hereby ratified, approved and confirmed; and

b) take any and all steps, as are, in the opinion of Aveos, necessary or incidental to the performance of its obligations pursuant to the LHT Agreement and the Transaction;

66 *ORDERS* and *DECLARES* that, upon the delivery of a Monitor's certificate, to the Purchaser, substantially in the form attached as *Schedule A* hereto (the "*Monitor's Certificate*"), all of Aveos' right, title, benefit and interest in and to the Air Canada Contract, shall vest absolutely and exclusively in the Purchaser, free and clear of and from any and all rights, titles, interests, security interests (whether contractual, statutory, or otherwise), hypothecs (legal or contractual), prior claims, mortgages, pledges, trusts, deeds of trust or deemed trusts (whether contractual, statutory or otherwise), liens (statutory or otherwise), executions, levies, charges or other financial or monetary claims, options, rights of first offer or first refusal, real property licences, encumbrances, obligations, conditional sale arrangements, adverse claims, priorities, options, judgments, writs of seizure and sale, leasing agreements or other similar restrictions of any kind, whether attached, perfected, registered or filed and whether secured, unsecured, legal, possessory or otherwise, remedies from facts which exist as at or before the Closing of the Transaction (as defined in the LHT Agreement), whether known or unknown, or any and all other rights of use, disputes and debts of all persons or entities of any kind whatsoever and howsoever arising, each of which and collectively being herein referred to as the "*Claims*," including, without limiting the generality of the foregoing:

a) any encumbrance or charge created by the Initial Order, as amended, or by any other order of this Court in these proceedings;

b) all charges, security interests or claims, inasmuch as they relate to property of Aveos, evidenced by registration at or with the Quebec Personal and Movable Real Rights Registry (Québec) ("**RDPRM**"), the Quebec Land Registry, any provincial personal property registry system including without limitation, registrations pursuant to the Personal Property Security Act (Ontario), the Personal Property Security Act (Manitoba) and the Personal Property Security Act (British Columbia), the Canadian Intellectual Property Office or any other personal property registry system, or pursuant to the Bank Act (Canada), the Trademarks Act (Canada) or any other legislation;

67 *ORDERS* and *DECLARES*, for greater certainty, that all hypothecs, encumbrances and Claims affecting or relating to the Air Canada Contract, upon delivery of the Monitor's Certificate, be and are expunged and discharged as against the Air Canada Contract;

68 *ORDERS* that, upon receipt of a copy of the signed Monitor's Certificate having been delivered to the Purchaser, Aveos is authorized to receive payment of the Purchase Price from the Purchaser;

69 *DECLARES* that notwithstanding

a) the pendency of these proceedings;

b) any application for a bankruptcy order issued pursuant to the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3 (the "**BIA**") in respect of Aveos and any bankruptcy order issued pursuant to any such applications; and

c) any assignment in bankruptcy or any receivership;

the LHT Agreement and Transaction shall be binding on any trustee in bankruptcy or receiver that may be appointed in respect of Aveos and shall not be void or voidable and shall not be deemed to be a settlement, fraudulent preference, assignment, or fraudulent conveyance, transfer for under value or other reviewable transaction under the CCAA, the BIA,

Articles 1631 et seq. of the *Civil Code of Québec*, S.Q. 1991, c. 164 ("C.C.Q.") or any other applicable federal or provincial legislation;

70 *ORDERS* and *DIRECTS* the Monitor to file with the Court a copy of the Monitor's Certificate, forthwith after execution and delivery thereof;

71 *DECLARES* that the present Order constitutes the only authorization required by Aveos to proceed with the LHT Agreement and the Transaction and, for greater certainty, *DECLARES* that the parties involved in the LHT Agreement are exempted from requiring or obtaining any authorization that may be required from any person or authority whatsoever;

72 *DECLARES* that for the purposes of determining the nature and priority of Claims, the net proceeds from the sale of the Air Canada Contract shall stand in place and stead of the Air Canada Contract and that, from and after the delivery of the Monitor's Certificate, all Claims shall attach to the proceeds from the sale of the Air Canada Contract with the same priority as they had with respect to the Air Canada Contract immediately prior to the sale, as if the Air Canada Contract had not been sold;

73 *ORDERS* that neither the Purchaser nor any affiliate thereof shall assume or be deemed to assume any liabilities or obligations whatsoever of any of Aveos or the mis en causes (other than as expressly assumed under the terms of the LHT Agreement or the Transaction or of the present Order);

74 *ORDERS* that the LHT Agreement being Exhibit P-1 to the Motion, and any related or ancillary agreements shall not be repudiated, disclaimed or otherwise compromised in these proceedings;

75 *ORDERS* that all persons shall cooperate fully with Aveos and the mis en cause, the Purchaser and their respective affiliates and the Monitor and do all such things that are necessary or desirable for the purposes of giving effect to and in furtherance of the present Order, the LHT Agreement and the Transaction;

76 *REQUESTS* the aid and recognition of any Court or administrative body in any Province of Canada and any Canadian federal court or administrative body and any federal or state court or administrative body in the United States of America and any court or administrative body elsewhere, to act in aid of and to be complementary to this Court in carrying out the terms of the present Order;

77 *ORDERS* that the present Order shall have full force and effect in all provinces and territories in Canada;

78 *ORDERS* the provisional execution of the present Order, notwithstanding any appeal and without the necessity of furnishing any security;

79 *THE WHOLE WITHOUT COSTS.*

APPENDIX

SCHEDULE A

Superior Court of Quebec 500-11-042345-120

Monitor's Certificate

(Pursuant to the Order rendered by the Hon. Louis J. Gouin, j.s.c., on August 24, 2012)

Pursuant to an Order of the Honourable Mark Schragar, j.s.c. of the Superior Court of Quebec (the "*Court*") dated March 19, 2012, as amended and restated by further Orders issued on March 30, 2012, April 5, 2012 and May 4, 2012 (collectively, the "*Initial Order*"), FTI Consulting Canada Inc. was appointed monitor (the "*Monitor*") of Aveos Fleet Performance Inc./Aveos Performance Aéronautique Inc. ("*Aveos*") and of Aero Technical US, Inc. (together with Aveos, the "*Petitioners*") under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 (as amended, the "*CCAA*"). Pursuant to the Initial Order and from further Orders issued by the Court, the Petitioners benefit from a stay of proceedings granted thereby pursuant to the CCAA.

Pursuant to an Order of the Court dated August 24, 2012 (the "*Authorization of Sale and Vesting Order*") the Court, *inter alia*, authorized and approved the transaction and conveyance and the assignment of the Air Canada Contract by and between the Petitioners on the one hand, and Lufthansa Technik AG, on the other hand (together with any designated affiliate, the "*Purchaser*"), and provided for, among other things, the vesting in the Purchaser of all of the Petitioners' rights, title and interest in and to the Air Canada Contract, free and clear of any and all Claims, encumbrances, charges, liens and hypothecs, the whole in accordance with the *Authorization of Sale and Vesting Order*, which vesting is to be effective with respect to the Purchased Assets and Air Canada Contract upon delivery by the Monitor to the Purchaser of this certificate;

Unless otherwise indicated herein, capitalized terms have the meaning ascribed to them in the *Authorization of Sale and Vesting Order*;

THE MONITOR HEREBY CERTIFIES that:

1. It has received written confirmation from the Petitioners that the closing of the LHT Transaction has occurred; and
2. The LHT Transaction has been completed to the satisfaction of the Monitor.

MADE AT MONTRÉAL, THIS DAY OF , 2012.

Footnotes

- 1 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36.
- 2 Exhibit P-4.
- 3 Exhibit P-5.
- 4 Exhibit MTU-20.
- 5 Exhibit P-6, page 3, middle paragr.
- 6 Exhibit MTU-9, art. 7.1(d)(iii).
- 7 Exhibit MTU-20, art. 7.1(d)(iii).
- 8 Exhibit P-4.
- 9 Exhibits MTU-15, MTU-16, MTU-17, MTU-18 and MTU-19.
- 10 Exhibit P-7.
- 11 A bid analysis was provided by Aveos to the Court (the « **Bid Analysis** »), but kept « under seal », as the dollar amount of Lufthansa Bid is very sensitive, and confidential.
- 12 Bid Analysis.
- 13 Exhibits MTU-9 and MTU-20, art. 7.1(d)(iii).
- 14 Monitor's Thirteenth Report, dated August 13, 2012.
- 15 [Re Terrace Bay Pulp Inc., 2012 CarswellONT 9470 \(OSCJ Commercial List\)](#).
- 16 [Re Grant Forest Products Inc., 2010 ONSC 1846 \(OSCJ-Commercial List\)](#).

- 17 [Re White Birch Paper Holding Co.. 2010 QCCS 4915 \(leave to appeal refused 2010 QCCA 1950\).](#)
- 18 [White Birch Paper Holding Company \(Arrangements relatif à\) 2011 QCCS 7304.](#)
- 19 [Re AbitibiBowater Inc. et al., 2010 QCCS 1742.](#)
- 20 [Re AbitibiBowater Inc. et al., 2009 QCCS 6460.](#)
- 21 [Monitor's Thirteenth Report, dated August 13, 2012.](#)
- 22 [Addendum to the CRO's Sixth Report, dated August 13, 2012.](#)

End of Document

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TAB 11

2010 QCCS 1742
Quebec Superior Court

AbitibiBowater, Re

2010 CarswellQue 4082, 2010 QCCS 1742, 190 A.C.W.S. (3d)
679, 71 C.B.R. (5th) 220, J.E. 2010-962, EYB 2010-173333

In the Matter of A Plan of Compromise or Arrangement of: AbitibiBowater Inc., Abitibi-Consolidated Inc., Bowater Canadian Holdings Inc. and The other Petitioners listed on Schedules "A", "B" and "C" (Debtors) and Ernst & Young Inc. (Monitor) and The Land Registrar for the Land Registry Office for the Registration Division of Montmorency, The Land Registrar for the Land Registry Office for the Registration Division of Portneuf, The Land Registrar for the Restigouche County Land Registry Office, The Land Registrar for the Thunder Bay Land Registry Office and The Registrar of the Register of Personal and Movable Real Rights (mis en cause)

Clément Gascon, J.C.S.

Heard: April 26, 2010

Judgment: May 3, 2010

Docket: C.S. Montréal 500-11-036133-094

Counsel: Me Sean Dunphy, Me Guy P. Martel, Me Joseph Reynaud, for the Debtors

Me Avram Fishman for the Monitor

Me Robert E. Thornton for the Monitor

Me Serge F. Guérette for the Term Lenders

Me Nicolas Gagné for Ville de Beaupré

Me Éric Vallière for the Intervenor, American Iron & Metal LP

Me Marc Duchesne for the Ad hoc Committee of the Senior Secured Noteholders and U.S. Bank National Association, Indenture Trustee for the Senior Secured Noteholders

Me Frederick L. Myers for the Ad hoc Committee of Bondholders

Me Bertrand Giroux for the Intervenor, Recyclage Arctique Béluga Inc.

Subject: Insolvency; Civil Practice and Procedure

Related Abridgment Classifications

Bankruptcy and insolvency

[XVII Practice and procedure in courts](#)

[XVII.9 Miscellaneous](#)

Bankruptcy and insolvency

[XIX Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act](#)

[XIX.5 Miscellaneous](#)

Headnote

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Miscellaneous

Pulp and paper corporation experienced financial problems and placed itself under protection of Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) — In context of its restructuring, it contemplated sale of four closed mills to American bidder — While most parties supported and recommended contemplated sale, including monitor, unsuccessful bidder objected to it — Corporation brought motion seeking approval of sale — Motion granted — Court had jurisdiction to approve sale of assets in course of CCAA proceedings — Criteria for determining whether sale should be approved were established in previous decision

of Ontario Court of Appeal — Here, evidence showed that over sixty potential purchasers were contacted and provided with bid package during sale process — Evidence also showed that proposed transaction reflected current fair market value of assets — Court was of view that sale process was beyond reproach and that corporation sought to achieve best possible results — Therefore, nothing justified refusing corporation's request and setting aside monitor's recommendation.

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Practice and procedure in courts — Miscellaneous

Pulp and paper corporation experienced financial problems and placed itself under protection of Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) — In context of its restructuring, it contemplated sale of four closed mills to American bidder — While most parties supported and recommended contemplated sale, including monitor, unsuccessful bidder objected to it — Corporation brought motion seeking approval of sale — Motion granted — As was decided by previous decision of Ontario Court of Appeal, when deciding upon sale approval motion, court should consider best interests of parties who have direct interest in proceeds of sale, i.e. creditors — Author recently confirmed validity of that precedent in both CCAA and US proceedings — Here, none of creditors supported unsuccessful bidder's contestation — As such, unsuccessful bidder's interest was merely commercial and its contestation actually delayed sale process — Therefore, unsuccessful bidder's legal standing appeared to be most probably inexistent.

Faillite et insolvabilité --- Loi sur les arrangements avec les créanciers des compagnies — Divers

Société papetière a connu des difficultés financières et s'est mise sous la protection de la Loi sur les arrangements avec les créanciers des compagnies — Dans le cadre de sa restructuration, elle a considéré la possibilité de vendre quatre usines désaffectées à un soumissionnaire américain — Tandis que la plupart des parties intéressées, y compris le contrôleur, étaient en faveur de la vente en question et la recommandaient, un soumissionnaire déçu s'y est opposé — Société a déposé une requête visant à obtenir l'approbation de la vente — Requête accueillie — Tribunal avait la compétence pour approuver la vente des actifs dans le cadre de procédures entamées sous le régime de la Loi — Test servant à déterminer si une vente devrait être approuvée a été établi dans une décision antérieure de la Cour d'appel de l'Ontario — En l'espèce, la preuve démontrait qu'on avait contacté plus de soixante acheteurs potentiels et qu'on leur avait fourni une trousse d'appel d'offres au cours du processus de la vente — Preuve démontrait également que l'opération proposée reflétait la juste valeur marchande des actifs — Tribunal était d'avis que le processus de vente était sans reproche et que la société visait à obtenir les meilleurs résultats possibles — Par conséquent, rien ne justifiait que l'on refuse la demande de la société et que l'on fasse fi de la recommandation du contrôleur.

Faillite et insolvabilité --- Procédure devant les tribunaux — Divers

Société papetière a connu des difficultés financières et s'est mise sous la protection de la Loi sur les arrangements avec les créanciers des compagnies — Dans le cadre de sa restructuration, elle a considéré la possibilité de vendre quatre usines désaffectées à un soumissionnaire américain — Tandis que la plupart des parties intéressées, y compris le contrôleur, étaient en faveur de la vente en question et la recommandaient, un soumissionnaire déçu s'y est opposé — Société a déposé une requête visant à obtenir l'approbation de la vente — Requête accueillie — Tel que l'a décidé la Cour d'appel de l'Ontario dans une décision antérieure, lorsqu'il s'agit de rendre une décision concernant une requête visant l'autorisation d'une vente, le tribunal devrait prendre en considération les meilleurs intérêts des parties qui ont un intérêt direct dans le produit de la vente, soit les créanciers — Auteur a récemment confirmé la validité de ce précédent dans le cadre des procédures instituées sous le régime de la Loi ainsi que sous le régime américain — En l'espèce, aucun créancier n'appuyait l'opposition du soumissionnaire déçu — Comme tel, l'intérêt du soumissionnaire déçu était purement commercial et sa contestation avait en fait retardé le processus de la vente — Par conséquent, l'intérêt pour agir du soumissionnaire déçu était probablement inexistant.

Table of Authorities

Cases considered by *Clément Gascon, J.C.S.*:

- AbitibiBowater Inc., Re* (2009), 2009 CarswellQue 14189, 2009 QCCS 6460 (C.S. Que.) — considered
- BDC Venture Capital Inc. v. Natural Convergence Inc.* (2009), 256 O.A.C. 372, 2009 CarswellOnt 5098, 2009 ONCA 637 (Ont. C.A. [In Chambers]) — referred to
- BDC Venture Capital Inc. v. Natural Convergence Inc.* (2009), 2009 CarswellOnt 5535, 2009 ONCA 665, 57 C.B.R. (5th) 186 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to
- Beauty Counsellors of Canada Ltd., Re* (1986), 1986 CarswellOnt 171, 58 C.B.R. (N.S.) 237 (Ont. S.C.) — considered
- Boutique Euphoria inc., Re* (2007), 2007 QCCS 7128, 2007 CarswellQue 14282 (C.S. Que.) — referred to
- Boutiques San Francisco Inc., Re* (2004), 2004 CarswellQue 10918, 7 C.B.R. (5th) 189 (C.S. Que.) — referred to

Calpine Canada Energy Ltd., Re (2007), 2007 CarswellAlta 1050, 2007 ABQB 504, 35 C.B.R. (5th) 1, 415 A.R. 196, 33 B.L.R. (4th) 68 (Alta. Q.B.) — referred to

Canadian Red Cross Society / Société Canadienne de la Croix-Rouge, Re (1998), 1998 CarswellOnt 3346, 5 C.B.R. (4th) 299, 72 O.T.C. 99 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Canwest Global Communications Corp., Re (2010), 64 C.B.R. (5th) 221, 2010 ONSC 1176, 2010 CarswellOnt 1077 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Consumers Packaging Inc., Re (2001), 150 O.A.C. 384, 27 C.B.R. (4th) 197, 2001 CarswellOnt 3482, 12 C.P.C. (5th) 208 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to

Grant Forest Products Inc., Re (2010), 2010 CarswellOnt 2445, 2010 ONSC 1846, 67 C.B.R. (5th) 258 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Nortel Networks Corp., Re (2009), 2009 CarswellOnt 4467, 55 C.B.R. (5th) 229 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

PSINET Ltd., Re (2001), 28 C.B.R. (4th) 95, 2001 CarswellOnt 3405 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Rail Power Technologies Corp., Re (2009), 2009 QCCS 2885, 2009 CarswellQue 6503 (C.S. Que.) — referred to

Royal Bank v. Soundair Corp. (1991), 7 C.B.R. (3d) 1, 83 D.L.R. (4th) 76, 46 O.A.C. 321, 4 O.R. (3d) 1, 1991 CarswellOnt 205 (Ont. C.A.) — considered

Selkirk, Re (1987), 1987 CarswellOnt 177, 64 C.B.R. (N.S.) 140 (Ont. S.C.) — considered

Skyepharma PLC v. Hyal Pharmaceutical Corp. (1999), 1999 CarswellOnt 3641, 12 C.B.R. (4th) 87, [2000] B.P.I.R. 531 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Skyepharma PLC v. Hyal Pharmaceutical Corp. (2000), 47 O.R. (3d) 234, 2000 CarswellOnt 466, 130 O.A.C. 273, 15 C.B.R. (4th) 298 (Ont. C.A.) — considered

Tiger Brand Knitting Co., Re (2005), 2005 CarswellOnt 1240, 9 C.B.R. (5th) 315 (Ont. S.C.J.) — referred to

Tiger Brand Knitting Co., Re (2005), 19 C.B.R. (5th) 53, 2005 CarswellOnt 8387 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to

Statutes considered:

Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3

Generally — referred to

Canadian Commercial Corporation Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-14

Generally — referred to

Code civil du Québec, L.Q. 1991, c. 64

en général — referred to

Land Registration Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.4

Generally — referred to

Personal Property Security Act, S.N.B. 1993, c. P-7.1

Generally — referred to

Personal Property Security Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.10

Generally — referred to

Registry Act, R.S.N.B. 1973, c. R-6

Generally — referred to

MOTION by corporation seeking Court's approval of sale.

Clément Gascon, J.C.S.:

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND VESTING ORDER IN RESPECT OF THE BEAUPRÉ, DALHOUSIE, DONNACONA AND FORT WILLIAM ASSETS (#513)

Introduction

1 This judgment deals with the approval of a sale of assets contemplated by the Petitioners in the context of their CCAA restructuring.

2 At issue are, on the one hand, the fairness of the sale process involved and the appropriateness of the Monitor's recommendation in that regard, and on the other hand, the legal standing of a disgruntled bidder to contest the approval sought.

The Motion at Issue

3 Through their Amended Motion for the Issuance of an Order Authorizing the Sale of Certain Assets of the Petitioners (Four Closed Mills)(the "*Motion*"), the Petitioners seek the approval of the sale of four closed mills to American Iron & Metal LP ("*AIM*") and the issuance of two Vesting Orders¹ in connection thereto.

4 The Purchase Agreement and the Land Swap Agreement contemplated in that regard, which were executed on April 6, 15 and 21, 2010, are filed in the record as Exhibits R-1, R-1A and R-2A.

5 In short, given the current state of the North American newsprint and forest products industry, the Petitioners have had to go through a process of idling and ultimately selling certain of their mills that they no longer require to satisfy market demand and that will not form part of their mill configuration after emergence from their current CCAA proceedings.

6 So far, the Petitioners, with the assistance of the Monitor, have in fact undertaken a number of similar sales processes with respect to closed mills, including:

(a) the pulp and paper mill in Belgo, Quebec that was sold to Recyclage Arctic Beluga Inc. ("*Arctic Beluga*"), as approved and authorized by the Court on November 24, 2009;

(b) the St-Raymond sawmill that was sold to 9213-3933 Quebec Inc., as approved and authorized by the Court on December 11, 2009; and

(c) the Mackenzie Facility that was sold to 1508756 Ontario Inc., as approved and authorized by the Court on March 23, 2010.

7 The transaction at issue here includes pulp and paper mills located in Dalhousie, New Brunswick (the "*Dalhousie Mill*"), Donnacona, Quebec (the "*Donnacona Mill*"), Fort William, Ontario (the "*Fort William Mill*") and Beaupré, Quebec (the "*Beaupré Mill*") (collectively, the "*Closed Mills*").

8 The assets comprising the Closed Mills include the real property, buildings, machinery and equipment located at the four sites.

9 The Closed Mills are being sold on an "as is/where is" basis, in an effort to (i) reduce the Petitioners'ongoing carrying costs, which are estimated to be approximately CDNS12 million per year, and (ii) mitigate the Petitioners'potential exposure to environmental clean-up costs if the sites are demolished in the future, which are estimated at some CDNS10 million based on the Monitor's testimony at hearing.

10 The Petitioners marketed the Closed Mills as a bundled group to maximize their value, minimize the potential future environmental liability associated with the sites, and ensure the disposal of all four sites through their current US Chapter 11 and CCAA proceedings.

11 According to the Petitioners, the proposed sale is the product of good faith, arm's length negotiations between them and AIM.

12 They believe that the marketing and sale process that was followed was fair and reasonable. While they did receive other offers that were, on their faces, higher in amount than AIM's offer, they consider that none of the other bidders satisfactorily demonstrated an ability to consummate a sale within the time frame and on financial terms that were acceptable to them.

13 Accordingly, the Petitioners submit that the contemplated sale of the Closed Mills to AIM is in the best interest of and will generally benefit all of their stakeholders, in that:

a) the sale forms part of Petitioners' continuing objective and strategy to elaborate a restructuring plan, which will allow them (or any successor) to be profitable over time. This includes the following previously announced measures of (a) disposing of non-strategic assets, (b) reducing indebtedness, and (c) reducing financial costs;

b) the Closed Mills are not required to continue the operations of the Petitioners, nor are they vital to successfully restructure their business;

c) each of the Closed Mills faces potential environmental liabilities and other clean-up costs. The Petitioners also incur monthly expenses to maintain the sites in their closed state, including tax, utility, insurance and security costs;

d) the proposed transaction is on attractive terms in the current market and will provide the Petitioners with additional liquidity. In addition to realizing cash proceeds from the Closed Mills and additional proceeds from the sales of the paper machines, the projected sale will also relieve the Petitioners of potentially significant environmental liabilities; and

e) the Petitioners' creditors will not suffer any prejudice as a result of the proposed sale and the issuance of the proposed vesting orders since the proceeds will be remitted to the Monitor in trust and shall stand in the place and stead of the Purchased Assets (as defined in the contemplated Purchase Agreement). As a result, all liens, charges and encumbrances on the Purchased Assets will attach to such proceeds, with the same priority as they had immediately prior to the sale.

14 In its 38th Report dated April 24, 2010, the Monitor supports the Petitioners' position and recommends that the contemplated sale to AIM be approved.

15 Some key creditors, notably the Ad Hoc Committee of the Bondholders, also support the Motion. Others (for instance, the Term Lenders and the Senior Secured Noteholders) indicate that they simply submit to the Court's decision.

16 None of the numerous Petitioners' creditors opposes the contemplated sale. None of the parties that may be affected by the wording of the Vesting Orders sought either.

17 However, Arctic Beluga, one of the unsuccessful bidders in the marketing and sale process of the Closed Mills, intervenes to the Motion and objects to its conclusions.

18 It claims that its penultimate bid² for the Closed Mills was a proposal for CDN\$22.1 million in cash, an amount more than CDN\$8.3 million greater than the amount proposed by the Petitioners in the Motion.

19 According to Arctic Beluga, the AIM bid that forms the basis of the contemplated sale is for CDN\$8.8 million in cash, plus 40% of the proceeds from any sale of the machinery (of which only CDN\$5 million is guaranteed within 90 days of closing), and is significantly lower than its own offer of over CDN\$22 million in cash.

20 Arctic Beluga argues that it lost the ability to purchase the Closed Mills due to unfairness in the bidding process. It considers that the Court has the discretion to withhold approval of the sale where there has been unfairness in the sale process or where there are substantially higher offers available.

21 It thus requests the Court to 1) dismiss the Motion so that the Petitioners may consider its proposal for the Closed Mills, 2) refuse to authorize the Petitioners to enter into the proposed Purchase Agreement and Land Swap Agreement, and 3) declare that its proposal is the highest and best offer for the Closed Mills.

22 The Petitioners reply that Arctic Beluga has no standing to challenge the Court's approval of the sale of the Closed Mills contemplated in these proceedings.

23 Subsidiarily, in the event that Arctic Beluga is entitled to participate in the Motion, they consider that any inquiry into the integrity and fairness of the bidding process reveals that the contemplated sale to AIM is fair, reasonable and to the advantage of the Petitioners and the other interested parties, namely the Petitioners' creditors.

24 To complete this summary of the relevant context, it is worth adding that at the hearing, in view of Arctic Beluga's Intervention, AIM also intervened to support the Petitioners' Motion.

25 It is worth mentioning as well that even though he did not contest the Motion *per se*, the Ville de Beaupré's Counsel voiced his client's concerns with respect to the amount of unpaid taxes³ currently outstanding in regard to the Beaupré Mill located on its territory.

26 Apparently, part of these outstanding taxes has been paid very recently, but there is a potential dispute remaining on the balance owed. That issue is not, however, in front of the Court at the moment.

Analysis and Discussion

27 In the Court's opinion, the Petitioners' Motion is well founded and the Vesting Orders sought should be granted.

28 The sale process followed here was beyond reproach. Nothing justifies refusing the Petitioners' request and setting aside the corresponding recommendation of the Monitor. None of the complaints raised by Arctic Beluga appears justified or legitimate under the circumstances.

29 On the issue of standing, even though the Court, to expedite the hearing, did not prevent Arctic Beluga from participating in the debate, it agrees with Petitioners that, in the end, its legal standing appeared to be most probably inexistent in this case.

30 This notwithstanding, it remains that in determining whether or not to approve the sale, the Court had to be satisfied that the applicable criteria were indeed met. Because of that, the complaints raised would have seemingly been looked at, no matter what. As part of its role as officer of the Court, the Monitor had, in fact, raised and addressed them in its 38th Report in any event.

31 The Court's brief reasons follow.

The Sale Approval

32 In a prior decision rendered in the context of this restructuring⁴, the Court has indicated that, in its view, it had jurisdiction to approve a sale of assets in the course of CCAA proceedings, notably when such a sale was in the best interest of the stakeholders generally⁵.

33 Here, there are sufficient and definite justifications for the sale of the Closed Mills. The Petitioners no longer use them. Their annual holding costs are important. To insure that a purchaser takes over the environmental liabilities relating thereto and to improve the Petitioners' liquidity are, no doubt, valid objectives.

34 In that prior decision, the Court noted as well that in determining whether or not to authorize such a sale of assets, it should consider the following key factors:

- whether sufficient efforts to get the best price have been made and whether the parties acted providently;
- the efficacy and integrity of the process followed;
- the interests of the parties; and

- whether any unfairness resulted from the process.

35 These principles were established by the Ontario Court of Appeal in the *Royal Bank v. Soundair Corp.*⁶ decision. They are applicable in a CCAA sale situation⁷.

36 The *Soundair* criteria focus first and foremost on the "integrity of the process", which is integral to the administration of statutes like the CCAA. From that standpoint, the Court must be wary of reopening a bidding process, particularly where doing so could doom the transaction that has been achieved⁸.

37 Here, the Monitor's 38th Report comprehensively outlines the phases of the marketing and sale process that led to the outcome now challenged by Arctic Beluga. This process is detailed at length at paragraphs 26 to 67 of the Report.

38 The Court agrees with the Monitor's view that, in trying to achieve the best possible result within the best possible time frame, the Petitioners, with the guidance and assistance of the Monitor, have conducted a fair, reasonable and thorough sale process that proved to be transparent and efficient.

39 Suffice it to note in that regard that over sixty potential purchasers were contacted during the course of the initial Phase I of the sale process and provided with bid package information, that the initial response was limited to six parties who submitted bids, three of which were unacceptable to the Petitioners, and that the subsequent Phase II involved the three finalists of Phase I.

40 By sending the bid package to over sixty potential purchasers, there can be no doubt that the Petitioners, with the assistance of the Monitor, displayed their best efforts to obtain the best price for the Closed Mills.

41 Moreover, Arctic Beluga willingly and actively participated in these phases of the bidding process. The fact that it now seeks to nevertheless challenge this process as being unfair is rather awkward. Its active participation certainly does not assist its position on the contestation of the sale approval⁹.

42 In point of fact, Arctic Beluga's assertion of alleged unfairness in the sale process is simply not supported by any of the evidence adduced.

43 Arctic Beluga was not treated unfairly. The Petitioners and the Monitor diligently considered the unsolicited revised bids it tendered, even after the acceptance of AIM's offer. It was allowed every possible chance to improve its offer by submitting a proof of funds. However, it failed to do enough to convince the Petitioners and the Monitor that its bid was, in the end, the best one available.

44 Turning to the analysis of the bids received, it is again explained in details in the Monitor's 38th Report, at paragraphs 45 to 67.

45 In short, the Petitioners, with the Monitor's support, selected AIM's offer for the following reasons:

- (a) the purchase price was fair and reasonable and subjected to a thorough canvassing of the market;
- (b) the offer included a sharing formula, based on future gross sale proceeds from the sale of the paper machines located at the Closed Mills, that provided for potential sharing of the proceeds from the sale of any paper machines;
- (c) AIM confirmed that no further due diligence was required;
- (d) AIM had provided sufficient evidence of its ability to assume the environmental liabilities associated with the Closed Mills; and
- (e) AIM did not have any financing conditions in its offer and had provided satisfactory evidence of its financial ability to close the sale.

46 Both the Petitioners and the Monitor considered that the proposed transaction reflected the current fair market value of the assets and that it satisfied the Petitioners' objective of identifying a purchaser for the Closed Mills that was capable of mitigating the potential environmental liabilities and closing in a timely manner, consistent with Petitioners' on-going reorganization plans.

47 The Petitioners were close to completing the sale with AIM when Arctic Beluga submitted its latest revised bid that ended up being turned down.

48 The Petitioners, again with the support of the Monitor, were of the view that it would not have been appropriate for them to risk having AIM rescind its offer, especially given that Arctic Beluga had still not provided satisfactory evidence of its financial ability to close the transaction.

49 The Court considers that their decision in this respect was reasonable and defensible. The relevant factors were weighed in an impartial and independent manner.

50 Neither the Petitioners nor the Monitor ignored or disregarded the Arctic Beluga bids. Rather, they thoroughly considered them, up to the very last revision thereof, albeit received quite late in the whole process.

51 They asked for clarifications, sometimes proper support, finally sufficient commitments.

52 In the end, through an overall assessment of the bids received, the Petitioners and the Monitor exercised their business and commercial judgment to retain the AIM offer as being the best one.

53 No evidence suggests that in doing so, the Petitioners or the Monitor acted in bad faith, with an ulterior motive or with a view to unduly favor AIM. Contrary to what Arctic Beluga suggested, there was no "fait accompli" here that would have benefited AIM.

54 The Petitioners and the Monitor rather expressed legitimate concerns over Arctic Beluga ultimate bid. These concerns focused upon the latter's commitments towards the environmental exposures issues and upon the lack of satisfactory answers in regard to the funding of their proposal.

55 In a situation where, according to the evidence, the environmental exposures could potentially be in the range of some CDN\$10 million, the Court can hardly dispute these concerns as being anything but legitimate.

56 From that perspective, the concerns expressed by the Petitioners and the Monitor over the clauses of Arctic Beluga penultimate bid concerning the exclusion of liability for hazardous material were, arguably, reasonable concerns¹⁰. Mostly in the absence of similar exclusion in the offer of AIM.

57 Similarly, their conclusion that the answers¹¹ provided by that bidder for the funding requirement of their proposal were not satisfactory when compared to the ones given by AIM¹² cannot be set aside by the Court as being improper.

58 In that regard, the solicitation documentation¹³ sent to Arctic Beluga and the other bidders clearly stated that selected bidders would have to provide evidence that they had secured adequate and irrevocable financing to complete the transaction.

59 A reading of clauses 4 and 5 of the "funding commitment" initially provided by Arctic Beluga¹⁴ did raise some question as to its adequate and irrevocable nature. It did not satisfy the Petitioners that Arctic Beluga had the ability to pay the proposed purchase price and did not adequately demonstrate that it had the funds to fulfill, satisfy and fund future environmental obligations.

60 The subsequent letter received from Arctic Beluga's bankers¹⁵ did appear to be somewhat incomplete in that regard as well.

61 Arctic Beluga's offer, although highest in price, was consequently never backed with a satisfactory proof of funding despite repeated requests by the Petitioners and the Monitor.

62 In the situation at hand, the Phase I sale process was terminated as a result of the decision to remove the Mackenzie Mill from the process. However, prior to that, the successful bidder had failed to provide satisfactory evidence that it would be able to finance the transaction despite several requests in that regard.

63 If anything, this underscored the importance of requesting and appraising evidence of any bidder's financial wherewithal to close the sale.

64 The applicable duty during a sale process such as this one is not to obtain the best possible price at any cost, but to do everything reasonably possible with a view to obtaining the best price.

65 The dollar amount of Arctic Beluga's offer is irrelevant unless it can be used to demonstrate that the Petitioners, with the assistance of the Monitor, acted improvidently in accepting AIM's offer over theirs¹⁶.

66 Nothing in the evidence suggests that this could have been the case here.

67 In that regard, Arctic Beluga's references to the findings of the courts in *Beauty Counsellors of Canada Ltd., Re*¹⁷ and *Selkirk, Re*¹⁸ hardly support its argument.

68 In these decisions, the courts first emphasized that it was not desirable for a purchaser to wait to the last minute, even up to the court approval stage, to submit its best offer. Yet, the courts then added that they could still consider such a late offer if, for instance, a substantially higher offer turned up at the approval stage. In support of that view, the courts explained that in doing so, the evidence could very well show that the trustee did not properly carry out its duty to obtain the best price for the estate.

69 This reasoning has clearly no application in this matter. As stated, the process followed was appropriate and beyond reproach. The bids received were reviewed and analyzed. Arctic Beluga's bid was rejected for reasonable and defensible justifications.

70 That being so, it is not for this Court to second-guess the commercial and business judgment properly exercised by the Petitioners and the Monitor.

71 A court will not lightly interfere with the exercise of this commercial and business judgment in the context of an asset sale where the marketing and sale process was fair, reasonable, transparent and efficient. This is certainly not a case where it should.

72 In prior decisions rendered in similar context¹⁹, courts in this province have emphasized that they should intervene only where there is clear evidence that the Monitor failed to act properly. A subsequent, albeit higher, bid is not necessarily a valid enough reason to set aside a sale process short of any evidence of unfairness.

73 In the circumstances, the Court agrees that the Petitioners and the Monitor were "entitled to prefer a bird in the hand to two in the bush" and were reasonable in preferring a lower-priced unconditional offer over a higher-priced offer that was subject to ambiguous caveats and unsatisfactory funding commitments.

74 AIM has transferred an amount of \$880,000 to the Petitioners' Counsel as a deposit required under the Purchase Agreement. It has the full financial capacity to consummate the sale within the time period provided for²⁰.

75 As a result, the Court finds that the Petitioners are well founded in proceeding with the sale to AIM on the basis that the offer submitted by the latter was the most advantageous and presented the fewest closing risks for the Petitioners and their creditors.

76 All in all, the Court agrees with the following summary of the situation found in the Monitor's 38th Report, at paragraph 79:

- (a) the Petitioners have used their best efforts to obtain the best purchase price possible;
- (b) the Petitioners have acted in a fair and reasonable manner throughout the sale process and with respect to all potential purchasers, including Arctic Beluga;
- (c) the Petitioners have considered the interests of the stakeholders in the CCAA proceedings;
- (d) the sale process with respect to the Closed Mills was thorough, extensive, fair and reasonable; and
- (e) Arctic Beluga had ample opportunity to present its highest and best offer for the Closed Mills, including ample opportunity to address the issues of closing risk and the ability to finance the transaction and any future environmental liabilities, and they have not done so in a satisfactory manner.

77 The contemplated sale of the Closed Mills to AIM will therefore be approved.

The Standing Issue

78 In view of the Court's finding on the sale approval, the second issue pertaining to the lack of standing of Arctic Beluga is, in the end, purely theoretical.

79 Be it as a result of Arctic Beluga's Intervention or because of the Monitor's 38th Report, it remains that the Court had, in any event, to be satisfied that the criteria applicable for the approval of the sale were met. In doing so, proper consideration of the complaints raised was necessary, no matter what.

80 Even if this standing issue does not consequently need to be decided to render judgment on the Motion, some remarks are, however, still called for in that regard.

81 Interestingly, the Court notes that in the few reported decisions²¹ of this province's courts dealing with the contestation of sale approval motions, the standing issue of the disgruntled bidder has apparently not been raised or analyzed.

82 In comparison, in a leading case on the subject²², the Ontario Court of Appeal has ruled, a decade ago, that a bitter bidder simply does not have a right that is finally disposed of by an order approving a sale of a debtor's assets. As such, it has no legal interest in a sale approval motion.

83 For the Ontario Court of Appeal, the purpose of such a motion is to consider the best interests of the parties who have a direct interest in the proceeds of sale, that is, the creditors. An unsuccessful bidder's interest is merely commercial:

24 [...] If an unsuccessful prospective purchaser does not acquire an interest sufficient to warrant being added as a party to a motion to approve a sale, it follows that it does not have a right that is finally disposed of by an order made on that motion.

25 There are two main reasons why an unsuccessful prospective purchaser does not have a right or interest that is affected by a sale approval order. First, a prospective purchaser has no legal or proprietary right in the property being sold. Offers are submitted in a process in which there is no requirement that a particular offer be accepted. Orders appointing receivers commonly give the receiver a discretion as to which offers to accept and to recommend to the court for approval. The duties of the receiver and the court are to ensure that the sales are in the best interests of those with an interest in the proceeds of the sale. There is no right in a party who submits an offer to have the offer, even if the highest, accepted by either the receiver or the court: *Crown Trust v. Rosenberg*, supra.

26 Moreover, the fundamental purpose of the sale approval motion is to consider the best interests of the parties with a direct interest in the proceeds of the sale, primarily the creditors. The unsuccessful would be purchaser has no

interest in this issue. Indeed, the involvement of unsuccessful prospective purchasers could seriously distract from this fundamental purpose by including in the motion other issues with the potential for delay and additional expense.

84 The Ontario Court of Appeal explained as follows the policy reasons underpinning its approach to the lack of standing of an unsuccessful prospective purchaser²³:

30 There is a sound policy reason for restricting, to the extent possible, the involvement of prospective purchasers in sale approval motions. There is often a measure of urgency to complete court-approved sales. This case is a good example. When unsuccessful purchasers become involved, there is a potential for greater delay and additional uncertainty. This potential may, in some situations, create commercial leverage in the hands of a disappointed would be purchaser which could be counterproductive to the best interests of those for whose benefit the sale is intended.

85 Along with what appears to be a strong line of cases²⁴, Morawetz J. recently confirmed the validity of the *Skyepharma* precedent in the context of an opposition to a sale approval filed by a disgruntled bidder in both Canadian proceedings under the CCAA and in US proceedings under Chapter 11²⁵.

86 Here, Arctic Beluga stood alone in contesting the Motion. None of the creditors supported its contestation. Its only interest was to close the deal itself, arguably for the interesting profits it conceded it would reap in the very good scrap metal market that exists presently.

87 Arctic Beluga's contestation did, in the end, delay the sale approval and no doubt brought a level of uncertainty in a process where the interested parties had a definite interest in finalizing the deal without further hurdles.

88 From that perspective, Arctic Beluga's contestation proved to be, at the very least, a good example of the "à propos" of the policy reasons that seem to support the strong line of cases cited before that question the standing of bitter bidder in these debates.

For these Reasons, The Court:

1 **AUTHORIZES** Abitibi-Consolidated Company of Canada ("*ACCC*"), Bowater Maritimes Inc. ("*BMT*") and Bowater Canadian Forest Products Inc. ("*BCFPI*" and together with *ACCC* and *BMI*, the "*Vendors*") to enter into, and Abitibi-Consolidated Inc. ("*ACI*") to intervene in, the agreement entitled *Purchase and Sale Agreement* (as amended, the "*Purchase Agreement*"), by and between *ACCC*, *BMI* and *BCFPI*, as Vendors, American Iron & Metal LP (the "*Purchaser*") through its general partner American Iron & Metal GP Inc., as Purchaser, American Iron & Metal Company Inc., as Guarantor, and to which *ACI* intervened, copy of which was filed as Exhibits R-1 and R-1(a) to the Motion, and into all the transactions contemplated therein (the "*Sale Transactions*") with such alterations, changes, amendments, deletions or additions thereto, as may be agreed to with the consent of the Monitor;

2 **ORDERS** and **DECLARES** that this Order shall constitute the only authorization required by the Vendors to proceed with the Sale Transactions and that no shareholder or regulatory approval shall be required in connection therewith, save and except for the satisfaction of the Land Swap Transactions and the obtaining of the U.S. Court Order (as said terms are defined in the Purchase Agreement);

3 **ORDERS** and **DECLARES** that upon the filing with this Court's registry of a Monitor's certificate substantially in the form appended as *Schedule "D"* hereto, (the "*First Closing Monitor's Certificate*"), all right, title and interest in and to the *Beaupré Assets*, *Donnacona Assets* and *Dalhousie Assets* (each as defined below and collectively, the "*First Closing Assets*"), shall vest absolutely and exclusively in and with the Purchaser, free and clear of and from any and all claims, liabilities, obligations, interests, prior claims, hypothecs, security interests (whether contractual, statutory or otherwise), liens, assignments, judgments, executions, writs of seizure and sale, options, adverse claims, levies, charges, liabilities (direct, indirect, absolute or contingent), pledges, executions, rights of first refusal or other pre-emptive rights in favour of third parties, mortgages, hypothecs, trusts or deemed trusts (whether contractual, statutory or otherwise), restrictions on transfer of title, or other claims or encumbrances, whether or not they have attached or been perfected, registered, published or filed and whether secured, unsecured or otherwise

(collectively, the "*First Closing Assets Encumbrances*"), including without limiting the generality of the foregoing: (i) any encumbrances or charges created by the Order issued on April 17, 2009 by Justice Clément Gascon, J.S.C., as amended, and/or any other CCAA order; and (ii) all charges, security interests or charges evidenced by registration, publication or filing pursuant to the *Civil Code of Québec*, the *Ontario Personal Property Security Act*, the *New Brunswick Personal Property Security Act* or any other applicable legislation providing for a security interest in personal or movable property, excluding however, the permitted encumbrances, easements and restrictive covenants listed on *Schedule "E"* hereto (the "*Permitted First Closing Assets Encumbrances*") and, for greater certainty, *ORDERS* that all of the First Closing Assets Encumbrances affecting or relating to the First Closing Assets be expunged and discharged as against the First Closing Assets, in each case effective as of the applicable time and date set out in the Purchase Agreement;

4 **ORDERS** and **DECLARES** that upon the filing with this Court's registry of a Monitor's certificate substantially in the form appended as *Schedule "F"* hereto, (the "*Second Closing Monitor's Certificate*"), all right, title and interest in and to the Fort William Assets (as defined below), shall vest absolutely and exclusively in and with the Purchaser, free and clear of and from any and all claims, liabilities, obligations, interests, prior claims, hypothecs, security interests (whether contractual, statutory or otherwise), liens, assignments, judgments, executions, writs of seizure and sale, options, adverse claims, levies, charges, liabilities (direct, indirect, absolute or contingent), pledges, executions, rights of first refusal or other pre-emptive rights in favour of third parties, mortgages, hypothecs, trusts or deemed trusts (whether contractual, statutory or otherwise), restrictions on transfer of title, or other claims or encumbrances, whether or not they have attached or been perfected, registered, published or filed and whether secured, unsecured or otherwise (collectively, the "*Fort William Assets Encumbrances*"), including without limiting the generality of the foregoing: (i) any encumbrances or charges created by the Order issued on April 17, 2009 by Justice Clément Gascon, J.S.C., as amended, and/or any other CCAA order; and (ii) all charges, security interests or charges evidenced by registration, publication or filing pursuant to the *Ontario Personal Property Security Act* or any other applicable legislation providing for a security interest in personal or movable property, excluding however, the permitted encumbrances, notification agreements, easements and restrictive covenants generally described in *Schedule "G"* (the "*Permitted Fort William Assets Encumbrances*") upon their registration on title. This Order shall not be registered on title to the Fort William Assets until all of such generally described Permitted Fort William Assets Encumbrances are registered on title, at which time the Petitioners shall be at liberty to obtain, without notice, an Order of this Court amending the within Order to incorporate herein the registration particulars of such Permitted Fort William Assets Encumbrances in *Schedule "G"*;

5 **ORDERS** the Land Registrar of the Land Registry Office for the Registry Division of Montmorency, upon presentation of the Monitor's First Closing Certificate, in the form appended as *Schedule "D"*, and a certified copy of this Order accompanied by the required application for registration and upon payment of the prescribed fees, to publish this Order and (i) to proceed with an entry on the index of immovables showing the Purchaser as the absolute owner in regards to the First Closing Purchased Assets located at Beaupré, in the Province of Quebec, corresponding to an immovable property known and designated as being composed of lots 3 681 089, 3 681 454, 3 681 523, 3 681 449, 3 682 466, 3 681 122, 3 681 097, 3 681 114, 3 681 205, 3 682 294, 3 681 022 and 3 681 556 of the Cadastre of Quebec, Registration Division of Montmorency, with all buildings thereon erected bearing civic number 1 du Moulin Street, Beaupré, Québec, Canada, G0A 1E0 (the "*Beaupré Assets*"); and (ii) proceed with the cancellation of any and all First Closing Assets Encumbrances on the Beaupré Assets, including, without limitation, the following registrations published at the said Land Registry:

- Hypothec dated February 17, 2000 registered under number 140 085 in the index of immovables with respect to lots 3 681 454 and 3 681 089 of the Cadastre of Quebec, Registration of Montmorency (legal construction);
- Hypothec dated April 1, 2008 registered under number 15 079 215 and assigned on January 21, 2010 under number 16 882 450 in the index of immovables with respect to lots 3 681 454 and 3 681 089 of the Cadastre of Quebec, Registration of Montmorency;
- Hypothec dated August 18, 2008 registered under number 15 504 248 in the index of immovables with respect to lot 3 681 089 of the Cadastre of Quebec, Registration of Montmorency;

- Hypothec dated October 30, 2008 registered under number 15 683 288 in the index of immovables with respect to lots 3 681 454 and 3 681 089 of the Cadastre of Quebec, Registration of Montmorency (legal construction);
- Hypothec dated April 20, 2009 registered under number 16 123 864 in the index of immovables with respect to lot 3 681 454 (legal construction) and Prior notice for sale by judicial authority dated July 23, 2009 registered under number 16 400 646 in the index of immovables with respect to lots 3 681 454 and 3 681 089 of the Cadastre of Quebec, Registration of Montmorency; and;
- Hypothec dated May 8, 2009 registered under number 16 145 374 and subrogated on January 1, 2010 under number 16 851 224 in the index of immovables with respect to lots 3 681 454 and 3 681 089 of the Cadastre of Quebec, Registration of Montmorency;
- Hypothec dated May 8, 2009 registered under number 16 145 375 and subrogated on January 1, 2010 under number 16 851 224 in the index of immovables with respect to lots 3 681 454 and 3 681 089 of the Cadastre of Quebec, Registration of Montmorency; and
- Hypothec dated December 9, 2009 registered under number 16 789 817 in the index of immovables with respect to lots 3 681 454 and 3 681 089 of the Cadastre of Quebec, Registration of Montmorency;

6 **ORDERS** the Land Registrar of the Land Registry Office for the Registry Division of Portneuf, upon presentation of the Monitor's First Closing Certificate, in the form appended as Schedule "D", and a certified copy of this Order accompanied by the required application for registration and upon payment of the prescribed fees, to publish this Order and (i) to proceed with an entry on the index of immovables showing the Purchaser as the absolute owner in regards to the First Closing Purchased Assets located at Donnacona, in the Province of Québec, corresponding to an immovable property known and designated as being composed of lots 3 507 098, 3 507 099, 3 507 101 and 3 507 106 of the Cadastre of Quebec, Registration Division of Portneuf, with all buildings thereon erected bearing civic number 1 Notre-Dame Street, Donnacona, Québec, Canada, G0A 1T0 (the "*Donnacona Assets*"); and (ii) proceed with the cancellation of any and all First Closing Assets Encumbrances on the Donnacona Assets, including, without limitation, the following registrations published at the said Land Registry:

- Hypothec dated March 9, 2009 registered under number 16 000 177 with respect to lot 3 507 098 (legal construction) and Notice for sale by judicial authority dated September 24, 2009 registered under number 16 573 711 with respect to lots 3 507 098, 3 507 099, 3 507 101 and 3 507 106 of the Cadastre of Quebec, Registration Division of Portneuf;
- Hypothec dated April 30, 2009 registered under number 16 122 878 and assigned on May 22, 2009 under number 16 184 386 with respect to lots 3 507 098, 3 507 099, 3 507 101 and 3 507 106 of the Cadastre of Quebec, Registration Division of Portneuf;
- Hypothec dated March 18, 1997 registered under number 482 357 modified on August 30, 1999 under registration number 497 828 with respect to lots 3 507 098, 3 507 101 and 3 507 106 of the Cadastre of Quebec, Registration Division of Portneuf; and
- Hypothec dated November 24, 1998 registered under number 493 417 and modified on August 30, 1999 under registration number 497 828 with respect to lots 3 507 098, 3 507 101 and 3 507 106 of the Cadastre of Quebec, Registration Division of Portneuf;

7 **ORDERS** the Quebec Personal and Movable Real Rights Registrar, upon presentation of the required form with a true copy of this Vesting Order and the First Closing Monitor's Certificate, to reduce the scope of the hypothecs registered under numbers: 06-0308066-0001, 08-0674019-0001, 09-0216695-0002, 09-0481801-0001 and 09-0236637-0016²⁶ in connection with the Donnacona Assets and 08-0163796-0002, 08-0163791-0002, 08-0695718-0002, 09-0481801-0002, 09-0256803-0016²⁷, 09-0256803-0002²⁸ and 09-0762559-0002 in connection with the Beauré Assets and to cancel, release and discharge all of

the First Closing Assets Encumbrances in order to allow the transfer to the Purchaser of the Beaupré Assets and the Donnacona Assets, as described in the Purchase Agreement, free and clear of any and all encumbrances created by those hypothecs;

8 **ORDERS** that upon registration in the Land Registry Office for the Registry Division of Restigouche County of an Application for Vesting Order in the form prescribed by the *Registry Act* (New Brunswick) duly executed by the Monitor, the Land Registrar is hereby directed to enter the Purchaser as the owner of the subject real property identified in *Schedule "H"* hereto (the "*Dalhousie Assets*") in fee simple, and is hereby directed to delete and expunge from title to the Dalhousie Assets any and all First Closing Assets Encumbrances on the Dalhousie Assets;

9 **ORDERS** that upon the filing of the First Closing Monitor's Certificate with this Court's registry, the Vendors shall be authorized to take all such steps as may be necessary to effect the discharge of all liens, charges and encumbrances registered against the Dalhousie Assets, including filing such financing change statements in the New Brunswick Personal Property Registry (the "*NBPPR*") as may be necessary, from any registration filed against the Vendors in the NBPPR, provided that the Vendors shall not be authorized to effect any discharge that would have the effect of releasing any collateral other than the Dalhousie Assets, and the Vendors shall be authorized to take any further steps by way of further application to this Court;

10 **ORDERS** that upon registration in the Land Registry Office:

(a) for the Land Titles Division of Thunder Bay of an Application for Vesting Order in the form prescribed by the *Land Registration Reform Act* (Ontario), (and including a law statement confirming the filing of the Second Closing Monitor's Certificate, as set out in section 4 above, has been made) the Land Registrar is hereby directed to enter the Purchaser as the owner of the subject real property identified in *Schedule "T", Section 1* (the "*Fort William Land Titles Assets*") hereto in fee simple, and is hereby directed to delete and expunge from title to the Fort William Land Titles Assets all of the Fort William Assets Encumbrances, which for the sake of clarity do not include the Permitted Fort William Land Titles Assets Encumbrances listed on Schedule G, Section 1, hereto;

(b) for the Registry Division of Thunder Bay of a Vesting Order in the form prescribed by the *Land Registration Reform Act* (Ontario), (and including a law statement confirming the filing of the Second Closing Monitor's Certificate, as set out in section 4 above, has been made) the Land Registrar is hereby directed to record such Vesting Order in respect of the subject real property identified in *Schedule "T", Section 2* (the "*Fort William Registry Assets*");

11 **ORDERS** that upon the filing of the Second Closing Monitor's Certificate with this Court's registry, the Vendors shall be authorized to take all such steps as may be necessary to effect the discharge of all liens, charges and encumbrances registered against the Fort William Assets, including filing such financing change statements in the Ontario Personal Property Registry ("*OPPR*") as may be necessary, from any registration filed against the Vendors in the OPPR, provided that the Vendors shall not be authorized to effect any discharge that would have the effect of releasing any collateral other than the Fort William Assets, and the Vendors shall be authorized to take any further steps by way of further application to this Court;

12 **ORDERS** that the proceeds from the sale of the First Closing Assets and the Fort William Assets, net of the payment of all outstanding Taxes (as defined in the Purchase Agreement) and all transaction-related costs, including without limitation, attorney's fees (the "*Net Proceeds*") shall be remitted to Ernst & Young Inc., in its capacity as Monitor of the Petitioners, until the issuance of directions by this Court with respect to the allocation of said Net Proceeds;

13 **ORDERS** that for the purposes of determining the nature and priority of the First Closing Assets Encumbrances, the Net Proceeds from the sale of the First Closing Assets shall stand in the place and stead of the First Closing Assets, and that upon payment of the First Closing Purchase Price (as defined in the Purchase Agreement) by the Purchaser, all First Closing Assets Encumbrances except those listed in Schedule E hereto shall attach to the Net Proceeds with the same priority as they had with respect to the First Closing Assets immediately prior to the sale, as if the First Closing Assets had not been sold and remained in the possession or control of the person having that possession or control immediately prior to the sale;

14 **ORDERS** that for the purposes of determining the nature and priority of the Fort William Assets Encumbrances, the Net Proceeds from the sale of the Fort William Assets shall stand in the place and stead of the Fort William Assets, and that

upon payment of the Second Closing Purchase Price (as defined in the Purchase Agreement) by the Purchaser, all Fort William Assets Encumbrances except those listed in Schedule G hereto shall attach to the Net Proceeds with the same priority as they had with respect to the Fort William Assets immediately prior to the sale, as if the Fort William Assets had not been sold and remained in the possession or control of the person having that possession or control immediately prior to the sale;

15 **ORDERS** that notwithstanding:

- (i) the proceedings under the CCAA;
- (ii) any petitions for a receiving order now or hereafter issued pursuant to the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act ("*BIA*") and any order issued pursuant to any such petition; or
- (iii) the provisions of any federal or provincial legislation;

the vesting of the First Closing Assets and the Fort William Assets contemplated in this Vesting Order, as well as the execution of the Purchase Agreement pursuant to this Vesting Order, are to be binding on any trustee in bankruptcy that may be appointed, and shall not be void or voidable nor deemed to be a settlement, fraudulent preference, assignment, fraudulent conveyance, transfer at undervalue or other reviewable transaction under the BIA or any other applicable federal or provincial legislation, nor shall it give rise to an oppression or any other remedy;

16 **ORDERS AND DECLARES** that the Sale Transactions are exempt from the application of the *Bulk Sales Act* (Ontario);

17 **REQUESTS** the aid and recognition of any court, tribunal, regulatory or administrative body having jurisdiction in Canada or in the United States to give effect to this Order, including without limitation, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware, and to assist the Monitor and its agents in carrying out the terms of this Order. All courts, tribunals, regulatory and administrative bodies are hereby respectfully requested to make such orders and to provide such assistance to the Monitor, as an officer of this Court, as may be necessary or desirable to give effect to this Order or to assist the Monitor and its agents in carrying out the terms of this Order;

18 **ORDERS** the provisional execution of this Vesting Order notwithstanding any appeal and without the necessity of furnishing any security;

19 **WITHOUT COSTS.**

Schedule "A" — Abitibi Petitioners

1. *ABITIBI-CONSOLIDATED INC.*
2. *ABITIBI-CONSOLIDATED COMPANY OF CANADA*
3. *3224112 NOVA SCOTIA LIMITED*
4. *MARKETING DONOHUE INC.*
5. *ABITIBI-CONSOLIDATED CANADIAN OFFICE PRODUCTS HOLDINGS INC.*
6. *3834328 CANADA INC.*
7. *6169678 CANADA INC.*
8. *4042140 CANADA INC.*
9. *DONOHUE RECYCLING INC.*
10. *1508756 ONTARIO INC.*

11. *3217925 NOVA SCOTIA COMPANY*
12. *LA TUQUE FOREST PRODUCTS INC.*
13. *ABITIBI-CONSOLIDATED NOVA SCOTIA INCORPORATED*
14. *SAGUENAY FOREST PRODUCTS INC.*
15. *TERRA NOVA EXPLORATIONS LTD.*
16. *THE JONQUIERE PULP COMPANY*
17. *THE INTERNATIONAL BRIDGE AND TERMINAL COMPANY*
18. *SCRAMBLE MINING LTD.*
19. *9150-3383 QUÉBEC INC.*
20. *ABITIBI-CONSOLIDATED (U.K.) INC.*

Schedule "B" — Bowater Petitioners

1. *BOWATER CANADIAN HOLDINGS INC.*
2. *BOWATER CANADA FINANCE CORPORATION*
3. *BOWATER CANADIAN LIMITED*
4. *3231378 NOVA SCOTIA COMPANY*
5. *ABITIBIBOWATER CANADA INC.*
6. *BOWATER CANADA TREASURY CORPORATION*
7. *BOWATER CANADIAN FOREST PRODUCTS INC.*
8. *BOWATER SHELBURNE CORPORATION*
9. *BOWATER LAHAVE CORPORATION*
10. *ST-MAURICE RIVER DRIVE COMPANY LIMITED*
11. *BOWATER TREATED WOOD INC.*
12. *CANEXEL HARDBOARD INC.*
13. *9068-9050 QUÉBEC INC.*
14. *ALLIANCE FOREST PRODUCTS (2001) INC.*
15. *BOWATER BELLEDUNE SAWMILL INC.*
16. *BOWATER MARITIMES INC.*
17. *BOWATER MITIS INC.*

18. *BOWATER GUÉRETTE INC.*

19. *BOWATER COUTURIER INC.*

Schedule "C" — 18.6 CCAA Petitioners

1. *ABITIBIBOWATER INC.*

2. *ABITIBIBOWATER US HOLDING 1 CORP.*

3. *BOWATER VENTURES INC.*

4. *BOWATER INCORPORATED*

5. *BOWATER NUWAY INC.*

6. *BOWATER NUWAY MID-STATES INC.*

7. *CATAWBA PROPERTY HOLDINGS LLC*

8. *BOWATER FINANCE COMPANY INC.*

9. *BOWATER SOUTH AMERICAN HOLDINGS INCORPORATED*

10. *BOWATER AMERICA INC.*

11. *LAKE SUPERIOR FOREST PRODUCTS INC.*

12. *BOWATER NEWSPRINT SOUTH LLC*

13. *BOWATER NEWSPRINT SOUTH OPERATIONS LLC*

14. *BOWATER FINANCE II, LLC*

15. *BOWATER ALABAMA LLC*

16. *COOSA PINES GOLF CLUB HOLDINGS LLC*

Schedule "D" — First Closing Monitor's Certificate

CANADA

PROVINCE OF QUEBEC DISTRICT OF MONTRÉL

No.: 500-11-036133-094

SUPERIOR COURT

Commercial Division (Sitting as a court designated pursuant to the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C., c. C-36, as amended)

IN THE MATTER OF THE PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF:

ABITIBIBOWATER INC., AND ABITIBI-CONSOLIDATED INC., AND BOWATER CANADIAN HOLDINGS INC., AND THE OTHER PETITIONERS LISTED HEREIN, PETITIONERS AND ERNST & YOUNG INC., MONITOR

CERTIFICATE OF THE MONITOR

Recitals:

WHEREAS on April 17, 2009, the Superior Court of Quebec (the "*Court*") issued an order (as subsequently amended and restated, the "*Initial Order*") pursuant to the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* (the "*CCAA*") in respect of (i) Abitibi-Consolidated Inc. ("*ACT*") and subsidiaries thereof (collectively, the "*Abitibi Petitioners*"),²⁹ (ii) Bowater Canadian Holdings Inc. and subsidiaries and affiliates thereof (collectively, the "*Bowater Petitioners*")³⁰ and (iii) certain partnerships³¹. Any undefined capitalized expression used herein has the meaning set forth in the Initial Order and in the Closed Mills Vesting Order (as defined below);

WHEREAS pursuant to the terms of the Initial Order, Ernst & Young Inc. (the "*Monitor*") was named monitor of, *inter alia*, the Abitibi Petitioners; and

WHEREAS on •, 2010, the Court issued an Order (the "*Closed Mills Vesting Order*") thereby, *inter alia*, authorizing and approving the execution by Abitibi-Consolidated Company of Canada ("*ACCC*"), Bowater Maritimes Inc. ("*BMI*") and Bowater Canadian Forest Products Inc. ("*BCFPI*") and together with ACCC and BMI, the "*Vendors*") of an agreement entitled *Purchase and Sale Agreement* (the "*Purchase Agreement*") by and between ACCC, BMI and BCFPI, as Vendors, American Iron & Metal LP (the "*Purchaser*") through its general partner American Iron & Metal GP Inc., as Purchaser, American Iron & Metal Company Inc., as Guarantor, and to which ACI intervened, copy of which was filed and into all the transactions contemplated therein (the "*Sale Transactions*") with such alterations, changes, amendments, deletions or additions thereto, as may be agreed to with the consent of the Monitor.

WHEREAS the Purchase Agreement contemplates two distinct closing in order to complete the Sale Transactions, namely a First Closing in respect of the First Closing Purchased Assets and a Second Closing in respect of the Fort William Purchased Assets (all capitalized terms as defined in the Purchase Agreement).

The Monitor Certifies that it has been Advised by the Vendors and the Purchaser as to the Following:

- (a) the Purchase Agreement has been executed and delivered;
- (b) the portion of the First Closing Purchase Price payable upon the First Closing and all applicable taxes have been paid (all capitalized terms as defined in the Purchase Agreement);
- (c) all conditions to the First Closing under the Purchase Agreement have been satisfied or waived by the parties thereto.

This Certificate was delivered by the Monitor at ____ [TIME] on _____ [DATE].

Ernst & Young Inc. in its capacity as the monitor for the restructuration proceedings under the *CCAA* undertaken by AbitibiBowater Inc., Abitibi-Consolidated Inc., Bowater Canadian Holdings Inc. and the other Petitioners listed herein, and not in its personal capacity.

Name: _____

Title: _____

Schedule "E" — Permitted First Closing Assets Encumbrances

1. Beupré Mill

- a. Servitudes dated February 10, 1954 registered under numbers 34 173, 34 174, 34 175, 34 176, 34 177, 34 178, 34 179, 34 180 in the index of immovables with respect to lot 3 681 454 in the Registration Division of Montmorency, Cadastre of Québec;
- b. Servitude dated April 4, 1964 registered under number 45 815 in the index of immovables with respect to lot 3 681 454 in the Registration Division of Montmorency, Cadastre of Québec;
- c. Servitudes dated December 17, 1980 registered under numbers 83 049, 83 050, 83 051, 83 052 and 83 053 in the index of immovables with respect to lot 3 681 089 in the Registration Division of Montmorency, Cadastre of Québec;
- d. Servitudes dated December 18, 1980 registered under number 83 095, 83 096 and 83 097 in the index of immovables with respect to lot 3 681 089 in the Registration Division of Montmorency, Cadastre of Québec;
- e. Servitude dated December 23, 1980 registered under number 83 121 in the index of immovables with respect to lot 3 681 089 in the Registration Division of Montmorency, Cadastre of Québec;
- f. Servitudes dated December 24, 1980 registered under numbers 83 140, 83 141, 83 142, 83 143, 83 144, 83 145, 83 146 and 83 147 in the index of immovables with respect to lot 3 681 089 in the Registration Division of Montmorency, Cadastre of Québec;
- g. Servitude dated December 30, 1980 registered under number 83 182 in the index of immovables with respect to lot 3 681 089 in the Registration Division of Montmorency, Cadastre of Québec;
- h. Servitudes dated January 7, 1981 registered under numbers 83 196, 83 197, 83 198 and 83 199 in the index of immovables with respect to lot 3 681 089 in the Registration Division of Montmorency, Cadastre of Québec;
- i. Servitudes dated January 9, 1981 registered under numbers 83 215 and 83 216 in the index of immovables with respect to lot 3 681 089 in the Registration Division of Montmorency, Cadastre of Québec;
- j. Servitude dated March 20, 1981 registered under number 83 751 in the index of immovables with respect to lot 3 681 089 in the Registration Division of Montmorency, Cadastre of Québec;
- k. Servitude dated June 22, 1981 registered under number 84 426 in the index of immovables with respect to lot 3 682 466 in the Registration Division of Montmorency, Cadastre of Québec;
- l. Servitude dated November 13, 1981 registered under number 85 429 in the index of immovables with respect to lot 3 681 089 in the Registration Division of Montmorency, Cadastre of Québec;
- m. Servitude dated December 4, 1981 registered under number 85 555 in the index of immovables with respect to lot 3 681 089 in the Registration Division of Montmorency, Cadastre of Québec;
- n. Servitude dated December 9, 1981 registered under number 85 567 in the index of immovables with respect to lot 3 681 089 in the Registration Division of Montmorency, Cadastre of Québec;
- o. Servitude dated December 14, 1981 registered under number 85 602 in the index of immovables with respect to lot 3 681 089 in the Registration Division of Montmorency, Cadastre of Québec;
- p. Servitude dated December 16, 1981 registered under number 85 617 in the index of immovables with respect to lot 3 681 089 in the Registration Division of Montmorency, Cadastre of Québec;
- q. Servitude dated December 7, 1982 registered under number 87 882 in the index of immovables with respect to lot 3 681 089 in the Registration Division of Montmorency, Cadastre of Québec;

- r. Servitude dated December 20, 1982 registered under number 88 007 in the index of immovables with respect to lot 3 681 089 in the Registration Division of Montmorency, Cadastre of Québec;
- s. Servitude dated March 23, 1983 registered under number 91 937 in the index of immovables with respect to lot 3 681 089 in the Registration Division of Montmorency, Cadastre of Québec;
- t. Servitude dated September 9, 1983 registered under number 90 365 in the index of immovables with respect to lot 3 681 089 in the Registration Division of Montmorency, Cadastre of Québec;
- u. Servitude dated April 25, 1985 registered under number 91 154 in the index of immovables with respect to lot 3 681 089 in the Registration Division of Montmorency, Cadastre of Québec;
- v. Servitude dated July 7, 1986 registered under number 98 833 in the index of immovables with respect to lot 3 681 089 in the Registration Division of Montmorency, Cadastre of Québec;
- w. Servitude dated September 8, 1986 registered under number 99 187 in the index of immovables with respect to lot 3 681 089 in the Registration Division of Montmorency, Cadastre of Québec;
- x. Servitude dated December 23, 1997 registered under number 91 937 in the index of immovables with respect to lot 3 681 089 in the Registration Division of Montmorency, Cadastre of Québec;
- y. Servitude dated December 23, 1997 registered under number 134 993 in the index of immovables with respect to lots 3 681 089 and 3 681 097 in the Registration Division of Montmorency, Cadastre of Québec;
- z. Servitude dated December 23, 1997 registered under number 134 994 in the index of immovables with respect to lot 3 681 097 in the Registration Division of Montmorency, Cadastre of Québec; and
- aa. Servitude dated July 25, 2000 registered under number 141 246 in the index of immovables with respect to lots 3 681 089 and 3 681 097 in the Registration Division of Montmorency, Cadastre of Québec.

2. Dalhousie Mill

None

3. Donnacona Mill

- a. Servitude dated November 12, 1920 registered under number 68 747 in the index of immovables with respect to lot 3 507 106 in the Registration Division of Portneuf, Cadastre of Québec;
- b. Servitude dated October 26, 1931 registered under number 80007 in the index of immovables with respect to lots 3 507 098, 3 507 101 and 3 507 106 in the Registration Division of Portneuf, Cadastre of Québec;
- c. Servitude dated May 11, 1933 registered under number 87 789 in the index of immovables with respect to lot 3 507 106 in the Registration Division of Portneuf, Cadastre of Québec;
- d. Servitude dated April 10, 1946 registered under number 109891 in the index of immovables with respect to lots 3 507 098, 3 507 101 and 3 507 106 in the Registration Division of Portneuf, Cadastre of Québec;
- e. Servitude dated October 6, 1951 registered under number 125685 in the index of immovables with respect to lots 3 507 098, 3 507 101 and 3 507 106 in the Registration Division of Portneuf, Cadastre of Québec;
- f. Servitude dated February 16, 1961 registered under number 154 517 in the index of immovables with respect to lot 3 507 106 in the Registration Division of Portneuf, Cadastre of Québec;

- g. Servitude dated February 1, 1983 registered under number 272521 in the index of immovables with respect to lots 3 507 098, 3 507 101 and 3 507 106 in the Registration Division of Portneuf, Cadastre of Québec;
- h. Servitude dated April 14, 1986 registered under number 293891 in the index of immovables with respect to lots 3 507 098, 3 507 101 and 3 507 106 in the Registration Division of Portneuf, Cadastre of Québec;
- i. Servitudes dated March 25, 1987 registered under numbers 301930, 301931 and 302028 in the index of immovables with respect to lots 3 507 098, 3 507 101 and 3 507 106 in the Registration Division of Portneuf, Cadastre of Québec;
- j. Servitude dated October 30, 1990 registered under number 333377 in the index of immovables with respect to lots 3 507 098, 3 507 101 and 3 507 106 in the Registration Division of Portneuf, Cadastre of Québec;
- k. Servitude dated April 19, 1996 registered under number 476330 in the index of immovables with respect to lots 3 507 098, 3 507 101 and 3 507 106 in the Registration Division of Portneuf, Cadastre of Québec;
- l. Servitude dated April 19, 1996 registered under number 476331 in the index of immovables with respect to lots 3 507 098, 3 507 101 and 3 507 106 in the Registration Division of Portneuf, Cadastre of Québec; and
- m. Servitude dated May 20, 2003 registered under number 10 410 139 in the index of immovables with respect to lot 3 507 106 in the Registration Division of Portneuf, Cadastre of Québec.

Schedule "F" — Second Closing Monitor's Certificate

CANADA

PROVINCE OF QUEBEC DISTRICT OF MONTRÉL

No.: 500-11-036133-094

SUPERIOR COURT

Commercial Division (Sitting as a court designated pursuant to the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C., c. C-36, as amended)

IN THE MATTER OF THE PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF:

ABITIBIBOWATER INC., AND ABITIBI-CONSOLIDATED INC., AND BOWATER CANADIAN HOLDINGS INC., AND THE OTHER PETITIONERS LISTED HEREIN, PETITIONERS AND ERNST & YOUNG INC., MONITOR

CERTIFICATE OF THE MONITOR

Recitals:

WHEREAS on April 17, 2009, the Superior Court of Quebec (the "*Court*") issued an order (as subsequently amended and restated, the "*Initial Order*") pursuant to the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* (the "*CCAA*") in respect of (i) Abitibi-Consolidated Inc. ("*ACT*") and subsidiaries thereof (collectively, the "*Abitibi Petitioners*"),³² (ii) Bowater Canadian Holdings Inc. and subsidiaries and affiliates thereof (collectively, the "*Bowater Petitioners*")³³ and (iii) certain partnerships³⁴. Any undefined capitalized expression used herein has the meaning set forth in the Initial Order and in the Closed Mills Vesting Order (as defined below);

WHEREAS pursuant to the terms of the Initial Order, Ernst & Young Inc. (the "*Monitor*") was named monitor of, *inter alia*, the Abitibi Petitioners; and

WHEREAS on •, 2010, the Court issued an Order (the "*Closed Mills Vesting Order*") thereby, *inter alia*, authorizing and approving the execution by Abitibi-Consolidated Company of Canada ("*ACCC*"), Bowater Maritimes Inc. ("*BMT*") and Bowater Canadian Forest Products Inc. ("*BCFPI*" and together with ACCC and BMI, the "*Vendors*") of an agreement entitled *Purchase and Sale Agreement* (the "*Purchase Agreement*") by and between ACCC, BMI and BCFPI, as Vendors, American Iron & Metal LP (the "*Purchaser*") through its general partner American Iron & Metal GP Inc., as Purchaser, American Iron & Metal Company Inc., as Guarantor, and to which ACI intervened, copy of which was filed and into all the transactions contemplated therein (the "*Sale Transactions*") with such alterations, changes, amendments, deletions or additions thereto, as may be agreed to with the consent of the Monitor.

WHEREAS the Purchase Agreement contemplates two distinct closing in order to complete the Sale Transactions, namely a First Closing in respect of the First Closing Purchased Assets and a Second Closing in respect of the Fort William Purchased Assets (all capitalized terms as defined in the Purchase Agreement).

The Monitor Certifies that it has been Advised by the Vendors and the Purchaser as to the Following:

- (a) the Purchase Agreement has been executed and delivered;
- (b) the portion of the Second Closing Purchase Price payable upon the Second Closing and all applicable taxes have been paid (all capitalized terms as defined in the Purchase Agreement);
- (c) all conditions to the Second Closing under the Purchase Agreement have been satisfied or waived by the parties thereto.

This Certificate was delivered by the Monitor at ____ [TIME] on _____ [DATE].

Ernst & Young Inc. in its capacity as the monitor for the restructuration proceedings under the *CCAA* undertaken by AbitibiBowater Inc., Abitibi-Consolidated Inc., Bowater Canadian Holdings Inc. and the other Petitioners listed herein, and not in its personal capacity.

Name: _____

Title: _____

Schedule "G" — Permitted Fort William Assets Encumbrances

Section 1 Permitted Fort William Land Titles Assets Encumbrances

1. Notification Agreement in favour of the City of Thunder Bay, registered on PIN 62261-0314, PT Fort William Indian Reserve No. 52 (Grand Trunk Pacific) 1600 acres; PT Water LT in front of Indian Reserve No. 52 (Grand Trunk Pacific Railway Company) PT 1, 2, 3, 55R-10429; Thunder Bay, save and except Parts 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 22, 23 and 24, 55R-13027
2. Water Easement in favour of the City of Thunder Bay registered on Part of PIN 62261-0314, PT Fort William Indian Reserve No. 52 (Grand Trunk Pacific) 1600 acres; PT Water LT in front of Indian Reserve No. 52 (Grand Trunk Pacific Railway Company) PT 1, 2,3, 55R-10429; Thunder Bay, save and except Parts 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 22, 23 and 24, 55R-13027, being Part 10, 55R-13027

Section 2 Permitted Fort William Registry Assets Encumbrances


3. Notification Agreement in favour of the City of Thunder Bay, Part of PIN 62261-0533 , PT Fort William Indian Reserve No. 52 (Grand Trunk Pacific) 1600 acres, being Parts 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16 and 25, 55R-13027

4. Telephone Easement in favour of the City of Thunder Bay registered on Part of PIN 62261-0533 , PT Fort William Indian Reserve No. 52 (Grand Trunk Pacific) 1600 acres, being Part 20, 55R-13027
5. Water Easement in favour of the City of Thunder Bay, registered on Part of PIN 62261-0533, PT Fort William Indian Reserve No. 52 (Grand Trunk Pacific) 1600 acres, being Parts 12 and 15, 55R-13027
6. Easement in favour of Union Gas, registered on Part of PIN 62261-0533 , PT Fort William Indian Reserve No. 52 (Grand Trunk Pacific) 1600 acres, being Parts 20 and 25, 55R-13027
7. Agreement registered as Instrument #403730 on July 14, 1999
8. Easement registered as Instrument #403729 on July 14, 1999

The said registered reference plan 55R13027 is attached as Annex A to this Schedule G (the "Reference Plan").

Motion granted.

Annex A



Graphic 1

Schedule "H" — Dalhousie Assets

Municipal address:

451 William St., Dalhousie, New Brunswick, Canada, E8C 2X9

Legal description (Property Identifier No.):

50173616, 50172030, 50173715, 50172667, 50172634, 50173574, 50173582, 50173590, 50172626, 50173640, 50173624, 50173632, 50173657, 50173681, 50173673, 50173665, 50173749, 50173756, 50173764, 50105394, 50251354, 50172774, 50173566, 50173707


Save and Except for

The surveyed land bounded by the bolded line in the plan attached in Annex A to this Schedule H (the "*Dalhousie Plan*").

For greater certainty, the following property is not included in the sale:

Legal description (Property Identifier No.): 50191857, 50191865, 50191881, 50191873, 50191899, 50191915, 50191931, 50192384, 50192400, 50068832, 50193002, 50192996, 50192988, 50192970, 50192418, 50260538, 50260520, 50260512, 50072131, 50340959, 50340942, 50340934, 50340926, 50340918, 50340900, 50340892, 50340884, 50340645, 50340637, 50340629, 50340611, 50339779, 50192392, 50191949, 50191923, 50191907, 50172949, 50172931, 50172907, 50056506, 50241611, 50172899, 50172881, 50172873, 50172865, 50172857, 50172840, 50172832, 50172824, 50172444, 50171966, 50171958, 50173699, 50104553, 50173731, 50172923, 50172915.

Annex A — Dalhousie Plan



Graphic 2

Schedule "I" — Fort William Assets

Municipal address:

1735 City Road, Thunder Bay, Ontario, Canada, P7B 6T7

Legal description:

Section 1 Fort William Land Titles Assets

PIN 62261-0314, PT Fort William Indian Reserve No. 52 (Grand Trunk Pacific) 1600 acres; PT Water LT in front of Indian Reserve No. 52 (Grand Trunk Pacific Railway Company) PT 1, 2 ,3, 55R-10429; Thunder Bay, save and except Parts 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 22, 23 and 24, 55R-13027

Section 2 Fort William Registry Assets

Part of PIN 62261-0533, PT Fort William Indian Reserve No. 52 (Grand Trunk Pacific) 1600 acres, being Parts 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16 and 25, 55R-13027

Footnotes

- 1 Namely, a first Vesting Order in respect of the Beupré, Dalhousie, Donnacona and Fort William closed mills assets (Exhibit R-3A) and a second Vesting Order in respect of the corresponding Fort William land swap (Exhibit R-4A).
- 2 Dated March 22, 2010 and included in Exhibit I-1.
- 3 Exhibits VB-1 and I-5.
- 4 *AbitibiBowater Inc., Re*, 2009 QCCS 6460 (C.S. Que.), at para. 36 and 37.
- 5 See, in this respect, *Rail Power Technologies Corp., Re*, 2009 QCCS 2885 (C.S. Que.), at para. 96 to 99; *Nortel Networks Corp., Re*, 2009 CarswellOnt 4467 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]), at para. 35; *Boutique Euphoria inc., Re*, 2007 QCCS 7128 (C.S. Que.), at para. 91 to 95; *Calpine Canada Energy Ltd., Re* (2007), 35 C.B.R. (5th) 1 (Alta. Q.B.), and *Boutiques San Francisco Inc., Re* (2004), 7 C.B.R. (5th) 189 (C.S. Que.).
- 6 *Royal Bank v. Soundair Corp.* (1991), 7 C.B.R. (3d) 1 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 16.
- 7 See, for instance, the decisions cited at Note 5 and *Tiger Brand Knitting Co., Re* (2005), 9 C.B.R. (5th) 315 (Ont. S.C.J.), leave to appeal refused (2005), 19 C.B.R. (5th) 53 (Ont. C.A.); *PSINET Ltd., Re*, 2001 CarswellOnt 3405 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]), at para. 6; and *Canadian Red Cross Society / Société Canadienne de la Croix-Rouge, Re*, 1998 CarswellOnt 3346 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]), at para. 47.
- 8 *Grant Forest Products Inc., Re*, 2010 ONSC 1846 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]), at para. 30-33.
- 9 See, on that point, *Consumers Packaging Inc., Re* (Ont. C.A.), at para. 8, and *Canwest Global Communications Corp., Re*, 2010 ONSC 1176 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]), at para. 42.
- 10 See Exhibit I-1 and general condition # 5 of the Arctic Beluga penultimate bid.
- 11 See Exhibits I-6, I-8 and I-9.
- 12 See Exhibit I-7.
- 13 See Exhibit I-2.
- 14 See Exhibit I-6.
- 15 See Exhibit I-9.
- 16 *Royal Bank v. Soundair Corp.* (1991), 7 C.B.R. (3d) 1 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 30.
- 17 (1986), 58 C.B.R. (N.S.) 237 (Ont. S.C.)
- 18 (1987), 64 C.B.R. (N.S.) 140 (Ont. S.C.)
- 19 *Rail Power Technologies Corp., Re*, 2009 QCCS 2885 (C.S. Que.), at para. 96 to 99, and *Boutique Euphoria inc., Re*, 2007 QCCS 7128 (C.S. Que.), at para. 91 to 95.
- 20 Exhibits AIM-1 and AIM-2.

- 21 See, for instance, the judgments rendered in *Rail Power Technologies Corp., Re*, 2009 QCCS 2885 (C.S. Que.); *Boutique Euphoria inc., Re*, 2007 QCCS 7128 (C.S. Que.); and *Boutiques San Francisco Inc., Re* (2004), 7 C.B.R. (5th) 189 (C.S. Que.).
- 22 *Skyepharma PLC v. Hyal Pharmaceutical Corp.*, [2000] O.J. No. 467 (Ont. C.A.), affirming (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) ("*Skyepharma*").
- 23 *Id.*, at para. 30. See also, *Consumers Packaging Inc., Re* (Ont. C.A.), at para. 7.
- 24 See *Consumers Packaging Inc., Re* (Ont. C.A.), at para. 7; *BDC Venture Capital Inc. v. Natural Convergence Inc.*, 2009 ONCA 637 (Ont. C.A. [In Chambers]), at para. 20; *BDC Venture Capital Inc. v. Natural Convergence Inc.*, 2009 ONCA 665 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 8.
- 25 *In the Matter of Nortel Networks Corporation*, 2010 ONSC 126, at para. 3.
- 26 Assigned to Law Debenture Trust Company of New York registered under number 09-0288002-0001.
- 27 Assigned to U.S. Bank National Association and Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. under number 10-0018318-0001.
- 28 *Ibid.*
- 29 The Abitibi Petitioners are Abitibi-Consolidated Inc., Abitibi-Consolidated Company of Canada, 3224112 Nova Scotia Limited, Marketing Donohue Inc., Abitibi-Consolidated Canadian Office Products Holdings Inc., 3834328 Canada Inc., 6169678 Canada Incorporated., 4042140 Canada Inc., Donohue Recycling Inc., 1508756 Ontario Inc., 3217925 Nova Scotia Company, La Tuque Forest Products Inc., Abitibi-Consolidated Nova Scotia Incorporated, Saguenay Forest Products Inc., Terra Nova Explorations Ltd., The Jonquière Pulp Company, The International Bridge and Terminal Company, Scramble Mining Ltd., 9150-3383 Québec Inc. and Abitibi-Consolidated (U.K.) Inc.
- 30 The Bowater Petitioners are Bowater Canadian Holdings Incorporated., Bowater Canada Finance Corporation, Bowater Canadian Limited, 3231378 Nova Scotia Company, AbitibiBowater Canada Inc., Bowater Canada Treasury Corporation, Bowater Canadian Forest Products Inc., Bowater Shelburne Corporation, Bowater LaHave Corporation, St. Maurice River Drive Company Limited, Bowater Treated Wood Inc., Canoxel Hardboard Inc., 9068-9050 Québec Inc., Alliance Forest Products (2001) Inc., Bowater Belledune Sawmill Inc., Bowater Maritimes Inc., Bowater Mitis Inc., Bowater Guérette Inc. and Bowater Couturier Inc.
- 31 The partnerships are Bowater Canada Finance Limited Partnership, Bowater Pulp and Paper Canada Holdings Limited Partnership and Abitibi-Consolidated Finance LP.
- 32 The Abitibi Petitioners are Abitibi-Consolidated Inc., Abitibi-Consolidated Company of Canada, 3224112 Nova Scotia Limited, Marketing Donohue Inc., Abitibi-Consolidated Canadian Office Products Holdings Inc., 3834328 Canada Inc., 6169678 Canada Incorporated., 4042140 Canada Inc., Donohue Recycling Inc., 1508756 Ontario Inc., 3217925 Nova Scotia Company, La Tuque Forest Products Inc., Abitibi-Consolidated Nova Scotia Incorporated, Saguenay Forest Products Inc., Terra Nova Explorations Ltd., The Jonquière Pulp Company, The International Bridge and Terminal Company, Scramble Mining Ltd., 9150-3383 Québec Inc. and Abitibi-Consolidated (U.K.) Inc.
- 33 The Bowater Petitioners are Bowater Canadian Holdings Incorporated., Bowater Canada Finance Corporation, Bowater Canadian Limited, 3231378 Nova Scotia Company, AbitibiBowater Canada Inc., Bowater Canada Treasury Corporation, Bowater Canadian Forest Products Inc., Bowater Shelburne Corporation, Bowater LaHave Corporation, St. Maurice River Drive Company Limited, Bowater Treated Wood Inc., Canoxel Hardboard Inc., 9068-9050 Québec Inc., Alliance Forest Products (2001) Inc., Bowater Belledune Sawmill Inc., Bowater Maritimes Inc., Bowater Mitis Inc., Bowater Guérette Inc. and Bowater Couturier Inc.
- 34 The partnerships are Bowater Canada Finance Limited Partnership, Bowater Pulp and Paper Canada Holdings Limited Partnership and Abitibi-Consolidated Finance LP.

TAB 12

2015 BCSC 1376
British Columbia Supreme Court

North American Tungsten Corp., Re

2015 CarswellBC 2232, 2015 BCSC 1376, [2015] B.C.W.L.D. 6686, [2015] B.C.W.L.D. 6687, 256 A.C.W.S. (3d) 767

**In the Matter of the Companies' Creditors
Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as amended**

In the Matter of the Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44, as amended

In the Matter of North American Tungsten Corporation Ltd. Petitioner

Butler J., In Chambers

Heard: July 8, 2015

Judgment: July 9, 2015

Docket: Vancouver S154746

Counsel: John R. Sandrelli, Jordan D. Schultz, for Petitioner

Kibben M. Jackson, for Monitor, Alvarex & Marsal Canada Inc.

William E.J. Skelly, for Callidus Capital Corporation

Mary Buttery, H. Lance Williams, for Government of Northwest Territories

Jonathan McLean, Angela L. Crimeni, for Wolfram Bergbau and Hütten AG, Global Tungsten & Powders Corp.

Subject: Civil Practice and Procedure; Insolvency

Related Abridgment Classifications

Bankruptcy and insolvency

[XIX Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act](#)

[XIX.2 Initial application](#)

[XIX.2.b Grant of stay](#)

[XIX.2.b.vii Extension of order](#)

Bankruptcy and insolvency

[XIX Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act](#)

[XIX.3 Arrangements](#)

[XIX.3.b Approval by court](#)

[XIX.3.b.iv Miscellaneous](#)

Table of Authorities

Cases considered by *Butler J., In Chambers*:

Anvil Range Mining Corp., Re (2001), 2001 CarswellOnt 1325, 25 C.B.R. (4th) 1 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Azure Dynamics Corp., Re (2012), 2012 BCSC 781, 2012 CarswellBC 1545, 91 C.B.R. (5th) 310 (B.C. S.C. [In Chambers]) — referred to

Indalex Ltd., Re (2013), 2013 SCC 6, 2013 CarswellOnt 733, 2013 CarswellOnt 734, D.T.E. 2013T-97, 96 C.B.R. (5th) 171, 354 D.L.R. (4th) 581, 20 P.P.S.A.C. (3d) 1, 439 N.R. 235, 301 O.A.C. 1, 8 B.L.R. (5th) 1, (sub nom. *Sun Indalex Finance LLC v. United Steelworkers*) [2013] 1 S.C.R. 271, 2 C.C.P.B. (2nd) 1 (S.C.C.) — followed

Pacific Shores Resort & Spa Ltd., Re (2011), 2011 BCSC 1775, 2011 CarswellBC 3500, 75 C.B.R. (5th) 248 (B.C. S.C. [In Chambers]) — referred to

Ted Leroy Trucking Ltd., Re (2010), 2010 SCC 60, 2010 CarswellBC 3419, 2010 CarswellBC 3420, 12 B.C.L.R. (5th) 1, (sub nom. *Century Services Inc. v. A.G. of Canada*) 2011 D.T.C. 5006 (Eng.), (sub nom. *Century Services Inc. v. A.G. of Canada*) 2011 G.T.C. 2006 (Eng.), [2011] 2 W.W.R. 383, 72 C.B.R. (5th) 170, 409 N.R. 201, (sub nom. *Ted LeRoy Trucking Ltd., Re*) 326 D.L.R. (4th) 577, (sub nom. *Century Services Inc. v. Canada (A.G.)*) [2010] 3 S.C.R. 379, [2010] G.S.T.C. 186, (sub nom. *Leroy (Ted) Trucking Ltd., Re*) 296 B.C.A.C. 1, (sub nom. *Leroy (Ted) Trucking Ltd., Re*) 503 W.A.C. 1 (S.C.C.) — considered

Timminco Ltd., Re (2012), 2012 CarswellOnt 9633, 2012 ONCA 552, 2 C.B.R. (6th) 332 (Ont. C.A.) — followed

Statutes considered:

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36

Generally — referred to

s. 11.02 [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] — considered

s. 11.02(2) [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] — considered

s. 11.02(3) [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] — considered

s. 11.2 [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] — considered

s. 11.2(1) [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] — considered

s. 11.2(4) [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] — considered

s. 11.2(4)(a) [en. 2007, c. 36, s. 65] — considered

s. 11.2(4)(d) [en. 2007, c. 36, s. 65] — considered

s. 11.2(4)(e) [en. 2007, c. 36, s. 65] — considered

s. 11.2(4)(f) [en. 2007, c. 36, s. 65] — considered

s. 11.2(4)(g) [en. 2007, c. 36, s. 65] — considered

APPLICATIONS by debtor company for extension of stay of proceedings, and for approval of interim financing.

Butler J., In Chambers:

1

THE COURT: This is my ruling on the applications I heard yesterday. The petitioner, North American Tungsten Corporation Ltd. (the "Company"), applies for an extension of the stay of proceedings which was granted in the initial order in this matter on June 9, 2015 (the "Initial Order"), and seeks approval for interim financing pursuant to s. 11.2 of the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36.

2 I will set out the background to this matter and the parties' positions. For the reasons that follow, I am approving the Company's application to extend the stay and approving the interim financing facility on the terms proposed as those were modified during the course of argument yesterday. As always, if a transcript of this ruling is ordered, I reserve the right to amend it, but only as to form, not substance.

Background

3 The Company is involved in the exploration, development, mining and processing of tungsten and other minerals. The main capital assets of the Company are the Cantung Mine located in the Northwest Territories and the Mactung property, an undeveloped exploration property located on the border of the Yukon Territory and the Northwest Territories. The Mactung

property is one of the largest deposits of tungsten in the world. It has received approvals from the federal and Yukon governments to proceed to the next stage of development, but a very large capital investment will be required to construct a mine.

4 The Company sought protection under the *CCAA* as a result of circumstances mostly beyond its control, including a severely depressed world market for tungsten. At the reduced price the Company has been receiving for its tungsten, the Cantung Mine was generating sufficient cash flow to pay the majority of its operational and administrative costs but was unable to meet its financing costs. At the time of the Initial Order, the Company was experiencing significant cash flow problems.

5 Alvarez & Marsal Canada Inc. was appointed Monitor under the Initial Order. A summary of the amounts claimed as owing by secured creditors and their respective security interests as at July 7, 2015 is set out in the Monitor's Fourth report. I will refer to that summary because an understanding of the security interests held by the principal creditors is necessary to consider the issues raised on this application.

6 Callidus Capital Corporation is owed approximately \$13.33 million. This is secured by all present and after-acquired property not related to Mactung. That includes more than 200 pieces of mining equipment used at the Cantung Mine. The Monitor has opined that there is sufficient value in the equipment to satisfy that debt.

7 The Government of Northwest Territories ("GNWT") is owed \$24.67 million. This is secured by all present and after-acquired property related to Mactung. While there is some issue and ongoing negotiation about the actual amount of debt which arises from the Company's reclamation obligations, it is significant.

8 Global Tungsten & Powders Corp. ("GTP") and Wolfram Bergbau and Hütten AG ("WBH") are the Company's only two customers for all of the tungsten produced from the Cantung Mine. The total indebtedness to the customers is approximately \$8.16 million. They also hold security over all present and after-acquired property related to Mactung.

9 Debenture holders are owed \$13.58 million, which is secured by all present and after-acquired property of the Company.

10 Queenwood Capital Partners II LLC ("Queenwood II") is owed approximately \$18.51 million, secured by all present and after-acquired property of the Company. The principals of Queenwood II are related to Company insiders.

11 The total amount of the secured debt is in the range of \$80 million. There is also approximately \$14 million in unsecured liabilities. The reported book value of the assets at the time of the Initial Order was approximately \$64 million, which included a value of \$20 million for the Mactung property. The fair market value or realizable value has not been determined by the Monitor.

12 The somewhat unique situation here is that Callidus does not have security over the Mactung property and the GNWT and the customers do not have security over the Cantung property.

13 The stay granted by the Initial Order expired yesterday, but I extended it until July 10, 2015 to allow me to consider the arguments advanced on this application. Since the Initial Order, management of the Company has been working in good faith to develop a plan of arrangement. Management has developed an operating plan to manage cash flow through the next several months. I will not refer to the projected cash flow except to say that it anticipates receipt of the interim financing and continued revenues of more than \$22 million from operations.

14 The Company has been involved in extensive discussions with the Monitor and stakeholders to put in place a potential Sale and Investment Solicitation Process ("SISP"). To date the plan has involved re-focusing on surface mining and milling ore stockpiles rather than underground mining. Employees have been terminated. If the interim financing is obtained, the Company plans to continue operations at the mine until the end of October 2015, including management of environmental care. It plans to conduct an orderly wind down of underground mining activities, including a staged sale of equipment used in the underground work. It plans to reconfigure the mill facilities to facilitate tailings reprocessing so that it can use existing tailings stores as well as the surface extraction as a revenue source. It also plans to undertake limited expenditures on Cantung reclamation and Mactung environmental work with a view to increasing asset values. It hopes to seek court approval of a SISP in the next couple of weeks.

15 As a result of difficulties arising from timing of receipt of payments from GTP, one of the customers, the cash flow problems for the Company became critical within the last ten days. The Company sought interim financing and received an offer from a third party. Callidus was opposed to that offer of financing and the Company eventually obtained a \$500,000 loan from Callidus on June 29, 2015 on a short-term basis (the "Gap Advance"). They continued to negotiate and arrived at an agreement for interim financing (the "Interim Facility") and a forbearance agreement (the "Forbearance Agreement"). These form the basis for the application before this court. Terms of these agreements which are relevant to the application include:

- a) the \$500,000 Gap Advance would be deemed to be an advance under the Interim Facility;
- b) Callidus will advance an additional \$2.5 million, which along with the Gap Advance would be secured over all of the property of the Company and have priority over the secured creditors; and
- c) the Company will have to make repayments to Callidus by certain dates and those payments include payments of interest and principal on the existing loan facility (the "Post-Filing Payments").

16 At the hearing of the application, one of the more contentious issues was the Company's request that the court make the order in relation to the Gap Advance *nunc pro tunc*. This term was sought because s. 11.2(1) of the *CCAA* allows a court to make an order for interim financing but "The security or charge may not secure an obligation that exists before the order is made."

17 Of course the Gap Advance was an obligation which existed before the making of any order for interim financing. During the course of argument yesterday, the Company withdrew the application for a *nunc pro tunc* order in relation to the Gap Advance. This occurred because Callidus agreed to modify the terms of the Interim Facility such that the Gap Advance will be treated as an advance under its existing facility. In other words, the proposed Interim Facility is now for a \$2.5 million loan facility and not \$3.0 million, as set out in the application.

Position of the Company

18 The Company says that in all of the circumstances, proceeding with the Forbearance Agreement and the Interim Facility is better for the petitioner's restructuring efforts and necessary given the urgent need for funding. It stresses that without access to the interim financing, it will be unable to meet its ongoing payroll obligations or its negotiated payment terms for the post-filing obligations. It will be unable to continue restructuring and will likely face liquidation by its secured creditors. It also says there is greater value for all stakeholders if the Company is permitted to continue operating as a going concern. It says there would likely be no recovery for creditors other than the senior secured creditors without access to the Interim Facility. The local community of Watson Lake and local businesses would suffer significantly, as 100 employees would be out of work. Further, the Company says there is little prejudice to the secured creditors. In addition, it says if the mine site is abandoned, there would be a larger reclamation obligation, which would be to the detriment of the GNWT and other creditors with claims against an interest in the Mactung property.

Position of the Customers

19 The customers oppose the Interim Facility and the extension of the stay. They argue that the financing of \$2.5 million at interest rates of 21% will not help the Company emerge from this process with a workable plan. They argue that putting the Cantung Mine into care and maintenance as of November and hoping that tungsten prices rise in the future is not a workable plan.

20 The customers say the result of approval of the Interim Facility is that the security interests of WBH and GTP would be prejudiced because those interests would be subordinated to Callidus as well as the GNWT. Finally, they argue that the bankruptcy of the Company and sale of its assets is inevitable no matter what happens.

Position of the GNWT

21 The GNWT does not oppose the extension of the stay nor the granting of the Interim Facility. However, it opposes the Forbearance Agreement which would grant the Interim Facility priority over the GNWT Mactung security, which it holds to

secure the environmental and reclamation obligations of the Company. It says that it would be prejudiced as a result of the granting of that priority and that in the circumstances here there is no reason to do so. It says that Callidus would effectively receive approximately \$1.5 million in Post-Filing Payments in very short order, which essentially allows it an unfair priority.

The Monitor

22 The Monitor provided detailed comments supporting the Company's application for interim financing as well as the stay. In doing so it made the following observations:

- Without the interim financing, the Company would have no choice but to immediately cease operations. This would negatively impact the progress of reclamation of the mine and tailings ponds and may have a negative impact on the near term market value of the Mactung property.
- The key senior management of the Company remain in place and are committed to pursuing restructuring solutions or transactions that will see an orderly transition of ownership and stewardship of the assets.
- The Interim Facility is supported by Queenwood II and the debenture holders, the creditors who potentially have the most to lose.
- Based on the confidential appraisal, it appears that the equipment values in aggregate exceed the amounts due to Callidus, which may eliminate or at least mitigate the potential prejudice to creditors having security over Mactung.
- The terms of the Interim Facility including interest rates and fees are consistent with market terms for interim financings in the context of distressed companies and are commercially reasonable in these circumstances when compared to the terms of other court approved interim financing facilities.

23 The Monitor concludes its comments in its Fourth Report by stating that "the interim financing contemplated by the Interim Lending Facility and the Forbearance Agreement will enhance the prospects of a viable restructuring and/or a future SISP being undertaken by the Company. Overall... the Monitor is of the view that, balancing the relative prejudices to the stakeholders, the terms of the Forbearance Agreement and Interim Lending Facility are reasonable in the circumstances and the Monitor supports the Company's application..."

Extension of the Stay

24 I turn now to the reasons for granting the extension of the stay. Subsection 11.02(2) of the *CCAA* provides that the Company may apply for an extension of the stay of proceedings for a period that the court considers necessary on any terms that the court may impose. Subsection 11.02(3) provides:

- (3) The court shall not make the order unless
 - (a) the applicant satisfies the court that circumstances exist that make the order appropriate; and
 - (b) in the case of an order under subsection (2), the applicant also satisfies the court that the applicant has acted, and is acting, in good faith and with due diligence.

25 A number of decisions have considered whether "circumstances exist that make the order appropriate". In *Ted Leroy Trucking Ltd., Re*, 2010 SCC 60 (S.C.C.), the Court emphasized that the underlying purpose of the legislation must be considered when construing the provisions in the *CCAA*. Justice Deschamps stated at para. 70:

... Appropriateness under the *CCAA* is assessed by inquiring whether the order sought advances the policy objectives underlying the *CCAA*. The question is whether the order will usefully further efforts to achieve the remedial purpose of the *CCAA* — avoiding the social and economic losses resulting from liquidation of an insolvent company. I would add that appropriateness extends not only to the purpose of the order, but also to the means it employs.

26 When granting an extension, it is a prerequisite for the petitioner to provide evidence of what it intends to do in order to demonstrate to the court and stakeholders that extending the proceedings will advance the purpose of the *CCAA*. The debtor company must show that it has at least "a kernel of a plan": *Azure Dynamics Corp., Re*, 2012 BCSC 781 (B.C. S.C. [In Chambers]).

27 It is also appropriate for the company to use the *CCAA* to effect the sale of the company's business as a going concern. While the main focus of the legislation is the reorganization of insolvent companies, a sales and investment solicitation process (SISP) may be the most efficient way to maximize the value of stakeholders' interests and minimize the harm which stems from liquidation: *Anvil Range Mining Corp., Re* (2001), 25 C.B.R. (4th) 1 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]).

28 When *CCAA* proceedings are in their early stages, it is appropriate for courts to give deference when considering extensions of the stay, provided the requirements of s. 11.02(3) have been met. See, for example, *Pacific Shores Resort & Spa Ltd., Re*, 2011 BCSC 1775 (B.C. S.C. [In Chambers]).

29 The good faith and due diligence requirement of s. 11.02(3) includes observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealings in the proceedings, the absence of an intent to defraud and a duty of honesty to the court and to the stakeholders directly affected by the *CCAA* process.

30 I am satisfied that it is appropriate to grant the extension of the stay as sought by the Company. I reject the position of the customers that the Company has failed to put forward any kind of plan. The operating plan which the Company has begun to put in place responds to the existing cash flow problems and is intended to put the Company in a position to enhance the prospects of a viable restructuring and/or a future SISP.

31 It is more than a kernel of a plan. It is a strategy to move forward in an orderly way which may provide benefits to all stakeholders. It takes into account the remedial purpose of the legislation and attempts to minimize the potential social and economic losses of liquidation of the Company. None of the parties suggested that the Company is acting with an absence of either good faith or due diligence, and I am satisfied from the evidence of Mr. Lindahl and the comments of the Monitor that the Company is indeed proceeding in a fashion which fulfills its obligations of good faith and due diligence.

The Interim Facility

32 I turn to my reasons for approving the interim financing. Subsection 11.2(4) of the *CCAA* sets out factors which the court must consider in determining whether to grant a priority charge to an interim lender. The factors in that section which are most relevant to this application are:

- (a) the period during which the company is expected to be subject to proceedings under this Act;
- ...
- (d) whether the loan would enhance the prospects of a viable compromise or arrangement being made in respect of the company;
- (e) the nature and value of the company's property;
- (f) whether any creditor would be materially prejudiced as a result of the security or charge; and
- (g) the monitor's report... if any.

33 While the factors listed in that section should be considered, the court may also consider additional factors, which may include the following as set out in *Timminco Ltd., Re*, 2012 ONCA 552 (Ont. C.A.) at para. 6, and I am paraphrasing:

- a) without interim financing would the petitioner be forced to stop operating;

- b) whether bankruptcy would be in the interests of the stakeholders; and
- c) would the interim lender have provided financing without a super priority charge...

34 In *Indalex Ltd., Re*, 2013 SCC 6 (S.C.C.) at paras. 58 and 59, the Court approved of the following factors which had been considered by the chambers judge:

- a) the applicants needed additional financing to support operations during the period of the going concern restructuring;
- b) there was no other alternative available and in particular no suggestion that the interim financing would have been available without the super priority charge;
- c) the balancing of prejudice weighed in favour of approval of the interim loan facility.

35 When I consider all of these factors, I am satisfied that it is appropriate to approve the Interim Facility. My reasons for doing so include the following:

- The cash flow projections show that the \$2.5 million from the Interim Facility will be sufficient to allow the Company to satisfy obligations along with its ongoing revenues from operations through to November 2015. By that time the SISF should be well underway and perhaps concluded.
- I accept the Monitor's comments regarding the Interim Facility and Forbearance Agreement. In other words, I accept that the Company would not be able to find other interim financing on more favourable terms and that without such financing, the Company would have no choice but to immediately cease operations.
- I further accept the Monitor's comment that cessation of the operations would negatively impact the reclamation of the Cantung Mine and tailings ponds and may have a negative impact on the market value of the Mactung property.
- The Interim Facility enhances the Company's prospects of carrying out a successful SISF and presenting a viable plan to its creditors. If it is forced to shut down its operations, the Company will likely not be able to continue these proceedings and could not continue with the SISF.
- Bankruptcy and a forced liquidation of the assets is not in the best interests of any stakeholder.
- It is unlikely that any creditor will be materially prejudiced by the priority financing. There are two significant reasons for this. First, I accept the Monitor's view that the equipment security is likely to be sufficient to satisfy the existing debt to Callidus. Second, to the extent that the payments to Callidus under the Interim Facility cover Post-Filing Payments, those will likely be offset by the fact that the ongoing operations will result in the conversion of substantial inventories of unprocessed ore. That ore is Cantung property and so it is currently subject to the existing Callidus security. Under the operating plan, revenue from that asset will be used for ongoing operations.
- I further accept the comments of the Monitor and the submissions of the Company that keeping the Cantung Mine operating will likely assist the Company in managing its environmental obligations and thus limit the risk that the GNWT will be faced with a significant reclamation project. As counsel for the Monitor indicated, abandonment of the mine is likely to result in greater costs. The situation would undoubtedly be somewhat chaotic.
- Finally, I conclude that the Interim Facility will further the policy objectives underlying the *CCAA* by mitigating the effects of an immediate cessation of the mining operations which would result in the loss of employment for the Cantung Mine workers and negatively impact the surrounding community.

36 Before concluding, I will make one final comment regarding the requirements of the Forbearance Agreement that the Company make the Post-Filing Payments to Callidus. The Initial Order permits such payments to Callidus. Further, there is nothing in the *CCAA* which prohibits these payments. In the circumstances I have already outlined above, the use of the

inventories of unprocessed ore to fund ongoing operations would only be possible with the approval of the Interim Facility. In other words the Post-Filing Payments may be offset by the revenues earned from that asset, which would be a benefit to all creditors.

37 In summary, I am granting the extension of the stay. I believe the request was to July 17, 2015. I will hear from counsel on that issue if there is some other date that is preferred. Further, I approve the Forbearance Agreement and the Interim Facility in the amount of \$2.5 million, and as previously indicated, the Gap Advance is not included in that.

38 What about the date for an extension of the stay?

39

MR. SCHULTZ: Yes, My Lord. So that'll turn a little bit on your availability actually, as was indicated by Mr. Sandrelli, the Company anticipates bringing an application to coincide with the end of the stay for a further extension and approval of a SISP. The Company is also hopeful that an application to approve as was alluded to some further financing from Callidus in respect to the GTP receivable. So I guess I am in your hands a little bit as to whether you might be available on the 17th for an hour to hear those.

40

THE COURT: I can be available, but it would have to be by telephone. I am in Williams Lake next week.

41

MR. SCHULTZ: Okay.

42

THE COURT: So I think that we should proceed with that because the next couple weeks after that I am probably not available.

43

MR. SCHULTZ: Okay. In that case then the 17th is probably the best day, and that would be the day we will be seeking the extension to for now.

44

THE COURT: All right. The stay is extended to July 17, 2015.

Applications granted.

TAB 13

2017 BCSC 808
British Columbia Supreme Court

Sunrise/Saskatoon Apartments Limited Partnership, Re

2017 CarswellBC 1275, 2017 BCSC 808, [2017] B.C.W.L.D. 3765, [2017] B.C.W.L.D. 3766, 279 A.C.W.S. (3d) 464

**In the Matter of the Companies' Creditors
Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as amended**

And In the Matter of the Business Corporations Act, S.B.C. 2002, c. 57, as amended

And In the Matter of the Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44, as amended

In the Matter of the Plan of Compromise and Arrangement of Sunrise/Saskatoon
Apartments Limited Partnership and Those Parties Listed on Schedule "A"

Fitzpatrick J., In Chambers

Heard: April 21, 2017

Judgment: April 21, 2017

Docket: Vancouver S1611657

Counsel: C.J. Ramsay, K.G. Mak, for Petitioners

P. Bychawski, for KingSett Mortgage Corporation

M. Buttery, for Community Trust

J.R. Sandrelli, for Monitor, PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP

G.G. Plottel, for MCAP Financial Corp.

M.C. Verbrugge, for GMI Servicing Inc.

C.D. Brousson, for Timbercreek Mortgage Servicing Inc.

R.P. Wu, for Steering Committee of Limited Partners (M. Rauch, C. Duidre, C. Cumming, F. Banducci and R. Gritten)

B.R. Bennett, for New Summit Partners Corp., Oledale Management Services Inc. and H.C. Apartments LP

G.H. Dabbs, for Van Maren Group

M. Russell, for Superior Millwork Ltd., Durabuilt Windows & Doors Inc. and Adler Firestopping Ltd.

Subject: Insolvency

Related Abridgment Classifications

Bankruptcy and insolvency

[XIX Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act](#)

[XIX.2 Initial application](#)

[XIX.2.b Grant of stay](#)

[XIX.2.b.vii Extension of order](#)

Bankruptcy and insolvency

[XIX Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act](#)

[XIX.3 Arrangements](#)

[XIX.3.b Approval by court](#)

[XIX.3.b.iv Miscellaneous](#)

Table of Authorities

Statutes considered:

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36

Generally — referred to

APPLICATION by petitioners to extend stay of proceeding; APPLICATION by mortgagee for order approving various loans.

Fitzpatrick J., In Chambers:

1 This is a *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* proceeding. The petitioners are in the business of acquiring and developing various rental buildings in Regina and Saskatoon, Saskatchewan. The matter began with the granting of an initial order on December 19, 2016.

2 At the outset, this restructuring proceeding had all the hallmarks of being a very contested matter. This arose largely from the concerns of the extensive secured creditor group, who hold different levels of security on the various projects or buildings.

3 Fortunately, much of the stakeholders' differences were subsequently put aside as a result of extensive negotiations. Those negotiations led to the granting of the amended and restated initial order (the "ARIO") on February 3, 2017.

4 The ARIO provides a general framework for dealing with the various properties. In broad terms, the ARIO provided for various properties to be immediately put up for sale. In addition, the ARIO allowed for the petitioners to continue with their construction activities towards completing certain buildings and finalizing the leasing of the various units in those buildings. The general idea is that, once the construction was finished, those buildings would similarly be put up for sale.

5 Another circumstance which the petitioners had in mind leading up to the granting of the ARIO was that, with the exception of the phase 1 properties, which were to be put up for sale, there remained the possibility of a restructuring with respect to some or all of the other buildings.

6 A fundamental aspect of the stakeholder's intentions regarding the ARIO was to recognize and respect the various interests that applied to each individual property, which have different encumbrances (what the Monitor describes as the "capital stack"). Generally speaking, each property or building has different and different levels of lenders, beginning with the first secured creditor and continuing down to the limited partners or equity interests that apply to each of the properties. Accordingly, from the outset of these proceedings, the stakeholders have agreed to a concept of "ring fencing", which preserves the cash flows and costs associated with each of the individual properties and allows an orderly assessment of the viability of the properties on that basis.

7 Since the ARIO was granted, there have been substantial continuing efforts by all of the stakeholders toward finalizing the "go forward" path, all with the involvement of the Monitor. Those efforts are principally outlined in the Monitor's Fourth Report dated April 13, 2017, and in particular at paragraph 8 and following. The Monitor reports that five properties were put up for sale and agreements are anticipated in early May. The sixth property, being CILO, has now been added to that sales process, and definitive agreements on that property are expected on May 23, 2017.

8 In addition, substantial work has been completed on the construction front, with various budgets being prepared. Arbutus has been retained to take that process forward. The necessary financing for that construction has been secured with KingSett Mortgage Corporation through a syndicated process. Therefore, the funding is in place with respect to the construction which is anticipated to take between six to eight months, or to the end of 2017.

9 The Monitor outlines that there have been extensive discussions between the various stakeholders. Stakeholders participating in the discussions concerning the need for construction financing have included the limited partners. Even so, it appears that they have declined to provide that financing, leading to KingSett agreeing to do so.

10 I have also been assisted on this application by the Monitor's Supplemental Report dated April 19, 2017, on one particular issue, which I will address in these reasons.

11 The two applications before me today are as follows: firstly, the petitioners apply to extend the stay to August 31, 2017; secondly, KingSett applies for an order approving various loans. These loans include an initial loan of \$50,000 in respect of the CILO project. That loan was superseded by a second loan of \$502,000, which paid out the \$50,000 loan. Finally, KingSett

applies for approval of a \$17.5 million loan with respect to the construction on the various Sunrise projects. To some extent, KingSett's application is brought *nunc pro tunc* because, working within the general framework under the ARIO, the petitioners have already received initial draws under that financing.

12 There is no opposition to the application by KingSett to approve the loans. In fact, the Monitor supports the order being granted, as do the petitioners. I have no hesitation in concluding that the order should be granted. I find that the evidence establishes that the relevant test under the *CCAA* is met in the circumstances.

13 Accordingly, the order as sought by KingSett in its notice of application dated April 18, 2017, is granted, with the minor amendment addressed by KingSett's counsel during submissions.

14 The petitioners' application to extend the stay of proceeding to August 31 has invited some opposition. Counsel for the petitioners has made submissions as to their reasoning for the August 31 date. In broad terms, those reasons relate to both the sales process and the construction process which are underway. It is anticipated that the sales process will bring forward applications either in June or possibly early July. In addition, the construction schedule anticipates a process of six to eight months from today, which leads us into the December 2017 time frame. Counsel also point out that there is a cost of coming back to court for further extension. Given the number of faces that I see in this courtroom, it cannot be doubted that that is a significant cost arising from every court appearance.

15 The proposed extension date of August 31 is not opposed by many of the secured creditors. These secured creditors take no position on that issue, although they all indicated that they reserved their rights in the sense that they will see how the process plays out. If matters do not proceed to their liking, they all indicate that they may apply to the Court to propose another course of action.

16 The proposed extension date is opposed by two secured creditors: Community Trust, a senior secured creditor on the Nutana property with debt of approximately \$15 million; and, the Van Maren Group, a junior secured creditor (mostly in third position) on the Sunset properties. Both creditors seek an extension date earlier than August 31.

17 Community Trust submits that the more appropriate date is the end of June. Its opposition is advanced on the basis that in the normal course a *CCAA* extension date is tied to what is called a threshold date. Further, Community Trust submits that since it is somewhat unclear in terms of how the sales and construction process will unfold, an earlier date is appropriate. Counsel for Community Trust also suggests that by granting the extension date to August, it will effectively reverse the onus by requiring any secured creditor who opposes the continuation of the proceeding to bring its own application to set a different course.

18 The Monitor has expressly addressed the issue as to extension date in its Supplemental Report at paragraph 3.3. Essentially, the Monitor says that there has been positive momentum to these proceedings and that much has been accomplished in terms of achieving consensus between the various stakeholders as to a process going forward. The Monitor also notes that the agreed upon process not only involves the sales, but also a construction process that requires some stability in terms of retaining trades without the sword of Damocles being held over people's heads and worrying about having to justify further extensions.

19 Finally, the Monitor concludes that, given the CILO sales process, which is somewhat further delayed, that sales process might well only result in a sale to be addressed in early July.

20 Accordingly, the Monitor concludes that the August 31 extension date provides a reasonable date given the overall circumstances.

21 The decision as to what an appropriate extension date is requires that the Court allow some flexibility to the parties. It remains a matter of exercising my discretion in terms of what I think is the most appropriate in the circumstances.

22 In my view, there is no doubt that there will be further court attendances between now and August, particularly given the sales process that is underway. In my view, those applications will provide more than ample opportunity for any secured creditor, including Community Trust and Van Maren, to voice any concerns or disagreement about the process going forward.

23 I agree that I see no need to put the petitioners to the extra cost of making further applications for extensions of the stay. The costs of doing so will, of course, redound to the prejudice of the overall stakeholder group given the significant costs that are involved.

24 I have in mind too that there will be ongoing oversight by the Monitor. If anything untoward should happen, I would expect that the Monitor would file a report to that effect and alert the stakeholders so that the matter can be brought back before the court to be addressed in the usual fashion.

25 Overall, I am satisfied that the Monitor has appropriately analyzed the various moving parts that are in play in this proceeding at this time. Accordingly, I grant the order allowing the extension date to August 11, 2017. I have chosen this date because it accords with my rota when I will be sitting in Vancouver and the calendars of counsel.

Applications granted.